Dolgobinda Kayal v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education
1990-08-20
KALYANMOY GANGULY
body1990
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner, inter alia, challenges the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him and the order of suspension along with a prayer for directing the authorities concerned to hold the election of the Managing Committee of the School forthwith. 2. So far as the last prayer is concerned the petitioner does not press the same and confines himself to the question of only the order of suspension and the issuance of the charge-sheet. 3. It appears from the affidavit of service filed in Court that all the respondents have been served with the copies of this application. Inspite of such service no one appears for the respondents excepting the State. There is no affidavit-in-opposition on record and the statements and allegations made in the writ petition are not denied by any of the respondents and as such are deemed to be admitted by the application of the doctrine of non-traverse. 4. The petitioner was appointed as a Special Cadre, Asstt. Teacher of Madhusudanpur Laxmipur Radhakanta Academy (High School) on or about May, 12, 1970. On May 1, 1972 the petitioner was appointed as Head Master of the said School and approval to such appointment was given by the District Inspector of Schools (SE) 24-Parganas by his Memo No. 2374 dated November 25, 1974 which is Annexure 'A' to the petition. On June 30, 1987 the petitioner got his first extension of one year from 2nd June, 1987 to 1st June, 1988 on attaining the age of 60 years. The petitioner got his second extension with effect from 2nd June, 1988 to 1st June, 1989 on or about 4th June, 1988. It is the allegation of the petitioner that after an ad-hoc committee was constituted for certain purposes including holding of an ejection the Secretary of the ad-hoc committee tried to prevail upon the petitioner to delay the holding of such election but not being successful convened an emergency meeting on December 31, 1988 no notice of which was served on the petitioner. No basis of such emergency meeting was also stated in the notice of the said meeting and no agenda was there relating to initiation of any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. 5.
No basis of such emergency meeting was also stated in the notice of the said meeting and no agenda was there relating to initiation of any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. 5. It further transpires that by a resolution taken on December 31, 1988 in the aforesaid emergency meeting the petitioner was purported to be suspended under clause VII(a) of Sub Rule 9 of Rule 28 of rules for Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules). The order of suspension has been annexed to the writ petition and marked with letter ‘M’. By an order dated February 28, 1989 a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner wherein various charges relating to the years 1971-72 etc. were levelled against the petitioner. 6. The petitioner challenges the said order of suspension and Issuance of the charge-sheet on several grounds. Rule 21 of the said Rules provides as follows : "21. Agenda-The notice of each meeting shall set forth the business to be transacted at the meeting, the agenda being drawn up by the Secretary of the Committee in consultation with the Head of the Institution and the President of the Committee and, except with the consent of three-fourths of the members present, no business other than that so stated shall be transacted, provided that no matter involving the appointment of deputation or dismissal or removal of a teacher or other employee shall be taken up unless the matter has been placed on the agenda of the meeting issued with the notice, and evidence of service of such notice is maintained and preserved for inspection by any member of the Committee or any person authorised by the Board or the Director or the State Education Department.” 7. It is an admitted position that there was no agenda in the notice for the meeting held on the said date regarding initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. It is not also stated any where as to how the question of initiation of a disciplinary proceeding or an order of suspension would certainly become so urgent so as to invoke the emergency powers reserved for real emergency.
It is not also stated any where as to how the question of initiation of a disciplinary proceeding or an order of suspension would certainly become so urgent so as to invoke the emergency powers reserved for real emergency. In the back drop of the facts that the Secretary of the School was trying to prevail upon the petitioner not to hold the election so as to be endowed with an extension of the term of the ad-hoc committee, he machinated the entire thing. That apart, no subsistence allowance has been paid to the petitioner right from the date of the order of suspension till this date. State charges have been levelled against the petitioner. No satisfactory explanation has been given for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge sheet after about 18 years. It may be recounted here that the appointment of the petitioner was not only approved by the appropriate Government authority as Head Master of the School but his term was also extended twice after attaining the age of 60 years. During the entire period there was no whisper against the petitioner relating to any of the alleged misconduct or misdemeanour. Again in the back drop of the facts stated hereinbefore it stands to reason that the Secretary of the ad-hoc committee was out to take his revenge against the petitioner. It has been stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr. reported in AIR 1990 SC 1308 that where there has been inordinate delay in issuing the charge-sheet which is devoid of any satisfactor explanation the charge-sheet is liable to be quashed. Applying the same principles here the charge sheet in the instant case also should be quashed on the twin grounds of inordinate delay and non-mentioning of the business of initiation of such disciplinary proceedings in the agenda of the emergency meeting. The urgency of convening the meeting is also devoid of any substance. It has also been decided in the case of (2) Sachi Nath Ghose and Ors. v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & ors. reported in 1976(2) Cal LJ 289 that the emergency powers should not be used for routine business and they should be reserved for real emergency. 8.
It has also been decided in the case of (2) Sachi Nath Ghose and Ors. v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & ors. reported in 1976(2) Cal LJ 289 that the emergency powers should not be used for routine business and they should be reserved for real emergency. 8. Considering the facts stated hereinbefore I am of the opinion that neither the order of suspension which is Annexure 'M' to the petition nor the charge-sheet which is Annexure 'N' to the petition can be sustained either in law or in the back ground of the facts. For reasons stated above this application succeeds and is allowed. The order of suspension dated January 2, 1989 issued by the respondent No.6 the and charge sheet dated Feb. 28, 1989 which is Annexure 'N' to the petition issued by the same respondent are hereby quashed. The respondents concerned are directed to treat the petitioner as on duly till the date of this judgment throughout and to pay all arrears of full salary minus any amount if any which have already been paid to the petitioner within five weeks from the date of communication of this order. The question of any further extension of the petitioner's service will however be decided by the appropriate authority and this Court does not express any opinion on that aspect of the matter. There will be no order as to costs. Liberty is given to the petitioner to communicate the gist of the operative part or the order.