JUDGMENT R.D. Shukla, J. -- 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9.1.1981 of the Court of Fourth Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Raipur, passed in Civil Appeal No. 78-A of 1977 [arising out of Civil Suit No. 4-A of 1976, decided on 18.10.1976 of the Court of Third Additional Judge to the Court of Civil Judge (Class II), Raipur], whereby decree passed in favour of the plaintiff-applicant has been reversed and the suit has been dismissed. 2. It is undisputed that the defendant Mohanlal was inducted as a tenant in the suit shop as per registered lease-deed dated 12.12.1972. It is also not in dispute that the defendant received plaintiff's notices dated 16.4.1975 and 22.7.1975. Plaintiff filed the suit on 20.12.1975 on grounds that the defendant Mohanlal was a tenant of "Prakash Bhawan", situated at Kankalipara Ward of Raipur Town, on Rs. 150/- per month and was doing his plastic manufacturing. The defendant was inducted in the suit shop for one year and failed to renew the lease-deed in spite of repeated demands. The defendant was inducted in the suit shop as per lease-deed dated 12.12.1972 and he encroached upon open land on the back portion of the tenanted premises and constructed a big shed thereon. He, thus, acted against the wishes of the landlord. The plaintiff had let out the tenanted premises to the defendant, but he parted with the possession of the premises to one Mahesh Singh and, as such, committed breach of condition. He is, therefore, liable to be evicted on the ground of subletting under section 12(1)(b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 3. The plaintiff's suit was decreed by the trial Court. However, the finding has been reversed by the first appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal. 4. During the pendency of the second appeal, defendant-respondent died. As such, the present respondents were brought on record as his LRs vide order dated 21.9.87 of this Court. 5. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the appellant is entitled to amend the plaint as prayed for by his application dated 20th April, 1981, filed before this Court? As such, the present respondents were brought on record as his LRs vide order dated 21.9.87 of this Court. 5. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: "(1) Whether the appellant is entitled to amend the plaint as prayed for by his application dated 20th April, 1981, filed before this Court? (2) Whether, under the circumstances of the case, the respondent-tenant can be said to have unlawfully sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of the suit accommodation and has, thus, rendered himself liable to eviction from the suit accommodation?" 6. Vide judgment of this Court dated 26.4.1986, the case was sent back to the trial Court with a direction to record the evidence and submit the finding to this Court on the following ground of sub-letting: "Whether the defendant unlawfully sublet? assigned or parted with the possession of the accommodation for consideration or otherwise to M/s. Maheshwari Plastic, a registered partnership firm?" The trial Court has remitted its finding vide judgment dated 9.7.1987 and answered the issue in the affirmative thereby holding that the defendant had sublet the suit shop to the partnership firm who carries on the business in the name and style of "M/s. Maheshwari Plastic". Since this finding of fact has been remitted by the trial Court and on issue remanded by this Court, it would be proper to re-assess the evidence for coming to a conclusion as to whether the finding is correct. The plaintiff has examined Jiwanlal and Rajendra Prasad Dube in support of his contention, while the defendant has examined Ramratan Taori in support of his contention. Jiwanlal has stated that he has his shop near the shop in suit where some boys used to sit. Mohanlal (defendant) has not been coming to the firm for the last 5-6 years. During his cross-examination, he has denied the suggestion of relationship of those boys with the defendant-though he has admitted that Mohanlal (defendant) is the owner of Maheshwari Plastic. He has also stated in answer to a Court question that Mahesh Kumar is sitting in the shop for the time being. 7. (Mahesh Kumar is the son of the defendant Mohanlal, who is dead). Plaintiff's witness Rajendra Prasad Dube has stated that the shop in suit was given on rent to Mohanlal and not to Maheshwari Plastic. He has also stated in answer to a Court question that Mahesh Kumar is sitting in the shop for the time being. 7. (Mahesh Kumar is the son of the defendant Mohanlal, who is dead). Plaintiff's witness Rajendra Prasad Dube has stated that the shop in suit was given on rent to Mohanlal and not to Maheshwari Plastic. As against this, Ramratan Taori has stated that Maheshwari Plastic is a partnership firm and started business in the year 1972. When the partnership started its business, Mohanlal (defendant), Kanchan Devi and his wife Manti Devi were its partners. He has further stated that for negotiation of lease, he had gone to plaintiff along with Mohanlal (defendant). He has tried to prove that the suit shop was given to partnership firm only. Ex.P.1 is the lease-deed. It reads that the entire lease was made between the defendant Mohanlal Rathi, Proprietor of Maheshwari Plastic and Kirtinarayan Agarwal (Plaintiff). There is no mention of partnership firm in this lease-deed. This lease deed was executed on 12.12.1972. Defendant Mohanlal, who is dead now, was examined in the case earlier as DW -3. He has admitted in cross-examination that the firm Maheshwari Plastic Industry is a registered partnership firm, which carries on the business of manufacturing plastic goods in the suit shop. In para 13 of his statement, he answered to a question that Maheshwari Industry partnership firm has not been shown to be the lessee in the lease-deed. He has admitted that since the plaintiff was not ready to let out the suit accommodation to the partnership firm and consented to let it out to the person alone who had come to him for negotiation of rent. It is, thus, evident that the shop in suit was never let out to the partnership firm. 8. Admittedly, the partnership firm is a separate entity other than the defendant himself