ORDER V.D. Gyani. J. -- 1. All these bail petitions u/s. 439 CrPC have a common thread, although they relate to crimes registered at various police stations against different persons. All of them, barring only M.Cr.C. 1200/90 alone, are repeaters, having lost in their bid, to get bail on merits. The common thread that runs through these petitions is the common ground of delay raised in all these petitions, and stressed by all the learned counsel appearing in these cases. Trials in all these cases have been delayed for want of committal orders which in turn have been delayed or deferred for non-production of reports, either from the Chemical Examiners or from the State Forensic Laboratory with the net result that the petitioners undoubtedly accused of serious crimes, like murder and dacoity, are suffering pretrial incarceration. They have a point-when they ask, how long and after all how long they should wait for filing of reports from State Forensic Science Laboratory, the passing of committal orders at times very conveniently and comfortably deferred, by the magistrates, at the behest of some of the sessions judges, putting a self-serving assumptive interpretations of Criminal Court Rules and Orders framed by this Court, issuing administrative instructions to the magistrates not to commit a case to sessions until such reports are filed. (It is no exaggeration but a grim reality emerging from records of this bunch of petitions.) The investigating agency after filing of charge sheet to avoid attracting proviso to section 167(2) CrPC, seldom if ever bothers much less evinces any interest, in producing or filing such reports, in cases where incomplete charge sheets are filed. While this rigmarole goes on, it is the accused, who has to pay for all this delay. 2. Learned counsels appearing for the petitioners expressing their concern and anxiety for expeditious trial, submitted that in view of a considerable number of pending sessions trials, there was no possibility of any early trial in near future even if the case stands committed to sessions for trial. 3. It was with a view to get adequately apprised of the number of cases pending in the Courts of magistrates awaiting committal for want of reports from the State FSL, and the number of pending sessions trials in the concerned Sessions Division, a direction was made seeking information from the Sessions Judges of the concerned Sessions Division. 3. It was with a view to get adequately apprised of the number of cases pending in the Courts of magistrates awaiting committal for want of reports from the State FSL, and the number of pending sessions trials in the concerned Sessions Division, a direction was made seeking information from the Sessions Judges of the concerned Sessions Division. Accordingly reports have been received from Sessions Judges of Indore, Ujjain, Ratlam, Dewas, Jhabua and West Nimar Districts. The Sessions Judge, Indore reports that as on 1.7.90, 533 sessions trials were pending in the Courts. The number of cases awaiting committal for want of chemical examiner's reports were 146. On the basis of information which could be collected in this short span of time the Sessions Judge, Ujjain has reported that 63 sessions trials were pending and the number of cases awaiting committal were 79. There are as many as 31 sessions trials pending in the Court of 1st Addl. Sessions Judge and 15 in Vth Addl. Sessions Judges Court, Ujjain wherein reports from State FSL have not been filed although the cases stood committed. The report received from the Sessions Judge, Jhabua makes a shocking reading, 427 sessions trials were pending on 1.7.90. At Alirajpur alone 126 trials were pending with the Court of IIIrd Addl. Sessions Judge. According to report received from Ratlam, cases awaiting committal were 169, with 130 pending sessions trials. 4. Excluding from consideration the time that has elapsed, which on an average comes to six months, the prospects of a trial, in the context of above noted pendency in the ordinary course, can well be gauged. 5. Shri Desai, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State, deserves a word of praise for the fair stand that he had taken on principle there is no dispute, (nor could there be any in face of number of many judgments of the Supreme Court) about the right of an accused to have a speedy trial. 6. These pennons pose a crucial question. How long an accused facing charges, triable by Court of sessions, be refused bail and detained in custody, awaiting passing of committal order -- a pre-condition for commencement and completion of sessions trial. 6. These pennons pose a crucial question. How long an accused facing charges, triable by Court of sessions, be refused bail and detained in custody, awaiting passing of committal order -- a pre-condition for commencement and completion of sessions trial. Since there is no statutory time limit prescribed, as in case of magisterial trial in respect of non-bailable offences, under sub-section (6) of section 437 CrPC unlike magisterial trial, can an accused standing trial at the Court of Sessions, be asked to wait indefinitely or for an unduly long time, for conclusion of trial, without being admitted to bail? What should be the reasonable time, that he must be asked to wait for, before being granted bail. Whether pendency of cases, marring prospects of a trial not necessarily speedy but within a reasonable time, has any bearing, on time factor, as one of the prime consideration for grant of bail. 7. I may make it very clear, that it is certainly not with a view to find fault with subordinate Courts, as regards pendency n nor to my mind it can justifiably be found with the various identifiable factors, such as the huge case lead with corresponding paucity of number of Judges, even as per sanctioned strength let alone the required, the procedural road-blocks apathy, shown by the investigating agency, lack of personnel, and equipments, apart from numerous other causes, account for delay. The question that looms large is what should be the average length of time between committal and trial. In absence of any such broad guide lines, these accused in custody, seem to be most seriously disadvantaged by delay. In England, to quote from Modern English Legal System by P.T. Smith and S.N. Bailey (a Sweet and Maxwell publication 1st Edition reprinted in 1986 page 379), after eight weeks period, the accused can challenge the accusation by way of 'application for discharge'. How for such a course is available to our conditions is altogether a different matter. 