JUDGMENT S. K. Dhaon And D. S. Sinha, JJ. - The principal prayer is that a writ in the nature of mandamus may be issued to the co-ordinator, Admission Committee, Harcourt Bulter Technological Institute, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to, as the Institute), to admit the petitioner in the B. Tech. 3 years programme in paint Technology. 2. The Institute has put in appearance. It has also filed a counter affidavit. The petitioner has also filed a rejoinder-affidavit. The petition is, therefore, ripe for hearing though not formally admitted as yet. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, we are proceeding to dispose of this petition finally. 3. The material facts which emerge from the record is that the Chairman of the Admission Committee of the Institute by means of an advertisement notified that a Combined Entrance Examination (C.E.E ), organised by the Institute for admission in a number of participating institute mentioned in the advertisement, for the academic year 1989-90 will be held on 22nd May, 1989. There is a note to the effect that the application form with information Brochure containing the details of C. E. E. 1989 will be available from 1st February, 1989 from all the participating institutions of U. P. mentioned in the advertisement. The information brochure for the Combined Entrance Examination 1989 in paragraph 2.1. had a heading "Institute wise academic Qualifications and Age Limit". Not less than 26 institutions are mentioned under this heading and the Institute is one of them. Its place was at Serial No. 6. For 3 years course in Bichemical Engineering, Food Technology, Oil Technology, Paint Technology and Plastic Technology apart from minimum academic qualifications, the requirement of age was that the maximum limit was 22 years as on 1st October, 1989, relaxable by 3 years in case of S.C./S.T. Candidates. The petitioner was neither a S. C. nor S. T. candidate. Annexure-1 to the petition appears to be a proforma of letter to be issued by the Co-ordinator of the Admission Committee to the various candidates. It is alleged that the petitioner received a letter on the said proforma. By this letter, the petitioner was required to bring with him certain documents, one of them was original High School Certificate as proof of age while reporting at the office of the Admission Committee. It is alleged that the petitioner received a letter on the said proforma. By this letter, the petitioner was required to bring with him certain documents, one of them was original High School Certificate as proof of age while reporting at the office of the Admission Committee. The petitioner was also advised to carry with him attested photostat copy of the High School Certificate as proof of age. The petitioner forwarded his admission form. Ho deposited a sum of Rs. 560 which included 600 as fee and Rs. 50 as counselling fee with the Admission Committee of the Institution. He was allotted roll No. 46937. He was issued an interview letter. He was interviewed and thereafter he was informed that he could not be admitted in B. Tech. 3 years programme in Paint Technology as he was Overage on 1st October, 1989. 4. As already indicated, in this Court the petitioner has confined his prayer to the issue of a writ of mandamus to a issued to the Institute to admit him in 3 years course in Paint Technology. There is no prayer on behalf of the petitioner for any direction to the Institute to admit him in any other course. The Admission Committee of the institute is sole respondent in this petition. We are, therefore, confining ourselves on the limited question as to whether, under the circumstances of the case, the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for. 5. Learned counsel has urged that the facts and circumstances of the case call for the application of doctrine of equitable estoppel in favour of the petitioner. According to him, the institution acted rather too late in refusing admission to the petitioner on the ground that he did not fulfill the requirement of age. We have given anxious consideration to this submission and we are unable to accept the same. This is a case where the petitioner has prior knowledge, even before the admission of the admission form, that for being considered for admission in 3 years course for Paint Technology in the Institute he had to be 22 years. Old on 1st October, 1989. He was also aware that the Institute had not been given any power or jurisdiction to relax the age limit. Old on 1st October, 1989. He was also aware that the Institute had not been given any power or jurisdiction to relax the age limit. He was also aware that on the basis of the admission form submitted by him he could be considered for admission to various courses in various Institutes mentioned in the advertisement, for which, the said age limit had not been fixed. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner made an application deposited the aforementioned fee and presented himself for the interview on the representation made by the Institute that he would be considered for admission in 3 years Paint Technology Course. Therefore, the question of the petitioner acting to his determent on the alleged representation of the Institute did not arise. In such a situation, the question of invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not arise. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel upon two decisions. They are : (1) Shri Krishna v. The Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra, AIR i976 SC p. 76. (2) Manoj Kumar Gupta v. Co-ordinator, Admission Committee, Motilal Nehru Regional Engineering College, Allahabad and others, AIR 1985 Alld p. 257. 6. In the first case, a student was allowed to appear in Part I Law Examination of the University concerned. He was issued an admit-card by the University authorities. The card contained an endorsement that during the academic period the student had defaulted in attending class and, therefore, there was shortage of attendance. On the basis of the admit card issued to the candidate, he appeared in the examination. The result was not declared on ground that he had defrauded the University in appearing in the examination even though there was shortage in his attendance. In these circumstances, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that University was stopped from enforcing the rule of attendance. This case, therefore, is not apposite. 7. In the second case the material facts were these. An entrance examination was held for admission to B. Arch. Course. The requirement as contained in the information brochure, so far as the entrance examination was concerned, was that a candidate must secure aggregate of 65% of marks in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics. The further requirement was that a candidate should pass in English at the qualifying examination. The candidate concerned appeared in the entrance examination. He was called appeared in the entrance examination. He was called for interview. The further requirement was that a candidate should pass in English at the qualifying examination. The candidate concerned appeared in the entrance examination. He was called appeared in the entrance examination. He was called for interview. He fulfilled the requirement of having secured 58% of marks in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics. He also passed examination in English at the qualifying examination. Thereafter, the College concerned turned around and refused admission on the ground that the candidate had no secured 55% marks in the Intermediate examination. This Court emphasised that the requirement that a candidate should secure 55% marks in the Intermediate Examination was not in existence when the person concerned applied for admission, and when he appeared in the entrance examination. Therefore, upon the facts of the case, this Court took the view that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied and the Engineering College concerned could not refuse admission to the student concerned. This case too is distinguishable on facts. 8. There is one feature to which we must advert. In the writ petition, in paragraph 15, there is a clear cut averment that another student, Pradeep Kumar Goel, who was similarly situated as the petitioner, had been denied admission by the Institute and this Court on 10th September, 1985, by means of an interim order, directed the Institute to admit him provisionally. In the counter-affidavit, it has been brought to our notice that the writ petition of Pradeep Kumar Goel was dismissed on 7th November, 1985. It is to be remembered that the instant writ petition was presented in this Court on 20th October, 1989 and an interim order was passed by this Court on 24th October, I98y. We have no hesitation in taking the view that the petitioner deliberately tried to over reach the Court and suppressed material facts with view to obtain an interim order. This ground should have been enough to dismiss the petition in limine. However, keeping in view the fact that the petitioner is a student, we have examined his case on merits. 9. The petition is dismissed. The interim order, dated 24th October, 1989 is hereby discharged. No order as to costs.