Judgment Ram Nandan Prasad, J. This is a tenant's application in revision under section 14 (8) of' the Bihar Building (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the judgment and decree for eviction passed against them. The suit had been filed by O.P. nos. 1 and 2 for eviction of the petitioners on the ground of personal necessity from the suit premises, namely part of the ground floor of holding no. 8, ward no. 1, in mohalla Pethiapar of Danapur Cantonment area, District Patna, fully described in schedule 2 of the plaint. 2. The undisputed position i9 that the parties are related to each other. Briefly staled the plaintiff's case is as follows:- “The house property bearing holding no. 8 in ward no. 1, mohalla Pethiapar within the Danapur Cantonment originally belonged to Shiv Prasad Sah alias Nanhak Prasad husband of petitioner no. 1 and father of the remaining these petitioners. Being in need of money, the said Shiv Prasad Sah executed a registered sale deed dated 20.7.1982 in favour of plaintiff no. 1 Kaushalaya Devi, which was in pursuance of an agreement of sale executed earlier, and thereby the vendor conveyed to Kaushalaya Devi a shop room situated on the ground floor of the aforesaid holding discription of which has been given in schedule 1 of the plaint. The plaintiff came in possession of the same from the date of execution and continued in possession as owner ever since then. Some time thereafter Shiv Prasad Sah died. Being in need of money the petitioners i.e. Shiv Pd. Sah's widow and sons negotiated with plaintiff no. 1 to sell the remaining portion of the house holding no. 8 and towards that end they at first executed an agreement on 8.9.1983 and received advance of Rs.10000/- and thereafter they executed a registered sale deed dt. 21.4.1984 (Ext.2/a) in respect of the suit property in favour of Kaushalaya Devi and Raj Kuman Devi after accepting Rs.30,000/- and thus received the entire consideration money of Rs.40000/- which had been negotiated between the parties. This sale was with a view to paying of the dues which the petitioners had incurred for performing marriage of one of the daughters Nibha Gupta of late Shri Shiv Pd. Sah. This sale was with a view to paying of the dues which the petitioners had incurred for performing marriage of one of the daughters Nibha Gupta of late Shri Shiv Pd. Sah. The plaintiffs purchasers came in possession of the vended property from the date of the sale but on request of the petitioners they allowed them to remain in a portion of the suit premises on a monthly rental of Rs.50/- till they are able to arrange for alternative accommodation. This was done due to the consideration that the petitioners are near relative of the plaintiffs. However, the petitioners defaulted to pay rent since the month of Feb. 1984. Further, the plaintiffs have personal necessity for the entire suit premises as described in schedule 2 of the plaint and as the defendants have not vacated the same they had to take recourse to file this suit.” 3. As after issuance of notice defendants did not appear the suit was decreed exparte, the guardian adlitem on behalf of minor defendant (petitioner no. 4) formally putting in his appearance in the suit. This exparte decree was however set aside in an application under Order 9, rule 13 C.P.C. Thereafter a joint written statement was filed by the defendants. The assertion regarding sale by Shiv Pd. Sah of schedule no. 1 property (Ext. 2) namely the shop room on the ground floor of holding no. 8 has been made in paragraph nos. 2 and 3 of the plaint and this has not been challenged, on the contrary in paragraph 14 of the written statement it has been stated that the statement in paragraph 3 is correct. Thus the sale deed executed by Shiv Pd. Sah in respect of schedule no. 1 property (Ext. 2) is not challenged. As regards the sale deed dated 24.1.1984 (Ext. 2/a) executed by the petitioners defendants i.e. the widow and sons of Shiv Prasad Sah, the case of the petitioners (defendants) is that this was a farzi transaction and the sale deed was executed to save the house property in question, which was the only residential house of the petitioners, from being partitioned at the instance of the three daughters of the late Shiv Pd. Sah and that the defendants executed this farzi deed in favour of the plaintiff nos. Sah and that the defendants executed this farzi deed in favour of the plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 Kaushalaya Devi and Raj Kumari Devi at the instance and advice of their common relation Ramesh Pd. but in fact no consideration had passed and possession was never made over to the plaintiffs over this property. It is the further case of the petitioner that the sale deed (Ext. 2/a) was never acted upon and the petitioners have been residing in the house in their own right as owners and as such there is no question of any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The defendants have pleaded that the suit for eviction is not at all maintainable and that it has been filed to grab the defendants property on wrong allegations. 4. The learned Munsif held that the sale deed in question is a valid document and accepted the plaintiff's case that after the sale they have allowed the petitioners to stay in the suit premises as tenants and thus the relation of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. He further held that the plaintiffs had personal necessary in respect of the suit premises and accordingly he decreed the suit in their favour. 