Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. All these three appeals involving common questions of law and facts with the consent of the parties were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The plaintiffs-appellants filed three suits being Title Suit Nos. 112 of 1974, 113 of 1974 and 114 of 1974, alleging, inter alia, therein that the respective defendants in each suit became defaulter by not paying and/or depositing the rent, in accordance with law from February, 1971 till the date of the institution of suit. 3. The plaintiffs in the suit further prayed for a decree on the ground of personal necessity but the said plea has been negatived by both the learned courts below. 4. It is further admitted that in terms of an order pessed in Title (Partition) Suit No. 27/40, the defendants were directed to deposit the rent in the said court and pursuant thereto, the defendant deposited the stipulated monthly rent till 15.1.1971 when the property which was attached in the said suit was released from attachment. 5. According to the defendants, thereafter, they went to the plaintiff No. 1 for tendering the rent for the remaining period of January and whole period of February, 1971, but he refused to accept the said rent and thereafter, the respondent remitted the rent through postal money order. 6. According to the defendants, thereafter, they have been remitting the monthly rent by postal money order. 7. Upon the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were flamed, which are as follows: (1) Has the plaintiff any cause of action for the suit? (2) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (3) Whether the defendant is a defautter in payment of the suit? (4) Whether the plaintiff requires the premises in suit reasonable and in good faith for his own business purpose? (5) Is the notice under Sec. 106, T.P. Act legally and validly served on the defendant? (6) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for arrears of rent and damages as claimed for? (7) To what relief or reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled? 8. (5) Is the notice under Sec. 106, T.P. Act legally and validly served on the defendant? (6) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for arrears of rent and damages as claimed for? (7) To what relief or reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled? 8. The learned trial court held that in view of the fact that the defendants have been tendering rent by postal money order in terms of the provisions contained in Sec. 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 which is in pari materia with section with Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, the defendants are not defaulters. 9. However, the learned trial court granted a decree with regard to the arrears of rent claimed by the plaintiffs. 10. On appeal, the learned appellate court held that the defendants did not make any default prior to the remittance of the stipulated monthly rent to the plaintiffs having relied upon a decision of this Court in Sri Nand Gopal Prasad V/s. Mostt. Prem Lata Devi and Ors., 1988 0 PLJR 923 and Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narain Singh, 1980 0 PLJR 195. 11. The learned court of appeal below further took into consideration all the money order coupons, which were marked as Ext. A/21 to A/18 and came to the conclusion that even if the said remittance by pastal money orders are accepted in their entirety, It will be evident that they have become defaulters. The learned court of appeal below, in this connection has relied upon a decision of this Court in Madholal and Ors. V/s. Madan Mohan Agrawalla and Ors. -- . In short, the learned court of appeal below held that in terms of the provisions contained in Sec. 11(1)(d) read with Sec. 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, a tenant in absence of any contract to the contrary is required to pay rent for the month in question by the last date of next succeeding month and thereby rejected the plea of the defendant-appellants to the effect that a tenant becomes defaulter when rent is not paid by him by the last date of the third month. 12. In all these appeals, different substan tial questions of law were formulated, at the time of admission. 12. In all these appeals, different substan tial questions of law were formulated, at the time of admission. In Second appeal No. 60 of 1985(R), by an order, dated 11.12.1985, the following substantial question of law was formulated: In view of the fact that the plaintiff No. 1 (P.W. 4) did not in his evidence in chief deny the, assertion made by the appellant in the written statement that he had tendered the rent to the plaintiff No. 1 hand-to-hand and on his refused it was remitted by money order, whether the court below could have recorded a finding that there was no tender when it did not notice this fact. 13. In Second Appeal No. 59 of 1985(R), by an order, dated 16.12.1985, the following substantial question of law was formulated: Whether the court below could have recorded a finding that the remittance of rent by money order was not proceeded by tender hand to hand without considering the effect of Ext. C/9? 14. In Second Appeal No. 60 of 1985(R), by an order, dated 12.12.1985, (he following substantial question of law was formulated: Whether court below could have held that there was no tender of rent of appellant, where in evidence this assertion was not denied by the respondent? 15. In effect and substance, therefore, the defendant-appellants seek to contend in these appeals that they in their pleadings raised a contention to the effect that the rent for the part of January, 1971 and February, 1971 was tendered to the plaintiff No. 1 and he having refused to accept the said rent, the same was remitted by postal money order and the said purported tender by hand to hand was although not necessary in law but was done in fact and also finds mention in the postal money order coupons. 