Judgment :- Petitioner (the Society, for reference ) is a co-operative society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (the Act). The first respondent was its paid Secretary. Respondents 2 to 9 along with one Paramu (now deceased) were the members of its managing committee (hereinafter referred to as the erstwhile board) from February 18,1973. Fresh election was held to the managing committee on March 21,1976, consequent on which the erstwhile Board had to vacate office in favour of the newly elected members. A joint meeting of the members of the old and new committees was convened to be held on May 16,1976 for the purpose of handing over charge, but the members of the erstwhile Board did not turn up. Another meeting was therefore convened for the purpose on May 26,1976 when again the members of the erstwhile Board tailed to attend. The first respondent Secretary was present, and he agreed to hand over the cash balance a May 28,1976, but, instead of doing so, he locked up the office of the society on the 26th and made himself scarce. All the books and records of the society were with him. The managing committee had therefore to take proceedings in the Magistrate's Court to obtain custody of the office with the books and the records. They could obtain possession of the office, the books and the records, with police aid, only on June 21,1976. 2. The accounts of the society were thereafter audited. The audit report noted various irregularities and manipulation of accounts, which are, detailed under twelve heads in the defect register attached to it. A copy of the defect register is ExtPl. Inter alia it was noted that the first respondent Secretary had issued 32 receipts for amounts aggregating Rs. 27,006.64 and 105 receipts for amounts aggregating Rs. 61,078-84 on May 28,1976 as if these amounts had been received on that day. None of these amounts was however brought into the accounts or credited to the society. The auditor reported that these amounts, being items 7 and 9 of Ext. P1, should be recovered from the secretary and the members of the erstwhile Board. There were also other items mentioned in Ext, P1 of which item No.5 related to a bogus lo&n issued on June 17,1974 to one Zacharia, under which an amount of Rs. The auditor reported that these amounts, being items 7 and 9 of Ext. P1, should be recovered from the secretary and the members of the erstwhile Board. There were also other items mentioned in Ext, P1 of which item No.5 related to a bogus lo&n issued on June 17,1974 to one Zacharia, under which an amount of Rs. 916-69 was alleged to have been received in repayment on May 28,1976. In fact, this Zacharia was dead on February 14,1972 long before the loan was sanctioned, and therefore, could not have received the amount of the loan, or repaid it, as alleged. Item No. 6 related in part to an alleged loan to one Gouri Amma on the same day, to whom no such loan could have been advanced having regard to the circumstance that her continuing guarantee bond stood discharged as early as on March 19,1974. The amount involved was Rs. 1,523-82. I will mention another item as well namely item No. 8, an amount of Rs. 2,500/- received by the first respondent on May 28 on sale of coconuts to a third party. In addition the auditor had recommended recovery from the secretary and the erstwhile Board, of an amount of Rs, 6,817-10 being the cash balance on May 25,1976, which was not handed over to the new Board. This forms part of item 1 of Ext. P1 and the auditor had fastened the liability therefore on the secretary and the erstwhile Board. 3. Items 2,3,11,12 concerned items, the recovery of which had been defaulted due to the negligence of the secretary and the erstwhile Board. The auditor had recommended their recovery also from those persons. 4. There were some other items also dealt with by Ext. P1, but reference to them is unnecessary for purposes of this original petition. 5. On receipt of the audit report, the society instituted proceedings under S.69 of the Act for recovery of the amount covered by Ext. P1. Inter alia, the society sought to make respondents 1 to 9 and Paramu jointly and severally liable for the amounts made mention of earlier, namely items 1,5 to 9,11, and 12. Their case in relation to item Nos. 1,5,6,8,11 and 12 has already been set forth above. So far as items No.7, relating to the 32 receipts aggregating Rs. P1. Inter alia, the society sought to make respondents 1 to 9 and Paramu jointly and severally liable for the amounts made mention of earlier, namely items 1,5 to 9,11, and 12. Their case in relation to item Nos. 1,5,6,8,11 and 12 has already been set forth above. So far as items No.7, relating to the 32 receipts aggregating Rs. 27,006.64 issued on May 28,1976, was concerned, the case was that the loans alleged to have been discharged thereby were all bogus ones by which only respondents 1 to 9 and Paramu had benefited. The receipt of these amounts had not been entered in the accounts of the society nor the amounts credited to its account. Regarding the amounts covered by the 105 receipts (item No. 9) the case was that they related to transactions by which the erstwhile Directors had only benefited themselves. The receipt of these amounts was also not entered in the accounts or credited to the society. The petitioner therefore, claimed a decree making respondents 1 to 9 and Paramu jointly and severally liable for the amounts covered by all these items. A decree was separately claimed against respondents 1 and 2, these cretary and the Ex-President for amounts covered by some other items in Ext. P1 including items 2 and 3. 