Order This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed for issuance of a writ directing the respondent to pay compensation for the loss of life of the husband of the petitioner, who was done to death by respondent no. 2, Bishwanath Mishra and respondent no. 3, Ram Niwas Kunwar. 2. In. order to appreciate the contention raised by the parties, it may be useful to notice the broad facts of the case. The petitioner is resident of Village Kasmara within Kowakole Police Station in the District of Nawadah where her husband had a grocery shop. On account of mounting tension due to apprehension of caste riot, police force was deputed in the said village to maintain law and order in the year 1984 of which the said two respondents were party. On 6.4.1984 both of them went to the said shop and asked for cigarettes. The husband of the petitioner was not present at the shop and she was alone, there. When she wanted to hand over the cigarettes, they caught her and attempted to commit rape. On alarm raised by the petitioner, her husband appeared and picked up a knife kept in the shop for cutting GUR. In order to save his wife, Ratan Sao inflicted knife injury to one of the Constables. Thereafter they forcibly took Ratan Sao near the village school and fired at him. Having sustained the injury he dropped down dead. In order to escape the criminal liability, respondent no. 3, Constable Ram Niwas Kunwar, instituted a case against Ratan Sao and some other persons, which was registered as Kowakole P.S. Case No. 23 of 1984. 3. The case of the petitioner further is that after the laid incident she was not allowed to go out and kept confined in her house. However, after three days she managed to escape and lodged a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nawadah. 'One Saket Bihari Singh of Village Nawadah sent a petition on 9.4.1984 to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India disclosing the facts mentioned above and made a prayer for enquiry by the C.B.I. or the C.I.D. or any independent agency and also prayed for payment of compensation to the petitioner. The Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court of India sent the said petition to this High Court on the basis of which Cr. The Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court of India sent the said petition to this High Court on the basis of which Cr. W.J.C. No. 180 of 1984 was registered and a Bench of this Court directed an enquiry by a superior officer of the Police Department. In compliance of the said order, inquiry was conducted and the report was submitted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Anti-Dacoity) which fully supports the allegations made by the petitioner. 4. The case lodged by respondent no. 3 (Kowakole P.S. Case No. 23 of 1984) was investigated by the police and was found to be false. In the case instituted by the petitioner, report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, popularly known as charge-sheet, was submitted against the accused, including respondent nos. 2 and 3, under the orders of the Inspector-General of Police (Law and Order), Bihar. Upon receipt of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Session. The accused were put on trial in the court of the 1st Additional Sessions Judge. Nawadah and the said two respondents were convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and also under section 376 read with section 511 of the Indian Penal Code. A copy of the judgment is Annexure 1 to this petition. 5. In the instant case, notices were issued to the respondents at the stage of admission. A counter affidavit has been filed or behalf of respondent no. 1, the State of Bihar, admitting that the armed Constables including respondent nos. 2 and 3, were deputed for maintaining law and order at Village Kasmara. It is stated therein that whatever was done by the said two respondents, as alleged by the petitioner, was not done in discharge of their official duties. It was done in their personal capacity and so the State is not liable to pay any compensation. 6. A separate counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent no. 2, Bishwanath Mishra, admitting that armed force was deputed in Village Kasmara. According to him, the deputation of Armed Force was made to control the activities of the terrorists in the area. It is also stated therein that on the date of occurrence Ratan Sao, the husband of the petitioner, along with other terrorists, attacked him (respondent no. 2) and inflicted dagger injury on his chest. According to him, the deputation of Armed Force was made to control the activities of the terrorists in the area. It is also stated therein that on the date of occurrence Ratan Sao, the husband of the petitioner, along with other terrorists, attacked him (respondent no. 2) and inflicted dagger injury on his chest. He was removed to Patna Medical College Hospital, where he remained under treatment for 17 days and then his life could be saved. When the deceased and his associates made an attempt on the life of respondent no. 2 and tried to snatch his rifle, other members of the Armed Force posted there fired rifle, which perchance caused injury to Ratan Sao. It is further stated that respondent no. 3, Ram Niwas Kunwar, lodged Kowakole P.S. Case No. 23 of 1984 under section 307 etc. of the Indian Penal Code, in which police submitted charge-sheet. Upon receipt of the charge-sheet, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nawadah took cognizance of the offences and committed the case to the Court of Session where it has been numbered as Sessions Trial No. 20/86 and it is still pending disposal. An appeal has been filed on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and 3 before the High Court against the judgment of their conviction (Annexure 1), which has not been disposed of as yet. 7. In response to the notice, respondent nos. 3 has appeared before this Court through an Advocate, who has filed power on his behalf. No counter-affidavit/show cause has been filed on his behalf. 