16. Mr. N.K. Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in each of the appeals submitted that the learned court of appeal below has committed an irregularity in relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sri Nand Gopal Prasad V/s. Mostt. 16. Mr. N.K. Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in each of the appeals submitted that the learned court of appeal below has committed an irregularity in relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sri Nand Gopal Prasad V/s. Mostt. Prem Lata Devi and Ors., 1985 0 PLJR 923 and Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narain Singh, 1980 0 PLJR 195 inasmuch as in a later decision, it has expressly been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Tehal Modi alias Ram Tehal Chaurasia V/s. Ratan Lal and Ganesh Shankar Vidyar, 1989 0 PLJR 950 that prior tender is not necessary before remitting the rental by postal money order. 17. The learned Counsel further submitted that the learned court of appeal below misdirected himself in allowing the appeal as a result whereof the findings of the learned trial court to the effect that the defendants were not defaulters was reserved by not taking into consideration the pleadings of the defendants as also the evidence on record, whereby and whereunder the defendat pleaded and proved that the remittance by postal money orders were proceeded by tender of the stipulated monthly rent by the tenant to the landlord. 18. Mr. N.K. Prasad, therefore, submitted that even if it be held that tender by hand to hand was a pre-requisite before a tenant could take recourse to the Statutory provisions thereof by making remittance of rent by postal money order in terms of Sec. 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, such a fact was pleaded and proved. 19. It is true that in Ram Tehal Modis case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court taking into consideration various other decisions, came to the conclusion that a prior tender of rent by a tenant to his landlord was not a prerequisite before he can take recourse to his statutory remedy of remittance of stipulated monthly rent by postal money order. 20. 20. However, in that decision, the Division Bench of this Court, did not consider the effect of the Full Bench decision in Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narayan Singh case (supra), and as such in Darshan Singh and sons V/s. Bilquish Begam, 1989 0 BBCJ 517 , I explained that the aforementioned decision has to be read in the light of the Full Bench decision rendered by this Court in Raj Kumar Prasads case (supra). 21. S. Roy, J. who spoke for the Division Bench in Ram Tehal Modis case (supra), himself in Dauluram Agarwala V/s. Shivdayal Bhartiya 1989 PLJR 227, stated the law thus: In Veena Rani case (supra) this legal position was reiterated. It was so done again on the facts of Ram Tahal Modis (supra). The legal position that boils down, therefore is that if the tenant takes recourse to send rent by money order without tendering it by any other mode that would be under the general law and the tender of the money order to the landlord must be, in absence of any contract, made within the last date of the month following that for which the rent was sent. If there has been tender, whatever, may be the mode, within the last date of the following month that for which rent was payable and the landlord refused to accept it, the remittance must be within a reasonable time. Bach case, therefore, shall have to be decided on proven facts. 22. It will thug be seen that Section Roy, J, himself explained his earlier decision of Division Bench in Ram Tahal Modis case (supra) in the light of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Raj Kumars case (supra). 23. In this view of the matter, there cannot be any doubt that remittance by money order must be preceded for the first time by a tender by hand to hand or by any other mode, when the same is possible and in the event of refusal by the landlord to accept such tender, it in open to the tenant to remit the stipulated monthly rent by postal money order in terms of Sec. 16 of the 1982 Act. 24. 24. However, in this case, assuming that there had been such tender of rent by hand to hand was made by the tenant to the plaintiff No. 1, it is evident from the judgment of the learned court of appeal below that even from Ext. A/24 to A/48, it must be held that the defendant-tenant having remitted two months rent simultaneously on a number of occasions, he became a defaulter with the meaning of Sec. 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. 25. Sec. 11(1)(d) of the said Act read as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Sec. 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the following grounds: ... (d) ... Where the amount of two months rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from his in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract, or in the absence of such contract by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Sec. 16. 26. No substantial question of law has been formulated by this Court with regard to the aforementioned finding of fact arrived at by the learned court of appeal below. 27. However, it is now a settled law that in order to make a person defaulter, it is not necessary that he should be a defaulter in respect of two consecutive months. Reference, in this connection may be made to Syed Abdul Wahab V/s. Md. Sakman alias Lokman, 1989 0 PLJR 587, which was rendered after taking into the consideration the Full Bench decision of this Court in Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narayan Singh -- ; Tip Top V/s. Indramani, 1982 0 BBCJ 433 and in Sadanand Das V/s. Md. Hussain and Anr. 1986 0 PLJR 46. 