Ramchandra Singh v. Union Of India — 1990 DIGILAW 330 (PAT)

Judgment MOOKHERJI, J. 1. C.W.J.C. No. 572 of 1989 (R) and M.J.C. No. 298 of 1989 have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. C.W.J.C. No. 572/89(R). In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have sought for quashing the order dated 20-2-1989, passed by respondent Deputy Commissioner of Dhanbad in B.P.L.E. case No. 1/87 (State V/s. Ram Chandra Singh and others (Annexure-1) whereby the petitioners have been directed to remove the unauthorised and illegal encroachments made by them in plot Nos. 639, 641 and 643 appertaining to Khata No. 43 of Mauza No. 31, Dhobitarn, P.S. Bank-More, Dhanbad and to remove the same within two weeks from the date of the order, failing which the Coal-Superintendent (respondent No.4) could seek assistance of police force and Magistrate for removal of it and it has been further directed that since the petitioners have not made any claim on portions of plot Nos. 636, 638, 640, 642, 645 and 658 of the said khata, the Coal Superintendent could resume possession over these plots and also the order dated 8-3-1989 of Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division in B.P.L.E. Case No. 27 of 1989 dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioners against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad. 2. The petitioners state, inter alia, that the subject matter of dispute in the impugned proceeding are several plots measuring a total area of 34,000 sq. ft. out of those plots, the petitioners purchased 0.16, 0.18 and 0.09 acres respectively in this way that 0.16 acre in plot No.639 was purchased by petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 by virtue of a registered document dated 5-3-1982 and 0.27 acre in plot Nos. 642 and 643 of the said khata was purchased by petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 on 22-5-1982 by different sale deeds for consideration after obtaining necessary permission under the Land Ceiling Act, came in possession of a total areas 0.43 acre in the aforesaid three plots and thereafter got their names mutated in the office of circle officer, Dhanbad and since then they have been paying rent to the authorities. The petitioners have constructed boundary wall and staff quarters, septic reservior, bath room, etc. for the purpose of running a petrol pump. The petitioners have constructed boundary wall and staff quarters, septic reservior, bath room, etc. for the purpose of running a petrol pump. A registered lease for a period of ten years in favour of petitioner No. 3 with regard to the aforesaid three plots on a rental of Rs. 25/ - per month was entered into. Petitioner No. 5 applied for necessary permission and/or agency to run petrol pump before Bharat petroleum Company and the then Dy. Commissioner on being approached by the said petroleum company, granted a no objection certificate for running a petrol pump and service station business in the said plot by its memo No. 2451/ Supply/ Dhanbad dated 8-8-1984 (Annexure-1/A) after obtaining necessary report from Circle Officer, Dhanbad (Annexure-1). They entered into a partnership business with effect from 1-3-1986, invested a huge amount to set up the business in the name of style of M/s. Kamdhenu service station, Shastri Nagar, Dhanbad and for that they also obtained cash credit facility from a Bank. 3. The petitioners have further averred that a proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being M. P. No. 327 of 1985 (annexure-2) was initiated by Assistant Coal Superintendent against the petitioners with regard to the aforesaid purchased land and another case under the same provision being M. P. Case No. 1072 of 1985 was initiated against petitioner No. 1 Ramchandra Singh with regard to plot Nos. 640, 641, 642, 645 and 558 which by an order dated 16-10-1985 was made absolute against Assistant Coal Superintendent and vacated in favour of petitioner No. 1 (Annexure-3). The Coal Superintendent Dhanbad got a proceeding initiated, being case No. 9 of 1985 in the Court of Estate Officer, Dhanbad under Sec. 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction and Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971 for eviction of petitioner No. 1 and that proceeding was decided ex parte without giving any opportunity by an order dated 1-6-1985, against which petitioner No. 1 filed Misc. Appeal No. 45 of 1985 and that was allowed by an order dated 16-4-1986 (Annexure-4). 4. The petitioners further aver that the respondents and the Estate Officer again got a proceeding under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act initiated against petitioner No. 1 (B.P.L.E. No. 17(iii) 84-85) for removal of encroachment upon plot Nos. 638, 639, 642 and 643. Appeal No. 45 of 1985 and that was allowed by an order dated 16-4-1986 (Annexure-4). 4. The petitioners further aver that the respondents and the Estate Officer again got a proceeding under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act initiated against petitioner No. 1 (B.P.L.E. No. 17(iii) 84-85) for removal of encroachment upon plot Nos. 638, 639, 642 and 643. The Circle Officer, Dhanbad by an order dated 15-5-1985 decided the case in favour of the said petitioner (Annexure-5). Against that, an appeal was preferred before Additional Collector, Dhanbad and it was remanded to the Court below (Annexure-6) and thereafter the respondent No. 4 (Coal Superintendent) withdraw the case without obtaining any permission to refile similar case under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act (Annexure-7). 5. The petitioners further contend that from the facts stated, it would be clear that petitioners are being harassed at the instance of the respondent-Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad as another proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated by the said respondent with mala fide intention/motive against the petitioners with regard to plot Nos. 638, 637, 640, 641, 642, 643, 657, 658 and 636, that at no stage of that proceeding the respondent divulged that Bharat Coking Coal had any right, possession and interest in the land in question and as a matter of fact, no averment in that regard had been made at any stage and that the respondent-Deputy Commissioner in the circumstances, had no jurisdiction to initiate the impugned proceeding inasmuch as the same was barred by the principle of res judicata and other provisions of the law. 6. In a supplementary affidavit, it has been asserted that a proceeding under Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure initiated against the petitioners by Coal Superintendent being M.P. case No. 1072 of 1985 ended in favour of the petitioners and the possession of the petitioners was declared in the said case and thereafter, another proceeding under Sec. