ORDER Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. In these two writ petitions, the employees of Unit Trust of India, Madras Regional Office, are the petitioners They have filed these two writ petitions seeking for writ of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from proceedings with the enquiry into the charges in disciplinary action. The ground on which they want this court to issue the writ of mandamus is that the facts which go to form the background and basis for the charges in the disciplinary action are one and the same in the case of original proceedings already inituted against them by the respondents. 2. Mr. K.T. Palpandian, learned Counsel for the petitioners are, would place reliance on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kushashwar v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. to say that then the facts and circumstance forcing the background for both the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal proceedings are one and the same there ought to be stay of the disciplinary proceedings by this Court. An against this. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy learned Counsel for the respondents would say that the pronouncement of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioners has refrained from settling the law in a straight jacket formula, and the learned judges of the Supreme Court expressly opined that they do not propose to hazard such a step as that, would create greater hardship and individual situations may not be available to act and thereby injustice is likely to ensure; and hence that pronouncement should be taken only as having been rendered on the facts of that case and in the present cases the facts and circumstances do not warrant the indulgence of interdicting the disciplinary proceedings by this court. 3. Before we express our opinion on the question raised, after assessing the submission as made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the counter submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respondents, we feel obliged to extract the charge sheet filed against the petitioners in the criminal proceedings and the charge memorandums issued to the petitioners in the disciplinary proceedings by way of Annexures to this order of ours. A copy of the charge sheet, which is common to both the petitioners, in the criminal proceedings shall stand annexed as Annexure 'A' to this order, The charge memorandums issued to the petitioners are similar and it would suffice the purpose if a copy of one charge memorandum relating to the petitioner in W.P.No.8711 of 1989 stands annexed to this order as Annexure 'B' 4. It may be stated that the laying of the charge sheet in the criminal proceedings stemmed out of the very same facts and circumstances on the basis of which disciplinary proceedings are being prosecuted against the petitioners. But it must be remembered that in the original Proceedings the charges are for offences punishable under Section 120-B, IPC, for criminal conspiracy; under Section 381, IPC. for theft by clerk or servant of property in procession of master; under Section 467, IPC. for forgery of valuable security and under Section 109, IPC. for abetment. The said charges will have to be tested from a different angle with reference to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code for which the petitioners stand charge-sheeted, and certainly the degree of proof in the criminal proceedings will be on a higher level than the degree of proof in the disciplinary proceedings. In contrast, the acts of gross misconduct alleged against the petitioners in the charge memorandums in the disciplinary proceedings may have to be tested and adjudicated upon, keeping in mind the enforcement of discipline and integrity amongst the staff in the administration. It must be noted that there is a complaint in the charge memorandums of violation of staff Rule 27 relating to liability to abide by the Rules and orders and Staff Rule 29, relating to the obligation of the employee to promote the interests of the Unit Trust. Different considerations will weigh with regard to assessment of the charges in the disciplinary proceedings. 5. So far as this court is concerned the settled view is that even though there could have been an acquittal in the criminal proceedings, still prosecution of disciplinary proceedings would not be barred. In M.N. Rubber Co. Ltd. v. S. Natarajan and Presiding Officer, (1985) 2 LLJ 364 a Bench of this Court opined that departmental proceedings can be taken even after the original case too initiated in respect of identical charge, which might have ended in acquittal. In M.N. Rubber Co. Ltd. v. S. Natarajan and Presiding Officer, (1985) 2 LLJ 364 a Bench of this Court opined that departmental proceedings can be taken even after the original case too initiated in respect of identical charge, which might have ended in acquittal. This principle to a very great extent indicates that departmental proceedings have got an independent angle of testing the charges levelled therein and they have got to be viewed from independent standard and the decision in favour of the employee in the criminal proceedings need not necessarily stand in the way of prosecution of the disciplinary proceedings against him. It would be a different matter if the service rules or regulations lay down a contrary position. In such a case, the service rules or regulations will certainly govern. There could also be a service rule or a regulation, interdicting the prosecution at parallel level, the disciplinary proceedings, along with the criminal proceedings. In such a contingency also such a service rule or regulation has to govern. This is not the position in the present cases. 6. In Kushashwar v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. the relevant passage that should be taken note of is found in paragraph 6 thereof and it runs as follows: The view expressed in the three cases of this court seen to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the original case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent-employee to seek such an order to stay or injunction from the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide is the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisible to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down my general guideline. 7. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down my general guideline. 7. On a careful perusal of the above passage, the ultimate guidence which this court could get is that as to whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaniety of the proceedings should receive judicial consideration and the court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted pending criminal trial. We already pointed out certain features, which in our view, are relevant and which dissuade us from interdicting the disciplinary proceedings taking note of the pendency of the criminal proceedings. At the risk of repetition, we may point out that the charges levelled against the petitioners in the disciplinary proceedings will have to be tested from different angles and in particular, keeping in mind the enforcement of discipline and the level of integrity amongst the staff in the administration of the respondents. That need not necessarily be a factor to be taken note of in the criminal proceedings. We could not subscribe our support to the straight-jacket formula advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that whenever disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings are grounded on the same set of facts, there should be an interdiction of the disciplinary proceedings, awaiting the decision in the criminal proceedings. The relevant passage in the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Kunheswar v. Bharat Coking Co. Ltd. does not support any such broad proposition. Ultimately, as stated by the Supreme Court, the facts and circumstances of a particular case are the deciding factors after they receive the judicial consideration. Mr. K.T. Palpandian learned Counsel for the petitioners, would draw our attention to Staff Rule 54(3) which speaks about dismissal of an employee on his conviction of an offence. That is a contingency on the happening of which the Staff Rule contemplated the dismissal of an employee. But from that rule, there could not be a deriving of any support for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings should await decision in criminal proceedings. Our consideration of the facts and circumstances of the cases do not justify the grant of prayers in the writ petitions, Accordingly we dismiss these two writ petitions. But from that rule, there could not be a deriving of any support for the proposition that disciplinary proceedings should await decision in criminal proceedings. Our consideration of the facts and circumstances of the cases do not justify the grant of prayers in the writ petitions, Accordingly we dismiss these two writ petitions. We make no order as to costs.