JUDGMENT Binod Kumar Roy, J : The petitioner, the sole defendant, assails an order rejecting his written statement, 2. The relevant facts are in a narrow compass. The opposite party filed the suit in question on 17th July, 1987 for eviction of the petitioner under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act. 1982 (herein after referred to as the ‘Act’). She alleged that she is one of partner of M/s Simla Tailoring House and Simla Enterprises and wants to start the said business in the suit premise she requires the same bonafide for her personal use and occupation for manufacture of garments, mosquito net. and furnitures - wooden and steel. She will keep there machinary and accommodate workers. Thus the tenant-defendant is liable for eviction under Section 11 of the Act. the plaint was Submitted and a summon issued and served on the petitioner. The Petitioner appeared on July, 1987 filed & petition for grant of time to file his written Statement which was allowed till 22.8.1987. On 22.8.1987 also he again prayed for time to file his written statement which was allowed by the court till 8.9.1987. On 8.9.1987 a further petition for time was filed on which the trial court directed that the petitioner to file written statement till 24.9.1987. On 24.9.1987 even though an attendence was filed on his behalf, as well as a further petition for time when the suit was called out, the petitioner failed to appear, However, the petitioner was directed to file his written statement latest by 9.11.1987. On 9.11.1987 a petition (as contained in Annexure-A to the counter affidavit) was filed on behalf of the opposite party praying to commence the hearing of the suit by debarring the petitioner from filing written statement. However, on that day the petitioner filed his written statement. To the petition of the opposite party a rejoinder was also filed by the petitioner. The petition was heard and by the impugned order allowed holding that no leave having been prayed for, written statement in question cannot be accepted. 3. The revision petitioner assert, that while passing the said order the trial court has mis-interpreted the Plaint and over-looked the glaring fact that besides the ground of personal necessity other grounds were also taken therein and there fore the suit was not under section 14 of the Act. 3. The revision petitioner assert, that while passing the said order the trial court has mis-interpreted the Plaint and over-looked the glaring fact that besides the ground of personal necessity other grounds were also taken therein and there fore the suit was not under section 14 of the Act. Further, While granting adjournments the court itself has not considered the suit in question to be on the ground of personal necessity alone otherwise it would not have granted time for filing written statement. 4. In the counter affidavit to the Revision petition it has been stated, inter alia, to the effect that no leave was prayed for by filing an affidavit despite grant of repeated opportunities on 31.7.1987, 22.8.1987, 8.9.1987 and 24.9.1981. Even though the petitioner filed his written statement on 9.11.1987 he again did not file any affidavit and pray for grant of leave. Even though the petitioner filed a rejoinder (as contained in Annexure-B to the councer affidavit) to the petition. Annexure-A, on 15.12.1987 he still failed to pray for grant of leave by filing an affidavit. The suit was on the grounds of personal necessity alone and not on any other ground viz. default in payment of rent and on account of damages caused to the suit premises. 5. Mr. Keshav Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that leave to contest can be sought for at any stage of the suit as held by this court in Basudeo Prasad Ps. Raghunath Prasad 1990 P.L.J.R. 356 and thus the court below has committed a jurisdictional error in allowing the petition of the opposite party. He also relies upon Rajendra Mahto Vs. Hart Narayan Mahto 1989 P.L.J.R. 489. He also points out that a general summon was sent. 6. Mr. Narendra Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, contends that in Basudeo Prasad's case; supra the moot question involved was as to whether leave should be refuse, if a petition looking leave filed by the tenant not on the first day of the appearance but on the adjourned date, on the ground that it was not filed on the first day. The petitioner who, owns a house, wanted to drag the litigation. He also places reliance on Umesh Ram Vs. Shatrughan Prasad 1987 P.L.J.R. 62 and in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Company Ltd. Vs. Suraj Kuer 1986 P.L.J.R. 982. 7. The petitioner who, owns a house, wanted to drag the litigation. He also places reliance on Umesh Ram Vs. Shatrughan Prasad 1987 P.L.J.R. 62 and in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Company Ltd. Vs. Suraj Kuer 1986 P.L.J.R. 982. 