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated which was challenged in Criminal Misc. No. 4835 of 1986 (Annexure-E) and further proceeding was stayed by the High Court. During the pendency of that Cr. Misc. case, the respondent initiated the impugned proceeding (Annexure-11) in order to defeat the stay and a show cause notice was served, which was challenged by the petitioners in Cr. No. 4835 of 1986 (Annexure-E) and further proceeding was stayed by the High Court. During the pendency of that Cr. Misc. case, the respondent initiated the impugned proceeding (Annexure-11) in order to defeat the stay and a show cause notice was served, which was challenged by the petitioners in Cr. W.J.C. No. 140 of 1987 (R) in which, the Ranchi Bench of this Court directed the petitioners to file show cause (Annexure-9) before the respondent-Dy. Commissioner some other factual and legal points have also been mentioned in the supplementary affidavit which will be taken at the appropriate stage. 7. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 Deputy Commissioner, it is stated that on 12-1-1987 the Coal Superintendent (respondent No. 4) filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of Bihar Land Encroachment Act (in short B.P.L.E. Act) alleging therein that the land belonging to Union of India was encroached upon by the petitioners, which was acquired in the year 1958 in the Land Acquisition Case No. 20/ 58-59 after observing all the legal formalities and the compensation was paid to the actual owner (annexures-B,C and D) and the same was not denied by the present petitioners in various cases initiated by/or against them. On the contrary, they (petitioners) based their claim on the sale deeds executed in their favour in the year 1982 respecting the land claimed by them. The documents relied upon by the petitioners are of no help to establish their title to and possession over the land as they could not have also acquired title to the land in view of the acquisition of the land in the year 1958 and, therefore, the documents papers, judgment, etc. in favour of the petitioners have no relevancy. 8. It is further contended that after the land was acquired in the year 1958 and possession was delivered in favour of the Union of India, through Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad, Union of India is the owner of the land and the nature of the land on account of acquisition has become a public land. On the basis of the objections made in the petition, a case under B.P.L.E. was instituted and after examining all the documents, the Dy. Commissioner respondent passed the order under challenge (Annexure-11) which, on appeal by the petitioners was also confirmed by the Commissioner, Hazaribagh Division (respondent) No. 2 (Annexure-12). 9. On the basis of the objections made in the petition, a case under B.P.L.E. was instituted and after examining all the documents, the Dy. Commissioner respondent passed the order under challenge (Annexure-11) which, on appeal by the petitioners was also confirmed by the Commissioner, Hazaribagh Division (respondent) No. 2 (Annexure-12). 9. It is then contended that the petrol pump in a part of plot No. 639, named Kamdhenu Service Station, was fraudulently constructed by the petitioners which they could not have legally constructed on a public land, having no title to it in any portion of the same, that neither the withdrawal of the earlier proceeding under the B.P.L.E. Act nor the earlier proceeding under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short P.P. Act) would be a bar to initiation of a proceeding by the Dy. Commissioner under the provisions of B.P.L.E. Act and, therefore, the principle of res judicata, as has been sought to be made out, has also no application in the instant case. 10. It is then averred that the petitioners have only confined their claim with respect to plot Nos. 639, 642 and 643 on the basis of fabricated sale deeds and not on any other plots which were also subject matter of acquisition in the year 1958. As regards these plots also, the petitioners never questioned the said acquisition in any proceeding and as such, they cannot also lay any claim on plot Nos. 639, 642 and 643. The sale deeds of the year 1982, in the facts and circumstances, cannot confer any title to and possession over the land in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners took forcible possession of the land in question in plot No. 639, illegally and thereby, encroached upon the said land, although it was acquired in the year 1958 in accordance with law and possession was delivered to the Union of India. The petitioners by practising fraud/misrepresentation got their names mutated. That mere raising of some constructions over the land illegally encroached upon, will not confer any right on the petitioner (s). 11. The petitioners by practising fraud/misrepresentation got their names mutated. That mere raising of some constructions over the land illegally encroached upon, will not confer any right on the petitioner (s). 11. The respondents further contended that issuance of a no objection certificate approving the site of a petrol pump by the authorities does not mean that the title or legality of possession of the persons concerned had been examined and that such a no objection certificate in respect of a public land cannot create any right much less valid right in favour of any person. The decision of the proceeding under Secs. 144 and 145 of the Cr. P.C. are also of no help because they are in respect of public land. At any rate, respondent Deputy Commissioner was competent to initiate a proceeding under the B.P.L.E. Act in respect of public land as the very object of this special Act is for removal of unauthorised encroachment on public land. The order passed by the Circle Officer as well as the Estate Officer in favour of the petitioners have not been passed in accordance with law as the matter in issue was not properly examined and for that matter the order passed by the Circle Officer was set aside in appeal. The orders were obtained by suppressing material facts particularly, the acquisition proceeding that had taken place long ago in the year 1958. 12. It is further averred by the respondents that petitioner No. 1 Ram Chandra Singh who was the only party in the proceeding before the Anchal Adhikari, Dhanbad, Estate Officer and the 6th Additional District Judge, Dhanbad clearly stated and asserted before the Deputy Commissioner in B.P.L.E. Act 1/87-88 that he had no concern with the land in question, in his reply (Annexure-10A) that the petitioners had also moved this court before Ranchi Bench in C.W.J.C. No. 4835 of 1986 (R) where all the points raised here had been taken, but the Court rejected that writ application with a direction to file a show cause before the respondent Dy. Commissioner in the B.P.L.E. case which was initiated in accordance with law. Similar order was passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1197 of 1988 (R) after considering the show cause filed by the respondent Dy. Commissioner. 