JUDGMENT Nathoo Lal, Member. - This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 21-6-1984 passed by Additional Commissioner, Bareilly Division, Bareilly in Appeal No. 38 of 1983 of district Budaun arising out of the judgment and decree dated 30-9-83 passed by Sub-Divisional Officer Sahaswan district Budaun in suit No. 3 under Sections 229-B/176 of the U.P, Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, to be called the "Act" hereinafter. 2. Briefly stating the facts of the case are that a suit under sections 229-B/l 76 of the Act was brought before Sub-Divisional Officer Sahaswan district Budaun by Shri Lochanpuri, respondent son of Mohanpuri resident of village Khitaura, Bhagwant, Pargana Kot, Tehsil Sahaswan district Budaun, against the appellants Chandan son of Khumani, Duli Ram son of Sri Ram residents of the same village and two others with the allegations that plot No. 406/968 area 6 bighas 16 biswas and 5 biswansis situate in village Khitaura Bhagwant pargana Kot, Tehsil Sahaswan district Budaun was the bhumidhari tenancy of Harnam and Shishupal Singh son of Hukum Singh of the village with transferable rights and with equal shares. The plaint case is that one of the co-tenants Shishupal Singh transferred his half share in favour of Chandan, appellant and mutation took place accordingly but the half share of Harnam Singh was put to public auction in execution of a decree of the suit No. 372 of 1973 Lochanpuri v. Harnam Singh, decided by the Civil Court and the auction sale was finalised in favour of plaintiff as a result of which the sale certificate dated 20-4-79 was issued in bis favour and as such he became bhumidhari tenant of half share accordingly. It has further been alleged that mutation sought on the basis of this auction sale by the plaintiff was refused and objections were filed by the appellants in those proceedings also. The suit was contested by the appellants-defendants on the grounds that the recorded tenure holders Harnam Singh had transferred a specific area of land of his khata under a registered sale deed executed on 2-9-77 in favour of appellant Chandan and on 24-7-80 in favour of appellant Dali Ram, and as such their names had already been mutated in revenue records. The defendants also alleged that all the proceedings of execution of decree of the civil court including the attachment of land in dispute and its auction sale etc. were illegal and have no effect on the rights and interest of the defendants. The suit was decreed by the trial court under his judgment and decree dated 30-9-83 and the appeal preferred by aggrieved Chandan and Duli Ram before the Commissioner Bareilly Division, Bareilly was also dismissed under his judgment and order dated 21-6-84 paying the way for this litigation to come to this court in the form of second appeal. 3. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the record. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant, during the course of his arguments, has vehemently raised the question relating to the fact whether the so called judgment-debtor Harnam Singh did have half share at the time when the proceedings relating to execution of decree of the civil court had taken place and whether there is any such evidence on record to prove the fact. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that to prove the pleadings of para 1 of the plaint that Shishupal Singh and Harnam Singh son of Hakim Singh had half share in plot No. 409/968 containing an area of 6 bighas 16 bis was and 5 biswansis, no relevant khatauni has been filed and therefore it cannot be inferred that Harnam Singh and Shishupal Singh did have half share each as pleaded in the plaint. The learned counsel has drawn my attention towards the documentary evidence on record including the khatauni of 1384 to 1385 Fasli showing an area of 3 bighas 13 biswas and 2 biswansis recorded in the name of appellant Chandan and the other khatauni extract for 1384 to 1387 Fasli having 1 bigha 14 biswas and 15 biswansis area recorded in the name of Harnam Singh from the plot in dispute No. 409/968 and similarly another khatauni extract of 1390 to 1395 Fasli showing entries in the name of Harnam Singh as the recorded bhumidhar with an area of 1 bigha 14 biswas and 15 biswansis and entries in the name of Chandan appellant with an area 1 bigha 13 biswas and 7 biswansis in addition to an area of 3 bighas 13 biswas and 2 biswansis of the same plot recorded separately. The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants are that there is no evidence on record to show that Chandan Singh and Harnam Singh are the recorded co-tenure holders but as a matter of fact the documentary evidence on record goes to prove that both the persons are separately recorded in separate khatas in the khatauni and there had been sub-ploting of plot No. 409/968 originally containing the total area of 6 bighas 16 biswas and 5 biswansis. Thus the learned counsel for the appellant has argued laying stress more and more on the point that when evidently Harnam Singh was recorded as bhumidhar of an area of 1 bigha 14 biswas and 15 biswansis only at the relevant time when the execution proceedings of the civil court decree took place, how could the attachment of the specific area of 3 bighas 8 biswas and 12 biswansis relating to plot no. 409/968 of the village be said to be valid particularly when according to the pleadings of the plaintiff himself Harnam Singh had only 3 bighas 8 biswas and 20 biswansis area of the plot in his half share. The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant therefore are that whole of the execution proceedings of the civil court decree right from the attachment to the confirmation of sale have vitiated and no rights can be held to have accrued in favour of plaintiff-respondent on that basis. The other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the execution proceedings of the civil court have also been bad in law because of an other point relating to the legal implication involved and the contentions of the learned counsel are that in case of a cotenant as alleged by the plaintiff himself in his plaint itself, no specific area can be ear-marked for the purposes of attachment as has been done in the attachment under consideration and no specific area can be sold of because every co-tenant has got his right and interest in every inch of land of co-tenancy particularly when the half share has been alleged by the plaintiff while the area under attachment was more than half of the total area of the plot in dispute as disclosed in the plaint. The learned counsel for the appellant has also stated that if it is a case of co-tenancy rights and the co-tenancy will continue even if the land has been placed under attachment. The other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the findings of the learned courts below declaring the sale deeds executed by Harnam Singh in favour of appellants after the attachment of the land in dispute are void, are not supported by any legal authority because according to the contentions of the learned counsel there is no law that rightful owner cannot sell land which is under attachment by the court. