V. GOPALASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful defendant prefers this appeal against the judgment dated 9-5-1979 and decree dated 22-6-1979 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Balesore in Original Suit No. 29 of 1976-III decreeing the plaintiff' suit, on contest, with costs for recovery of Rs. 10,845. 78 paise together with future interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff' case may be briefly stated as follows : the plaintiff is a registered money-lender and on 20-4-1975 the defendant borrowed from him a sum of Rs. 10,000/- executing a promissory note in his favour agreeing to repay the said amount, on demand, together with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. On 15-7-1975 the defendant paid a sum of Rs. 1,000/- towards the dues of the said loan and made an endorsement to that effect on the reverse side of the promissory note. Thereafter, the defendant did not pay any further amount towards the discharge of the promissory note dues despite repeated demands made by the plaintiff. So the plaintiff served a registered notice, through his Advocate, on 22-3-1976 demanding of the defendant to pay the entire balance dues. The defendant did not give any reply to that notice, nor did he pay any amount towards the discharge of the promissory note dues. Hence, the plaintiff was compelled to file this suit for recovery of Rs. 10,845. 78 paise, the balance dues under the suit promissory note by the date of filing of the suit together with further interest. ( 3 ) THE gist of the averments made in the written statement filed by the defendant, may be briefly stated as follows : on 20-4-1975 the defendant borrowed only a sum of Rs. 5,000/- from the plaintiff and had given the plaintiff a blank paper containing his left thumb impression and signature and making use of it the plaintiff had fabricated the suit promissory note showing as if Rs. 10,000/- was borrowed by him. The defendant had paid the plaintiff Rs. 8,000/- towards the full discharge of the entire dues under the suit promissory note. So, nothing more was due under the suit promissory note. But as the defendant demanded of the plaintiff to return the suit promissory note the letter filed the suit with false allegations. 10,000/- was borrowed by him. The defendant had paid the plaintiff Rs. 8,000/- towards the full discharge of the entire dues under the suit promissory note. So, nothing more was due under the suit promissory note. But as the defendant demanded of the plaintiff to return the suit promissory note the letter filed the suit with false allegations. ( 4 ) FROM the pleadings, the evidence adduced in the case and the arguments advanced at the Bar, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal : (1) Whether the suit promissory note is fully supported by consideration? (2) What is the amount paid by the defendant to the plaintiff towards the dues of the suit promissory note? (3) Whether, in fact, there was non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 18-B of the Orissa Money Lenders Act, 1939? (4) Whether, because of such alleged non-compliance, the suit is liable to be dismissed? (5) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to? ( 5 ) THE parties have adduced oral evidence in support of their respective contentions. The plaintiff has examined himself as P. W. 1. The defendant has examined himself as D. W. 1. in support of his case. He further examined D. W. 2 in proof of the alleged payment of Rs. 8,000/- to the plaintiff towards the dues of the promissory note. Beside adducing oral evidence, the plaintiff has also adduced documentary evidence Exts. 1 to 5 in support of his case. No documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the defendant. ( 6 ) POINT No. 1 : From the evidence of the defendant it is seen that he was the Secretary of Narsinghpur Seva Samanya Samiti from the year 1950 till June 1975. So, he is normally not expected to give a blank paper containing his left thumb impression and signature and thus, give an opportunity to the plaintiff to fabricate a promissory note for any amount. The defendant has admitted in cross-examination that the entire suit promissory note, Ext. 1 was written by him in his own handwriting and he had given his signature on the revenue stamps and also affixed his thumb impression on Ext. 1 and made endorsement to that effect. The defendant further admitted that the endorsement of payment marked Ext. 1/a was made by him. 1 was written by him in his own handwriting and he had given his signature on the revenue stamps and also affixed his thumb impression on Ext. 1 and made endorsement to that effect. The defendant further admitted that the endorsement of payment marked Ext. 1/a was made by him. Hence, the evidence of the plaintiff that the defendant had duly executed the suit promissory note, Ext. 1 is fully supported by the above admissions made by the defendant himself in his evidence. Hence, the plea of the defendant that he had given his signature and thumb impression in a blank paper is patently false. ( 7 ) SECTION 118 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that every negotiable instrument was made or for consideration. A promissory note is a negotiable instrument. When execution of the promissory note is admitted or duly proved, the presumption arising under Section 118 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is that the hand-note is fully supported by the consideration mentioned therein. As it is proved that the defendant had duly executed the suit promissory note Ext. 1, so there is a presumption under Section 118 (a) that the same is fully supported by consideration. According to the defendant, none else use present when he borrowed the amount under the suit promissory note. Apart from the presumption under Section 118 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act available to the plaintiff, the evidence of the plaintiff that on 20-4-1975 he had advanced Rs. 10,000/- to the defendant, on the defendant executing the suit promissory note, Ext. 1 in