6. The Arbitrator by his award Ext.P2 held that respondents 1 to 9 and Paramu were jointly and severally liable for the amounts covered by items 5,6 and 7 in Ext.P1 aggregating Rs. 29,447.64. So far as the amounts covered by items 8 and 9 and others were concerned, he stated that they had been received by the secretary on May 28,1976. The secretary had misappropriated the amounts, and therefore, he alone could be made liable for the same. Respondents 2 to 9 and Paramu could not be made liable for the whole or any portion of the amount, as there was no record to show that they had received or enjoyed the amount. The arbitrator also held that item 2,3,11 and 12 fell within the scope of S.68 of the Act and therefore, could not be dealt with in proceedings under S.69. 7. Appeals were filed before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal separately by respondent No. 1, respondent No.2 and by respondents 3 to 9, Paramu being dead. The Tribunal disposed of the appeals by a common order Ext. P4. 7. Appeals were filed before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal separately by respondent No. 1, respondent No.2 and by respondents 3 to 9, Paramu being dead. The Tribunal disposed of the appeals by a common order Ext. P4. The appeals filed by respondents 2 to 9 were allowed, and it was held that they were not liable for any portion of the amounts claimed from them. The award against them was vacated. The Society's appeal claiming joint decree against respondents 2 to 9 for the amounts covered by items Sand 9 as well as for a decree regarding items 2,3,11 and 12 was dismissed. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Arbitrator regarding items 2,3,11, and 12 and relegated the society to proceedings under S.68. 8. The petitioner society has filed this original petition challenging Ext. P4. The claim is that respondents 2 to 9, the members of the erstwhile Board, are jointly and severally liable along with the first respondent for the amounts covered by items 1 and 5 to 9. It is also submitted that the claim for recovery of the amounts covered by items 2,3,11, and 12 ought to have been considered on merits, instead of abdicating jurisdiction, on the ground of bar under S.68. 9. Before entering into the merits of the controversy, I must state that I am not impressed with the society's claim for making respondents 2 to 9 liable for the amount covered by item No. 8. This is the amount received by the secretary, the first respondent, on May 28,1976 as the price of coconuts sold to a third party. There is no case that this was not a genuine transaction or that the amount had been received earlier and not accounted for. There is also no case that respondents 2 to 9 had benefited therein. The Arbitrator as well as the Tribunal therefore rightly declined to make respondents 2 to 9 liable for the amount. 10. The position is however, different in relation to items 1,5,6,7 and 9. So Car as items 5 and 6 are concerned the Arbitrator had given Ms reasons why respondents 2 to 9 were also jointly and severally liable for those amounts. There is no proper consideration of these heads of claim by the Tribunal. 10. The position is however, different in relation to items 1,5,6,7 and 9. So Car as items 5 and 6 are concerned the Arbitrator had given Ms reasons why respondents 2 to 9 were also jointly and severally liable for those amounts. There is no proper consideration of these heads of claim by the Tribunal. So far as items 7 and 9 are concerned, the petitioner's case was that they represented transactions (bogus or otherwise) under which the members of the erstwhile Board had benefited themselves, and therefore, they were liable to make good the amount. The Tribunal however, made short work of the claim by stating that the first respondent Secretary had not appeared before the Tribunal, that he had not challenged the evidence about his liability and that he had taken the liability upon himself. I am left wondering how this could be a valid reason to absolve respondents 2 to 9 of liability, if they are otherwise liable. The Tribunal found force (without any consideration) in the plea of respondents 2 to 9 that they had actually committed no misappropriation and that they had no part in the foul dealings of the Secretary. According to the Tribunal, the first respondent secretary had misappropriated all the amounts, fabricating records, and by not accounting for the cash received. In the circumstances, he absolved respondents 2 to 9 of liability. 11. I am afraid the Tribunal has committed gross errors of law and of fact in exonerating respondents 2 to 9 from liability. Rule 47(b) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules provides that it is the duty of the President of the society to arrange to maintain accounts and registers in proper form and to keep the cash balance and other assets under safe custody. Ee is to act as the Treasurer of the society if there is no specific provision in the byelaws to elect or appoint a treasurer. Sub clause (d) of the Rule states that the committee of the society shall primarily be responsible for the maintenance and safety of all accounts, records, cash and other assets of the society. It is their duty to see that the officers concerned discharge their functions and duties as laid down in the rules and the byelaws. Sub clause (d) of the Rule states that the committee of the society shall primarily be responsible for the maintenance and safety of all accounts, records, cash and other assets of the society. It is their duty to see that the officers concerned discharge their functions and duties as laid down in the rules and the byelaws. It is evident from these provisions, that there is a statutory duty cast on the committee of the society for the proper custody and accounting of the cash and other assets of the society and that they are answerable for any misappropriation of the same during their tenure. They cannot wash off their hands of liability, by contending that there was a Secretary in office. 