and, therefore, it would be deemed that the shop in suit had been let out to the defendant and not to the partnership firm, i.e., Maheshwari Plastic Industry. It was, therefore, rightly held by the learned trial Court that the shop in suit was let out to the defendant only. 9. There is no proof as to whether the suit shop was in full or part possession of the defendant. It was, therefore, rightly held by the learned trial Court that the shop in suit was let out to the defendant only. 9. There is no proof as to whether the suit shop was in full or part possession of the defendant. Since Maheshwari Plastic Industry is the partnership firm and is paying rent to the plaintiff, it could have very well produced the documents to show as to whether the suit shop was let out to the partnership or the defendant Mohanlal in person. They could also show whether they are paying any rent to Mohanlal. Since he has not come out with that proof, adverse inference will have to be drawn. 10. Section 12(1)(b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, reads as follows:- "(b) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, unlawfully sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the accommodation for consideration or otherwise". There is no community or unity of interests between partners. Therefore, they hold immovable property of the firm as tenant in common and not as joint tenants. Having regard to the incidents of tenancy in common, one partner has no interest in the share in the property of another partner. Where one partner transfers or relinquishes his share in the partnership business to another, the transferee partner has no antecedent title to the share of the transferring partner. Therefore, the making over or relinquishment of lease hold interest as a part of the transferor's share in the assets of the firm, constitutes transfer of such lease hold interest. The following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in Shah Phoolchand v. Parvati Bai AIR 1989 SC 865 fully apply to the facts of the present case: "Subletting -- Evidence showing that firm to which tenant had sublet premises carrying on business in said premises. Tenant and other firm not producing their income-tax returns, assessment order as well as account books and ledgers for relevant period-- Held: in circumstances it was open to trial Court to come to conclusion that had account books been produced, they would have shown that rent was received by tenant from firm which would justify finding of subletting". Tenant and other firm not producing their income-tax returns, assessment order as well as account books and ledgers for relevant period-- Held: in circumstances it was open to trial Court to come to conclusion that had account books been produced, they would have shown that rent was received by tenant from firm which would justify finding of subletting". As observed above, the defendant has failed to prove in rebuttal of plaintiff's case that shop was not let out to the firm. Even in the absence of the account-books and other documents, it can safely be assumed that the defendant has otherwise parted with the possession of the accommodation. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent has then submitted on the basis of Kshitish Chandra v. Commr. of Ranchi AIR 1981 SC 707 that the remand order was wrong and illegal order and, therefore, the finding remitted by the trial Court cannot be taken into consideration at this second appellate stage. As observed earlier, the case was remanded back to the trial Court. The defendant had also taken part in the proceedings and adduced evidence also. Now, therefore, after having taken part in the proceedings, he cannot challenge the remand order in this Court again. Even otherwise, this Court cannot re-consider the remand order at this stage. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent then submitted that now, after the death of Mohanlal, his heirs have come into possession of the suit shop and, therefore, decree for eviction cannot be granted. In my opinion, if, on considering the terms of agreement, it was found that there was subletting by the tenant, he was liable to be evicted on that ground even if possession has been taken back by the tenant heirs. K. Achyuta Bhatt v. Manga Devi AIR 1989 SC 93 . 13. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the partnership firm, who is said to be the sub-tenant and the person in possession of the shop in suit, has not been a party and, therefore, the defendant cannot be evicted. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel. This point cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this appeal. (Shah Phoolchand v. Lalchand, referred to above). 14. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel. This point cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this appeal. (Shah Phoolchand v. Lalchand, referred to above). 14. Learned counsel for the respondent then submitted on the basis of the case reported in Girdharilal v. Prafulla Chandra 1969 JLJ 578 = 1969 MPLJ 399 that the tenant entering into a partnership with another person and carrying on partnership business in a part of the house but retaining full control with possession, will not amount to subletting. This is not the case here. It has come in this case that partnership firm is carrying on the business and the defendant Mohanlal was the original partner. It has no where been pleaded that he was carrying on the business on behalf of the firm in a part of the accommodation and was keeping control over the whole accommodation and, moreover, in view of the. observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, this may not be taken to be a good ground at this stage. 15. In view of the discussion aforesaid, it is clear that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving subletting and, therefore, he is entitled to a decree. As a consequence, appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. Judgment and decree of the first appellate Court dated 9.1.1981 is set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored accordingly. Plaintiff-appellant is granted a decree of eviction against the defendants-respondents. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/- if certified.