5. At the time of hearing of this application the following points were raised :- "(i) Since the question of title have been raised by the defendants the learned Munsif should have treated it as a regular the suit and called upon the plaintiffs to pay advalorem court fee and get the title adjudicated before the claim of eviction could be accepted. (ii) The procedure prescribed in section 14 of the B.B.C. Act has not been strictly followed and therefore, the suit should not have been tried according to the Special procedure laid down under section 14 of the Act and should have been dealt with as a regular suit for eviction. (iii) The court below has wrongly and improperly appreciated the evidence in holding (i) that relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties and (ii) that the plaintiffs have any personal necessity for the suit premises. These findings therefore, should be held to be unsustainable." 6. I take up the first contention put forward on behalf of the, petitioners. I have already mentioned above that the execution of the first sale deed by Shiv Pd. These findings therefore, should be held to be unsustainable." 6. I take up the first contention put forward on behalf of the, petitioners. I have already mentioned above that the execution of the first sale deed by Shiv Pd. Sah in respect of the shop room on the ground floor of the suit house has not been challenged (vide paragraph 14 of the written statement). The petitioner did not also challenge the plaintiff's claim that since the date of execution of the sale deed by Shiv Pd. Sah, the purchaser came in possession of the vended property described in schedule-I of the plaint. As regards the second sale deed dated 24.1.1984 (Ext. 2/a) the petitioners do not deny the execution and registration but their stand is that it is a farzi sale deed which had been executed by them in order to defeat the claim of the daughters of Shiv Pd. Sah in the suit property. Now in view of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988 such a pica is no longer available to them. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Bihari Khare, 1989 PLJR, S.C. page 75 that the pending cases relating to Benami and farzi transactions will also be governed by the said Act. The petitioners" therefore, are not entitled in law now to put forward the plea of farzi or benami transaction. Morever, even according to the legal position as it stood prior to the corning into force of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act 1988, the onus to establish that the sale deed was in the fact a farzi or benami deed lay squarely on the petitioners and in this regard their evidence, which has been discussed in detail by the trial court, is not satisfactory. Firstly, it has not been challenged or denied that the plaintiffs are in possession of a portion of the suit property, and the evidence also shows that the original sale deed (Ext. 2/a) was in possession of the plaintiffs. Thus these two factors clearly go against the case of Benami Transaction put forward by the defendants. The petitioners have not been able to explain as to how the plaintiffs are in occupation of a portion of the suit premises. 2/a) was in possession of the plaintiffs. Thus these two factors clearly go against the case of Benami Transaction put forward by the defendants. The petitioners have not been able to explain as to how the plaintiffs are in occupation of a portion of the suit premises. If the story that the sale deed Ext.2/a is a farzi transaction and has not been acted upon is correct then the plaintiffs could not come in possession of any portion of the suit property described in schedule 2 of the plaint. Since the sale deed Ext.2/a has been executed by the petitioners and has been registered, and the plea of benami transaction is no longer available, it must be prima facie accepted that the sale deed Ext. 2/a is valid. The learned trial court, therefore, is fully justified in holding that the plaintiffs prima facie have title to the suit property and have the right to sue for eviction of the petitioners. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the trial court has committed error of law in proceeding with the suit as an eviction suit under the B.B.C. Act instead of treating it as a suit under the general law calling upon the plaintiffs to pay advalorem court fee and establish their title. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 7. The second contention is about complying with the special procedure under section 14 of the B.B.C. Act. The ground of personal necessity, as mentioned in section 11(c) of the Act, has been clearly stated in the plaint. No doubt there is also allegation in the plaint that the defendants defaulted in paying rent but no relief regarding rent has been claimed. Hence, merely because the plaintiffs choose to bring to notice the fact that there has also been default in payment of rent it does not disentitle them from having the suit tried under the special procedure prescribed under section 14 of the Act. The so called irregularity in following the special procedure is said to be in respect of sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act in as much as the tenants defendants after appearing in the suit did not file an affidavit and formally did not obtain leave of the court for contesting the suit. The so called irregularity in following the special procedure is said to be in respect of sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act in as much as the tenants defendants after appearing in the suit did not file an affidavit and formally did not obtain leave of the court for contesting the suit. It has to be borne in mind that after the suit was filed, notices had been issued to defendants by registered post as well as through the agency of the Court and when they did not appear there was also substituted service by publication in the gazette vide order sheet dated 27-2-85 and 16-3-1985 of the trial court. Since inspite