HANSARIA,. J, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has been detained by virtue of an order passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India with the aid of S. 3 (1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 as amended (hereinafter, "the Act") with a view to prevent the petitioner from being engaged in transporting smuggled goods and dealing in smuggled goods, otherwise than by engaging in concealing and keeping smuggled goods. The order was passed on 28/06/1990 and is founded on the following two grounds : (1) Recovery of 13 bars/biscuits of gold of foreign origin each weighing 10 tolas from the handbag carried by the petitioner on a search being made near Berhampur railway station. This recovery was made under these circumstances : An information was received by the officers of the Central Excise and Customs, Bhubaneswar, that the petitioner was engaged in dealing with foreign gold which he gets from Calcutta and disposes of in different towns of Andhra Pradesh and Orissa and that he was likely to arrive at Berhampur in the early hours of 19-5-1990 from Calcutta by Corromandal Express and would be carrying smuggled gold with him. Pursuant to the above information, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence along with the officers of the Central Excise and Customs, Bhubaneswar, boarded the Corromandal Express from Bhubaneswar in the afternoon of 18-5-1990 and tried discreetly to locate the petitioner, but they did not succeed in spotting him out. However, as the train reached Berhampur, the officers rushed towards the exit gate and kept a discreet watch and ultimately succeeded in spotting out the petitioner. When the officers approached the petitioner, he tried to run away, but somehow or other, the officers succeeded in apprehending him and brought him along with the baggage carried by him inside the Head Ticket Collector's room. Thereafter, both the baggage and the person of the petitioner were searched and the 13 pieces of gold bars biscuits weighing 1516. 3 grams valued at about Rs. 5,46,000/- were recovered. (2) On being interrogated on 19-5-1990, the petitioner gave out the details as to how he had brought the smuggled gold from Calcutta after purchasing the same from one Chatterjee. The aforesaid statement disclosed about various journeys undertaken by the petitioner for this purpose from Calcutta to Berhampur. 3 grams valued at about Rs. 5,46,000/- were recovered. (2) On being interrogated on 19-5-1990, the petitioner gave out the details as to how he had brought the smuggled gold from Calcutta after purchasing the same from one Chatterjee. The aforesaid statement disclosed about various journeys undertaken by the petitioner for this purpose from Calcutta to Berhampur. ( 2 ) THE validity of the detention order has been assailed only on the score that the second ground being not available inasmuch as the same was the result of an extorted confession, which aspect had not been made known to the detaining authority, the order passed on the first ground alone is not tenable in law. ( 3 ) WE are reminded by Mr. Rath, of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ayya alias Ayuh v. State of 11. P. , AIR 1989 SC 364 : 1989 Cri LJ 991, that personal liberty is, by every reckoning, the greatest of human freedoms and the laws of preventive detention are strictly construed and a meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however, technical, is strictly insisted upon by the courts. Let us, therefore, see whether in the case at hand there was any infraction of the safeguards made available to the detenu. ( 4 ) THE contention as noted above has been advanced by Mr. Rath relying on the fact that after the petitioner was arrested on 19-5-1990, he was produced before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Special Courts), Cuttack, on 20-5-1990 around 7 P. M. The first order sheet of that date of his court shows that the petitioner complained of no ill treatment, but then, after about 20 minutes, a bail petition was moved on his behalf by two counsel representing him when he complained to the court that one Das Babu, working as Assistant Collector of Central Excise, had assaulted him and had obtained his signatures on the documents purported to be his written statement. The petitioner then complained of pains, and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in-charge directed the Superintendent, Central Jail, to get the petitioner examined by a doctor and submit his report. We have seen this report which says that the petitioner was under treatment in the Indoor of the Jail Hospital from 22-5-1990 for fever and "myalgia chest". The petitioner then complained of pains, and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in-charge directed the Superintendent, Central Jail, to get the petitioner examined by a doctor and submit his report. We have seen this report which says that the petitioner was under treatment in the Indoor of the Jail Hospital from 22-5-1990 for fever and "myalgia chest". Although the fever had subsided, but the petitioner was suffering from "myalgia and Arthalgia" and his major muscles of the chest and shoulder were painful. There was pain and tendereness in the joints of toes of both the feet and the joints of the right hand ring finger. ( 5 ) IN this connection, the learned Standing Counsel contends that when the petitioner was first produced at about 7 p. m. before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, he complained of no ill treatment by the Inspector of Customs, but the scene changed after the appearance of two Advocates who moved the bail application on behalf of the petitioner. As to this, the reply of Mr. Rath is that the first part of the order had been written by the Peskar in normal course. without in fact asking the petitioner about his ill treatment, but when his counsel appeared and the court asked him about this aspect of the matter, he gave out the true story. We have perused the original records, and the first part of the order sheet around 7 p. m. appears to be in the hand of the Peskar whereas the second part recorded around 7. 