JUDGMENT R.D. Shukla, J. 1. This is plaintiffs second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20-4-1984 and 23-4-1984, respectively, of First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Rewa, passed in Civil Appeal No. 29-A of 1981, arising out of the judgment and decree dated 21-7-1980, of the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Class II), Mauganj, in Civil Suit No. 20-A of 1980 (Budhsen v. Alabux), whereby the decree for possession of the suit land has been confirmed. 2. Brief history of the case is that the plaintiff-respondent (here) filed a suit on-5-2-1978 in the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Class II, Mauganj, District Rewa, on the ground that the land bearing Khasra No. 335, measuring 0.85 decimals, situated at Dharampura, was owned and possessed by his father. It is ancestral property. Plaintiffs father died in December, 1955. Age of the plaintiff, at the time of his father's death, was about one year and age of the plaintiffs brother was about three years. Thus, they were minors. The plaintiff, his mother and elder brother were in cultivating possession of the suit land, and after the death of plaintiffs mother, his brother and he came in possession over the suit land. Plaintiffs elder brother Ugrasen died in June, 1974. The plaintiff gained majority two years prior to the filing of the suit. 3. The defendant illegally occupied 50 decimals of land as shown in Annexure-A of the plaint on 2-12-1975. The defendant also got this land illegally mutated in his name on 7-10-1975. The plaintiff, therefore, sought a declaration of title and possession of 50 decimals forming part of the land bearing Khasra No. 335 referred to above. It appears that the suit was earlier registered as Civil Suit No. 36-A of 1978 and, subsequently, it was transferred to the Additional Civil Judge and new number was allotted as Civil Suit No. 20-A of 1980. 4. The defendant, on the other hand, pleaded that the plaintiffs father had sold this land in the year 1934 to one Janakdhari Teli for a consideration of Rs. 34/- vide document (Ex. D-2). Janakdhari was in possession of the land, during life time and after his death, his widow Smt. Sukhmantibai came in possession. Smt. Sukhmantibai, widow of Janakdhari Teli, sold this land in the year 1960 to the defendant-appellant for a consideration of Rs. 365/-, vide unregistered sale-deed (Ex. D-3). 34/- vide document (Ex. D-2). Janakdhari was in possession of the land, during life time and after his death, his widow Smt. Sukhmantibai came in possession. Smt. Sukhmantibai, widow of Janakdhari Teli, sold this land in the year 1960 to the defendant-appellant for a consideration of Rs. 365/-, vide unregistered sale-deed (Ex. D-3). It is further pleaded that the father of the plaintiff filed a suit for redemption in the year 1945 against Janakdhari, which was dismissed in the year 1946. The defendant and his predecessor-in-title were all along in possession of the suit land which is part of Khasra No. 335, continuously since 1934 onwards. The defendant and his predecessor-in-title and interest were in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit land adverse to the interest of the plaintiff and his predecessor and to the knowledge of them for more than 12 years and, therefore, they have perfected their title by adverse possession. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit. Defendant filed an appeal against the said decree, which is also dismissed, vide judgment and dacree referred to above". Hence, this second appeal. 6. The defendant has raised the following grounds in appeal: (1) That the documents Exs. D-2 and D-3 have wrongly been not admitted in evidence even for collateral purposes; (2) Since the suit filed by Bharosa, father of the plaintiff was dismissed vide Ex. D-1, hence principles of res judicata would apply; (3) That the courts below have failed to consider the fact that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title were never in possession of the suit land after 1934 till date and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-title have perfected the title by adverse possession; (4) That the entries in Khasra records have been misread. 7. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law : - "(1) Whether the learned lower appellate Court has committed an error in rejecting the sale-deed executed in the year 1960 in favour of the appellant being unregistered and inadmissible under the provisions of the Registration Act of Rewa State which was repealed in the year 1950? (2) Whether the appellant has perfected his title by adverse possession? (3) Whether the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, are not attracted to the facts of the present case?" 8. As per plaint allegations, the father of the plaintiff, died in December, 1955. (2) Whether the appellant has perfected his title by adverse possession? (3) Whether the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, are not attracted to the facts of the present case?" 8. As per plaint allegations, the father of the plaintiff, died in December, 1955. The plaintiff was, at that time, only one years' of age. The suit has been filed on 5-2-1978. It is, thus, clear that the plaintiff gained majority (age of 18 years) in December, 1973 and was aged about more than 23 years at the time of filing of the suit. Hence the suit has been filed much after three years after gaining the majority. 9. The plaintiff has examined himself as P. W. 1, Birbhan (P. W. 2), Ugrasen (other than the brother of the plaintiff) as P. W. 3 and Ramprakash (P.