8. But it would not be out of place to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in Nimeon Sangma v. Home Secretary Govt. of Meghalaya ( AIR 1979 SC 1518 ) wherein the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of expeditious disposal of cases including investigation and trial, in the following words: "....... 8. But it would not be out of place to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in Nimeon Sangma v. Home Secretary Govt. of Meghalaya ( AIR 1979 SC 1518 ) wherein the Supreme Court emphasised the importance of expeditious disposal of cases including investigation and trial, in the following words: "....... criminal justice breaks down at a point when expeditious trial is not attempted while the affected parties are languishing in jail. The Criminal Procedure Code in Ss. 167, 209 and 309 has emphasised the importance of expeditious disposal of cases including investigations and trials. It is unfortunate, indeed pathetic, that there should have been such considerable delay in investigations by the police in utter disregard of the fact that a citizen has been deprived of his freedom on the ground that he is accused of an offence. We do not approve of this course and breach of the rule of law and express our strong displeasure at this chaotic state of affairs verging on wholesale breach of human rights guaranteed under the Constitution especially under Article 21 as interpreted by this Court." 9. As far time, the Supreme Court has made the following directions: "We direct that the State shall complete the investigation within two months from today where charge-sheets have not been laid and further direct the Sessions Court concerned to dispose of the cases where charge-sheets have been laid and commitment has been made, within six months from today." 10. This Court in Munna @ Kamta Prasad & another v. State of M.P. (Crimes 1986 Vol. 3 . 429) has held that: "If the conclusion of sessions trial is not possible within a reasonable time despite co-operation from the accused, in that circumstance, the undertrial prisoner deserves to be released on bail pending trial, on the ground of delayed trial alone." 11. In case of protracted trial, unreasonable delay in prosecuting the accused would not afford a cogent ground for grant of bail. The petitioners in all these bail petitions are cases of post charge-sheet confinement. They are either awaiting a committal order or facing a protracted trial. For no faults of their's a delayed trial is not only injurious to prosecution but also affects rile right of a speedy trial, as now recognised as a fundamental right of an accused. The petitioners in all these bail petitions are cases of post charge-sheet confinement. They are either awaiting a committal order or facing a protracted trial. For no faults of their's a delayed trial is not only injurious to prosecution but also affects rile right of a speedy trial, as now recognised as a fundamental right of an accused. Cases should not, therefore, be allowed to linger for an abnormal length of time. What would constitute unreasonable delay would depend upon the peculiar facts of each case. A broad out line can however be given. 12. The other aspect of this unreasonable delay is blurred prospects of a speedy trial, even if cases axe committed, in face of large number of sessions trials still pending before the Courts. In some of them dates have been fixed in the month of February, 1991. 13. In Babu & others v. State of M.P. ( 1978 JLJ 592 ) a same question arose where as against an order dated 19.6.78 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, fixed the sessions trial from 1.1.79, the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed as follows: "The State has no right to oppose the bail application in view of the fact that the applicants have to wait for commencement of the trial up to 1st January, 1979. If the State cannot provide for adequate machinery for dispensing justice quickly, the State cannot be heard to say that the applicants should be kept in custody without trial to such a long time. The remedy can be by way of increasing the strength of Judges competent to try such cases, but certainly, paucity of the time with the existing judicial machinery to try the accused expeditiously can be no ground for refusal of the bail. In such cases as a general rule bails should be granted. It is against all concepts of human liberty that in such circumstances the applicants should be refused bail. For inability of the Court, the under trial accused persons should not be and cannot be permitted to be kept in judicial custody. 14. In such cases as a general rule bails should be granted. It is against all concepts of human liberty that in such circumstances the applicants should be refused bail. For inability of the Court, the under trial accused persons should not be and cannot be permitted to be kept in judicial custody. 14. The High Court of Allahabad, in pursuance to the observations made by the Apex Court in Nimeon Sangma's case (supra), issued a circular letter with following directions: "The subordinate Criminal Courts shall get a periodical list of under trial prisoners pertaining to their Courts prepared fortnightly and suo motu pass orders releasing under trial prisoner who may be in jail for over six months on bail or personal bonds as the circumstances may require." (Quoted from Tyagi's Principles of Remand, Bails and Habeas Corpus 1st edition 1987). 15. A Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court as reported in Surya Narayansingh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1987 Patna 219) was also referred to by the petitioner's counsels. Shri Desai, however, submitted that it was a case where the delay in trial extended up to ten years, such is not the petition obtaining in this bunch of bail petitions. 16. Referring to Hussenara Khatun's case as reported in AIR 1979 SC 1360 as also Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar (AIR 1981 SC 931), Shri Desai, urged that in all these cases, the trial was delayed for almost a decade. 