28. Sakman alias Lokman, 1989 0 PLJR 587, which was rendered after taking into the consideration the Full Bench decision of this Court in Raj Kumar Prasad V/s. Uchit Narayan Singh -- ; Tip Top V/s. Indramani, 1982 0 BBCJ 433 and in Sadanand Das V/s. Md. Hussain and Anr. 1986 0 PLJR 46. 28. From a bare perusal of the said chart as mentioned in the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 174/76 giving rise to Second Appeal No. 58 of 1985 (R), it is evident that the defendant remitted the rent for July and August, 1971, in September, 1971, whereas he remitted the rent for the months of September and October, 1971 on 3.11.1971. He, therefore, clearly became a defaulter for the months of July and September. In absence of any pleadings of any proof that he tendered the monthly rent in respect of those months on the last date of August, 1971 and October, 1971. 29. It may further be mentioned that the defendant raised a plea only to the effect that a personal tender of rent made only in respect of part of the January, 1971 and February, 1971. It is, therefore, clear from the said chart, that on a number of occassions, he remitted the stipulated monthly rent by postal money order for two consecutive months in the third month. 30. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the learned court of appeal below has rightly held that the plaintiff became a defaulter, in terms of the provisions contained in Sec. 11(1)(d) of the said Act. 31. However, before parting with this case another fact must be mentioned. On 18.11.1990, when the appeals were taken up for hearing and the matters were heard at length. One Rajendra Prasad Burman and others pressed an application purported to be under Order I, Rule, 10, Sub-rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein, they alleged that by reason of a deed of sale, dated 23.12.1982 they acquired atleast 1/6th share of property in holding No. 762 and came in joint possession of the respondent-plaintiff through tenant. 32. In the said application, the said intervenors, further made an averment that they have been realising rent at the rate of Rs. 10 per month from the defendant. 33. Mr. 32. In the said application, the said intervenors, further made an averment that they have been realising rent at the rate of Rs. 10 per month from the defendant. 33. Mr. V. Shivnath the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, who pressed the aforementioned application for intervention, when questioned, stated that the said applicants do not want that the defendantstenants should be evicted. This Court, at that time asked Mr. V. Shivnath as to how the applicants have been accepting rent at the rate of Rs. 10 per month which appeared to be absurd to this Court, in view of the fact that the tenants have been paying a higher amount of rent to the plaintiff-respondents. This Court on that date further questioned Mr. N.K. Prasad as to Whether the defendant-tenants deny the title of the plaintiffs-respondents or not. 34. Mr. R.K. Prasad, then submitted that he would file a rejoinder to the aforementioned application filed by the intervenors purported to be under Order I, Rule 10, Sub-rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 35. Today at the time of bearing, a rejoinder to the said application was filed on behalf of the appellant whereas an application for amendment to the application for intervention was filed on behalf of intervenors, whereby and whereunder they purported to seek leave to amend by alleging that the quantum of rent mentioned in their application for intervention was inadvertantly typed as Rs. 10 only in place of Ra. 100. 36. Alongwith the said rejoinder, one rent receipt for the month of January, 1983 purported to be dated 31.3.1983 had been annexed wherein the name of the landlord was stated to be Om Prakash Berma and the rate of rent has been mentioned at Rs. 100. The said rent receipt was annexed with the said rejoinder filed by the tenants-appellants and marked as Annexure 1 thereto. 37. In Annexure-1, the name of the tenant has been mentioned as Radhakrishna Prasad. Annexure-2 is a rent receipt purported to have been granted by Sishir Kumar Chatterjee in favour of one Janki Prasad when in the rate of rent was mentioned as Rs. 5 per month and by reason of the said receipt of a sum of Rs. 15 allegedly realised by way of rent for the month of April to June, 1956 was acknowledged. 38. 5 per month and by reason of the said receipt of a sum of Rs. 15 allegedly realised by way of rent for the month of April to June, 1956 was acknowledged. 38. In Second Appeal No. 58 of 1985 (R), a similar submission is paragraph-3 of the show cause has been made. 39. The appellants in the said appeal annexed a rent receipt showing the monthly rent of Rs. 100 paid to one Omprakash Berma by Narain Sao, which is marked as Annexure-1 to the aforementioned show cause. The said receipts contains certain interpolation with regard to the date of the receipt. The date of the aforementioned rent receipt was mentioned to the 31st January, 1983 was sought to be realised. 40. Similarly, in Second Appeal No. 59 of 1985 (R), similar statements have been made in para 3 of the show cause, and in the said show cause a receipt purported to have been granted on behalf of Omprakash Berma to Sri Tribhuban Sao towards January, 1983 was sought to have been granted. 41. In view of the respective submissions made by the Counsel for the parties, I considered it necessary to hear Mr. V. Shivnath, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Intervenors, also in these appeals. 42. From a perusal of the application for interventior filed by Sri Rajendra Prasad Verman and others, it is evident that they made an unsuccessful attempt to get themselves impleaded as parties in Title Appeal No. 173 of 1976. However, they filed a Civil Revision application in this Court and by an order, dated 25.7.1984, it was observed that in the event of succeess in a partition suit, the applicant may made claim over the suit property. 