12. The specific case of the society in relation to items 7 and 9 is that they relate to transactions which are either not genuine or in relation to which the members of the erstwhile Board had benefited themselves. The books have been manipulated and receipts concocted on May 28,1976 as if the amounts had been received on that day. This being the case of the society, it was incumbent on the Tribunal to examine and adjudge on it. The Arbitrator himself went into the matter and found joint liability in respondents 2 to 9 for items 5,6 and 7. The Tribunal has over simplified matters by looking merely at the date of the receipts namely May 28,1976, and for that reason treating the amounts as having been received during a period when the erstwhile managing committee was not in office. Apart from the naivate of such a plea, in the face of the admitted fact that the new managing committee could not effectively function even after May 26,1976, because of the locking up of the office by the Secretary, and other circumstances, and their having had to approach the Magistrate's court for getting custody of the office, the records and the books, the fact remains that it is not the date seen on the receipts that is material, but whether the transactions were genuine, and if so, the actual date of receipt of the amounts. It was this aspect that fell for consideration, which the Tribunal glibly passed over as of no consequence. It was this aspect that fell for consideration, which the Tribunal glibly passed over as of no consequence. The Tribunal has misdirected itself on the questions to be decided and has not at all applied its mind to the case which came up for consideration. In fact so far as the amounts covered by the 105 receipts are concerned, there is practically no discussion at all in the order Ext. P2. 13. It has therefore, to be held that the Tribunal has done wrong in discharging respondents 2 to 9 from liability for the amounts covered by items 1 (part), 5,6,7 and 9 in Ext. P1 without a proper consideration of the case of the society. The order Ext. P4 has to be set aside in so far as these items are concerned. The Tribunal has to examine the matter afresh in the light of the pleadings and the evidence and arrive at an independent decision on the joint and several liabilities of respondents 2 to 9 for these amounts. 14. The society had made claim for the amounts covered by items 23,11, and 12 of Ext. P1, which spelt in the realm of negligence on the part of the erstwhile Board, causing loss to the society. These items fell within the scope of S.68 of the Act as well. The Arbitrator consequently held that the society "was free to take action to realize the loss from the persons responsible under S.68", The claims were therefore, disallowed in this petition under S.69. This was affirmed by the Tribunal with a non-speaking order, without any discussion whatsoever. The Tribunal stated merely: - "I also do not find reason to interfere with the finding of the Arbitrator that the proper course of action to be taken against alleged negligence on the part of the Board members discussed in para 19 of the award is under S.68 of the K.C.S. Act". This part of the orders Exts.P2 and P4 is also challenged by the society with the contention that S.69 can be availed even in relation to claims which may fall under S.68. This matter requires examination. 15. I shall extract the relevant statutory provisions to facilitate reference: - "68. This part of the orders Exts.P2 and P4 is also challenged by the society with the contention that S.69 can be availed even in relation to claims which may fall under S.68. This matter requires examination. 15. I shall extract the relevant statutory provisions to facilitate reference: - "68. Surcharge.-(1) If in the course of an audit, inquiry, inspection or the winding up of a society, it is found that any person, who is or was entrusted with the organization or management of such society or who is or has at any time been a officer or an employee of the society, has made any payment contrary to this Act, the rules or the bye laws, or has caused any deficiency in the assets of the society by breach of trust or willful negligence or has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property belonging to such society or has destroyed or caused the destruction of the records, the Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator or any creditor, inquire himself or direct any person authorized by him by an order in writing in this behalf, to inquire into the conduct of such person. (2) Where an inquiry is made under sub-section (1), the Registrar may, after giving the person concerned an opportunity of being heard, by order in writing, require him to repay or restore the money or other property or any part thereof, with interest at such rate, or to pay contribution and costs or compensation to such extent, as the Registrar may consider just and equitable". 