JUDGMENT - C. MOOKERJEE, C.J.:---The appellant No. 1 at the relevant time was the owner of petrol tanker No. MXL 7461. The appellant No. 2 was the insurer of the said vehicle. 2. On 29th October, 1987, while the said petrol tanker No. MXL- 7461 was proceeding from Pune side towards Banglore along National Highway No. 4, at about 3 A.M. near village Kavathe there was a collision between the said petrol tanker and motor lorry No. MEH-4197 which was coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the said impact, the appellant No. 1's petrol tanker No. MXL -7461 fell on it left side and rested on the sloping portion at some distance away from the tarred portion of the Highway. The other vehicle, however, still stood on its four wheels at some distance from the point of impact. At about 7.30 a.m. on the same day there was an explosion followed by fire and the said petrol tanker No. MXL-7461 was burnt down. It was also in evidence that after the said collision, a large number of persons from the neighbouring village had arrived at the place of occurrence and some of them had begun to collect and take away petrol coming out of the same tanker which was resting on one of its sides. As a result of the said explosion and fire, there was heavy, casualty among the members of the crowd who had gathered around the said tanker. Six persons died on the spot and out of 61 person who received burn injuries 21 persons expired at the hospital. 3. The respondent Smt. Vatchala Uttam More is the mother of the deceased Deepak Uttam More who was one of the victims of the said explosion and fire. 4. The said respondent filed an application under section 92-A of the Motor Vehicle Act. 1939, against the present appellants before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Satara. She also filled a separate application against the same parties under section 110 of the motor vehicle Act, 1939, claiming Rs. 75,000/- as compensation on account of the death of her son, Deepak. We understand that 21 other similar applications came to the filed under sections 92-A and 110 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 calming compensation from the present appellants on account of the deaths caused by the said explosion followed by fire. 75,000/- as compensation on account of the death of her son, Deepak. We understand that 21 other similar applications came to the filed under sections 92-A and 110 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 calming compensation from the present appellants on account of the deaths caused by the said explosion followed by fire. The present appellants contested the said claims made under section 92-A of the Act. 5. The learned Member of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara, by the judgment dated 22nd December, 1989, dismissed the application under section 92-A of the said Act including the application of the present respondent holding, inter alia, that, death of the victims could not be said to be on account of the accident arising out of the use of the said tanker and, therefore, provisions of section 92-A of the said Act were not attracted. The applications filed under section 110 of the said Act are still pending for disposal before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara. 6. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of her application under section 92-A of the said Act the present respondent filed First Appeal No. 54 of 1990 in this Court. The learned Single Judge immediately after admitting the said appeal, with the consent of the parties had taken it up for final disposal. The learned Single Judge allowed the appeal set aside the judgement and order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara, and directed the present appellants to pay to the present respondent the amount of Rs. 15,000/- under section 92-A of the Motor vehicle Act, 1939. The appellants have filed the instant Letters Patent Appeal against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge. 7. Having heard at length the learned Counsel on both the sides, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal. The point for determination was whether the death of the son of the present respondent had resulted from an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle admittedly owned by appellant No. 1 and which was insured by appellant No. 2. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly adjudge the present appellants liable under section 92-A to pay compensation in respect of the death of the respondent's son. In our view, the learned Single Judge has rightly adjudge the present appellants liable under section 92-A to pay compensation in respect of the death of the respondent's son. The said claim under section 92-A of the respondent was not liable to be rejected on the ground of any wrongful act neglect of default of the person in respect of whose death or disablement claim for compensation has been made. 8. Mr. Murthi, the learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted before us that there was no nexus between the fact of collision of the tanker No. MXL -7461 and the Motor Lorry No. MEH-4197 at about 3 a.m. on 29th October, 1987, and the subsequent explosion and fire at about 7.30 a.m. on the same day which resulted in the unfortunate deaths of the respondent's son and 21 other persons and also injuries to scores of others. Mr. Murthi's submission is that at the time of taking place of the explosion and fire the said tanker was no longer in use. It was resting on its side at some distance from the National Highway No. 4. Therefore, the death of the son of the respondent could not be said to be the result of an accident arising out of the use of the said tanker. Before us it was attempted to be also urged on behalf of the appellants that the fire was ignited by some one from amongst those who had been pilfering oil from the said disabled tanker and, therefore, the explosion and the consequent fire resulting in the deaths and injuries could not be said to have arisen from the use of the vehicle in question. 