13. Commissioner in the B.P.L.E. case which was initiated in accordance with law. Similar order was passed by this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1197 of 1988 (R) after considering the show cause filed by the respondent Dy. Commissioner. 13. It is further contended that petitioner had been given full opportunity to submit their show cause inasmuch as, the Income-tax authorities had also been directed by the Dy. Commissioner to make available the documents required by the petitioners as prayed for but the petitioners did not go to collect that records and, therefore, any averment made that proper opportunity was not given for producing the document has no relevancy. As a matter of fact, the so-called documents required by the petitioners were available in the records of B.P.L.E. case No. 17(iii) 1984-85. That since the petitioners had encroached upon the public land, the Deputy Commissioner respondent was within his jurisdiction to direct them to remove the encroachment. 14. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 4, the Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad in the court it is stated, inter alia, that the land in question along with other land had been acquired by the Government in accordance with law for the construction of quarter etc. and the possession was delivered to Coal Superintendent on behalf of the Union Government (Annexure-4). That acquisition proceeding had been initiated after completing all the legal formalities (Annexures-B-C and D) and therefore it cannot be questioned by the petitioners compensation was given to the then owner on 2-12-1958 in respect of 5.13 Acres (Annexure-D) The sale deeds on the basis of which the petitioners are claiming land, are fraudulent, sham and collusive documents conferring no title upon any of the vendees and therefore, the earlier proceeding against Ram Chandra Singh (Petitioner No. 1) under the provisions of B.P.L.E. Act cannot operate as res judicata in respect of the subsequent proceeding. 15. It is then averred that the petrol pump was constructed by encroaching the land in plot No. 639. 15. It is then averred that the petrol pump was constructed by encroaching the land in plot No. 639. That on legal advice the earlier B.P.L.E. case was withdrawn and a fresh case No. 1/87 was filed after impleading all necessary persons which would also be apparent from the fact that in the first case only petitioner No. 1 was a party, who subsequently gave up his claim on the ground that he had no concern with the land and the other petitioners who actually are claiming were, therefore made parties in the subsequent proceeding. 16. It is further averred that while passing order in Cr. Misc. No. 4835 of 1986(R) this Court had taken into account all the facts which pertained to various 144 Cr.P.C. proceedings, the action taken under Sec. 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act by the Estate Officer, Dhanbad for eviction of the petitioners in case No. 19 of 1985 and the decision of the District Judge, Dhanbad in Misc. appeal No. 45/85 setting aside the order of the Estate Officer, on erroneous grounds by an order dated 16-4-1986. 17. It is then averred that another proceeding was started against the petitioners under Bihar Public Land (Encroachment) Act before the Circle Officer, Dhanbad respecting the land, who without considering the rejoinder to show cause stayed the proceeding, that against that order an appeal bearing MRA case No. 30 of 1985 was preferred before the Addl. Collector and that the case was remanded to Circle Officer to hear afresh and that later on, it was withdrawn as it was advised to file a fresh case under B.P.L.E. Act making all the interested persons parties to it. It was pointed out that it had been held by this court by its order dated 26/05/1988 in Criminal Misc. No. 4835 of 1986 that the proceedings under Bihar Land Encroachment Act were independent proceedings and, therefore, the petitioners were liable to show cause to the notice by the Deputy Commissioner (Annexure-A). Similar direction was given in other writ application filed by the petitioners and as such, the petitioner cannot now question the impugned proceeding which was initiated by a competent authority in accordance with law. 18. Similar direction was given in other writ application filed by the petitioners and as such, the petitioner cannot now question the impugned proceeding which was initiated by a competent authority in accordance with law. 18. It was then contended that the plea taken by the petitioners that as the land acquired vested in the Central Government, that Government alone could take steps for eviction under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act and not the State authorities, is not tenable in view of the acquisition of the land by the State Government, delivery of possession effected on 2-12-1958 and payment of compensation to the owners. 19. The parties have also filed some other application in the shape of supplementary affidavits and replies thereto, but it is needless to state all the facts stated therein as they do not advance the case of the parties any further. M.J.C. 298 of 1989 20. The petitioners have filed an application under Secs. 10 and 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India to initiate a proceeding for contempt against the opposite parties for having wilfully and intentionally violated the order of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 572 of 1989 (R) dated 6th April passed by S.S. Hasan and S.H.S. Abidi, JJ. whereby, the authorities were directed not to evict the petitioners from plot Nos. 639, 642 and 643 having an area of 0.43 acres. Prior to that order, on 31-3-1989 stay order was also passed by this Court which was communicated to the opposite party-Dy. Commissioner through a special messenger, but even then, he (Opposite Party No. 2) ordered for posting of police force at the petrol pump of the petitioners and thereby they (petitioners) were deprived of using that land and pump. Accordingly, it is stated that the order of the Court to maintain status quo as also for not evicting the petitioners from the disputed plots till the disposal of the main application having been wilfully and deliberately violated by the Dy. Commissioner and other officials they rendered themselves liable for punishment under Contempt of Courts Act. 21. Accordingly, it is stated that the order of the Court to maintain status quo as also for not evicting the petitioners from the disputed plots till the disposal of the main application having been wilfully and deliberately violated by the Dy. Commissioner and other officials they rendered themselves liable for punishment under Contempt of Courts Act. 21. Opposite party No. 2 the then Deputy Commissioner of Dhanbad, who had passed the impugned orders and other