7. In Delhi Cloth. General Mills Company Ltd.'s case supra, a Division Bench of this Court, in paragraph 12 of its order observed as follows : “... ...Section 14 of the Act, now provides a special and exclusive procedure for trial of suits for eviction on the grounds of clauses (c) and (e) of Section 11(1). This procedure is materially and substantially different from the trial of suits on the ground of specifice in the other and clauses of the laid section 11. Consequently, the moment a notice or a summon is served on a tenant for eviction on the ground of clauses (c) and (e) of section 11(1), it is clearest notice to him that the proceeding would be contested only within the parameters of the specified procedure spelt out in section 14. There is no question of any written statement or a full-dress trill as such at the threshole stage and under sub section (4) of section 14, a tenant cannot contest the eviction unless ho first file an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such a contest and contains the prerequisite leave from the court as provided in sub section (8) thereof" 8. In Umesh Ram's case supra this court, when the tenant petitioner prayet1 for adjournment to file a written statement, but did not file an affidavit and did not obtain the leave of the court, held that the necessary ingredients of section 14(4) of the Act, are as follows: "(1) Summons must have been duly served on the tenant : (2) Unless the tenant files affidavit stating ground on which he seeks to make contest to the prayer for eviction his written statement shall not be entertained :- (3) If he has filed and affidavit with the written statement or even before it his written statement shall be entertained, and (4) In the absence of such an affidavit the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction. 9. Rajendra Mahto Vs. Hari Narayan Mahto 1989 P.L.J.R. 489 does not support the petitioner. 9. Rajendra Mahto Vs. Hari Narayan Mahto 1989 P.L.J.R. 489 does not support the petitioner. Rather it held as follows; "Section 14(4) mandates that the tenant, on when the summon is duly served shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless the files an affidavit…and obtain leave from the court as hereinafter provided. All that the statute in express term stipulates is that the tenant shall be deemed to have accepted the claim of the landlord and would be liable to eviction. There is a great difference between the words ‘unless’ and simultaneously. All that the statute contemplates is that before the tenant is entitled to file a written statement he must file an affidavit stating the ground for contesting the eviction and he must obtain leave from the court to contest the suit. That is a pre-requisite. But it does not mean that in point of time it must be co-related with the time of the very moment of the appearance of the tenant defendant. The filling of the affidavit and obtaining of leave form the court must precede the filling of the written statement and contesting the suit and not that there two conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously with the very first appearance of the tenant defendant. Taking any contrary view of the matter should be doing violence to the language of the legislatures..... ...If the tenant defendant has contested the suit even prior to the filling of the written statement he must obtain leave from the court which can be granted only when he files an affidavit stating the around or grounds on which he seeks to contest the suit for eviction." (onlining is by me to show the real ratio). 10. In Basudeo Prasad's case supra it is clear that a leave application was filed on the date adjourned for the purpose and is thus of no help to the petitioner. No special, form of summon has been provided in the Act, and thus the procedure prescribed in section 14(4) and (5) will not be applicable because of this as held by this Court in its decision reported in 1984 P.L.J.R. 525. 11. I find some substance in the argument of Mr. Prasad that the petitioner wanted to drag the litigation. No special, form of summon has been provided in the Act, and thus the procedure prescribed in section 14(4) and (5) will not be applicable because of this as held by this Court in its decision reported in 1984 P.L.J.R. 525. 11. I find some substance in the argument of Mr. Prasad that the petitioner wanted to drag the litigation. The fact that the petitioner himself owns his house in ward No. 4 of the Danapur Cantonment Board itself quit fit for business purpose; and near to Sadar Bazar as stated in paragraph 7 of the plaint (Annexure 1 to the revision petition) was not rebutted to be incorrect before me by Mr. Srivastava. 12. The position in the instant case is an unfortunate one. Despite repeated indulgence the petitioner never filed the required affidavit and tried to obtain leave before filing his written statement. Thus, he must thank himself for his inaction and for violating the mandate of the legislature. 13. For the reason, aforementioned. I am constrained to hold that no illegality has been committed by the court below while allowing the prayer of the opposite party and the impugned order is not Vitiated on account of any jurisdictional error. 14. In the result I do not find any merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the care, there shall be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.