Judgment :- Third defendant consigned vetivert oil worth Rs.11,440.00 with the fourth defendant for carriage and delivery to the fifth defendant at Delhi. He then encashed the bill with the plaintiff, Union Bank of India. Plain tiff sent the bill by registered post to the second defendant, Punjab National Bank at Delhi, along with the G.C. note issued by the carrier. Some unknown persons intervened and received the bill and notes from the postal authorities in the name of the second defendant and took delivery of the consignment from the fourth defendant as if delivery was taken by the consignee. Defendants 1 and 6 are the Union of India and the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs. The suit for realisation of the amounts from the defendants was decreed only against the carrier (fourth defendant), who remained ex parte, and dismissed as against others directing costs of defendants 2,3 and 5 to be paid. Plaintiff has come up in appeal. 2. Though records were manipulated as if the bill and notes were received by the second defendant Bank and delivery was taken by the fifth defendant consignee, the evidence is that everything was forged by some unknown interveners in the names of defendants 2 and 5. At the time of arguments, the further claim was only against defendants 1 and 6. 3. The stand taken by defendants 1 and 6 was that delivery of the postal articles was made to the right person through the Delhi General Post Office and hence the consignee itself took delivery. When the second defendant denied receipt of the postal articles, appellant filed a complaint to the sixth defendant. An enquiry was conducted by the sixth defendant, who informed the appellant that the postal article was correctly delivered to the second defendant. On the ground that the correctness of this report was accepted by the appellant, trial court held that the plea of defendants 1 and 6 that the appellant is stopped from contending otherwise is correct. Though defendants 1 and 6 said that the trial court has no jurisdiction, which vests with the Delhi Court alone, the trial court held otherwise. The plea of defendants 1 and 6 under S.6 of the Indian Post Office Act was accepted in order to exonerate them. 4. I do not think that any question of estoppels is involved. Though defendants 1 and 6 said that the trial court has no jurisdiction, which vests with the Delhi Court alone, the trial court held otherwise. The plea of defendants 1 and 6 under S.6 of the Indian Post Office Act was accepted in order to exonerate them. 4. I do not think that any question of estoppels is involved. So also, there cannot be any dispute on the basis of the evidence that the second defendant did not receive the postal article and hence there is no chance of it being given to the fifth defendant consignee for taking delivery. There is evidently negligence on the part of the fourth defendant carrier in delivering the consignment without proper identification to some wrong person. There cannot be any liability on the part of defendants 2,3 and 5. The question, therefore, is only whether defendants 1 and 6 are also to be made liable. If at all they could be made liable, it could only be on the ground that delivery of the postal article was made to a wrong person enabling delivery of the consignment being taken. 5. S.6 of the Indian Post Office Act is sufficient answer to the claim against defendants 1 and 6. The wide immunity, which the Crown enjoys in England, does not prevail in India. In India, postal service of the Government is not a sovereign function. The post office is not a common carrier. Liability of the Government of India is not contractual, but only statutory. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. MIS. P.M. Rathodand Co. (AIR 1959 SC 1394) it was held that whatever be the jural relationship between the seller and the post office in respect of carriage of goods sent by the seller under V.P.P. system, it becomes an agent of the seller for the recovery of the price and if it fails to recover the price and deliver the goods, it is liable for damages to the seller. That decision by itself may not be a direct authority for the position that the jural relationship arises only by contract and is not a statutory liability. Debananda Dora v. Union of India and others (AIR 1965 Orissa 118) held that even the contractual obligation, while accepting insured articles, is only as provided by the statute. If Commissioner of Income tax, Delhi v. Mis. P.M. Rathodand Co. Debananda Dora v. Union of India and others (AIR 1965 Orissa 118) held that even the contractual obligation, while accepting insured articles, is only as provided by the statute. If Commissioner of Income tax, Delhi v. Mis. P.M. Rathodand Co. (AIR 1959 SC 1394) is read along with Mothi Rungaya Chetty v. Secretary of State for India in Council (ILR 28 Madras 213) and Union of India v. Firm Ram Gopal Hukum Chand and others (AIR 1960 Allahabad 672), it may be possible to infer by implication that there is a contractual relationship between the sender of the V.P.P. and the post office. We are not concerned with that question. Even by accepting an insured article, no contractual obligation is undertaken. The liability, which the postal department accepts, is a statutory liability of a bailee. The liability of the Government is to be found within the four corners of the Act and Rules. Otherwise, there is no liability. The postal department is liable for the tortuous acts of its officials committed during the course of their duty with regard to the postal articles entrusted to their care. 6. S.6 specifically says that the Government shall not incur any liability by reason of the loss, misdelivery or delay of or damage to any postal article in the course of transaction by post. Otherwise, it is likely to result in very serious liabilities to the Government everyday on account of the working of the postal department in which some delays and mistakes are possible without anybody intending. This immunity of the Government is subject to the exception that it is not applicable in cases where such liability was undertaken in express terms by the Central Government as provided in the Act. So also, no officers of the post office shall incur any liability by reason of the loss, misdelivery, delay or damage unless it is a case involving the result caused by fraud or willful act or default. That means, the liability of the Central Government is confined to statutory liability expressly undertaken under the provisions and liability of the postal employees is confined to cases where the loss, delay, misdelivery or damage was the result caused fraudulently or by willful act or default. 7. The case in hand does not involve one where any statutory liability is undertaken by the Government. 7. The case in hand does not involve one where any statutory liability is undertaken by the Government. Such a contingency may arise in the case of value paid parcels or insured goods. Here what is involved is only delivery of a registered postal article by mistake or negligence to a wrong person resulting in delivery of the consignment being taken by the wrong person instead of the consignee. In such cases, there is no statutory liability for the Government. On the other hand, there is statutory immunity from liability under the first part of S.6. There is not even an allegation that misdelivery was fraudulent or by willful act or default on the part of the concerned employees. What is alleged by the appellant is also only misdelivery by mistake or negligence. Mala fides in the action of the employees are not alleged in the pleadings or evidence. Therefore, under the second part of S.6, the postal department or its employees also cannot be held liable on account of the immunity for actions, which are not fraudulent, or by willful act or default. The Government or the postal department can incur statutory liability only under special circumstances provided, otherwise, the working of the postal department itself will become impossible. The restrictions are imposed by way of public policy. Fraud or willful act or default, which forms exceptions to the immunity under S.6, are matters to be specifically alleged with sufficient details and proved, if denied. The suit was, therefore, rightly dismissed as against defendants 1 and 6 also. The appeal is dismissed without costs.