JUDGMENT 1. The Second Respondent was at Physical Education Teacher in the school in the Danish Mission Compound, Panruti run by the Congregation of Carnelite Sisters of St. Theresa of Ernakulam, the writ petitioner herein. Her services were terminated. She raised an industrial dispute invoking the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The writ petitioner duly opposed the attempt to raise an Industrial Dispute contending that the institution is a minority institution an the teacher will not be a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Dispute Act. However, the first respondent by G.O. Ms. No. 1303, Labour and Employment, dated June 19, 1981 made a reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 for adjudication by the First Additional Labour Court, Madras. The dispute referred was 'Whether the non-employment of Selvi Ruby Shantha David is justified; if not, to what relief she is entitled, to compute the relief, if any, awarded in terms of money if it can be computed." The reference was as I.D. No. 333 of 1981 on the file of the First Additional Labour Court, Madras, the third Respondent herein. 2. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that if the Industrial Disputes Act is applied to teaching institution of the petitioner, the rights guaranteed to the minority institution under Article 30(1) of the Constitution will stand violated. It is not necessary to go into the various points raised in the developing of the Industrial Law in relation to Educational Institutions. In Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Rajappa and others (1978-I-LLJ-349), the Supreme Court of India has held that even Educational Institution can be brought within the definition of industry under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the said decisions (sic) while held that Educational Institution was an industry, an observation was made that it was possible for some of the employees in that industry might not be workman. The questions has now been resolved in Miss A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and others, (1989-I-LLJ-61). After considering all the earlier decisions, the Supreme Court of India lays down the law as follows (p. 65) : "The question for consideration is whether even after the inclusion of the above two classes of employees in the definition of the expression 'workman' in the Act a teacher in a school can be called a workmen. After considering all the earlier decisions, the Supreme Court of India lays down the law as follows (p. 65) : "The question for consideration is whether even after the inclusion of the above two classes of employees in the definition of the expression 'workman' in the Act a teacher in a school can be called a workmen. We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether they are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduates education, cannot be called as 'Workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of teachers. The clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that teachers cannot be treated as 'Workmen' as defined under the Act. It is not possible to accept the suggestion that having regard to the object of the Act, all employees in an industry except those falling under the four exceptions (i) to (iv) in section 2(s) of the Act should be treated as workmen. The acceptance of this argument will render the words 'to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work' meaningless. 3. Mr. R. Ganesan, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, had a doubt whether the Physical Education Teacher can be equated to the other teaching staff. Mr. T. Martin, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, refers to Rule 15 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 which prescribes the qualification and conditions of service of teachers and other persons. The emphasis is made on the term 'Teachers and other persons' Annexure V of the Rules contains the qualifications for appointment as 'teachers' in Private Schools (Regulated). Item No. 8 of the Tabular Column prescribing the qualifications refers to 'Physical Education Teacher'. According to Mr. The emphasis is made on the term 'Teachers and other persons' Annexure V of the Rules contains the qualifications for appointment as 'teachers' in Private Schools (Regulated). Item No. 8 of the Tabular Column prescribing the qualifications refers to 'Physical Education Teacher'. According to Mr. T. Martin, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the inference is irrestiable that a Physical Education Teacher is also treated in the class of 'Teachers' while prescribing the qualification. Similarly in the old Madras educational Rules, Clause VI prescribes the qualifications of a Physical Education Teacher an the same forms part of the qualifications prescribed for all teachers. It follows, therefore, the Physical Education Teacher would also be treated as a Teacher. 4. Further, in the passage quoted above from the decision of the Supreme Court in Miss A. Sundarambal v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and Others, (supra) there is reference to the fact that imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Similarly, in University of Delhi an Another v. Ram Nath (1963-II-LLJ-335), there is a reference to the fact that teachers build up the physical and mental standards of a student. These observations of the Supreme Court also support the view that a Physical Education Teacher should be treated in all respects as equivalent to other teaching staff. It follows therefore that on the simple ground that the second respondent is not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, the impugned Government Order making a reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial disputes Act for adjudication by the third respondent is found to be without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed. There will be no order as to costs.