ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 30(1)(aa) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 preferred by the claimants aggrieved by an award whereby compensation has been allowed to the claimants but without interest. The claimants/appellants pray for award of interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the application till realisation. 2. The learned counsel for the insurance company has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. He submits that Section 30 of the Act contemplates an appeal to the High Court only against the orders specifically provided by Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act. Section 30(1)(aa) contemplates an appeal against an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A', but not against an order refusing to award interest or penalty and hence, the present appeal is incompetent. 3. Section 30(1) of the Act reads as under :- "30. Appeals. - (1) An appeal shall lie to High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: - (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; (aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A; (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half/monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of: compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependent; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions.'' The Section as it originally stood did not contemplate an appeal against an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A. In the original Act there was no provision for the award of interest and penalty. By Act No. 8 of 1959, Section 4A empowering the Commissioner to direct the payment of interest and also impose penalty in the situations contemplated therein was inserted in the Act. In the original Act there was no provision for the award of interest and penalty. By Act No. 8 of 1959, Section 4A empowering the Commissioner to direct the payment of interest and also impose penalty in the situations contemplated therein was inserted in the Act. Simultaneously, Clause (aa) was added into Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act providing for an appeal against "an order awarding interest or penalty." The Legislature well knew that on enactment of Section 4A there would be occasions where the Commissioner might not award interest and might not impose penalty, still, it did not make provision for an appeal against 'an order refusing to award interest or penalty under Section 4A.' 4. A comparative reading of Clause (aa) with other clauses of Section 30(1) gives a peep into the mind of the Legislature. Clause (a) contemplates an appeal against an order allowing or disallowing a claim. Clauses (c) and (d) also speak of an appeal in the matter of allowing or disallowing, both. Clause (e) similarly contemplates an appeal against both the eventualities, that is, refusing to register or registering a memorandum. Clause (b) speaks of an appeal against an order refusing to allow redemption but not an appeal against an order allowing redemption. Thus, it is clear that out of several orders of the nature contemplated by Clauses (a) to (e), which the Workmen's Commissioner is competent to pass under the Act, Clauses (a), (c), (d) and (e) contemplate an appeal when the impugned order has resulted in either eventuality, but Clauses (aa) and (b) contemplate an appeal against only one out of the two possible eventualities implicit in the discretion vested in the Workmen's Commissioner. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that an order refusing to award interest or penalty must be read implicitly in the phraseology of the Clause (aa) because there can possibly be no justification behind the Legislature providing for an appeal only against an order awarding interest or penalty and no appeal if it were not awarded. It is difficult to accept this submission. 6. It is difficult to accept this submission. 6. The Apex Court in D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal 1988 (3) SCC 26 has held:- "Right of appeal is creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration''. It was a case where an application for contempt filed by the appellant was dismissed and the appellant preferred an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 19(1) thereof provided for an appeal from any order or decision of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Their Lordships having examined the relevant provisions concluded that the provisions contemplated only an order punishing for contempt where the High Court had chosen to exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt; the provision did not contemplate any appeal being preferred against an order when the High Court acquitted the contemner meaning thereby that the High Court did not exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Their Lordships held:- "It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly, that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution". 7. A Full Bench of this Court has held in Babulal v. Ramesh Babu Gupta 1990 MPLJ 482 = 1990 JLJ 422 :- "An appeal is a creature of the Statute. There is no inherent right of appeal.'' 8. Certain observations of the Madras High Court in Govind Singh v. Addl. Commr. for Workmen's Compensation 1972 (1) LLJ 430, also lend support to the objection raised to the maintainability of the appeal. There is no inherent right of appeal.'' 8. Certain observations of the Madras High Court in Govind Singh v. Addl. Commr. for Workmen's Compensation 1972 (1) LLJ 430, also lend support to the objection raised to the maintainability of the appeal. A question arose as to whether an order of the Commissioner refusing to set aside the exparte order was one covered by the various sub-clauses in Section 30(1). It was held:- "Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides appeals to the High Court from certain specified orders of the Commissioner functioning under the Act. The various sub-clauses in Section 30 do not include an order under which the Commissioner refuses to set aside an exparte order. Section 30 deals with normal orders passed by the Commissioner as a Court subordinate to the High Court after hearing the parties and after following the prescribed procedure. But in a case where no such order, as is contemplated under Section 30, is passed, it cannot be said that even in such circumstances the Commissioner should be expected to have acted.......". 9. This Court can certainly iron out the creases if there be some but it cannot legislate in the process of interpretation. The language of statute being plain has to be read and given effect to as it is. A negative expression cannot be read into a positive expression and no one can be conferred with a right of appeal only on the ground of propriety or sympathy. If there be a lacuna in the language of Clause (aa) of Section 30(1) and/or if the clause does not correctly express the legislative intent, it is for the Legislature to amend the statute. In P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 93 3 para 14, their Lordships have said: "The Court must indeed proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it intended to say what it said : See Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar 1953 SCR 533 at P. 545 = AIR 1953 SC 148 at P. 152. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. "No case can be found to authorise any Court to alter a word so as to produce a casus omissus." Per Lord Halsbury, Mersey Docks v. Henderson 1888 (13) App Cas 595, 602, "We cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there": Cra-wford v. Spooner( 1846) 6 Moore P.C. 1, 8, 9. Where the language of the statute leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, the Court can, of course, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature In doing so "a judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases''. Per Denning, L.J., as he then was, Seaford Court Estates v. Asher 1949 (2) All. F R. 155 at 164. See the observation of Sarkar, J. in M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa 1961 (2) SCR 295 at P. 314= AIR 1961 SC 1107 at P. 1115.". 10. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the Municipal Commissioner, Baroda v. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. and Ors. 1976 ACJ 104 and U.P. State Transport Corporation v. Abdul Hameed 1985 ACC 425, to support the maintainability of the appeal saying that in all these decisions interest was allowed by the appellate Court. Suffice it to say that the question of maintainability of an appeal by the claimants, claiming interest only, did not arise for decision in those appeals and hence the two decisions are of no assistance to the learned counsel for the appellant. 11. The appeal is held to be not maintainable. It is dismissed but without any order as to costs.