orders filed a detailed show cause stating inter alia, that prior to the order dated 6-4-1989 in C.W.J.C. No. 572/89(R), two orders were passed by this Court dated 15-3-89 and 31-3-1989. By the first order, status quo as existing on that date was ordered to be maintained which was to remain in force till 31-3-1989, the next date of hearing. On 31-3-89, the case was adjourned for next Monday at the instance of State counsel and the orders as contained in annexures-11 and 12 to main application were stayed. Before the order dated 15-3-89 came to his knowledge, the Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad (O.P. 3) made a prayer for deputation of a Magistrate and police force and took possession of the land on 11-3-1989 in the light of the order passed in Bihar Public Land Encroachment case No. 1 of 1987 (Annexures-A/1 and A/2). In the changed circumstances, the opposite party No. 2 could not help the petitioners in the light of the orders dated 15-3-89 and 31-3-89. The Coal Superintendent was in lawful possession of the land as the petitioners were dispossessed in view of the order passed prior to the order passed by this court on 15-3-89. On 16-3-89 an order was passed on the petition of petitioner No. 3 to maintain status quo as existing on 15-3-89 and an information to that effect was sent to the Coal Superintendent (Annexure-A/3). 22. On 16-3-89 an order was passed on the petition of petitioner No. 3 to maintain status quo as existing on 15-3-89 and an information to that effect was sent to the Coal Superintendent (Annexure-A/3). 22. On 28-2-89, petitioner No.5 had filed an application for staying the operation of the impugned order till the disposal of appeal before the Commissioner North Chhotanagpur, Hazaribagh, but as no stay order had been granted in the appeal and a period of two weeks allowed by the impugned order, had already elapsed, the petitioners were directed to stop the business of running the petrol pump immediately and hand over the possession to the Coal Superintendent with a direction to the Coal Superintendent that no demolition or destruction of any portion of the building should be made till the disposal of the appeal by the learned Commissioner. This was communicated to the petitioners (Annexure-A/4) By a letter No. 1449 dated 23-2-89, the Coal Superintendent informed that he had taken possession of plot Nos. 636, 638, 640, 641, 645 and 648 on 11-3-89 after demarcation by the Anchal Amin (Annexure-A/5). By that time, no status quo order or any stay order was received from this court. This court passed stay order on 31-3-89, but the order could not be complied with due to the fact that before the stay order was received, the possession was already taken by the Coal Superintendent on 11-3-89 and on the date also no information was given by the petitioners that a writ had been filed. 23. So far as the third order of this court dated 6-4-89 that the petitioners should not be evicted is concerned, it is stated that as the possession of the land had already been given to the Coal Superintendent he had no power to restore back the possession to the petitioners as there was no such direction from this Court. It is further submitted that all these facts were not placed by the petitioners before this Court. Some facts relating to acquisition of land, etc. have been stated, but we are not concerned with that in this contempt application. 24. All the steps have been taken by way of precautions for the safety of the petroleum products available in the tank of the petitioners at they were highly inflammable products. Home Guards Jawans with lathi were deputed to maintain law and order. 25. have been stated, but we are not concerned with that in this contempt application. 24. All the steps have been taken by way of precautions for the safety of the petroleum products available in the tank of the petitioners at they were highly inflammable products. Home Guards Jawans with lathi were deputed to maintain law and order. 25. O.P. No. 2 has also offered unqualified apology if inadvertently, any inconvenience was housed to this court. The successor-in-office of O.P. 2 O.P. 4 also filed a separate show cause more or less in the same line. It is not necessary to state it in detail as mainly the allegations are against O.P. 2, the then Dy. Commissioner of Dhanbad. 26. Now, I take up the main writ application i.e. C.W.J.C. No. 572 of 1989 (R). From what has been stated above, it will appear that most facts are admitted in this case. In the circumstances, it is needless to discuss all the documents referred to by the parties, except the relevant ones. 27. It appears that the petitioners have claimed title to and possession over parts of the three plots viz. 639, 642 and 643 from two sources. So far as 16 decimals of plot No. 639 is concerned, it is stated that this plot originally belonged to one Jodha Rai Mohto and after his death, his son Chahtu inherited it and entered into an agreement with the father of Hardeo. After the death of Chahtu, his son in terms of the agreement sold the land to Hardeo on payment of balance consideration amount, who got his name mutated. On 5-3-82 Hardeo sold this 0.16 acres of land by registered deed to petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 for consideration after obtaining permission for the then Dy. Commissioner. 28. In respect of plot Nos. 642 and 643 (area 0.27 acre) it is stated the same also belonged to Jodha Mahto, but for some reason or the other the said land was taken over by Jharia Raj Estate and ultimately the land was settled with one Ram Briksh Vishwakarma. On 22-5-1982 Ram Briksh sold 27 decimals out of these two plots to petitioner Nos. 2, 3, and 4 by registered documents and the aforesaid petitioners got their names mutated after obtaining permission of the then Dy. Commissioner, Dhanbad. On 22-5-1982 Ram Briksh sold 27 decimals out of these two plots to petitioner Nos. 2, 3, and 4 by registered documents and the aforesaid petitioners got their names mutated after obtaining permission of the then Dy. Commissioner, Dhanbad. It is not a controversy that petitioner No. 1 Ramchandra Singh had not purchased any land falling in plot Nos. 639, 642 and 643. 29. Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners has raised four points viz (1) the impugned proceeding is hit by the principle of res judicata (2) the respondent-Dy. Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain an application under the provisions of Bihar Land Encroachment Act, as only the provisions of Public Premises Act was applicable which was earlier initiated and disposed of in favour of the petitioners (3) the petitioners have also acquired title to the property by purchase as also by adverse possession and (4) the action of the Deputy Commissioner-respondent was mala fide because the dispute which was once set at rest by different orders of Revenue courts as well as by the Collector under the Act, was again reopened to harass the petitioners. 30. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-Union of India Mr. Chitaley has submitted that none of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner is applicable on the facts and circumstances of the case. According to him, respondent Deputy Commissioner was the competent authority, being the Collector under the Act, to entertain an application under the provisions of Bihar Land Encroachment Act and pass the impugned order which was subsequently confirmed by the appellate authority and therefore, the petitioners cannot claim any title to the land much less, possession, in respect of public land. 31. Mr. Chitaley has further submitted that the order passed in the earlier proceedings are of no relevance as some of the orders under Sec. 144 Cr.P.C. have spent its force and the others are not in accordance with law. He has also submitted that once the land was acquired in the year 1958, any transaction respecting the land subsequent to that acquisition, by way of sale deed or orders will not create any right in favour of the petitioners and as such, the plea of res judicata is not available to the petitioners. 32. He has also submitted that once the land was acquired in the year 1958, any transaction respecting the land subsequent to that acquisition, by way of sale deed or orders will not create any right in favour of the petitioners and as such, the plea of res judicata is not available to the petitioners. 32. I now propose to take up the points raised on behalf of the petitioners in the manner they are placed. In support of the first point, learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that apart from the fact that the petitioners are lawful purchasers of the property under dispute which was also recognised by the Revenue authorities while mutating their names and also by the then Deputy Commissioner while issuing no objection certificate in the matter of installation of a petrol pump in portion of plot No. 649, all other earlier proceedings respecting the land initiated either at the instance of the Coal Superintendent or the then Deputy Commissioner of Dhanbad having been disposed of in favour of the petitioners, the respondent-Deputy Commissioner could not have initiated the impugned proceeding which is not only illegal on the face of it, but also hit by the principles of res judicata. Learned counsel has referred to the decision of the Criminal Courts passed in a proceeding under Sec. 145 Cr. P. C. (Annexure-18) in respect of disputed land of plot No. 639 in favour of their vender in 1973 and some orders passed in proceedings under Sec. 144 Cr. P.C. He has also referred to the earlier proceedings initiated under the provisions of Public Premises (Removal of Encroachment) Act respecting the disputed land. It is submitted that an appeal was preferred by petitioner No. 1 and the order of the original court was reversed in favour of the petitioner No. 1. In the circumstances, the subsequent proceedings under the provisions of Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act (in short B.P.L.E. Act) are barred by the principle of res judicata in as much as the petitioners being the rightful owners of the property, could not have been termed as encroachers and hence, the impugned proceeding is also not maintainable as the same could only be initiated against a person if the encroachment was with regard to any public land. 33. There is difficulty in accepting these contentions. 33. There is difficulty in accepting these contentions. It appears that in the year 1958, 5 and odd acres of land of various plots including the disputed plots was acquired for staff quarters etc. of the Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad after observing legal formalities, Compensation was paid to the previous owners and delivery of possession was effected on 2-12-58 (Annexures-B. E. and D.). 34. The petitioners have however, stated that all these were paper transaction. Even if it is assumed that the person (s) named by the petitioner was/were original owner (s) of the land, none of them at any stage of that acquisition proceeding had questioned the initiation of that proceeding or raised any objection with regard to acquisition. Neither the alleged agreement between the so-called son of recorded tenant and the father of owner of plot No. 639, nor any paper respecting the circumstances in which the other two plots viz. 642 and 643 were taken over by Jharia Raj and subsequently settled in the name of one Vishwakarma, had been filed or placed in the acquisition proceeding. It it not in controversy that the petitioners have not claimed any interest in the other plots acquired. 35. No objection certificate by the then Dy. Commissioner for installation of a petrol pump in a portion of plot No. 639 is of no consequence as it was granted to Indo Burma Petroleum Company and the certificate cannot confer any title on petitioners as once the land was legally acquired, it stood vested in the Government under Sec. 16 of the Land Acquisition Act and thereby, assumed the character of public land and therefore, persons encroaching upon any portion of it can be dealt with for eviction under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act (in short P.P. Act). 36. Now, it has to be seen what is the effect of the earlier orders under Secs. 144 and 145 Cr.P.C. passed by the original courts as also in the cases under P.P. and B.P.L.E. Act. 37. The order in a proceeding under Sec. 145 Cr.P.C. was passed in the year 1973. This proceeding was in respect of 0.16 acres of plot No. 639 only. 144 and 145 Cr.P.C. passed by the original courts as also in the cases under P.P. and B.P.L.E. Act. 37. The order in a proceeding under Sec. 145 Cr.P.C. was passed in the year 1973. This proceeding was in respect of 0.16 acres of plot No. 639 only. It appears the important issue of acquisition of the land in 1958 was disposed of by the learned Magistrate in a cryptic way by observing that "the facts whether the entire area of plot No. 639 was acquired or not and whether effective delivery of possession was given or not can be examined and thrashed in Civil Court. "It appears from Annexures-B,E, and D, that required notification was made in Bihar gazette for acquisition of 5.13 acres of land for staff quarters of Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act respecting some plots including the three disputed plots and declaration was made as required under Sec. 6 of the Act. It further appears that the disputed plots belonged to one Sham Munda and after acquisition compensation was paid to all the owners of the land to the tune of rupees one lac twenty one thousand four hundered forty two and fifty two paise. The learned Magistrate ought to have considered these matters, but it appears that he misdirected himself by relying upon certain orders of the revenue courts, wherein all those facts where not placed. 38. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that whatever may be the position which once an order was passed declaring the possession of the vendor of the petitioner in respect of 16 decimals of plot No. 639 and no action was taken within a period of three years, the right of the opponent to the disputed property came to an end by extinguishment of the right and title in the property with retrospective effect by virtue of Sec. 28 of the Limitation Act and in support of this, he has relied upon a decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1975 Madh Pra. 196 (Durga Prasad V/s. Pravin). This decision is not applicable in this case in view of the fact that in pursuance of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the possession of the land in question which had vested in the Govt. free from all encumbrances, having been taken over by the Govt. 196 (Durga Prasad V/s. Pravin). This decision is not applicable in this case in view of the fact that in pursuance of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the possession of the land in question which had vested in the Govt. free from all encumbrances, having been taken over by the Govt. vide Annexure-IV dated 2-12-1958 on title on the basis of adverse possession thereafter can be claimed beyond the expiry of the period of 30 years. 39. Then again, there is not an iota of material to show that a fraction of plot No. 639 was left out from acquisition. There is another aspect of the matter. The so called vendor of petitioner-Nos. 2 and 3, named Hardeo appears to have executed a sale document on 5-3-82 in respect of 16 decimals of plot No. 639. If the father of Hardeo or Hardeo himself was coming in possession of the property as real title holders he would have objected to the acquisition which was initiated in the year 1957 or at least would not have allowed the compensation amount to go to any other persons having no concern with the land in plot No. 639. As a matter of fact, neither the vendor of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 nor any person on his behalf claimed title to and possession over any portion of plot No. 639 at any stage of the acquisition proceeding. Similar is the position of other two disputed plot Nos. 642 and 643 where also, the so called vendor Ram Briksh Vishwakarma did not raise objection of any kind as aforesaid, in the acquisition proceedings. 40. The orders passed in the appeal arising out of case No. 19 / 85 under the provisions P. P. Act and the earliar orders under the provisions of B. P. L. E. Act are of no help as the orders were in favour of petitioner No. 1 Ramchandra who was neither a purchaser of any of the plots nor claimed any interest in any land as will appear from the supplementary affidavit (Annexure-10A) filed on behalf of all the petitioners, wherein it was clearly asserted that he had no interest in the land, the relevant paragraphs (4, 5, 8) of which are as follows : "That the opp. party Ram Chandra Singh has nothing to do with the land in present proceeding and he has been unnecessarily dragged everywhere and in the present proceeding in spite of the facts that he had no concern with the land in question, save and except other opp. parties are his relations. That the opp. parties further state and submit that the name of Ram Chandra Singh has been dragged by the petitioner Coal Superintendent in the (sic) everywhere and in the present case with some ulterior motive and for mala fide intention to humiliate him in the eyes of the authorities and to lower him down before this court. That the opp. parties further state and submit that the petitioner, Coal Superintendent knowing full well that Ram Chandra Singh has nothing to do with the land in question has been illegally and unnecessarily dragged everywhere and in the present proceeding to prejudice your honours judicial mind. 41. In the circumstances, the Coal Superintendent rightly withdrew the first proceeding under the provisions of B.P.L.E. Act (Annex. -2) as a regular petition under the said Act had already been filed making all the petitioners as parties to it. 42. The orders passed in 144 Cr.P.C. proceeding are also of no help as the same have spent its force long long ago. 43. There is also no substance in the contention of the petitioners that in view of the earlier order under the B. P. L. E. Act there could not have been any fresh proceeding under that Act. Firstly, there is no specific provision in law that once a proceeding was initiated and disposed of this way or that way, there could not be a second proceeding. The position would have however, been otherwise, if the earlier proceeding was between the same parties and a final order was passed under Sec. 6 of the Act. That apart as stated, the earlier proceeding (Annexure-5) was between Ram Chandra Singh petitioner No. 1 and the Coal Superintendent. 44. The petitioners have relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 88 (Sarguja Transport Service V/s. State Transport Appellate Tribunal) and it has been contended that in view of the principle laid down in the decision, it can be said that subsequent proceeding was not permissible. 44. The petitioners have relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 88 (Sarguja Transport Service V/s. State Transport Appellate Tribunal) and it has been contended that in view of the principle laid down in the decision, it can be said that subsequent proceeding was not permissible. I regret, this contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in that case a writ application was disposed of and therefore, a second writ was filed. Their Lordships observed that: "If the intention of the party was of Bench hunting in that event it shall not be permisible to entertain the second application." In the instant case, the position was not like that. The earlier B.P.L.E. Act. proceeding (Annex.-2) was simply dropped at the instance of the Coal Superintendent, Dhanbad on the ground that as another proceeding had been initiated, he was advised not to proceed with the first one. 45. It has however, been argued by learned Counsel for petitioners that even if it is accepted that the respondent-Deputy Commissioner was competent to initiate a second proceeding, still then, it is not maintainable, because in respect of a land belonging to Union of India, any action for removal of encroachment, the provisions of Public Premises Act has to be resorted to and not of the State Act (B. P. L. E. Act). In this connection a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 406 (Smt. Saiyada Mossarart V/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai Plant Bhiliai) may be seen, wherein it has been observed that: "Since there is no State legislation providing a speedy remedy for eviction of "unauthorised occupants" from public premises belonging to the Union Govt. the legislation enacted by the Centre under the authority of Entry 32 of the List I cannot be successfully assailed on the ground of lack of legislative competence. What is more, even if there was such a legislation, the legislation enacted by Parliament in regard to the property belonging to Union of India would prevail having regard to the mandate contained in Entry 32. Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all legislations pertaining to property of Union of India including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of India. Entry 32 is wide enough to cover all legislations pertaining to property of Union of India including the legislation for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the property belonging to the Union of India. Once the conclusion is reached that the legislation falls under Entry No. 32 of the List, it is unnecessary to examine the scope of Entry 18 of List III, pertaining to land that is to say, rights in or over land tenures including the relationship of land lord-tenant and the collection of rents, transfer and alienation of agricultural land, land improvement, agricultural lands and acquisitions. Entry 32 of List I says that: "Property of the Union and Revenue therefrom, but as regards property, situated in a State, subject to legislation made by the State save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides." 46. That means by reason of the Entry, Parliament has power to legislate with respect to agricultural land belonging to the Union of India even though the State Legislature has exclusive jurisdiction over such lands under Entry No. 18 of List II. The State Legislature shall have the power to legislate over property, situated within the State, subject to legislation by Parliament. Thus, in view of the legal position, it cannot be said that in respect of the Union property, only the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act are applicable as in Entry No. 32 of the Constitution it is not mentioned that the State Legislation in this regard is barred. In other words, Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act does not bar any action under the State Act in respect of property belonging to Union of India. 47. The petitioners have also relied on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1968 Patna 476 (M/s. Bhartiya Hotel V/s. Union of India) and it has been submitted that if a matter like the present one has been dealt with earlier under the Provisions of Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, subsequent proceeding in that regard would operate as res judicata to the extent that fresh petition for eviction under the same Act cannot be filed. This decision in the facts and circumstances, is not applicable in the instant case, because the first proceeding was dropped on the prayer of the respondent Coal Superintendent, because of a separate proceeding instituted against all the interested parties. 48. This decision in the facts and circumstances, is not applicable in the instant case, because the first proceeding was dropped on the prayer of the respondent Coal Superintendent, because of a separate proceeding instituted against all the interested parties. 48. The petitioners, however, have cited a decision of this Court reported in 1969 Pat LJR 23 (Kali Prasad Seal V/s. State of Bihar). Relying on the decision, it has been submitted that where proceedings for alleged encroachment was dropped, another proceeding regarding same allegation was without jurisdiction. This decision would have been helpful to the petitioner, had there been a final order under Sec. 6 of the Act. As stated above, no final order had been passed under Sec. 6 of the Act in the earlier proceeding. 49. In view of the legal and factual position discussed above, I find and hold that the impugned proceeding is not hit by the principle of res judicata and the respondent Dy. Commissioner on the facts and circumstances, was competent to initiate the proceeding under the provisions of B.P.L.E. Act. Therefore, this contention must fail. 50. The other claim that the petitioners besides being purchasers, are in possession of the land for more than 12 years and, therefore, they have also perfected their title to the land by adverse possession, has also no force. Even if it is assumed that they are in possession for more than 11 years, it will not create any right in their favour, because in the instant case Sec. 27 read with Article 112 of the Limitation Act will apply, which prescribes 30 years limitation in respect of public land. The possession of the land in question having been taken over by the Govt. on 2-12-1958 vide Annexure-IV in pursuance of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, title by adverse possession could not have been acquired by the petitioners or their predecessors-in-title, as alleged by them. The petitioners on their own showing have taken the sale deeds some time in the year 1982, i.e. only a couple if years before the initiation of the impugned proceeding. 51. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, contended that before them their vendor was in continuous possession since several twelve years. The petitioners on their own showing have taken the sale deeds some time in the year 1982, i.e. only a couple if years before the initiation of the impugned proceeding. 51. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, contended that before them their vendor was in continuous possession since several twelve years. As stated already, neither the alleged vendor at any stage appeared before the competent authorities to assert his possession, nor is there any paper that the vendor was it possession prior to so-called delivery of possession in favour of the petitioners to cover a period of 30 years as required. 52. In course of the argument, learned counsel for the petitioners have also raised two other points. In the first instance, it is stated that the petitioners could not place certain relevant facts in their show cause filed before the respondent-Dy. Commissioner as the connected important papers had been taken away by the Income-tax Department and no opportunity was given to them to collect the same, although this aspect of the matter was brought to the notice of the respondent-Dy. Commissioner. There is no substance in it as it appears that when a prayer was made by the petitioners in that regard, the Dy. Commissioner passed an order asking the concerned Income-tax Department to make those papers available with an intimation to the petitioners and also deputed a staff to assist the petitioners to locate those papers, but the petitioners did not take any action. Subsequently, when it was detected that the papers were available in the record of case B.P.L.E.M. (III)/84-85 and it was made known to them, they (petitioners) also did not take any further steps. 