his favour, has not been shaken in cross-examination and sounds quite convincing. In view of the above evidence, I agree with the finding of the trial court that the suit promissory note Ext. 1 dated 20-4-1975 is fully supported by consideration and the plaintiff had advanced the defendant a sum of Rs. 10,000/- on that date. ( 8 ) POINT No. 2 : According to the plaintiff, the defendant has paid only Rs. 1,000/- on 15-7-1975 towards the discharge of the promissory note dues and made an endorsement to that effect on the reverse side of the promissory note. The above evidence of the plaintiff is supported by Ext. 1/a, which is admitted by the defendant. The defendant claims to have paid a further sum of Rs. 8,000/- in a lump. 1,000/- on 15-7-1975 towards the discharge of the promissory note dues and made an endorsement to that effect on the reverse side of the promissory note. The above evidence of the plaintiff is supported by Ext. 1/a, which is admitted by the defendant. The defendant claims to have paid a further sum of Rs. 8,000/- in a lump. The defendant stated that he made the endorsement Ext. 1/a some days after he paid Rs. 8,000/ -. If there is any truth in the said statement, then the defendant would have mentioned about it also when he made the endorsement Ext. 1/a subsequent to the alleged payment of Rs. 8,000/ -. So it is difficult to believe the version of the defendant that he paid Rs. 8,000/- to the plaintiff few days before the date of making the endorsement Ext. 1 / a, P. W. 2 was examined to prove the said payment of Rs. 8,000/ -. But the evidence of D. W. 2 shows that the said sum of Rs. 8,000/- was paid in three instalments, comprising of Rs. 3,000/-, Rs. 3,000/ and Rs. 2,000/ -. So the evidence of D. W. 2 falsifies the plea of the defendant that he paid a lump sum of Rs. 8,000/- to the plaintiff. Hence, I agree with the finding of the trial Court that apart from the payment of Rs. 1,000/- on 15-7-1975, as evidenced by Ext. 1/a, the defendant has not paid any further amount towards the discharge of the dues of the suit promissory note. ( 9 ) POINT No. 3 : Sub-section (2) of Section 18-B of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act') provides :"the authority specified in the notification referred to in sub-section (1) shall scrutinise the documents with a view to determining if the transactions exceed the amount for which the money-lender has obtained the registration certificate and shall, after giving the money-lender a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass an order declaring the particulars of transaction that are within the amount specified in the said certificate. "sub-section (8) of Section 18-B of the Act provides :"no Court shall entertain any claim in respect of any loan advanced prior to the date of the order referred to in sub-section (2) unless the particulars thereof are contained in the said order and all suits in respect of such claims shall stand abated. "sub-section (8) of Section 18-B of the Act provides :"no Court shall entertain any claim in respect of any loan advanced prior to the date of the order referred to in sub-section (2) unless the particulars thereof are contained in the said order and all suits in respect of such claims shall stand abated. "section 18-B was inserted in the Orissa Money Lenders Act, 1939 by Orissa Act 54 of 1975. In the present case, the certified copy of the order passed under sub-section (2) of Section 18-B of the Act by the prescribed authority, which is marked Ext. 5 (without objection), shows that the order was passed on 9-1-1976. The present suit was filed on 13-9-1976. So evidently the order under sub-section (2) was passed prior to the date of the filing of the suit. The particulars of the suit loan are contained in the said order passed under sub-section (2) by the prescribed authority Annexure-5 as required under sub-section (8) of Section 18-B of the Act. But all the same the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that as the plaintiff did not plead that the provisions of Section 18-B of the Act were duly complied with, on that score alone, the suit stands abated. In this context, the counsel for the appellant relied on the observations in Daitrari Sahu v. Pagal Pande, 47 (1979) CLT 346, a single Judge decision of this Court, that in order to maintain the suit it was the primary duty of the plaintiff to plead and prove that the provisions of Section 18-B of the Act were duly complied with and that in the absence of pleading and proof, the plaintiff' suit stands abated by virtue of the provisions of subsection (8) of Section 18-B of the Act. In that case, admittedly the plaintiff had not proved that the provisions of Section 18-B were duly complied with. So the expression "plead and prove" should be understood in the context in which it was used by this court, keeping in mind the scope of sub-section (8 ). In my view what is emphasised by the said expression "plead and prove" is that it is not enough if the plaintiff merely pleads about the compliance of the provisions of Section 18-B, but he must also strictly prove such compliance. In my view what is emphasised by the said expression "plead and prove" is that it is not enough if the plaintiff merely pleads about the compliance of the provisions of Section 18-B, but he must also strictly prove such compliance. According to me, there is nothing in that decision or in the provision under sub-section (8) which would suggest that in the absence of a plea regarding the compliance of the provisions of Section 18-B, the suit shall stand abated. My view receive support from the several decisions of this Court relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent and referred to in the succeeding paragraphs. ( 10 ) IN Dibakar Pradhan v. Sk. Miskini, Volume 47 (1979) CLT 79 : AIR 1979 NOC 74 (Ori), the plaintiff filed the suit on 8-4-1977 for recovery of the dues under the suit promissory note. On 15-7-1977 he had applied to the trial Court for extension of time to produce the requisite order under sub-section (2) and had asked