9. Liability of the owner of a vehicle under section 92-A to pay compensation in case of death or permanent disablement is based on principle of no fault. The claimant is not required to plead and establish wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle. Any wrongful act, neglect or default of the victim is also totally irrelevant vide sub-sections (2) and (3) of the section 92-A of the Act). The claimant is not required to plead and establish wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle. Any wrongful act, neglect or default of the victim is also totally irrelevant vide sub-sections (2) and (3) of the section 92-A of the Act). Therefore, the scope of an enquiry under section 92-A is a limited one and the same is restricted to determination of following points: i) Whether death or permanent disablement of person in respect of whom compensation has been claimed resulted from an accident; ii) whether the said accident arose out of use of a motor vehicle. 10. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the learned member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Satara, was clearly wrong in making observation to the effect that the aforesaid provisions of no fault liability ought not to be extended to cover those persons who might have been committing their or pilferage at the time of their deaths or permanent disablement. We have already referred to sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 92-A which make totally irrelevant the questions of wrongful act, neglect or default either of the owner of the vehicle or of the victims of an accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle. The learned Single Judge has also rightly pointed out that there was also no evidence whatsoever that the person or persons in respect of whose deaths compensation had been claimed under section 92-A were themselves actually committing their or pilferage of petrol at the time of their death. These victims could have been only curious by standers at the site of the accident. Undisputedly the death of respondent's son resulted from the tanker's petrol catching fire and exploding. 11. The next question is whether the said accident arose (or 'arising') out of the use of the said tanker owned by the appellant No. 1 and insured with the appellant No. 2. We are not prepared to give any countenance to the contentions of Mr. Murthi, the learned advocate for the appellants, that at the time of the said accident the said tanker was no longer in use. We are not prepared to give any countenance to the contentions of Mr. Murthi, the learned advocate for the appellants, that at the time of the said accident the said tanker was no longer in use. It has been consistently held that for the purpose of adjudging the liability of the owners of motor vehicles to pay compensation the expression 'use of the motor vehicle' covers a very wide field, field more extensive than which might be called traffic use of the motor vehicle. The use of a vehicle is not confined to the periods when it was in motion or was moving. It would be still in use even when it was stationary vide the case of (Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v. R.J. Green Lloyd Pvt. Limited)1, decided by the High Court of Australia, reported in 1967 A.C.J. 329. The learned Single Judge has also referred to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Oriental Fire General Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Suman Navnath Rajguru ors,)2, reported in 1985 A.C.J. 243. In the said reported case before the Division Bench a petrol tanker which was parked near the footpath of a road had burst into flames causing death of a person who was a passer-by. In Oriental Fire General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Rajguru ors. (supra) the Division Bench held that the dependants of the deceased victim were entitled to compensation under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Acts, 1939. In support of their view that motor vehicle even when stationary it is still in use relied upon the views expressed by the Queens Bench in (Elliott v. Grey)3, 1959(3) All England Law Reports, 733, and by Delhi High Court in the case of (Pushpa Rani Chopra v. Anokha Singh)4, 1975 A.C.J. 396. We respectfully follow the decision in the case of Oriental Fire General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Rajguru others (supra) and hold that the expression 'use of a motor vehicle' in section 92-A covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. In the present case the tanker in question while proceeding along National Highway No. 4 (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on its side. In the present case the tanker in question while proceeding along National Highway No. 4 (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on its side. In the event it is found that the fire and explosion which occurred a few hours later were casually connected with the said impact which took place earlier, then the inevitable conclusion would be that the death of the respondent's son had resulted from an accident arising from the use of the said petrol tanker, it cannot be claimed that after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled. 12. The learned advocates on both the sides also cited a number of reported decisions which had considered the expression' ........ arising out of the use of motor vehicles' in section 110 and also the slightly different expression arising out of the use of motor vehicle in a public place' in section 95(1)(b)(c) and (cc) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939. In view of the clear authority of the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of the Oriental Fire General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Rajguru others (supra) it is unnecessary to refer to other reported decision We might mention that in the case of (Padmanabhan Nair v. Narayanikutty another)5, 1988(1) A.C.J. 58, Kerala High Court held compensation was payable in case of a death of passenger who died from fire caused from petrol carried by another passenger in a public bus. We note that the trend of these reported decisions is that the expression 'arising out of use of motor vehicle ' ought to be given not restricted but wide meaning. We ought to bear in our mind the object of inserting section 92-A in the status was to enlarge the right to receive compensation for death or permanent disablement in consequence of a motor accident. Therefore, right to receive compensation under section 92-A is not confined only to cases where death or permanent disablement is the proximate or direct result of an accident arising from use of a motor vehicle. Therefore, right to receive compensation under section 92-A is not confined only to cases where death or permanent disablement is the proximate or direct result of an accident arising from use of a motor vehicle. Right to compensation under section 92-A also extends to cases where death or such disablement may not be the proximate or immediate, but non the less arising from use of a motor vehicle (see observations made in Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v. R.J. Green Lloyd Pvt. Limited (supra) at pages (12) and (27). Undoubtedly, when the death or disablement of a victim is totally unconnected with or unrelated to the user of motor vehicle section 92-A is not attracted. 13. Therefore, we may proceed to consider whether the collision between the tanker No. MXL-7461 and the motor lorry and the subsequent explosion and fire resulting in the death of the respondent son and others and injury to others were two independent and unconnected incidents. Merely because there was interval of about 4/4 ½ hours between the said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker, one cannot be necessarily infer that there was no causal relation between the earlier event and the later incident of explosion and fire. We would presently indicate that the earlier between the two vehicles. If not the cause was atleast the main contributory factor for the subsequent explosion and fire in the tanker in question. The tanker in question was carrying petrol which was highly combustible and volatile material. After the heading collision with the other motor vehicle, the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on slopping grounds resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol. There were grave risks of explosion and fire from the petrol coming but of the tanker. The tanker was allowed to remain in such dangerous condition for hours without any effort being made to prevent such great hazard of fire and explosion from petrol escaping from the tanker. The negligence or even misconduct on the part of those who had been collecting petrol from the tanker were not relevant for the reasons already indicated earlier. Therefore, we conclude that the collision between the tanker and another vehicle which occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events. Therefore, we conclude that the collision between the tanker and another vehicle which occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events. Therefore, the appellants were liable to pay under section 92-A of the Act compensation to the dependants of the victim of the said accident. 14. We are unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that in the instant case the first information report recorded by the police and the panchanama indicated that the explosion and the fire near the petrol tanker had been caused by careless act of throwing away of a match stick used for lighting a beedi or cigarette. It is true that under Rule 306. A of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959, a Claims Tribunal shall obtain whatever supplementary information and documents which may be found necessary from the police, medical and other authorities and proceed to award the claim whether the parties who were given notice to appear or not on the appointed date. Rule 306-B also allows the Tribunal to award claim or compensation on the basis of among others panchanama and the first information report. Even if in adjudicating a dispute under section 92-A the Tribunal is not fetterred by strict rules of the Evidence Act and the papers mentioned in the aforesaid two rules are relevant. We find that in the instant case the papers and documents including the F.I.R. and the panachanama produced before the Tribunal did not establish that the fire was ignited by someone carelessly throwing a match stick. Even if the statement made to the police be treated as admissible in a proceeding under section 92-A, we find that the same contained expression of views of certain persons about probable cause of fire, but none of these persons made any categorical and positive statement about the cause of the fire. 15. Having given our anxious consideration, we are of the view that from the facts of this case it would be reasonable and probable to make an inference that the explosion and fire and the subsequent death of an unfortunate victim had arisen out of the use of the appellant No. 1's vehicle. 15. Having given our anxious consideration, we are of the view that from the facts of this case it would be reasonable and probable to make an inference that the explosion and fire and the subsequent death of an unfortunate victim had arisen out of the use of the appellant No. 1's vehicle. In the absence of any proof that the fire was caused by any human agency independently of the said collision which took place few hours earlier, it ought to be reasonably inferred that the explosion and the consequent life were caused either directly or indirectly as the result of the collision between the petrol tanker of appellant No. 1 and the other motor vehicle. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was right in allowing the appeal and setting aside the decision of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs. Upon application by the learned advocate for the appellants operation of this judgment is stayed for one month. Appeal dismissed. -----