of it there was no appearance by the defendants, the suit was decreed exparte vide order dated 26-6-1986 of the trial court. Thereafter, the defendants appeared and their application under Order 9 Rule 13 was allowed and they were allowed to contest the suit. It was under this circumstance that filing an affidavit seeking 'permission to contest the suit was not done. Since the defendants filed an application for setting aside the exparte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 and this was allowed and they were then allowed to contest the suit, this must, under the circumstances, be treated as compliance of the provision of sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act. In any view of the matter, even if it be taken that there has not been strict compliance of sub-section (4) of section 14, in the context of the facts and circumstances indicated above, this at the most will amount to an irregularity and will have no effect on the validity of the trial. Moreover, the defendants cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own default in not filing the affidavit for formally seeking permission to contest the suit. They have also not been able to show that any prejudice or disadvantage was caused to them on this account. In my opinion, therefore, such a default, caused by the defendants themselves will not, and cannot result in disentitling the plaintiffs or having the benefit of a speedy trial under section 14 of the Act. I, therefore find no merit in the second contention put forward on behalf or the petitioners. 8. I now take up the third contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners. I, therefore find no merit in the second contention put forward on behalf or the petitioners. 8. I now take up the third contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners. The trial court has dealt with the entire evidence oral and documentary available on the record and I think repetition of the same, is unnecessary. Twelve witnesses have been examined by the plaintiffs. P.W. 12 is the son of plaintiff Kaushalaya Devi and husband of plaintiff no. 2 Rajkumari Devi. He has said that he is doing the pairvi on behalf of the plaintiffs. He has stated about the 'plaintiff's case in his evidence. He has stated that the petitioner no. 1 Champa Devi is his aunt and that she and her sons are living in the suit premises as tenant. He has also said that in the remaining portion of the suit premises the plaintiffs are residing. He has also asserted that as the family of the plaintiffs has become larger they are in need of the suit premises for accommodation of their family members. It has not been suggested in cross-examination that the plaintiffs are not residing in a portion of the suit premises along with their family members. As I have already indicated above, if the defendants case of farzi sale was correct then the plaintiffs could not have come in possession of any portion of the suit premises described in schedule 2 of the plaint. It is not the defendant's case that the plaintiffs have come in occupation of any portion of the suit premises described in schedule 2 or the plaint in any other manner. Therefore this circumstance goes to support plaintiff's case that they came in possession of the entire premises, which is the vended property, by virtue of sale deed Ext. 2/a executed in their favour. Other witnesses of the plaintiff have spoken about the sale deed and about being witness to the negotiation relating to the tenancy on a monthly rental of Rs.50/- P.W. 4 is a common relation, and other P.Ws. are either close neighbours or residents of the same mohalla. There appears to be no reason why they will come forward to depose against the defendants and favour the plaintiffs. There are eight witnesses on behalf of the defendants. The main witness is D.W. 7 Binod Kumar, who is one of the defendants. are either close neighbours or residents of the same mohalla. There appears to be no reason why they will come forward to depose against the defendants and favour the plaintiffs. There are eight witnesses on behalf of the defendants. The main witness is D.W. 7 Binod Kumar, who is one of the defendants. He has merely stated that since after the death of his father his sisters were demanding their share and so the defendants in order to save the property, executed the sale deed but in fact there was no sale of the suit premises. He has also denied that the defendants are living in the suit premises as tenants. However, he has not said a word as to how the plaintiffs came to occupy a portion of the suit premises. There is also no specific denial by him of the plaintiff's assertion that their family has become larger and they are in need of the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity. The learned trial court has, after a full discussion of the materials on record, came to the finding that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists and that the plaintiffs have been able to show that the suit premises is required by them on the ground of bonafide personal necessity. He has also on the basis of evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs need for the suit premises will not be met by partial eviction. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am in agreement with the finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs have successfully established their case of personal necessity and are entitled to a decree for eviction against the petitioners defendants from the suit premises. 9. In view of what has been discussed above, I find that there is no merit in this application and the same is hereby dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case no costs are being awarded. Application dismissed.