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has asserted that since the pleadings of para 1 of the plaint have been admitted by the defendants in their written statement filed, there is no need of any evidence to prove the co-tenancy of Shishupal Singh and Harnam Singh. The learned counsel for the respondent has also contended that since the share of Harnam Singh was placed under attachment on 9-3-76 and since in the public auction conducted, the appellant Duli Ram was himself one of the bidders, the knowledge about the attachment and sale in execution of the civil court decree is proved and any transfer of the property under such attachment is void. The learned counsel has also argued that when the land had already been sold Harnam Singh did not have any right to transfer it as he had lost his rights in the land. 6. I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties. So far as the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants that there is no evidence to show that Harnam Singh had half share in the land originally recorded with an area of 6 bighas 16 biswas and 5 biswansis relating to plot No. 409/968 are concerned, the fact is proved from the extract of khatauni of record relating to the year 1378-1380 Fasli of village concerned showing khata No. 586 recorded in the name of Hakim Singh son of Pahalwan Singh with four plots including plot No. 409/968 with an area of 6 bighas 16 biswas and 5 biswansis. In the same khata the entries of succession under the orders of Supervisor Kanungo on the basis of P.A. 11 have also been made and the names of Harnam Singh and Shishupal Singh son of Hakim Singh have been replaced on the death of recorded tenure holder Hakim Singh. Thus there can be no dispute that Harnam Singh and Shishupal Singh being the real brothers if succeeded from their father equal shares in the property, Harnam Singh did have half share. But I agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence on record to show that at the time of execution of Civil Court decree when attachment took place Harnam Singh had half share recorded in his name as co-tenant because the khatauni available on record go to prove that in the year 1384 to 1389 Fasli Harnam Singh had an area of 1 bigha 14 biswas and 15 biswansis relating to plot No. 409/968 recorded in his name and the year 1384 Fasli corresponds to 1976 when the attachment took place. Thus it is proved that the attachment proceedings were based on the wrong facts and wrong area was attached which was not recorded in the name of judgment-debtor Harnam Singh and I totally agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant that from the very beginning the execution of Civil Court decree stood vitiated and afterwards the other proceedings of sale etc. also met the same fate and all of them have become invalid. 7. Moreover, there is a legal point affecting adversely the fate of the suit. also met the same fate and all of them have become invalid. 7. Moreover, there is a legal point affecting adversely the fate of the suit. Order 21, Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure Code makes specific provisions relating to the remedy for the persons purchasing the immovable property on auction sale in execution of a decree of the Civil Court and it provides that if any resistance or obstruction is put to the possession of immovable property to be taken by such purchaser and this resistance or obstruction is placed by any person obtaining possession of the property, the purchaser shall make an application to the court concerned complaining against such resistance or obstruction and the court shall adjudicate upon the application as under the provisions of Rule 98 or 99 and shall make order under Rule 100, in accordance with the determination oi questions referred to in Rule 101 of order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is another important point relating to the purchase of the property in dispute by the plaintiff-respondent which is also to be decided before his claim can be upheld. Order 21, Rule 72 of the C.P.C. clearly provides that no holder of a decree in execution of which property is sold shall without express permission of the court buy or purchase the property. This provision is mandatory and there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff respondent has purchased the land in dispute with the permission of the court concerned. The provisions of Rule 101 of Order 21 of the C.P.C. have got fatal affect on the maintainability of the suit itself because the jurisdiction of the revenue court in such matters is clearly barred to entertain the suit. The provisions of Rule 101 of Order 21 of the C.P.C. have got fatal affect on the maintainability of the suit itself because the jurisdiction of the revenue court in such matters is clearly barred to entertain the suit. The provisions of Rule 101 read as under : Order 21, Rule 101: "All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction, to decide such question." It is thus very clear from the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that the proper remedy for the plaintiff respondent Lochan was to have moved an application before the Civil Court concerned who had passed the decree in execution of which the land was purchased by him, complaining that the appellants vendees were resisting and obstructing him from taking over possession and were not accepting his rights and interest in the land purchased out of the share of the judgment-debtor Harnam Singh in sale under public auction and there upon it was for the Civil Court concerned to have adjudicated upon the application after hearing the other parties too. The orders of the Civil Court concerned in such matters have been made to contain same force and are to be subject to the same conditions as of an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree as provided by Rule 103 of Order 21 of the C.P.C. Thus I arrive at the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the revenue court is barred to entertain this suit and that the suit is not maintainable and proper forum has not been adopted. 8. In view of the observations made above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court on 30-9-1983 and by the lower appellate court on 21-6-1984 are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed with costs to the defendants-appellants.