JUDGMENT U.D.S. Sinha, J. - This is an application for grant of an ad interim order staying the operation of the order and judgment dated 21st September, 1989 passed by the II Addl. District Judge, Farrukhabad in Election Petition No. 1 of 1988. Girish Chandra v. Abdul Wahid & others, impugned before this Court in the instant first appeal. On 8th November, 1989 this Court declined to suspend the operation of the impugned order for reasons to be placed on record later. Here are the reasons. 2. Abdul Wahid, the appellant-applicant, was elected as Block Pramukh of Kshettra Samiti, Kanuauj, District Farrukhabad. Girish Chandra, the respondent-opposite party No. 1, challenged the election of the applicant by means of Election Petition No. 1 of 1988, filed under Rule 35 of the U.P. Kshettra Samitis (Election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1962, hereinafter called the 'Rules'. By means of his order and judgment dated 21st September, 1989, impugned in the appeal, the II Addl. Disxrict Judge, Farrukhabad allowed the election petition with costs; held the election of the applicant to be invalid; and declared the opposite party No. 1 to have been duly elected as Block Pramukh of Kshettra Samiti, Kannauj, District Farrukhabad. 3. Aggrieved by the order and judgment of the II Addl. District Judge, Farrukhabad dated 21st September, 1989, the applicant filed in this Court first appeal under Rule 49 of the Rules. Along with the appeal, the applicant also filed an application dated 24th September, 1989, praying for the stay of the operation of the impugned order and judgment. The appeal as well as the stay application was considered on 24h September, 1989. It was directed to be put up for admission on 29th September, 1989. However, the operation of the impugned order and judgment was stayed till 19th October, 1989. On 6th October. 1989 an application of the date was filed praying the Court to vacate the ex parte interim order dated 24th September, 1989. The application was directed to be listed with previous papers on 18th October, 1989. On 18th October, 1989 the appeal was ordered to be put up as unlisted for admission on 19th October, 1989. On 19th October, 1989, again the matter was directed to be put up on 20th October, 1989, at 1.30 P.M. in Chambers. The application was directed to be listed with previous papers on 18th October, 1989. On 18th October, 1989 the appeal was ordered to be put up as unlisted for admission on 19th October, 1989. On 19th October, 1989, again the matter was directed to be put up on 20th October, 1989, at 1.30 P.M. in Chambers. On 20th October, 1989, the Hon'ble Judge, seized of the matter, extended the interim order dated 24th September, 1989 till 1st November, 1989 and released the case to be put up before another Bench. On 1st November, 1989, the matter came up before me. The consideration of the matter was, however, postponed for the next day on the prayer of the Senior Advocate appearing for the applicant. The matter came up again on 3rd November, 1989. On this date too the matter could not be disposed of as it had to be adjourned on the request of Sri K. N. Tripathi, Senior Advocate, appearing for the opposite-party No. 1, for further hearing on 7th November, 1989. The matter was heard on 7th & 8th November, 1989. The appeal was admitted and upon the stay application following order was passed. "Upon hearing the valiant arguments of Sri R.C. Srivastava and Sri K.N. Tripathi, Senior Advocates, appearing for the appellant-applicant and respondent-opposite party No. 1 respectively, at length and in detail, and carefully weighing the facts and the circumstances of the case, the Court is clearly of the opinion that, for the reasons to be delivered later, it will be wrong to suspend the operation of the order impugned in the appeal and it declines to do so. This application is, therefore, rejected. Sd./- D.S.S. 8-11-1989." 4. Opposing the prayer for the grant of interim order staying the operation of the order impugned in the appeal, Sri K.N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1, submitted that this Court had no jurisdiction, whatsoever, to grant any stay order. In the alternative, Sri Tripathi submitted that the impugned order was declaratory in nature and it had become effective as soon as it was made. To be precise, the contention of Sri Tripathi was that the impugned order, being declaratory in nature, stood executed on the date of its being made, and there was nothing left to be stayed. 5. In the alternative, Sri Tripathi submitted that the impugned order was declaratory in nature and it had become effective as soon as it was made. To be precise, the contention of Sri Tripathi was that the impugned order, being declaratory in nature, stood executed on the date of its being made, and there was nothing left to be stayed. 5. Refuting the contentions advanced by Sri Tripathi, Sri R.C. Srivastava, Senior Advocate, appearing for the applicant, contended that Rule 40 of the Rules made the procedure in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, hereinafter called the `Code', applicable in the matter of hearing of the election petition under the Rules and as such the provisions of Rule 5 of Order 41 of the Code would be attracted. This Court could, therefore, pass stay order while entertaining the appeal under Rule 49 of the Rules. In the alternative, Sri Srivastava submitted that this Court had inherent powers to pass such interim order/orders as may be expedient in the interest of justice. Reliance was placed by Sri Srivastava on the following decisions : (a) 1975 (2) SCC 447 , Dr. Rajendra Kumari Bajpai v. Ram Adhar Yadav. (b) 1971 All LJ 1074 : ( AIR 1972 All 12 ) (FB), Baleshwar Dayal v. State of U.P. (c) AIR 1969 SC 430 , Income-tax Officer v. M.K. Mohammad Kunhi. 