- W. 4). He has filed Ex. P-5, copy of the order during mutation proceedings, whereby, on the objection of the plaintiff, the mutation proceedings were dropped vide order dated 29-11-1974 of Naib-Tahsildar, Mauganj. But as against it, it appears that without the notice to the plaintiff, the defendant got mutation done in his favour under the orders of Revenue "Inspector. However, it confers no title on defendant. He has further produced Exs. P-2, P-3 and P-4, copies of the Khasra records for the years 1975-76, 1961-62, 1966-67, 1971-72, respectively, and in all these Khasra records, the name of the defendant has been shown in possession of the suit land. 10. As against it, the defendant has produced Exs. D-1, D-2 and D-3 documents and Ex. D-4 Khasra entry for the year 1957-58. In that year, Janakdhari has been shown in possession of the land. Ex. D-5 is a document, copy of Khasra records, for the year 1959-60. Again in this year, Sukhmantibai, widow of Janakdhari, has been shown in possession of the suit land. Exs. D-6 and D-7 are identical copies like that of Exs. P-2 and P-3. In all these copies of Khasra records, the defendant has been shown to be in possession of the suit land. 11. The entries in these records shall be presumed to be correct unless proved otherwise. The defendant himself as D. W. 1 and his witnesses Surajbhan (D.W.2), Ramjas (D.W-3) and Sukhmanti (D.W.4) have stated that the defendant was in possession of the suit land. 11. The entries in these records shall be presumed to be correct unless proved otherwise. The defendant himself as D. W. 1 and his witnesses Surajbhan (D.W.2), Ramjas (D.W-3) and Sukhmanti (D.W.4) have stated that the defendant was in possession of the suit land. The plaintiffs witnesses, on the other hand, have stated that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. There is an oath against oath. Under these circumstances, on the basis of documents referred to above, it shall have to be held that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were in possession of the suit land during these years. The learned First Appellate Court, in para 10 of its judgment, had discussed about these entries. However, it has wrongly been held that since the name of the father of the plaintiff appears in column No. 3 of those records, he shall be deemed to be in possession. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiffs father Bharosa died in December, 1955, and, as such, he must not have been in possession at least thereafter. In fact, the defendant has been shown to be in possession of the suit land to the extent of 50 decimals land out of 0.85 decimals bearing Khasra No. 335, referred to above. Thus, in my opinion, there is a wrong reading of evidence with respect of possession of the suit land. 12. The counsel for the respondent has submitted that Sukhmanti was not residing in the village for the last about 19 years and, therefore, she could not say that the defendant was in possession of the suit land for last 20 years after the execution of the sale-deed (Ex. P-3). In fact, Sukhmanti has admitted that she had left the village after delivery of possession of the land to the defendant and, thus, there is no contradiction in her statement. 13. Now, so far as the documents (Exs. D-2 and D-3) are concerned, the counsel for the appellant has furnished a typed version of it. It has been mutually agreed by both the counsel that they may be used for reading the documents (Exs. D-2 and D-3). Ex. D-2 is a document for sale for a consideration of Rs. 34/-, written in Sambat Ashad Badi 2, Sambat 1991. It comes to June, 1934. It has been mutually agreed by both the counsel that they may be used for reading the documents (Exs. D-2 and D-3). Ex. D-2 is a document for sale for a consideration of Rs. 34/-, written in Sambat Ashad Badi 2, Sambat 1991. It comes to June, 1934. Section 1 of Rewa Rajya Registry Niyamawali provides that a document regarding immovable property having annual profit of Rs. 25/-, is compulsorily registrable. Section 21 of the said Niyamawali provides that in the absence of registration, document would not be admissible in evidence. 14. This land has been allegedly sold for Rs. 34/- only. It has an area of half an acre only. It must not have yielded so much of grain and other agricultural produce so as to fetch yearly profit of Rs. 25/- or more. It is a common knowledge that grain and other agricultural produce were very cheap at that time and even the higher than the average rate of yield must not have fetched a profit of Rs. 25/- per year and, therefore, strictly speaking, that document cannot be held to be inadmissible. The document is more than 30 years old and required no proof. The provision of Transfer of Property Act was not applicable in the erstwhile Rewa State. That has come into force in the year 1950 as per adoption of the laws and orders of Vindhya Pradesh. Thus, it is to be seen whether an unregistered document prior to coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act, can also be used for collateral purposes Under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, and whether the provision of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act will have a retrospective effect. This point was fully dealt with by the learned Judicial Commissioner of the then Vindhya Pradesh and it has been held in a case reported in Chhotelal v. Ram Pratap, AIR 1955 V.P. 15 that the person possessing immovable property on the basis of unregistered sale-deed, can get benefit of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and, to that extent, it will have a retrospective operation. By this document (Ex. D-2), the plaintiffs father Bharosa sold this property and transferred the property to Janakdhari, who was in possession of the property thereafter. This fact is further evident from the document-Ex. D-1-Copy of the judgment of Munsiff-Magistrate, dated 8-8-1946. By this document (Ex. D-2), the plaintiffs father Bharosa sold this property and transferred the property to Janakdhari, who was in possession of the property thereafter. This fact is further evident from the document-Ex. D-1-Copy of the judgment of Munsiff-Magistrate, dated 8-8-1946. It appears from the document (Ex. D-1) that plaintiffs father Bharosa has filed a suit for redemption which was controverted by Janakdhari, predecessor-in-title of the defendant, on the ground that the land has been sold to him. The suit for redemption was rejected. 