R. D. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) THIS plaintiff's second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 8-4-1985, passed in Civil Appeal No. 23-A of 1984, of the Court of Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Betul (arising out of the judgment and decree dated 10-8-1984, passed in Civil Suit No. 27-A of 1980, of the Court of Civil Judge (Class II), Betul), whereby dismissal of his suit for eviction has been confirmed. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the case of the plaintiff is that he filed a suit on 2-4-1980 under the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control Act (which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the Act') with the assertion that on a family settlement, the house in dispute has come to his share. He requires the suit house for his residence and for starting business for his major son. He and his family members, along with his brothers' family, mother and sister are living in a house which is not sufficient and suitable for their residence. Plaintiff has also alleged that the defendant has made material alteration in the ground-floor without the permission of the landlord-plaintiff. He, therefore, prayed that a decree for eviction be passed against the defendant. ( 3 ) THE defendant denied the plaint allegations and submitted that the plaintiff and his family members, along with his brothers' family, mother and sister are living in other portion of the house of which the suit accommodation is a part. The plaintiff has sufficient accommodation for his residence. He also denied any material alteration in the house. ( 4 ) THE trial Court negatived the plea of the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court confirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court. Hence, this second appeal. ( 5 ) THE appellant has contended that the first appellate Court has come to a finding that the need of the plaintiff is real but not bona fide and, hence, dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court confirmed the finding recorded by the trial Court. Hence, this second appeal. ( 5 ) THE appellant has contended that the first appellate Court has come to a finding that the need of the plaintiff is real but not bona fide and, hence, dismissed the suit. ( 6 ) THIS appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law - " (1) (a) Whether the finding of the first appellate Court that even though the plaintiff's need is real, yet it is not bona fide, is contrary to law; (b) If so, is the finding on the question of bona fide need vitiated for this reason?" ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the Court below has discarded material evidence. The finding is, therefore, perverse and, hence, a request, for interference by this Court is made. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the finding of fact has been concluded and, therefore, it cannot be disturbed in the second appellate stage. ( 9 ) NOW, therefore, it has first to be seen whether the house in dispute has fallen to the share of the plaintiff in family settlement. This fact has been pleaded in para 2 of the plaint though it has been denied by the defendant in his written statement, but that denial is on the basis of want of knowledge. The plaintiff has stated in para 2 of the plaint that there was a family settlement and the house has fallen to his share in that settlement. This fact has been admitted by the plaintiff's brother P. W. 4 Pundlik Rao, P. W. 2 Sewasingh has also stated about this fact. ( 10 ) THE defendant himself as D. W. 3 in his statement (para 13) has admitted that he is continuously paying the rent to Ramrao (Plaintiff) after the demise of plaintiff's father. He has further stated that the plaintiff had been asserting that the house in suit has fallen to his share. He himself has produced documents (Exts. D-11 to D-13), which are rent-receipts. In those receipts also, the plaintiff has been shown as the landlord of the house. Names of other brothers of the plaintiff have been struck off while issuing them to the defendant and the plaintiff has then been shown to be the sole landlord. He himself has produced documents (Exts. D-11 to D-13), which are rent-receipts. In those receipts also, the plaintiff has been shown as the landlord of the house. Names of other brothers of the plaintiff have been struck off while issuing them to the defendant and the plaintiff has then been shown to be the sole landlord. P. W. 3 Uttamrao, son of the plaintiff, has admitted in cross-examination that the plaintiff (his father) and his uncle are joint owners of the house in dispute. Uttamrao has been examined on 21-12-1983, when his age has been shown to be 18 years, while the family settlement had taken place in 1964. It appears that he was born long after that settlement; hence the admission of Uttamrao appears to be casual. It has been given undue importance as against the admission of the defendant in para 13 of his statement, which has not been considered; yet there is another admission by way of suggestion to the plaintiff during cross-examination as recorded in last line of para 12. It was suggested that the settlement was made in 1974 while plaintiff asserts that it was done in 1964. Thus, material evidence has not been taken into consideration by the two Courts below. ( 11 ) THE finding of fact of first appellate Court should not be disturbed unless the finding is perverse or material piece of evidence has been discarded, or the finding has been arrived at on the basis of inadmissible evidence. ( 12 ) IN this