ORDER Bakthavatsalam, J. 1. The writ petition is directed against the award of the Labour Court passed in I.D. No. 162 of 1981 upholding the non-employment of the petitioner. The petitioner raised on industrial dispute with regard to the dismissal of his service based on two chargers memos issued. After the issue of the chargemenos, the petitioner did not give any explanation since the records which he wanted to peruse, were with police by then in view of certain criminal proceedings which were pending against the petitioner. Though the petitioner asked for the documents, the petitioner was directed to go to the police station and peruse the documents. Since the petitioner did not peruse the documents and he did not give an explanation, no domestic inquiry was held by the 1st respondent, but, he was dismissed from service holding that the petitioner has not given explanation and also relying upon a statement of the petitioner given during the course of an inquiry under Section 65 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. It is also to be stated that the original case ended in acquittal in Crl. R.C. Nos. 621, 834, and 835 of 1983 but the Labour Court by the impugned award upheld the non-employment holding that the dismissal is right. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner is before me; 2. It is alleged in the affidavit, the Labour Court ought to have seen that the petitioner was not given the copy of the documents asked for and the statement made by the Labour Court that the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice as he was aware of the documents when the inquiry was conducted, is not correct. It is also stated in the affidavit that the view of the Labour Court that the inquiry was not necessary because the order of dismissal was based both on the report of the inquiry made under Section 65 of the Act and a statement given by the petitioner Ex.M-2 in the course of that proceedings, is wrong. It is also alleged that the petitioner was not able to give an explanation as he was asking for copy of the documents of defend the charge memos. It is also alleged that the petitioner was not able to give an explanation as he was asking for copy of the documents of defend the charge memos. Further, inasmuch as the Labour Court has taken into account the conviction of the petitioner in the Trial court and that it has been set aside by this court in Crl.R.C.Nos.621,834 and 835 of 1983, the inquiry for the purpose of disciplinary action cannot be dispensed with on the ground that an inquiry for some other purpose is held and as such it runs counter to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway (1960) 2 L.L.J. 61 . So also, it is alleged that the dismissal of the claim petition filed by the petitioner is not correct 3. No counter has been filed by the 1st respondent. 4. Mr. Prakash learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the statement given during the course of inquiry under Section 65 has been taken note of by the Labour Court and it should not have been done. The learned Counsel argues that no domestic inquiry has been conducted in this case admittedly and that the Labour Court ought to have made an independent inquiry in such circumstances. It is also stated by the learned Counsel that though no explanation was filed by the petitioner, it was incumbent on the Bank to have hold a domestic inquiry before the order of dismissal was passed. Learned Counsel relies on the decision of the Supreme Court report in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway (1960) 2 LLJ 61 for the proposition that reliance cannot be made on a statutory inquiry which has been dispensed with. He further points out that the conviction has been set aside by this Court. It is also contended that the impugned order of dismissal has been passed in violation of the principle of natural justice and the Labour Court has erred in upholding the order of the bank without going into the merits of the case. 5. Mr. He further points out that the conviction has been set aside by this Court. It is also contended that the impugned order of dismissal has been passed in violation of the principle of natural justice and the Labour Court has erred in upholding the order of the bank without going into the merits of the case. 5. Mr. Kalyanasundaram appearing for the Bank points out that in the counter filed before the Labour Court, the Bank wanted to let in evidence and in view of that, documents were marked and evidence was let in the learned Counsel further argues that the petitioner having admitted his guilt, in an inquiry under Section 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act, there is nothing wrong to dispense with the services of the petitioner. 6. I have considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent bank. After going through the award carefully, I am of the view that the award cannot stand judicial scrutiny. The Labour Court has only repeated what the bank has said in the order of dismissal. The Labour Court has not taken pains to examine the question independently by discussing the evidence adduced before it. I find the order of dismissal has been passed by the bank without holding a domestic inquiry. Admittedly, it is a case where a domestic inquiry has not been held. In my view, it cannot be done. Assuming the petitioner has not given an explanation, it is well settled that it is incumbent on the part of the management to hold an inquiry independently and arrive at a conclusion. Nothing prevents the Management from holding an inquiry by setting the petitioner ex pane. It has not been done here. What all has been done is it has affirmed the charge memo on the ground that no explanation has been given, based upon the statement of the petitioner which was given during the course of statutory inquiry under Section 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act. In my view of the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway (1960) 2 LLJ 61 , though it is a case under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, I am of the view that the principles ate equally applicable to the inquiry with regard to a workman. In my view of the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway (1960) 2 LLJ 61 , though it is a case under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, I am of the view that the principles ate equally applicable to the inquiry with regard to a workman. In that case, a departmental enquiry committee appointed to investigate and report about an accident which resulted on account of collision between a train engine and a bullock cart, held the concerned assistant station master and the pointsman reasonable for the collision. Relying on such finding the Assistant Station Master was called upon to show cause why a particular penalty should not be imposed on him. Subsequently, he was found guilty of the charge. It was held by the Supreme Court that the departmental enquiry would not substitute or dispense with the inquiry which ought to have been held to inquire into the misconduct alleged against that Assistant Station Master. Following that principle, I am of the view that the proper inquiry has not been held and the petitioner has not been given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case. Further, the Labour Court seems to have been influenced by the fact of conviction imposed on the petitioner by the Criminal Court. Now, that is no more. This Court has acquitted the petitioner. In view of the foregoing reasons, I am inclined to set aside the award of the Labour Court and remit the matter back to the Labour Court., to decide the question according to Law. 7. The writ petition will stand allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Since the claim petition is also dismissed by the same award, the Labour court will take up that petition C.P. No. 459 of 1979 along with I.D. No. 162 of 1981. Sincere award has been passed in 1984 and it has been not aside, it is desirable that the Labour Court disposes of the matter within three months from the date of receipt of records.