15. From the plain reading of this document, it is clear that Janakdhari accepted himself to be a transferee on the basis of document of sale and asserted his title over the land as back as in the year 1946. 16. Counsel for the appellant has submitted, on the basis of this document, that principle of res judicata would apply against the plaintiff, while the counsel for the respondent has submitted that, since there was no appeal against the said order by the defendant and, therefore, he is stopped from making any assertion about the admissibility of the documents. It appears that the suit has been rejected under the provision of Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, the principle of res judicata would not apply. Please see : Ram Gobinda v. Bhakta Bala, AIR 1971 SC 664 . Despite that, the defendant can always use the document for showing his assertion of being in possession of the land as owner and transferee on the basis of the Sale. Admittedly, Janakdhari was in possession as per document (Ex. D-1) on 8-8-1946. No documents have been filed by the plaintiff to show his possession at any time after 1946. He failed to show as to whether his father or mother had taken back the possession. That being so, the presumption of continuity of possession would arise. The plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title have never been shown in possession of the suit land so far as the suit land is concerned and, therefore, it will have to be accepted that the defendant and his predecessor-in-title i.e., Janakdhari and Smt. Sukhmanti, were in possession of the suit land. This fact has been lost sight of by the learned Judge of the first appellate Court. He has tried to discuss this point in para 9 of his judgment. It has given no finding about that. This fact has been lost sight of by the learned Judge of the first appellate Court. He has tried to discuss this point in para 9 of his judgment. It has given no finding about that. In my opinion, therefore, Exs. D-2 and D-3 can be used for collateral purposes snowing the possession of defendant and his predecessor-in-title. Ex. D-1 can also be used for showing his possession in the year 1946. 17. Janakdhari was in possession of the property in the knowledge of Bharosa (Plaintiffs father). He has asserted his title (as shown in Ex. D-1) as back as in 1946. It appears that he was in uninterrupted possession till his death and, thereafter, Sukhmanti, his widow, came in possession. Thus, Janakdhari perfected his title by adverse possession. 18. Sukhmanti inherited the suit land after the death of Janakdhari and she, therefore, had right to transfer the property. Sukhmanti has transferred the property somewhere in the year 1960 - as stamp-paper bears the date 12-1-1960. This document can be used for collateral purposes. The possession of the defendant has been proved by producing Khasra records as discussed above. The defendant's witnesses have also corroborated that fact. Fact of possession of the defendant has already been taken to be proved. The defendant was in possession of the property from 1960 onwards. The suit has been filed in 1978. The defendant has been found to be in possession continuously from 1960 till date. He was in possession within the knowledge of the plaintiffs predecessor-in-title and adverse to their interest. Hence, it will be deemed that he has perfected his title by adverse possession. 19. There is yet another observation of the two Courts below that D.W.2 Surajbhan has admitted that defendant is in possession of the land in suit for the last five years. This observation has been made with respect to the statement in para 5 of D.W.2 Surajbhan. D.W.2 Surajbhan has very clearly stated in para 1 of his statement that the defendant is cultivating the suit land for the last 12 to 15 years and, before that, Janakdhari was in possession. The defendant is transferee from Janakdhari's widow Sukhmanti. During the cross-examination, certain suggestions were made which, have been enumerated in para 5 of his statement. D.W.2 Surajbhan has very clearly stated in para 1 of his statement that the defendant is cultivating the suit land for the last 12 to 15 years and, before that, Janakdhari was in possession. The defendant is transferee from Janakdhari's widow Sukhmanti. During the cross-examination, certain suggestions were made which, have been enumerated in para 5 of his statement. He has denied the suggestion of the plaintiffs counsel that Rambharosa was cultivating the suit land during his life time and, thereafter, his wife and, then, his son plaintiff was cultivating the land. It is in that sequence that this fact has been written that the defendant is cultivating the suit land for the last five years. In fact, it has wrongly been typed in between the two composite sentences. He has denied the suggestion that the defendant was cultivating the suit land for the last five years. Thus, the learned two Courts below have wrongly discarded the evidence in Exs. D-1, D-2 and D-3. These documents have clearly proved the possession of the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest. There was misreading of the Khasra entries and the evidence of D. W. 2 Surajbhan. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the two Courts below, cannot be disturbed at this second appellate stage. But, in this case, material evidence has been discarded and not considered by the Courts below. Similarly, the fact of adverse possession has also not been considered. This raises a substantial question of law. "The Court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of ------". (Dilbagrai Punjabi v. Sharad Chandra, AIR 1988 SC 1858 ). 21. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the trial Court had the opportunity of seeing the witnesses which the appellate Court and this Court has not and, therefore, the finding of the trial Court as accepted by the first appellate Court, should not be disturbed. (Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari, AIR 1951 SC 120 ). 21. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the trial Court had the opportunity of seeing the witnesses which the appellate Court and this Court has not and, therefore, the finding of the trial Court as accepted by the first appellate Court, should not be disturbed. (Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari, AIR 1951 SC 120 ). In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that "This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge." It is true that a second appeal does not lie on finding of fact, but here in this case, not only material evidence has been discarded but also there is misreading of public documents, i.e., Khasra records as also the statement of D. W. 2 Surajbhan. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent has then referred to Madhusudan Das v. Narayani Bai, AIR 1983 SC 114 and submitted that the finding of the two Courts below cannot be disturbed. In para 8 of the same judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that no doubt that as a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on a misreading of the evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. It has further been argued that normally owner should be deemed to be in possession. This contention is correct, but, in this case, the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title are shown to, have been out of possession since 1934 onwards. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent then submitted that the co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of other co-heir's title. He relied on P. Laxmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 . I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down therein. However, the facts of this case are quite different. He relied on P. Laxmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 . I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down therein. However, the facts of this case are quite different. Suit was filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title to l/3rd share in the suit properties and for partition and recovery of that share on the allegation that the plaintiff and his brother were relations of the same degree and that all the three were equal co-heirs and succeeded to the property of his predecessor on his death. But, in the case here, apart from Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2, other document like Ex. D-3 fully support the view that Janakdhari claimed to be in possession on the basis of sale in the year 1946. Therefore, that hostile possession at least started from then. He perfected his title after the expiry of twelve years and, therefore, his wife, the sole heir, could transfer possession to defendant as has been done by Ex. D-2. The defendant is also in exclusive possession since 1960 onwards. The suit had been brought after the expiry of twelve years and, therefore, the defendant has also perfected his title. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent then referred to the case reported in B.S.V. Temple v. P. Krishna Murthy, AIR 1973 SC 1299 . In that case, the property was in possession and ownership of the plaintiff-respondent. In this case, the defendant and his predecessor were shown to be in continuous possession. Bharosa has been shown tenant in Khasra records, he died much before; hence,- he must not have been in possession of the suit land. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent has then referred to Ramchandra v. Ramlingam, AIR 1963 SC 302 and submitted that the finding of the Court below cannot be disturbed in this case. The limitation of this Court Under Section 100, Criminal Procedure Code has already been discussed in earlier para of this judgment. 26. Learned counsel for the respondent then referred to the case reported in Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, AIR 1981 SC 77 . In that case in para 7 onwards, it has been held that co-sharers in possession would become constructive trustees and the right of such co-sharers would be deemed to be protected by the trustees. It is not the case here. Sayeed, AIR 1981 SC 77 . In that case in para 7 onwards, it has been held that co-sharers in possession would become constructive trustees and the right of such co-sharers would be deemed to be protected by the trustees. It is not the case here. The defendant is in possession of the suit land which was in the knowledge of the plaintiff and his predecessors and, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to get the benefit of it. 27. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, it is held that the plaintiff has not been able to prove his subsisting title and, therefore, he is not entitled to the decree prayed for by him. As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-, if certified.