Sunanda Bhandare ( 1 ) SHOP no. 1044 Sita Ram Bazar,delhi owned by Shri Bhola Nath was let out to one Shri Ram Lal at a monthly rent of Rs. 9. 00. The said Shri Ram Lal died in the year 1964 and on 21-11-64 his widow, Smt. Anar Devi, Ms son Mahinder Kumar, daughters Kanti Devi, Shakuntala Devi, Laxmi Kant, son-in-law and two minor sons of Smt. Shakuntala Devi, namely Shri Pawan and Sbri Pappu made part payments of the rent and become tenants. On 6 10-1965 the widow Smt. Anar Devi died. On 2-8-1968 Shri Bholla Dutt terminated the tenancy by way of a notice dated 2-8-1968 and on 15-11-1968 served anotice of demand for arrears of rent on the tenants. On 13-2-1969 Shri Bhola Nath made a will creating a private Trust in favour of the present appellants. ( 2 ) SINCE the shop in question is in the walled city of Delhi it was necessary to obtain permission under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before filing an eviction petition. The appellants, therefore, filed an application under Section 19 of the Act before the Competent Authority, During the pendency of the proceedings before the Competent Authority, Shri Bhola Nath died and the appellants herein were brought on record Sv order dated 9 12-1969 the Competent Authority granted permission to the present appellants to file eviction proceedings against the tenants undersection 14 (l) (a) and (C) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Thereafter the appellants filed proceedings for ejectment against the respondents. The Addl. Rent Controller by his order dated 13-7-1971 dismissed the ejectment petition and gave benefit to the respondent under Section 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Thereafter. again a notice for arrears of rent was served on the tenants on 8-971 and a second ejectment petition was filed under Section 14 (lj (a) and (c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act on the ground of second default. Mahinder Kumar filed his written statement. Respondents 2 to 5 also filed their joint written statement. The appellants herein filed the replications to the written statement of respondent no. 1 on 9-8 72 and to the written statement of respondents 2 to 5 on 19-9-72 and evidence was recorded by the Addl. Rent Controller. Mahinder Kumar filed his written statement. Respondents 2 to 5 also filed their joint written statement. The appellants herein filed the replications to the written statement of respondent no. 1 on 9-8 72 and to the written statement of respondents 2 to 5 on 19-9-72 and evidence was recorded by the Addl. Rent Controller. On 25 9 73 an order for eviction was passed by the Addl. Rent Controller. After the eviction order was passed, Shri Mahinder Kumar died and hia widow Smt. Urmila Devi filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The Rent Control Tribunal by order dated 17-8-86 allowed the appeal and dismissed the eviction petition Being aggrieved by this order of the Rent Control Tribunal the present appellants have filed this second appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. ( 3 ) AT the hearing of the appeal a preliminary objection was raised by respondent no. 1 that the second eviction petition filed by the appellants and the other proceedings subsequent thereto are not maintainable. Learned counsel submitted that since the shop in question is in the slum area, fresh permission under Section 19 of the Act was necessary to be obtained by the appellants before filing the second eviction petition. Learned counsel submitted that the permission granted by the Competent Authority vide order dated 9-12-69 got exhausted when the first eviction petition was disposed of by the Addl. Rent Controller by orderdatedl3-7-1971: Learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal no. 1906/87 (Mohd. Usman and Others v. Mohd. Siddique and Another) decided on August 26, 1987 and submitted that all the proceedings instituted by the appellants for ejectment are without jurisdiction because the appellants had not obtained fresh permission under the Act. Learned counsel submitted that the judgment of this court in Hari Rajkishore Aggarwal v. Raj Kumar 1978 (2) Rent Control in Reporter 680 where a contrary view was taken has been overuled by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Usman s case (supra ). ( 4 ) ON the other learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd Usman s case (supra) is not applicable on the facts of the present case and is in any event distinguishable because the observations of the Supreme Court in Mohd Usman s case (supra) were on different facts. ( 4 ) ON the other learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd Usman s case (supra) is not applicable on the facts of the present case and is in any event distinguishable because the observations of the Supreme Court in Mohd Usman s case (supra) were on different facts. Learned counsel submitted that the gap between the order dismissing the first eviction petition and the filing of the second petition is so short that the reason given by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Usman s case (supra) is not applicable. Learned counsel further submitted that respondent no. 1 did not raise the preliminary objections either before the addl. Rent Controller or before the Rent Control Tribunal and, therefore, it is not open-to him to raise it in this second appeal because the respondent no. 1 acquiesced and waived his right. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Provash Chandra Dalui and Another v. Biswanath Banerjee and Another. JT 19and9 (Supp ). S. C. 92 in support of bis contention that since the respondents have not raised this objection before the two courts below, it amounted to waiver. ( 5 ) I do not think any of the two contentions raised by the appellants in opposition tp the preliminary objections raised by the respondent no. 1 have any merit. The Supreme Court in Mohd. Usman s case (supra) has observed as follows :- "section 19 of the Act confers a protection on the tenant. Permission is a pre-requisite for institution of the proceedings for eviction. The permission which had been obtained on the earlier occasion Was on the basis of a set of facts then prevailing ; on a consideration of those facts, and after hearing parties, permission had been given. The permission must be taken to have been exhausted when the earlier proceeding was taken Admittedly there has been. a gap of few years between that permission and the institution of the present eviction proceeding. If opportunity had been given to the tenant before the appropriate authority under the act in the matter of grant of permission it would have been open to the tenant to satisfy the authority that circumstances had changed and permission should not be granted. a gap of few years between that permission and the institution of the present eviction proceeding. If opportunity had been given to the tenant before the appropriate authority under the act in the matter of grant of permission it would have been open to the tenant to satisfy the authority that circumstances had changed and permission should not be granted. Since legislation intends to confer a protection on the tenant and makes permission a condition precedent to the institution of The eviction proceeding, we are inclined to agree with the counsel for appellant that a afresh permission should have been obtained before the second eviction proceeding was initiated. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in hari Rajkishore Aggarwal v. Raj Kumar 1978 (2) Rent Control Reporter 680-where a contrary view has been taken. For the reasons we have indicated above, we do not think that the decision lays down the correct law. " ( 6 ) UNDOUBTEDLY in Mohd Usman s case (supra) there was a gap of few years between the permission granted by the Competent Authority and the institution of second eviction proceedings. However, the Supreme Court in Mohd Usman s case (supra) has expressly over-ruled the judgment of this court in Hari Rajkishore Aggarwal s case (supra ). In Hari Rajkishore s case (supra) the permission under Section 19 of the Act was granted on 29-9-72. The eviction petition was filed by the appellant on 23 12-1973. The eviction order was passed sometimes in the year 1974 and the second eviction petition was filed on 12-12-1974 itself. Thus, the gap between the order of the Rent controller in the first eviction petition and the filing of the second petition was also very short. Inspite of that the supreme Court in Mohd Usman s case (supra) did not consider the judgment of this Court in Hari Rajkishore aggarwal s case (supra) to be good law. Therefore, the judgment of the supreme Court in Mohd Usman s case (supra) is very clear even if the gap between the two ciders is very short fresh permission has to be obtained. The permission granted by the Competent Authority under the Act gets exhausted when a final order is passed by. the appropriate court either allowing or dismissing the eviction petition. The permission granted by the Competent Authority under the Act gets exhausted when a final order is passed by. the appropriate court either allowing or dismissing the eviction petition. If the landlord has to file a fresh petition it is necessary for him to obtain fresh permission under Section 19. of the Act for the second time before filing the second eviction petition. ( 7 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that because the respondent no. 1 bad not raised the preliminary objection before the two courts below he had acquiesced or waived his right to raise this objection is also without any merit. The objection raised by the respondent is a pure question of law and it can be raised at any time during the proceedings. From the written statement filed by the respondents before the addl. Rent Controller I find that the respondents have specifically taken this plea. It appears that because of the judgment of this court in Hart kajkishore Aggarwal s case (supra) holding a contrary view, this question was not pressed further and not raised before the Rent Control Tribunal. There is no question of any acquiscence or waiver when the question of law goes to the very root of the matter. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellant in Provash Chandia Dalui s case. (supra) on the question of waiver if on totally different facts and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Undoubtedly hardship has been caused to the appellants because the appeal has remained pending even in this court for almost 14 years but in view of the legal position no relief can be granted to the appellant in this appeal. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances the appeal is dismissed on the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. No costs.