43. From a perusal of a preliminary decree passed in the suit, it appears that the said decree was signed on 9th June, 1988. 44. It is, therefore, clear that the intervenors had not filed an application with utmost expedition. 45. Further, as noticed from the show cause filed on behalf of the appellant, it is evident that Intervenor No. 5, Vijay Kumar perported to have purchased come interest in the properties, by reason of a deed of sale, dated 20th December, 1979, but the monthly rent was allegedly realised by his predecessors-in-interest since 1983 from the defendant-appellant. 46. 45. Further, as noticed from the show cause filed on behalf of the appellant, it is evident that Intervenor No. 5, Vijay Kumar perported to have purchased come interest in the properties, by reason of a deed of sale, dated 20th December, 1979, but the monthly rent was allegedly realised by his predecessors-in-interest since 1983 from the defendant-appellant. 46. The intervenors-applicants, therefore, on their own showing, having purchased undivided interest and that too in relation to the extent of 1/6th share only had, no right realise any rent for loss rent at the rate of Rs. 100 per month, particularly, in view of the fact that original rent was Rs. 20 per month. It further does not stand to reason as to how in one of the appeals, namely Title Appeal No. 60 of 1985 (R), the appellant thereof had been paying rent at the rate of Rs. 5 per month to some of the alleged co-sharers. 47. Mr. N.K. Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants-appellants, when questioned, very frankly conceded that the receipts purported to have been granted in the year 1983 by Omprakash Verma, had not been filed before the learned court of appeal below nor the purported rent receipts as contained in Annexure-2 to the said application as a result whereof rent at the rate of Rs. 5 per month and at the rate of Rs. 3 per month in Title Appeals No. 59 of 1985 (R) and 60 of 1985 (R) had been paid in the year 1956 had been produced either before the learned trial court and before the First Appellate Court. 48. The intervenors-applicants had also not contended that either before the learned court of appeal below or in the Civil Revision application they had ever annexed a copy of the rent receipt, allegedly, granted in favour of the defendant-appellants by them. 49. If the allegations contained in the aforementioned applications for intervention and/or the show cause filed on behalf of the defendants-appellants were true, in such an event, it was expected of the defendants-appellants to bring the said fact before the learned court of appeal below. 50. Further, it does not stand to reason as to how tenants have been paying rent of different amounts of rent to different co-sharers and that too with such a variation. 51. 50. Further, it does not stand to reason as to how tenants have been paying rent of different amounts of rent to different co-sharers and that too with such a variation. 51. In law, a purchaser of an undivided share, does not acquire any right to possess the property in question without the consent of all the co-owners as thereby he merely acquires a right to sue for partition. 52. In that view of the matter, it does not stand to any reason as to how, when and why without repuciating the title of the plaintiffs-respondents, the defendants-appellants had began to pay rent from January, 1983 to Omprakash Verma. 53. The intervenors-applicants as also the defendants-appellants have thus also not brought full facts on record. 54. The defendants-appellants apparently did not deny the title of the plaintiffs-respondents in their show cause, in view of my observations on the previous day of hearing that in the event, they deny title of their admitted landlords, they may be evicted upon forfeiture of their tenancy. In view of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Majati Subbarao V/s. P.V.K. Krishann Rao. 55. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, as a final decree proceeding has not yet started and it is not yet known as to whether intervenors-applicants would be allotted any share in the building in question and as they may also be directed to transfer their shares to the plaintiffs, in terms of Sec. 4 of the Partition Act, I am of the view that the intervenors-applicable, at this stage had absolutely no locus standi to oppose a decree for eviction which has been passed by the learned court of appeal below in favour of the plaintiff respondent, evidently by joining hands with the tenant-defendants. 56. The plea of the intervenors-applicants, therefore, that in view of the allegations made in their application for intervention, the suit for eviction should be dismissed, cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected. 57. In the result, there is no merit in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed. 58. Before parting with these cases, it must further be recorded that in view of the fact that the tenants-defendants are carrying on business in the tenanted premises, I asked Mr. N.K. Prasad as to whether the appellants want reasonable time for vacating the premises in suit on giving usual undertaking, but, Mr. 58. Before parting with these cases, it must further be recorded that in view of the fact that the tenants-defendants are carrying on business in the tenanted premises, I asked Mr. N.K. Prasad as to whether the appellants want reasonable time for vacating the premises in suit on giving usual undertaking, but, Mr. Prasad replied that the tenants-appellants are not prepared to give the usual undertaking before this Court. 59. In this view of the matter, these appeals are dismissed with costs.