69. Disputes to be referred to Registrar. -(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises (b) Between a member, past member, or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society, or (c) Between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; XXX XXX XXX Such dispute shall be retired to the Registrar for decision, and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute". "S.2. Definitions. "S.2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires - xxx Xxx xxx (i) 'Dispute' means any matter touching the business, constitution, establishments or management of a society capable of being the subject of litigation and includes a claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a society, whether such claim be admitted or not". The view taken by the Arbitrator and the Tribunal is that when once a matter fails within the purview of S.68, proceedings can be taken only under that provision. The society is precluded from resorting to proceedings under S.69 in relation to such claims. Ss.68 and 69 are mutually exclusive. Though not so stated, S.68 is treated as the special provision, which excludes the operation of the general provision S.69, in cases falling under it. 16. The claim made under items 2,3,11 and 12 of Ext. P1 relate to loss caused to the society by the negligence of the erstwhile Board. There is no case for either of the parties that these claims do not fall under S.69. The case of respondents 2 to 9 is only that they also fall under S.68, and therefore, arbitration proceedings under S.69 are ruled out. 17. Counsel for the society had a preliminary submission that S.68 is not attracted to the facts of this case. The contention is developed this way: S.68 requires that the loss to the society should be disclosed in the course inter alia of an audit. The audit contemplated is the one conducted under S.63 followed by the procedure prescribed inS.64. Such an audit has not been undertaken in this case, and therefore the condition precedent for invoking S.68 does not exist. 18. I am not in a position to entertain this plea, as it does not appear to have been raised before the two authorities below. The question whether there was an audit of the nature contemplated by S.63 is a question of fact. Admittedly there was an audit because; the very arbitration proceedings were based on the defects noted by the auditor in Ext. P1. If that audit did not satisfy the requirements of S.63, the petitioner should have raised that point before the authorities and invited a decision. I am not inclined to entertain such a plea based on question of fact for the first time in these proceedings. I overrule this contention. 19. P1. If that audit did not satisfy the requirements of S.63, the petitioner should have raised that point before the authorities and invited a decision. I am not inclined to entertain such a plea based on question of fact for the first time in these proceedings. I overrule this contention. 19. I shall now come to the crucial question arising for decision namely the inter action between Ss.68 and 69. S.68 applies in special circumstances and requires specific conditions to be satisfied before it could be invoked by the Registrar and an order of surcharged passed. The first of these conditions is that the illegal payment, or deficiency in assets, should have been found in the course of an audit, enquiry, inspection or the winding up of the society. The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Pentakota Sriramulu v. Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 621 (a case under the corresponding provisions of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932) is that the facts giving rise to the charge have to be disclosed in the course of an audit under S.63 or an inquiry under S.65, or an inspection under S.66 or on the winding up of the society. (Vide also my judgment in O.P. No. 3865 of 1988 rendered on August 3,1990). Unless, therefore, there was an audit, inquiry or inspection by virtue of the powers conferred by Ss.63, 65 or 66 and it was found in the course of such audit, inquiry or inspection, that any payment was made contrary to the Act, the rules or the bye-laws, by the persons concerned, or any deficiency was caused in the assets of the society, S.68 is not attracted. 20. Another essential pre-requisite for the operation of the section is that the payment or deficiency must have been caused by breach of trust, willful negligence, misappropriation or fraudulent retention of money or other property. The existence of any of these factors is also obligatory to attract action under the section. 21. The surcharge provision in S.68 can be invoked only if these conditions concur, and in no other cases. (See in this connection Gopal Krishna Vishweshwar v, Yellapura T.A.P.C.M. Society, Volume XXIXILR1979 (1) Karnataka 739). The existence of any of these factors is also obligatory to attract action under the section. 