6. To buttress his contention that this Court had no jurisdiction to pass any interim order while hearing appeal under R. 49 of the Rules, Sri Tripathi placed reliance on the following decisions : (a) AIR 1963 All 518 , Rameshwar Dayal v. Sub-Divisional Officer. (b) 1982 UPLBEC 82 : AIR 1982 All 172 , Meerut College Association v. Aravind Nath Seth. (c) 1989 All LJ 538, Mahavir Singh v. State. (d) (1989) 1 UPLBEC 76: 1990 All LJ 106, Tej Singh v. District Judge, Saharanpur. 7. In support of his alternative submission to the effect that impugned order, being declaratory in nature and having become effective as soon.as it was pronounced, was incapable of suspension by any stay order, Sri Tripathi placed reliance on a Division Court decision of this Court, rendered in the case of Sri Ram Ratan Gupta v. N. Dandekar & others, reported in 1964 All LJ at page 1030. 8. 8. For the purposes of adjudicating the controversy involved herein it will be apposite to have a look at the Rules, relevant in the context. 9. An election petition calling in question the election of a Pramukh may be presented under Rule 35 of the Rules before the District Judge or any other subordinate Civil Judicial Officer named or designated by the District Judge in this behalf in the manner and form prescribed under the Rules. 10. Under Rule 37 of the Rules a petitioner may claim either of the following two declarations : (a) that the election of the returned candidate is void; (b) that the election of the returned candidate is void and that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected. 11. Rule 40 of the Rules provides the procedure to be followed in the hearing of the election petitions. It, inter alia, envisages that except so far as provided by the U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 or in the Rules, the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the Adhiniyam, 1961 or any other provisions of the Rules and it can be made applicable will be followed in the hearing of the election petitions. 12. Powers of the Judge trying election petitions are defined in Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules. Rule 42 provides that if the petition is found to be frivolous the Judge may direct that the security or any part thereof shall be forfeited to the State Government. It further provides that an order for costs passed by the Judge shall be executed by him on an application made in that behalf in the same manner and in accordance with the same procedure as if it were a decree for the payment of money made by himself in a suit. 13. Rule 43 of the Rules stipulates that if the Judge after making such inquiry as he deems fit finds in respect of any person whose election is called in question by a petition, that his election was valid he shall dismiss the petition as against such person and award costs at his discretion. 13. Rule 43 of the Rules stipulates that if the Judge after making such inquiry as he deems fit finds in respect of any person whose election is called in question by a petition, that his election was valid he shall dismiss the petition as against such person and award costs at his discretion. On the other hand, if the Judge finds that the election of any person was invalid he shall either (a) declare a casual vacancy to have been created, or (b)declare another candidate to have been duly elected and in either case may award costs at his discretion. 14. Rule 46 of the Rules contemplates that an order of the Judge under sub-rule (2) of Rule 43 declaring a casual vacancy to have been created or declaring another candidate to have been duly elected shall take effect from the date of the order. It further contemplates that in case of a declaration of another candidate to have been duly elected such a declaration shall, as soon as may be, be notified by the State Government in the Gazette. Rule 47 of the Rules makes it incumbent upon the Judge to send a copy of the orders made by him under R. 43 each to the State Government and the District Magistrate as soon as may be after announcing the orders. It also calls upon Judge to sent record of the case to the District Magistrate of the District concerned for being dealt with in a specified manner. 15. Against every order made by Judge under Rule 43 there lies an appeal to this Court under Rule 49 of the Rules within 30 days from the date of the order. This Court has been further empowered to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of 30 days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 43 ordains the memorandum of the appeal to be accompanied by a Government treasury receipt evidencing a deposit of Rs. 500/- in favour of this Court as security for costs of the appeal. 16. Has this Court jurisdiction to grant any stay order while exercising its appellate powers under Rule 49, aforesaid, is the first question which calls for an investigation. 500/- in favour of this Court as security for costs of the appeal. 