case, the two Courts below have committed an error in not taking into consideration the material piece of evidence referred to above and the documents (Exs. D-11 to D-14) and it was a serious error. "the Court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law-" Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, AIR 1988 SC 1858 . It is, therefore, held that the house in dispute has fallen to the share of the plaintiff during the family settlement and he is the landlord of the house. It is, therefore, held that the house in dispute has fallen to the share of the plaintiff during the family settlement and he is the landlord of the house. ( 13 ) NOW, therefore, it has to be seen whether the plaintiff has proved his bona fide requirement and whether the finding of the first appellate Court that the need of plaintiff is real but not bona fide is against the law and it needs interference by this Court. ( 14 ) THE learned lower appellate Court, in para 17 of its judgment, has held that the need of the plaintiff appears to be real but not bona fide. This conclusion of the learned lower appellate Court is based on irrelevant consideration. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff-appellant, along with his brothers and their family members, are living jointly. In all, 18 persons are living in that house presently occupied by the plaintiff and other members of family. Among these 18 persons, there is an old mother and dumb sister of the plaintiff, besides his sons and daughters, out of them, one son is major. It is also an admitted fact that three rooms are in occupation of the plaintiff and his brothers and other members of their joint family. This has also been admitted by the defendant that all these members of the family are residing in that house from the time he was inducted in the suit accommodation. The defendant is residing in that house for the last 17 years. During this period, the members of the plaintiff's family and his brothers must have become major. Now, in this last decade of twentieth century, persons having sufficient members in their family, cannot be forced to live in congested and crowded rooms if they have other suitable accommodation at their command. ( 15 ) THE learned appellate Court has doubted the bona fide need of the plaintiff on the ground that his brother, though having accommodation in the first floor of the house fallen to his share, is not occupying it and has not filed a suit for eviction against his tenants. It has, therefore, been held that the plaintiff's need does not appear to be bona fide. I think this is an irrelevant consideration. It has, therefore, been held that the plaintiff's need does not appear to be bona fide. I think this is an irrelevant consideration. Once it is accepted that the plaintiff is the landlord of the house in suit, it is for him to choose as to whether he wants to live in a joint family house along with other family members in those congested and crowded rooms, or wants to avail of the right of residence and occupation of his house in the occupation of tenants. ( 16 ) COUNSEL for the respondent, on the basis of the case reported in Mattulal v. Radhelal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 has submitted that the question of bona fide requirement is a finding of fact and it cannot be disturbed now. I am in full agreement with the principles laid down in that case, but the Court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record, and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue, the High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. In my view, therefore, in this case, this Court is required to interfere due to serious error committed by the lower appellate Court. In this case, plaintiff cannot be non suited merely because his brother does not choose to file suit for eviction against his tenants or elects to reside in the joint family house in the congested and crowded rooms along with his mother and sister. ( 17 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the part of suit accommodation is being used as a dispensary (non-residential purpose) and rest of it is being used for residential purpose and, therefore, it cannot be vacated for residential purpose. Suit for splitting up of tenancy is not acceptable, but in such cases, it has to be seen what was the predominent object of the tenant. It appears from the documents on record (i. e. photographs filed by the parties), that only front and small portion is being used as dispensary and the rest of the house is being used for residential purpose, and, therefore, in this case, the predominent object appears to be residential. Please see: T. S. Subramanian v. Andhra Bank, AIR 1989 SC 1420 . Please see: T. S. Subramanian v. Andhra Bank, AIR 1989 SC 1420 . In my opinion, therefore, the plaintiff has succeeded in proving not only his real need but also bona fide need and the finding of the learned lower appellate Court on the question of bona fide requirement is vitiated for reasons stated above. ( 18 ) IT is, therefore, held that the plaintiff is landlord of the house in dispute and he bona fide requires the same for residential purpose. He is, therefore, entitled for a decree of eviction. ( 19 ) THE appeal is, therefore, accepted with costs. Judgment and decree of Courts below are set aside. Instead, a decree for eviction is granted in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant is directed to vacate the house in dispute within two months from the date of the decree. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-, if certified. Appeal allowed. .