for return of the documents which were in court. The trial Court held that as the order under Section 18-B (2) was not filed, the suit is not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed the suit. The requisite order under sub-section (2) was obtained after the dismissal of the suit. Considering these facts, a Division Bench of this Court, observing that "admittedly, Section 18-B of the Act had been recently introduced and every money-lender was not aware of the provision", allowed the civil revision, set aside the order dated 15-71977 of the trial Court and directed that the suit be restored to file on the undertaking given by the plaintiff that he would be filing the requisite order before the trial Court on or before 7-11-1978. Dayanidhi Misra v. Ramachandra Misra Volume 63 (1987) CLT 65 is a Division Bench decision of this Court wherein this Court held that :". . . . . . Dayanidhi Misra v. Ramachandra Misra Volume 63 (1987) CLT 65 is a Division Bench decision of this Court wherein this Court held that :". . . . . . THE suit for recovery of the loan by a money-lender has got to be filed within the prescribed period of limitation and he cannot be permitted to exclude the time spent by him for obtaining the certificate under Sec. 18-B of the Act, but at the same time the courts must grant reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff in appropriate cases to obtain and file a copy of such certificate before recording an order of abatement or dismissal of the suit on that account. "betakrishna Ker v. Laxman Lanke, Vol. 51 (1981) CLT 215 : AIR 1982 NOC 88 (Ori) is a case where the suit was filed on 20-7-1973 and was decreed in part on 28-11-1975 and the appeal before the District Judge was dismissed on 30-3-1977, on the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with the mandatory provision of sub-section (8) and hence the plaintiff preferred the second appeal on 3-10-1977. Section 18-B came into force in the year 1975 subsequent to the date of filing of the suit. The plaintiff came up on second appeal before this Court. The plaintiff obtained the requisite certificate under subsection (2) in January, 1978. According to the definition in S. 2 (q) of the Act, the word "suit" includes an appeal. Hence, it was considered necessary that the plaintiff should produce the order under sub-section (2) at the appellate stage, even though on the date of filing of the suit, Section 18-B was not even inserted in the Act. When the plaintiff had produced a copy of the order of the prescribed authority containing the particulars of the suit loan, this Court held that the plaintiff-appellant had satisfied the conditions of Section 18-B and hence decreed the suit and allowed the appeal. In Narayan Chowdhury v. Koka Das, Vol. 49 (1980) CLT 524 this Court held that an opportunity must be given to the moneylender to comply with the statutory requirement under Section 18-B of the Act within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court before an order of abatement can be passed. In Harihar Pati v. Dyetary Khhetoi, Vol. In Narayan Chowdhury v. Koka Das, Vol. 49 (1980) CLT 524 this Court held that an opportunity must be given to the moneylender to comply with the statutory requirement under Section 18-B of the Act within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court before an order of abatement can be passed. In Harihar Pati v. Dyetary Khhetoi, Vol. 57 (1984) CLT 290 : AIR 1984 Orissa 138, this Court observed that there may be cases where even though an order under subsection (2) has been obtained, the same could not be filed in Court before the order of abatement is passed. In that decision, this Court held that even though there are justifying circumstances for the non-filing of the order, yet when the trial Court passed orders for the abatement of the suit, as there is no provision in the Act for setting aside the order of abatement passed in the suit, the trial Court should, therefore, exercise its inherent power under Section 151, C. P. C. for setting aside the order of abatement to meet the ends of justice. From the above decisions it is very clear that the plaintiff should prove that there was due compliance with the provisions of Section 18-B of the Act by filing a copy of the order passed by the prescribed authority under subsection (2), which should contain all the material particulars regarding the suit loan. If the plaintiff fails to prove such compliance, the suit shall stand abated. If a copy of the order under sub-section (2) is not filed as required under the mandatory provision of Section 18-B, the court, before ordering for the abatement of the suit, shall give reasonable opportunity to the plaintiff to produce the same. Dayanidhi Misra' case (supra) and Narayan Choudhury' case (supra ). So there is no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant that when the plaintiff does not plead about the compliance of the provisions of Section 18-B on that score alone, the suit shall stand abated. ( 11 ) IN the present case, Ext. 5, the certified copy of the order passed by the prescribed authority under sub-section (2), contains all the material particulars regarding the loan. ( 11 ) IN the present case, Ext. 5, the certified copy of the order passed by the prescribed authority under sub-section (2), contains all the material particulars regarding the loan. So the plaintiff has duly complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 18-B. Hence the defendant' plea that the suit is not maintainable due to the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 18-B is neither valid nor tenable. ( 12 ) POINT No. 4 : In view of my above finding on point No. 3, agreeing with the finding of the lower court, I held that the suit is maintainable. ( 13 ) POINT No. 5 : In view of my above discussion on the several points raised, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for. ( 14 ) IN the result, I hereby confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and accordingly. Dismiss the appeal, on contest, with costs. Appeal dismissed.