20 p. m. is mainly in the hand of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate-in-charge. ( 6 ) THIS apart, it is contended by Mr. Rath that as the petitioner was entitled to legal assistance right from the first opportunity of his production and if, after appearance of his counsel, he gave out the true story, the same does not merit rejection. We do not propose to pursue this matter except to say that the statements of the petitioner recorded by the Central Excise officials on 19-5-1990 and for that matter on 20-5-1990 had in fact been retracted. We do not propose to pursue this matter except to say that the statements of the petitioner recorded by the Central Excise officials on 19-5-1990 and for that matter on 20-5-1990 had in fact been retracted. Whether this retraction was truthful is a matter on which we do not propose to give any opinion at this stage inasmuch as that is not really required because what is of importance is the retraction by the petitioner and the non-awareness of the detaining authority about the retraction. That the detaining authority was not made aware about the retraction, because of which he could not apply his mind to this vital aspect of the matter, is sought to be brought home to us by Mr. Rath by referring us to the list of enclosures which was attached to the grounds of detention. In this list, item No. 9 deals with the Court's order dated 21-5-1990 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack. This would show that the order dated 20-5-1990 which contains the retraction was not available and had not been borne in mind by the detaining authority while passing the impugned order. ( 7 ) THIS being the factual position, it is urged by Mr. Rath that the impugned order is not sustainable inasmuch as the second ground had formed the main foundation of the order but the attention of the detaining authority not having been drawn to the retraction of the confessional statements, the order has to be regarded as non-sustainable in law. In this connection, our attention has been invited to Asha Devi v. Shivraj, AIR 1979 SC 447 : 1979 Cri LJ 203, in which case also, the fact of retraction of confessional statement was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority because of which the order of detention was held bad in the eye of law as the order was founded basically on the confessional statement of the detenu. In Sitaram v. State of Rajastham, AIR 1986 SC 1072 : 1986 Cri LJ 860, also the fact that the detenu had retracted his confessional statement was not placed before the detaining authority which had introduced a serious infirmity in the order of detention. In Sitaram v. State of Rajastham, AIR 1986 SC 1072 : 1986 Cri LJ 860, also the fact that the detenu had retracted his confessional statement was not placed before the detaining authority which had introduced a serious infirmity in the order of detention. ( 8 ) THE position, factual and legal, which thus emerges is that the second ground was not available to the detaining authority in the present case important question is whether the order of detention can be sustained on the basis of first ground. ( 9 ) BEFORE we proceed further, it would be apposite to refer to S. 5-A of the Act which was inserted in 1975 and which has stated that the grounds of detention are severable and where the detention order has been made on two or more grounds, one or more of which is (are) found, inter alia, to be non-existent, the order shall not be inoperative or invalid merely because it is not possible to hold whether the Government or the official making the order would have been satisfied with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. The mandate of this section is that in such a case the order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of the grounds. Reference may be made in this connection to (1) Pushpadevi v. M. L. Wadhavan, AIR 1987 SC 1748 : 1987 Cri LJ 1888 (2) State of Gujarat v. Chamanlal Manjibhai, 1981 UJ (SC) 150 : AIR 1981 SC 1480 , and (3) Swaran Ahuja v. State of Karnatak, 1978 Cri LJ 1229, wherein the Apex Court had occasion to explain the width and scope of S. 5-A of the Act. ( 10 ) MR. Rath appearing for the petitioner is conscious of this legal position and it is because of this it has been submitted that if the second ground be non-existent, the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained on the basis of the first ground inasmuch as on the basis of that ground alone, the detaining authority could not have come to the conclusion that the