Research › Browse › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 337 (MP)

DASHRATH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

1990-09-04

K.L.SHRIVASTAVA

body1990
K. L. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 24. 10. 1989 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First class, Khachrod in Criminal Case No. 674 of 1987 where he has framed charges under Section 196, 294 and 506 of the I. P. C. against the petitioner. ( 2 ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to the revision petition are these. According to the prosecution at about 10 a. m. on 23-4-1987 when Dr. Chandra Prakash, a public servant, was on duty in the Civil Hospital, Khachrod, the petitioner who is an office beer of the Janta Party, filthily abused him, obstructed him in discharge of his public functions and criminally intimidated him. The petitioner did so as the doctor was not permitting the use of Ambulance for the removal of the corpse of a Bohra citizen. ( 3 ) THE occurrence was reported by Dr. Chandra Prakash to the police which registered a crime and after investigation, has charge-sheeted the petitioner in respect of the offences aforesaid. As already stated, the learned Magistrate has framed charges against the petitioner. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the provision embodied in section 195 (1) (a) (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, (for short the Codet) the Court could not take cognizance of the offence under Section 186 of the I. P. C. on the police report Regarding the charges in respect of other offence he urges that their ingredients do not prima facie exist. ( 5 ) IN support of his submission challenging the charge under section 506 of the I. P. C. the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in Roshanlal's case. ( 6 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the state is that the impugned order is proper and at any rate no exception can be taken to the charge under section 506 of the I. P. C. ( 7 ) THE point for consideration is whether the revision petition deserves to be allowed. ( 8 ) AS regards the charge under Section 186 IPC the learned Magistrate has not adverted to the aforesaid provision in Section 195 of the Code and has wrongly stated that the said offence is cognizable when a plain perusal of the First Schedule of the Code shows that it is non-cognizable. ( 8 ) AS regards the charge under Section 186 IPC the learned Magistrate has not adverted to the aforesaid provision in Section 195 of the Code and has wrongly stated that the said offence is cognizable when a plain perusal of the First Schedule of the Code shows that it is non-cognizable. The contention that the court could not take cognizance of the offence under Section 186 I. P. C. except on the complaint by the public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate has to be accepted and the charge in respect of the said offence has to be quashed. ( 9 ) THIS brings out to the contention regarding charges in respect of offences under Section 294 and 506 of the I. P. C. It is well-settled that at the stage of charge the material on record has no doubt to be tested but only for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out and that he should be required to face trial according to law. The material is not to be meticulously examined as has to be done to decide the case on merits after trial. Suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence is sufficient for sustaining the charge though the strongest of suspicion against the accused cannot be placed on pedestal of legal proof of the crime for entering conviction against him as the requirement then is of proof beyond reasonable doubt. ( 10 ) IN the decision in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar it has been pointed out that at the stage of charge to court has only to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and any basic infirmity appearing in the case and so on and that the test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. ( 11 ) REFERENCE at this stage may usefully be made to the provision in Section 211 (5) of the code. ( 11 ) REFERENCE at this stage may usefully be made to the provision in Section 211 (5) of the code. It runs thus: The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. ( 12 ) ON a careful consideration of the material on record in the light of the law discussed above, 1 find that it does not prima facie make out ingredients of the offence under Section 294 of the I. P. C. This conclusion in this case does not involve any pre-judging of the prosecution case without opportunity to adduce evidence. ( 13 ) NOW as to the charge under Section 506 of the I. P. C. It may be stated that criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503 of the I. P. C. and Section 506 which is in two parts embodies the penal provision therefore. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the alleged utterances by the petitioner there was more sound than substance and, therefore, the charge under Section 506 I. P. C. is not sustainable. I am of the view that in the context of the controversy in which the alleged utterances were made the contention that there was only empty threat cannot be upheld. On the material on record it prima facie appears that offence under Section 506 Part I of the I. P. C. was committed by the petitioner and he should be made to stand the trial therefor. ( 14 ) AS a result of the foregoing discussion I hold that the revision petition deserves to be allowed but only partly and it is so allowed. The charges under section 186 and 294 of the I. P. C. are quashed but the order framing charge under section 506 ibid in the terms stated above is maintained. Record of the case be sent back immediately. Petition partly allowed. .