53. The second point that has been raised is that in the notice in place of plot No. 639, plot No. 637 was mentioned and this alone has vitiated the proceeding, at least, so far it relates to plot No. 639. The counter-affidavit of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (paragraphs 6 and 10) it is clearly stated that when this error was detected, it was corrected accordingly. This has not been controverted. The petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a plea at a belated stage that they had no knowledge that plot No. 639 was one of the subject-matter of dispute. The counter-affidavit of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (paragraphs 6 and 10) it is clearly stated that when this error was detected, it was corrected accordingly. This has not been controverted. The petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a plea at a belated stage that they had no knowledge that plot No. 639 was one of the subject-matter of dispute. Rather, they were fully aware that plot No. 639 was one of the plots in the proceedings and contested the proceedings respecting all the plots, i.e. 639, 642 and 643 which was claimed by the petitioners. This contention, therefore, must fail. 54. Lastly, the petitioners have also pleaded mala fide on the part of the then respondent-Deputy Commissioner. Except the bald assertion made in the petitions, there is no other material to establish this allegation. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that they have been involved in some cases triable by Court of Session. In those cases, the petitioners having found the mala fide action of the Deputy Commissioner respondent moved the Supreme Court for the transfer of the cases and the cases were transferred to a Court of neighbouring State. By a supplementary affidavit, the petitioners have given a photostat copy of the order of the Sessions Judge, Dhanbad relating to an incident that had happened in his Court wherein the Judge had condemned the action of the police officers. Nowhere, there is any indication that the respondent-Deputy Commissioner was instrumental in creating the incident in Court. The cases no doubt have been transferred by the Supreme Court, but that by itself is not sufficient to establish mala fide against the respondent Deputy Commissioner. Thus, the allegation of mala fide also must fail. 55. To-sum up, (a) respondent - the then Deputy Commissioner, who was Collector under the B.P.L.E. Act was competent to initiate the impugned proceeding for removal of encroachment against the petitioners and the same was not hit by the principle of res judicata, (b) there is no illegality or impropriety in the order impugned or the exercise of jurisdiction, (c) the claim of the petitioners that by virtue of purchase, the earlier decision and also by adverse possession they have acquired title to the property has no merit, and (d) no mala fide against the respondent-Deputy Commissioner has been established for having initiated the instant proceedings. 56. 56. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this application and the same is accordingly dismissed with a consolidated costs of Rs. 5000.00 only. M.J.C. 298 of 89. 57. This application has been filed for starting a contempt of Court proceeding against the opposite party Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad and others for violating the orders passed in the original writ application dated 6-4-89 (as contained in Annexure-1) in C.W.J.C. No. 572 of 1989(R), wherein a direction was given not to evict the petitioners from the land till the disposal of that application. 58. In substance, the allegations are that even after the order of this Court in original Writ Application (C.W.J.C. No. 572/89R) which was communicated to the Dy. Commissioner, he (respondent No. 2) deputed police force and forcibly ousted them (petitioners) from a part of the property in dispute. 59. The then Deputy Commissioner (O. P. 2) has filed a detailed show cause, which have been stated earlier, while narrating the facts of the cases of the parties. According to him, prior to the order dated 6-4-89, two more orders were passed by this Court on 15-3-89 and 31-3-89 respectively and before the first order dated 15-3-89, the Coal Superintendent had already taken over possession of the land on 11-3-89, which fact was not disclosed by the petitioners before the Court. As soon as he received the order of the High Court, he directed the Coal Superintendent to maintain status quo and take action not to demolish or remove any construction. He could not restore the earlier position as there was no direction of the High Court to restore possession, if evicted already. The respondent-Dy. Commissioner has also offered unconditional apology in the event of any inconvenience caused to this Court. 60. The stand of the petitioner is that all these papers have been created subsequently after the orders of this Court were communicated to him to defeat its effect. 61. On the other hand, Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, Advocate-General, has contended that the then respondent-Dy. Commissioner took action to evict the petitioners when no stay was granted in the appeal against his order by the Commissioner, but as soon as he received the orders of this Court, he issued a direction to maintain the status quo, as existing on that date. Ram Balak Mahto, Advocate-General, has contended that the then respondent-Dy. Commissioner took action to evict the petitioners when no stay was granted in the appeal against his order by the Commissioner, but as soon as he received the orders of this Court, he issued a direction to maintain the status quo, as existing on that date. It is further submitted that he had taken all precautions so that no demolition of any kind was done in the existing structures. It has been further submitted that the orders will show that the delivery of possession was taken by the Coal Superintendent even before the first order dated 15-3-89 was passed. 62. In this connection, Mr. Mahto has referred to various orders as contained in Annexures-A to E. From a perusal of the same, it will appear that the respondent-Dy. Commissioners had passed order on 20-2-89 i.e. before the order dated 15-3-89 of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 572/89 and the delivery of possession was taken by the Coal Superintendent on 11-3-89 i.e. four days before. In the circumstances, it is difficult to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the then Deputy Commissioner, in collusion with Coal Superintendent and others manufactured those papers to defeat the orders of this Court. Having gone throught the detailed show cause and the Annexures contained therein, I am satisfied that no case for contempt is made out against the then Dy. Commissioner of any other respondents, and accordingly, the show cause are accepted and the rule issued is, hereby discharged. No costs. 63. G. G. SOHANI, C. J. :- . I agree. Order accordingly.