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1990 DIGILAW 338 (MAD)

G. Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Ex-officio Secretary and Additional Commissioner, Civil Supplies, Hyderabad

1990-04-24

RADHA KRISHNA RAO

body1990
Judgment : (at the admission stage)- The Mandal Revenue Officer, Kollapur visited the fair price shop of petitioner on 27.5.1987 along with the Revenue Inspector, Kollapur on receipt of a complaint from the Gopalrao and after examining five cardholders of ration cards found that the petitioner made false entries in his registers that he distributed sugar to the cardholders though he did not do so, and therefore, he seized 75 Kilograms of sugar from the shop of petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner, that the M.R.O. served a show cause notice on 8.12.1987 on the petitioner. To that, the petitioner filed his explanation. However, the 2nd respondent by his order dated 8.2.1988 confiscated the seized stock of 75 Kilograms of sugar. 2. His case is that the said order dated 8.2.1988 of the 2nd respondent was not communicated to him, but it was served on his counsel, under a covering letter dated 13.2.1988. He submits that he had no knowledge of the said order till 3.3.1990, on which date he received a registered letter along with the said order dated 8.2.1988 of 2nd respondent, that the appeal under Sec.6-C of the Essential Commodities Act has to be filed within one month from the date of communication of the order to the person concerned, that the petitioner filed an appeal before the 1st respondent on 28.3.1990, that the 1st respondent rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner by a Memo dated 29.3.1990 on the sole ground that the appeal is belated, and that therefore the said order dated 29.3.1990 may be quashed. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that under Sec.6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, any aggrieved person, by an order of confiscation under Sec.6-A of the said Act, may within one month from the date of communication of such order to him, file an appeal to the Government and as the petitioner received the order of 2nd respondent only on 3.3.1990, the period of limitation starts running from that date only and not from the date of communication of the order of 2nd respondent to the counsel for the petitioner. In other words, his contention is that mere communication of the order dated 8.2.1988 to his counsel is not a communication as per the provisions of Sec.6-C of the said Act and that limitation for filing an appeal against the order dated 8.2.1988 does not start running from the date communicating the order to his counsel. In the circumstances, he contends that the 1st respondent ought to have entertained the appeal of the petitioner. He relied on a decision of this Court in K.China Nagawath v. Special Tahsildar, L.R., Markapur K.China Nagawath v. Special Tahsildar, L.R., Markapur (1978)1 An.W.R (NRC.) 10 for the proposition that it is not the date of the pronouncement of the order, but the date of communication of the order to the party that is relevant for the purpose of determining whether the appeal preferred by the aggrieved party in the land reforms proceedings is within time or not. The facts of that case are not applicable to the facts of this case. That case relates to proceedings under Land Reforms Act. 4. The learned counsel further contends that the 1st respondent erred in rejecting to entertain the appeal of the petitioner. Even otherwise on facts, it has come out there is no sufficient cause for the petitioner in filing the appeal after a lapse of nearly two years. 5. In this case, the advocate for the petitioner received the order dated 8.2.1988 on 13.2.1988 and kept silent without informing the same to his party. The petitioner says that he received the order by registered post only on 3.3.1990. When a person engages an advocate in a case and when the advocate did not inform his party about the orders received by him in the matter and kept silent for quite a long time, the party cannot be allowed to say that he was unaware of those orders. Whatever may be, the party has to reap the consequences of the inaction on the part of his counsel. After a long lapse of nearly two years, the party cannot be permitted to say that principles of natural justice have been violated. The question whether there is violation of principles of natural justice or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 6. After a long lapse of nearly two years, the party cannot be permitted to say that principles of natural justice have been violated. The question whether there is violation of principles of natural justice or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 6. For the aforementioned reasons, I do not see any point to direct the authorities concerned to entertain the appeal of the petitioner at this belated stage. The question whether the party has got a remedy or not is left open. The writ petition is without merit and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Advocates fee Rs.200.