21. The surcharge provision in S.68 can be invoked only if these conditions concur, and in no other cases. (See in this connection Gopal Krishna Vishweshwar v, Yellapura T.A.P.C.M. Society, Volume XXIXILR1979 (1) Karnataka 739). Assuming that these requisites are present, the power vested is on the Registrar to act, either on his own motion or on the application of the managing committee, liquidator or any creditor, and to inquire into the conduct of the person concerned, and to pass an order requiring repayment, or restoration, of the money or other property, or to pay contribution or compensation, as he may consider just and equitable. The power so vested in the Registrar is, in essence, part of the supervision and control, which he exercises over societies, in their interest and in the interests of their members and creditors. The Registrar is no doubt bound to act if facts justifying action under the section are brought to his notice (vide Sundaram Iyer v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, AIR 1957 Mad. 634 paragraph 20). The fact, however, remains that the action under S.68 is one over which the society as such has no control, either with regard to its initiation or to its culmination. 22. S.69, on the other hand, vests a right in the society itself to take action inter alia for recovery of debts or other amounts due, from the category of persons mentioned therein. True, this right is of a general nature, but it is a right vested in the society itself to initiate action before an authority whose jurisdiction is coeval with that of the civil court (Balachandran v. Deputy Registrar, 1978 KLT 249 (FB)). 23. The true scope of S.68 is that it is a power vested in the Registrar to act in the interests of the society, its members or its creditors, against delinquent officer bearers and employees, whose conduct of the nature specified, has caused loss to the society. The Registrar is thus empowered to pass order for repayment or restoration of the money or property. It is a power vested in him to avert loss to the society by reason of the delinquency or fraud on the part of its committee members or employees. The Registrar is thus empowered to pass order for repayment or restoration of the money or property. It is a power vested in him to avert loss to the society by reason of the delinquency or fraud on the part of its committee members or employees. This is an overriding power vested in the Registrar, which he may exercise against errant office bearers and employees in cases where the interests of the society, its members or its creditors require it. 24. This is not, however intended to deny the society itself of its rights under S.69. This provision is one in substitution of the right to obtain relief from the civil courts under S.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. As pointed out in Balachandran's case cited supra. S.69 it self does not make any exception in relation to cases falling under S.68. It does not bar action by the society in such cases. The two sections are complementary to each other, liable to be invoked within their own spheres by the persons authorized. It is nowhere stated in the Act that cases falling under S.68 are outside the purview of S.69. There is nothing express to that effect; nor could I find anything by necessary implication to lead to that inference. It is well established that where the law provides two or more remedies, there is no reason to think that one debars the other, and therefore both must be understood to remain open to him, who claims the remedy. Unless the statute in express words or by necessary implication laid down that one remedy was to the exclusion of the other, both the remedies must be held available for obtaining redress. (Per Mahmood, J. in ShankarSahai v. Din Dial, ILR 12 All. 409 (FB), approved in State of Kerala v. CM Francis & Co., AIR 1961 S.C. 617 - See also Commissioner of Sales tax v. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1979 S.C. 1588). The view taken by the two authorities that since the claims under items 2,3,11 and 12 fall under S.68, proceedings' can be taken only under that section, and not under S.69, is not therefore sustainable. 25. The view taken by the two authorities that since the claims under items 2,3,11 and 12 fall under S.68, proceedings' can be taken only under that section, and not under S.69, is not therefore sustainable. 25. In Sundaram Iyer v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, AIR 1957 Madras 634, a Division Bench of the Madras Eigh Court dealt with Ss.49 and 51 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, 1932, which broadly correspond to Ss.68 and 69 of the Kerala Act. (I say broadly because the correspondence is only in the nature of the proceedings, for surcharge and arbitration, and not in the details where the provisions differ vastly - see in this connection Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies v. Kunhikannan,1979 KLT 152, which dealt with S.49 of the Madras Act and S.68 of the Kerala Act). The court held that S.49 was a special "rule" applicable to particular persons and in particular circumstances, while S.51 was one of general application. Construing the provisions of the Madras Act, it was held that in cases falling under both the provisions, the normal rule of construction should be that the two provisions were not in tended to operate on parallel lines, leaving open to the Registrar or to the departmental authorities to act under either provision in his or their unfettered discretion. S.51 excluding the jurisdiction of the civil courts, had to be strictly construed; S.49, on the other hand, provided for a remedy before the District Court. It was therefore held that in cases where S.49 applied, S.51 was excluded. 