8. Mrs. Anjana Prakash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has strenuously argued that in such cases the State is liable for the acts committed by its employees in course of their employment. It is stated that the petitioner is a poor lady with two children and old parents-in-law in her family. They are entirely dependent on her. After the murder of her husband there is none to look after them and she has no means of livelihood to maintain the family. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner has made a moderate claim of compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (one lakh), which is most reasonable in these hard days. 9. Learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State has contended that the alleged offence, giving rise to the petition, was committed by respondent nos. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner has made a moderate claim of compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (one lakh), which is most reasonable in these hard days. 9. Learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State has contended that the alleged offence, giving rise to the petition, was committed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 in their individual capacity, which was absolutely unconnected with their official duty. The State, therefore, is under no obligation to compensate the loss for the wrong committed by the said respondents. 10. Mr. Ram Suresh Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2, has contended that an appeal against the judgment of conviction of this respondent is still pending before this Court. As both the versions of the occurrence are still subjudice so it may not be proper to assume that the said two respondents committed the murder of the husband of the petitioner and on that basis fix the responsibility for payment of compensation. It is argued that the petitioner is not entitled to any compensation as her husband had, himself, made an attempt to commit a serious offence in which ho lost his life. 11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 3 has adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of respondent no. 2 and further contended that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioner is not entitled to any compensation. 12. In view of the contention raised on behalf of the parties it is clear that the State does not claim immunity on the ground that its action or the action of its employee is not amenable to such legal proceeding. By now it is well settled that the State is liable for tortious act committed by its employees in the discharge of their duties. This point pointedly fell for consideration in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati and another, (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 933) and it has been held that the State is as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act committed by its servant within the scope of his employment and functioning as such, as any other employer. 13. Vidhyawati and another, (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 933) and it has been held that the State is as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act committed by its servant within the scope of his employment and functioning as such, as any other employer. 13. The principle laid down in the said case has been firmly reiterated in M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1039) and it has been held thus :- “Thus, it is clear that this case recognises a material distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to public servants and acts committed by public servants which are not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers. If a tortious act is committed by a public servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask is was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. On the other hand, if the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any sovereign power, an action for damages would lie. The act of the public servant committed by him during the course of his employment is, in this category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been employed by a private individual for the same purpose. This distinction which is clear and precise in law, is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the State's liability arising from tortious acts committed by public servants...........” 14. This takes us to the consideration of the next question as to whether for the death of her husband, the petitioner is entitled to any compensation? It has been urged by Mrs. Anjana Prakash that the husband of the petitioner lost his life because be prevented respondent nos. 2 and 3 when they molested and made an attempt to commit rape on her. It has been urged by Mrs. Anjana Prakash that the husband of the petitioner lost his life because be prevented respondent nos. 2 and 3 when they molested and made an attempt to commit rape on her. Submission has been made that Ratan Sao had every legal right to protect his wife from unlawful act of respondent nos. 2 and 3 and, therefore, there is no justification to deny the compensation claimed by the petitioner. In support of the contention she has placed reliance on AIR 1990 Supreme Court 523 (SAHELI, a Women's Resources Centre through Ms. Nalini Bhanot and others v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and others). 