petitioner was engaged in transporting smuggled goods to prevent which it was necessary to detain him. The contention advanced in this connection is that the recovery of 13 bars / biscuits of gold being not in the train, it cannot be assumed that the petitioner was engaged in transporting gold because it may as well be that the gold bars / biscuits were handed over to him after he had reached Berhampur. It is, therefore, contended that no person instructed in law could have reasonably taken the view held the detaining authority on the basis of the first ground alone. To put it differently, the contention advanced is that there is no reasonable nexus between the first ground and the conclusion arrived at by the detaining authority. Reference has been made in this connection to Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 SC 2173 : 1986 Cri LJ 2042 and Ayya alias Ayub v. State of U. P. , AIR 1989 SC 364 : 1989 Cri LJ 991, in paragraph 12 of which judgment, the legal proposition advanced by Mr. Rath has been dealt with and accepted. ( 11 ) QUESTION, however, is whether on the basis of the first ground alone, any person instructed in law could have reasonably come to the conclusion arrived at by the detaining authority. As to this, we would like to say that the circumstances under which recovery of as many as 13 bars / biscuits of gold valued at about Rs. 5,46,000/- was made would have satisfied any reasonable mind that the petitioner was engaged in transporting gold inasmuch as he was coming from Calcutta and the officials of the Central Excise and Customs started keeping a track on him from Bhubaneswar, though they ultimately succeeded in apprehending the petitioner only after he had crossed the exit gate of Berhampur railway station. It may be stated that before the petitioner's baggage had been searched, he had tried to run away after he had been spotted near the exit gate of this station. A rational nexus between the recovery and transportation can, therefore, be well read in the facts and circumstances of the case. It cannot, therefore, be said that no reasonable person instructed in law could have come to the conclusion to which the detaining authority had arrived. There are cases a galore where on the basis of one solitary incident, orders of detention were passed and upheld by Courts. Everything depends upon propensity and potentiality. It cannot, therefore, be said that no reasonable person instructed in law could have come to the conclusion to which the detaining authority had arrived. There are cases a galore where on the basis of one solitary incident, orders of detention were passed and upheld by Courts. Everything depends upon propensity and potentiality. The petitioner being a goldsmith by profession, any reasonably instructed person could have well thought that the former might indulge again in transportation of gold if not detained. ( 12 ) THE result of the foregoing discussions is that though the second ground has to be held to be non-existent, the impugned order could have been passed on the basis of the first ground alone. The same is, therefore, upheld by dismissing the writ petition. ( 13 ) BEFORE parting, we would, however, like to observe that we have not at all appreciated the swearing in of the counter-affidavit in the present case by an officer working as Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Cuttack, inasmuch as it has been repeatedly pointed out by the Apex Court that in response to rule nisi, counter-affidavits should normally be filed by the detaining authority himself, more particularly, when allegation of mala fides or misuse of power or bias is attributed to the detaining authority. In the absence of any such allegation, the affidavits must be sworn in by responsible officer who personally dealt with or processed the case or by an officer duly authorised under the Rules of Business of the Government, Reference may be made in this connection to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Gazi Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1990 SC 1361 . The same view had been expressed by the Apex Court earlier in Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 679 : 1974 Cri LJ 606, and Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, (1987) 4 SCC 58 : AIR 1987 SC 1977 . In Tsering Dolkar v. Administrator, (1987) 2 SCC 69 : 1987 Cri LJ 988, filing of an affidavit by some officer other than the detaining authority on the basis of the records of the case, as in the present case, was held to be not acceptable. In the present case though there are no allegations as such of mala fides or personal bias, etc. In the present case though there are no allegations as such of mala fides or personal bias, etc. even so, we do not think if the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Cuttack, was the competent person to swear the affidavit inasmuch as it cannot be said that he had personally dealt with the matter or had processed the case or is an officer duly authorised under the Rules of Business of the Government to swear an affidavit on behalf of the detaining authority. This infirmity has, however, caused no dent to the stand of the opposite parties inasmuch as in upholding the order of detention we have not relied upon any statement made in the counter affidavit. ( 14 ) PADHI, J: - I agree. Order accordingly.