26. This decision appears at first blush to support the case of respondents 2 to 9, but from a close reading of the decision, it will be evident that the view taken by the Bench was based on the particular provisions of the Madras Act. Sub-section (1) of S.49 of the Madras Act is parallel to S.68(1) of the Kerala Act. But sub-section (2) of S.49 contained a vital departure, in that it provided that the order of the Registrar under subsection (1) shall be final, unless set aside by the District Court having jurisdiction, on an application made by the aggrieved party within three months of the date of receipt of the order. The Madras Act therefore, provided for a remedy of judicial review by the District Court in relation to an order of surcharge. The Madras Act therefore, provided for a remedy of judicial review by the District Court in relation to an order of surcharge. Such a provision is significantly absent in the Kerala Act. Further, S.51 of the Madras Act excluded the jurisdiction of the civil courts in relation to decisions rendered by the arbitrator on disputes comprehended by it and rendered such decisions final, subject only to revision by the Registrar in certain cases, under sub-section (5) of S.51, or by Government under S.57. It was in the light of these peculiar features of Ss.49 and 51, and the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts under S.51 that the court took the view that cases covered by S.49 could not be dealt with under S.51. This is clear from the discussion in paragraph 18 of the judgment, which runs as follows: "We will now advert to the nature of the proceedings under Ss.49 and 51. Under the latter provision, the enquiry and disposal is by an officer or other person nominated by the Registrar or by the Registrar himself and if he chooses the former course, the decision of the Deputy Registrar is subject to the revisional powers of the Registrar. In cases where he conducts the enquiry and decides the matter, the local Government have revisional powers under S.57. But in both the cases there is no right of recourse to the civil courts, for sub-sees. 6(a) and (b) of S.51 expressly enact that the decisions of the authorities under S.51 are not to be called in question in any civil court. The parties aggrieved are, therefore, shut out from any access to the courts, where questions of fact or even of law could be agitated. On the other hand, where the Registrar passes an order of surcharge under S.49(1), the aggrieved party has a right of recourse to the civil court under S.49(2) and when once it reaches that forum, its decisions would be subject to the normal procedure and appeals applicable to such courts. Thus, We have, on the one hand, a provision, which removes from the jurisdiction of the civil courts any interference with the decisions of the special forum, while on the other hand, a parallel procedure in which access is provided to the civil court, where questions of fact and law could be agitated. Thus, We have, on the one hand, a provision, which removes from the jurisdiction of the civil courts any interference with the decisions of the special forum, while on the other hand, a parallel procedure in which access is provided to the civil court, where questions of fact and law could be agitated. In a case where the provisions of S.49 are inapplicable, it is clear that recourse could be had to S.51 and the procedure there contained would alone be applicable. But in cases falling within S.49 where (1) S.51 has no application and (2) cases where a matter falls both within Ss.49 and 51, the normal rule of construction would be that the two provisions are not intended to operate on parallel lines, leaving it open to the Registrar or the departmental authorities to choose to act under either provision in his or their unfettered discretion. But that S.51 which excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court, will be strictly construed, and that in cases where S.49 is applicable S.51 would for that reason be excluded." 27. The position under the Kerala Act is different. There is no provision for judicial review by the District Court (asunder the Madras Act), of an order passed under sub-section (1) of S.68. The only remedy is by way of appeal to government. There is no recourse at all to a civil court. At the same time, awards under S.69 are not rendered final, but are, on the other hand, made subject to appeal to a Tribunal constituted under S.81, consisting of a person who is or has been holding the post of a District Judge in the State. This is in contrast to the provisions in S.51 of the Madras Act, noted earlier. The factor which weighed with the Madras Eigh Court, namely exclusion in paragraph 13 of this judgment, as also the petitioner's claim for items 2,3,11 and 12 in Ext.P1. The findings entered by the Tribunal regarding the other items shall not be reopened. The Tribunal Shall pass orders afresh in the matter within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. It shall be open to the Tribunal to remit the matter back to the Arbitrator, if felt necessary, for decisions on all or any of the points directed to be decided. The original petition is allowed as above. It shall be open to the Tribunal to remit the matter back to the Arbitrator, if felt necessary, for decisions on all or any of the points directed to be decided. The original petition is allowed as above. No costs.