16. Has this Court jurisdiction to grant any stay order while exercising its appellate powers under Rule 49, aforesaid, is the first question which calls for an investigation. The contention of Sri Tripathi was that this Court had no jurisdiction to pass any stay order. The authorities relied upon by Sri Tripathi in support of his contention may now be examined. 17. In Rameshwar Dayal v. Sub-Divisional Officer, AIR 1963 All 518 . this Court considered the question as to whether Sub- Divisional Officer, hearing an election petition under Section 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, had any inherent power to grant stay by way of interim relief and came to the conclusion that he did not have any power to grant stay as no such power was conferred upon him under the Act. It further held that the Sub-Divisional Officer did not have any inherent power inasmuch as inherent powers belong to a court and the Sub-Divisional Officer did not act as a court while trying an election petition. It acted as an election tribunal. The Court pointed out that only those courts which had a general jurisdiction to do justice were competent to pass any order that they considered necessary in the interest of justice and the election tribunals were created by a particular statute to decide certain disputes and were bound to decide them strictly according to law after following the prescribed procedure and had jurisdiction to do only that which they were expressly empowered to do. Obviously, this case has no relevance in as much as question for determination in the instant case relates to the jurisdiction of High Court exercising the powers as appellate Court and not to the jurisdiction of a tribunal. 18. The decision of this Court rendered in Meerut College Association v. Aravind Nath Seth, AIR 1982 All 172 , also does not have any bearing. In this case the court was considering the power of the Prescribed Authority to grant stay while deciding a reference under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Court held that the Prescribed Authority had no power to grant stay. The Court considered the jurisdiction and power of a tribunal of limited jurisdiction created by statute. 19. In this case the court was considering the power of the Prescribed Authority to grant stay while deciding a reference under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Court held that the Prescribed Authority had no power to grant stay. The Court considered the jurisdiction and power of a tribunal of limited jurisdiction created by statute. 19. The matter under consideration in the case of Mahavir Singh v. State, 1989 All LJ 538, was about the power of the Sub-Divisional Officer to grant interim relief while hearing an election petition under S. 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 and as such no assistance can be drawn herein. 20. The case of Tej Singh v. District Judge, Saharanpur, 1990 All LJ 106, pertained to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal hearing disputes relating to the election of Pramukhs and Up-Pramukhs under the Rules. After examining the provisions of the Rules, this Court ruled that the Tribunal did not have any express or implied power to grant any stay order while trying election petition under Rule 35 of the Rules. This case too has no application. 21. The cases relied upon by Sri R.C. Srivastava in support of his contention that this Court has inherent powers to pass interim order/orders while hearing appeal under Rule 49 of the Rules are also of no help in finding the solution to the problem at hand. In the case of Dr. Rajendra Kumar Bajpai v. Ram Adhar Yadav, (1975) 2 SCC 447 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question of applicability of the provisions of Order XI of the Code to the trial of election petitions in the High Court by force of S. 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and came to the conclusion that S. 87 of the Act was of widest amplitude so as to cover the entire procedure mentioned in the Code with only two exceptions where the Act contained express provision for certain matters which were inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Code; and where a particular provision of the Code was either expressly or by necessary intendment excluded by the Act. On this conclusion Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order XI of the Code apply to the trials of the election petitions in the High Court under the Representation of the People Act. 1951. 22. On this conclusion Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order XI of the Code apply to the trials of the election petitions in the High Court under the Representation of the People Act. 1951. 22. The next decision relied upon by Sri Srivastava is a Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in Baleshwar Dayal v. State of U.P. AIR 1972 All 12 (FB), wherein, considering the scope of revisional power of the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh under S. 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, this Court held that the State Government had power to make interim orders. The decision in this case turned on the language of S. 7-F of the said Act which empowered the Government to "make such order as appeared to it necessary for the ends of justice". No such power as was conferred upon the State Government has been expressly conferred upon this Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Rules. This case, therefore, renders no assistance. 23. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Income-tax Officer v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 . relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, also is of no relevance. In that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with the scope of Appellate Income-tax Tribuanal's power in the matter of grant of stay under S. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Section 254, aforesaid, authorises the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to "pass such orders as it thinks fit". Obviously, the expression "may pass such orders as it thinks fit" confers power upon the Appellate Income-tax Tribunal with widest possible amplitude while no such power has been conferred upon this Court under Rule 49 of the Rules. 24. It is no doubt true that Rule 49 of the Rules does not define the extent of jurisdiction and the power of this Court while hearing an appeal against the order passed by the Judge under Rule 43. It simply provides that an appeal-shall lie from every order made by the Judge under Rule 43 to the High Court within 30 days from the date of the order. It simply provides that an appeal-shall lie from every order made by the Judge under Rule 43 to the High Court within 30 days from the date of the order. It also authorises the High Court to entertain an appeal after expiry of the period of limitation of 30 days prescribed in the Rule on being satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. But because of the absence of details with regard to the jurisdiction and power it cannot be said that this Court has no jurisdiction to pass any order other than the one finally deciding the appeal. The Rule making authority, it appears, deliberately did not define the jurisdiction and powers of this Court while hearing an appeal. The Rule making authority, presumably, was aware of the jurisdiction and powers of this Court which it has as a court of record and superior court. 25. Article 215 of the Constitution of India declares every High Court to be a court of record. A court of record is undoubtedly a superior court. This Court, being a superior court of record, is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to pass interim orders. "Prima facie no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so. .........." (See paragraph 713 at pages 321-22 of Volume 10 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition). 26. Inevitable conclusion is that this Court, while hearing an appeal under R. 49, has and does not lack jurisdiction to pass an- ad interim order if circumstances of a particular case so warrant. The contention of Sri Tripathi to the contrary is untenable and hereby rejected. 27. Now question is whether this Court should pass an ad interim order suspending the operation of the order impugned in the appeal? The question of existence of jurisdiction alone is not decisive. In spite of the existence of jurisdiction there may not be occasion for its exercise. For determining the question as to whether there is any occasion to exercise jurisdiction for passing an interim order staying the operation of the impugned order it is necessary to examine the nature of the order. 28. In spite of the existence of jurisdiction there may not be occasion for its exercise. For determining the question as to whether there is any occasion to exercise jurisdiction for passing an interim order staying the operation of the impugned order it is necessary to examine the nature of the order. 28. The impugned order purported to declare the election of the appellant to be invalid and to declare the respondent No. 1 to have been duly elected. Obviously, the order is declaratory in nature and became effective on the date on which it was made, namely, 21st September, 1989, as provided under sub-rule (1) of Rule 46 of the Rules. A declaratory order under Rule 43 is auto-enforcing and auto-executing. The enforcement or execution of the order is not, dependent upon any action by any agency. Declaratory orders and decrees become effective as soon as they are made unless the statute, under which they are made, provides a different point of time for their being effective. As contemplated by Rule 43, the impugned order became effective from the date of its making and there remains nothing to be stayed. Thus there is hardly any occasion for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction to pass an ad interim order staying the operation of the impugned order. In other words, the impugned order, being declaratory in nature and having already become effective, is incapable of suspension by any interim order. This view is fortified by the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Sri Ram Ratan Gupta v. N. Dandekar, reported in 1964 All LJ at page 1030. 29. The alternative submission of Sri Tripathi that the impugned order, being declaratory in nature and having become effective as soon as it was pronounced, was incapable of suspension by this Court is, therefore, upheld. 30. For the reasons, detailed hereinbefore, the application dated 24th September, 1989, praying the Court to stay the operation of the order and judgment dated 21st September, 1989, impugned in the appeal, deserved to be rejected.