15. In that case one Kamlesh Kumari, who was residing in a rented room repeatedly resisted and foiled the illegal attempts made by the landlord to get it vacated. Ultimately, the landlord brought the local police in collusion and went to the tenanted premises. They beat Kamlesh Kumari, tore her clothes and molested her. Her nine years old son, Naresh, clung to her mother to protect her when one of the police officers forcibly removed him and threw him on the floor. As a result of injury sustained by him, Naresh died few days after. While giving direction to the Delhi Administration to pay compensation to Kamlesh Kumari it has been held thus ;- "An action for damages lies for bodily harm which includes battery, assault, false imprisonment, physical injuries and death. In cases of assault, battery and false imprisonment the damages are at large and represent a solatium for the mental pain, distress, indignity, loss of liberty and death." 16. In the instant case, admittedly, Ratan Sao was killed by someone from amongst the members of the police force deputed in his village to maintain law and order. It is also not in dispute that respondent nos. 2 and 3 have been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for committing the murder of Ratan Sao. They have also been convicted under section 376 read with section 511 of the Indian Penal Code and the appeal against the said judgment is pending. In SAHELI's case (supra) the criminal case filed in connection with the incident was under police investigation when their Lordships in the Supreme Court awarded compensation to that petitioner. They have also been convicted under section 376 read with section 511 of the Indian Penal Code and the appeal against the said judgment is pending. In SAHELI's case (supra) the criminal case filed in connection with the incident was under police investigation when their Lordships in the Supreme Court awarded compensation to that petitioner. The materials available before the Court were only two reports, one submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police and the other by the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch. Delhi whereas in this case a court of competent jurisdiction has found respondent nos. 2 and 3 guilty for committing the murder of the husband of the petitioner as also for making an attempt to commit rape on her. Besides this, the inquiry report submitted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Anti Dacoity), Bihar in compliance of the order passed by this Court earlier also supports the allegation made by this petitioner. Thus, the foundation of this case is more solid than that of SAHELI's case (Supra). 17. On behalf of respondent no. 2 the main point canvassed is that no compensation can be granted to the petitioner until final decision of the criminal cases. This argument is misconceived. It proceeds on the assumption that the compensation awarded to a victim in a criminal case is a measure of punishment to an accused for committing an offence and, thus, it is dependent on the final decision of the criminal case. When an offence is committed in relation to a person, it is not only an offence against the individual, who suffers harm and loss, but it is also an offence against the society. For its peaceful and orderly development, the society is interested in punishment of the offender. This is why prosecution for serious offences is the responsibility of the State, which represents the people in criminal cases. The person, who suffers harm and injury on account of commission of offence against him, does not gain anything personally by punishment of the offender. A person found guilty for committing an offence is punished in the interest of the society and this is one of the fundamental objects underlying the penal statutes for the larger interest of the society. 18. A person found guilty for committing an offence is punished in the interest of the society and this is one of the fundamental objects underlying the penal statutes for the larger interest of the society. 18. According to Law Laxicon (Reprinted Edition 1987), the expression "compensation" is used to denote the payment which a party is entitled to claim on account of loss or damage caused to it. The dictionary meaning of the said expression signifies that which is given in recompense, an equivalent rendered. Thus, it is manifest that it is not a punishment to an accused for committing an offence. It is a solatium given to the person who suffers injury or loss due to the offence committed against him. 19. Regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the case and the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases, referred to above, in our view, the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the damage, sustained by her on account of the murder of her husband caused by the employees of the State. Therefore, in our concluded opinion, it is just and proper to direct respondent no. 1, the State of Bihar, to pay to the petitioner a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand) within six weeks from the date of receipt/ production of a copy of this order. 20. It will be open to the State, if so advised, to take appropriate step for recovery of the whole or part of the amount of compensation paid to the petitioner from respondent nos. 2 and 3, if they are found responsible. 21. We would like to observe that this order shall not have any bearing in any criminal proceeding pending against respondent nos. 2 and 3 in connection with the murder of Ratan Sao. 22. With the observations and directions made above, this petition is thus, allowed. 23. Let a copy of this order be handed over to the learned Government Advocate for needful.