17. It is not the period of detention which is material. What is important is the principle of speedy trial, as laid down in these cases and the sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution available to the accused not only during trial and even at post-conviction stages, of offences punishable with death or life imprisonment. Confronted with growing delay and mounting back long of cases (for reasons far beyond the control of Courts), the question -- How long an arrested person must remain in custody? still remains to be answered. The accused in custody, hopefully looks up to the Courts; either try within a reasonable time or release on bail, is his cry. 18. A pre-trial detention not merely affects the detained accused presumed innocent until proven guilty but also the Court process, viewed in the perspective that emerges from the material made available in these petitions, the accused is at a disadvantaged position. 18. A pre-trial detention not merely affects the detained accused presumed innocent until proven guilty but also the Court process, viewed in the perspective that emerges from the material made available in these petitions, the accused is at a disadvantaged position. Investigating agency having filed incomplete charge-sheets within 90 days so as to avoid the application of section 167(2) CrPC, does not show any interest in completing the charge-sheet by filing desired reports either from the serologist, the Chemical Examiner or the Forensic Science Laboratory which itself is under heavy pressure of work and would not take any case out of turn, the magistrates are under pressure of directions issued by the Sessions Judge [M.Cr.C. 571/90) is a case to point]. In the garb of compliance of criminal Court Rules and Orders, the Sessions Courts dockets are heavily biased, on the whole, it is a very dismal disappointing picture for speedy trial. 19. The legislative intent behind section 167(2) CrPC is very clear. 20. It was with a view to do away with the practice which had grown up with the police to file, before a Magistrate, a preliminary or incomplete report and praying him from time-to-time for adjournment report and further while the investigation went on in leisurely manner. The object and reason in introducing the proviso to sub-section 167 CrPC is: "There is persistent complaint that investigations are not being completed quickly by the police and that in many cases accused persons are kept in detention on remand for very long periods causing hardship and misery to such under-trial prisoners and their families. Although stringent provisions are already there in the existing Code requiring investigations to be completed quickly, they have not had the desired effect. The Committee feels that a drastic remedy is called for in this behalf." 21. This object stands defeated by filing incomplete charge-sheets and delaying the trial, consequently delaying the committal and trial of serious cases. 22. Shri Desai, however, submitted that expert reports for which invariably passing of committal order is delayed or postponed, can be filed even at the time of trial. No doubt there are provisions but the practice of filing incomplete charge-sheets, without such reports, cannot certainly be approved of. 23. 22. Shri Desai, however, submitted that expert reports for which invariably passing of committal order is delayed or postponed, can be filed even at the time of trial. No doubt there are provisions but the practice of filing incomplete charge-sheets, without such reports, cannot certainly be approved of. 23. To conclude, I am fully conscious that no inflexible rule can be laid down as regards the length and lapse of time which would entitle an accused in custody facing serious charge triable by the Court of Sessions, to be released on bail. However, a general guide line, on the basis of Supreme Court Judgment, can well be given. The Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatun's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 ) indicated that even delay of one year is bad enough. In Nimeon Sangma's case (supra) a period of six months has been laid down. Keeping in view the pendency of large number of cases, a post charge-sheet period of six months, would be fair to both the accused as well as the State. 24. It is also made clear that in a given case where bail is claimed on the ground of delay, it is open to the Court to consider exceptional peculiarities of the case and refuse to grant but in that event the case should be given priority in the matter of trial. ORDER 1. It may be noted that applicant Mohan s/o Jagannath was admitted to bail on account of his illness, vide order dated 27.8.90, and as stated by the learned counsel Ratnabai w/o Kaniram has also been bailed out. (Cr. No. 43 of 1990). 2. This is second application by the petitioners. They have been in custody for almost six months. By order dated 7.8.90, the State was directed to specify the time by which report from the Chemical Examiner would be filed, but despite repeated opportunities (see order-sheet dt. 7.8.90), the State has not so far submitted any report or made any statement as regards the approximate time by which the report from the Chemical Examiner would be filed. Shri Jaisingh pointed out that the case solely hinges on an extra-judicial confession allegedly made to one Bapu, who was examined during investigation on 1.3.90. Although confession by accused No. 1 is said to have been made on 28.2.90, yet it was not disclosed to anyone. 3. Shri Jaisingh pointed out that the case solely hinges on an extra-judicial confession allegedly made to one Bapu, who was examined during investigation on 1.3.90. Although confession by accused No. 1 is said to have been made on 28.2.90, yet it was not disclosed to anyone. 3. Merits of the case apart, this is a case of delayed trial. In view of the foregoing reasons and taking into account the bleak and blurred prospects of a speedy trial, the petitioners are directed to be released on bail on each of them furnishing a personal bond in a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) with surety in like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ujjain for their appearance before the Court on 25.10.90, or on such further dates as may be fixed by the Court in that behalf.