RAMANBHAI SHIVABHAI PRAJAPATI v. STATE — 1990 DIGILAW 35 (GUJ)

V. H. BHAIRAVIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Criminal Revision Application has been directed by the petitioner-accused against the judgment and order of the learned Addl. Sessions judge, Kheda at Nadiad, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 1980 on 9- 9-1981 confirming the order of conviction passed by the learned Chief Judicial magistrate, Nadiad on 9-10-1980 in Cri. Case No. 769 of 1979 and modifying the order of sentence by allowing the appeal partly. By the order of the learned chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad, the petitioner has been held guilty for the offences under Secs. 7 (1) (3) (5) read with Secs. 16 (A) (i) (ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the petitioneraccused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,500. 00, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months. In appeal, the order of sentence has been modified by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nadiad and the petitioner-accused was ordered to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months instead of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. 00 instead of fine of Rs. 1500. 00, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for two months instead of three months. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case in short is that on 26-3-1979 at about 4. 45 p. m. , the petitioner-accused was selling milk to the customers near Shahid smarak, Mission Road, Nadiad. At that time, the Food Inspector Shri Hiralal b. Panchal of Nadiad Municipality came there and purchased 660 gms. of sample milk from the petitioner and paid the price of the milk to the petitioner and obtained a receipt of payment. He divided the sample milk into three equal parts in the presence of panchas and after completing formalities, he sent the sample to the Public Analyst at Baroda for analysis. On receiving the report of the Public Analyst, it was found that the sample milk was sub-standard milk having less fat falling within the meaning of "adulterated milk". He divided the sample milk into three equal parts in the presence of panchas and after completing formalities, he sent the sample to the Public Analyst at Baroda for analysis. On receiving the report of the Public Analyst, it was found that the sample milk was sub-standard milk having less fat falling within the meaning of "adulterated milk". On the strength of this report, after obtaining necessary sanction under Sec. 20 of the Act from the Competent Authority, the Food Inspector lodged a complaint in the Court of the learned Chief judicial Magistrate, Nadiad against the petitioner-accused for the offences alleged to have been committed under Secs. 7 (1) (3) (5) read with Secs. 16 (A) (i) (ii) of the Act. The said complaint was registered as Criminal Case no. 769 of 1979 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner-accused took the plea of defence under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act, but it was not accepted by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. On appreciation of the prosecution evidence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate held the petitioner-accused guilty for the alleged offences. The petitioner-accused has been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment as stated above by his judgment and order dated 9-10-1980. The impugned judgment and order of the learned Magistrate was challenged by the petitioner-accused in the Court of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nadiad in appeal being criminal Appeal No. 102 of 1980. The appeal was partly allowed. The conviction of the petitioner-accused was confirmed but the order of sentence was set aside and modified as stated above by the learned Addl. Sessions judge, Nadiad by his impugned judgment and order dated 9-9-1981. ( 3 ) BY invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 401 of the Cr. P. Code, the petitioner has prayed for quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order of conviction as it is patently illegal and apparently erroneous on the face of record which has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. ( 4 ) THE object and purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is to eliminate the danger to the human life and health from the sale of the adulterated food. Adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The Act has been enacted with the aim of eradicating the anti-social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. Adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The Act has been enacted with the aim of eradicating the anti-social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. Adulteration and misbranding of foodstuff are rampant evils in our Country and the Act has been enacted to check these social evils in the larger public interest for ensuring public welfare. However, the supreme Court has observed in the case of Ganeshmal Jashraj v. Government of Gujarat, 1980 (1) SCC 363 : (1980 GLR 429) as under :"however, it is not the small retailers who adulterate the articles of food sold by them. Yet, it is only the small retailers who are caught by the Food Inspectors and the investigation machinery of the Food Department does not for some curious and inexplicable reasons turn its attention to the wholesalers and manufactures. The small tradesmen who eke out a precarious existence living almost from hand to mouth are sent to jail for selling food-stuff which is often enough not adulterated by them and the wholesalers and manufactures who really adulterate the foodstuff and fatten themselves on the misery of others escape the arm of the law. The Food Inspection Department prides itself on its statistics by catching small tradesmen and by its gross indifference and inaction, allows wholesalers and manufacturers to carry on their nefarious activites untouched and unaffected by the penal law". ( 5 ) MISS. K. M. Shah, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has challenged the impugned orders on three grounds : firstly, that both the Courts have wrongly rejected the plea of defence of the accused under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act and that the finding of the lower Court as regards the liability of the petitioner-accused is perverse; secondly, there was no valid sanction as required under Sec. 20 of the act for prosecuting the petitioner-accused. Thirdly, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has committed an error in not asking a question to the petitioner as to what extent the adulteration in milk was found while recording the statement under Sec. 113 of the Cr. P. Code. ( 6 ) AS against this. Mr. M. C. Shah, the learned Counsel for the Nadiad municipality-respondent No. 2 herein, contended that this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence in its revisional jurisdiction. He has strongly supported the order of conviction. P. Code. ( 6 ) AS against this. Mr. M. C. Shah, the learned Counsel for the Nadiad municipality-respondent No. 2 herein, contended that this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence in its revisional jurisdiction. He has strongly supported the order of conviction. Further, he has submitted that even if it is held that the petitioner was a servant of the Lokmanya Consumers Stores, he was liable for prosecution. In support of his submission, he has relied on the case of Surajprasad v. State of U. P. , AIR 1961 SC 631 . For the reasons stated in the latter part of the judgment, I do not find any substance in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. ( 7 ) REVISIONAL powers conferred on the High Court by Sec. 401 of the cr. P. Code are wide enough to permit interference even with findings of fact and the Court in revision can and must interfere with findings of fact where there are exceptional grounds in the interests of justice, and in order to prevent a gross and palpable failure of justice or where the case has been approached by the subordinate Court from a wrong point of view or where the finding of the fact is not based on the evidence on record and is proved to be wrong from the record itself or where the judgment of the subordinate Court is wrong. In above circumstances, the Court can interfere even with findings of fact but before doing so, the Court must satisfy itself whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to exercise its revisional powers. Sec. 401 of the Cr. P. Code, conferring revisional powers on the high Court, reads as under :"high COURTs POWERS OF REVISION : 401. (1) In the case of any proceedings the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Secs. 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by Sec. 307, and, when the judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Sec. 392. 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by Sec. 307, and, when the judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Sec. 392. (2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. (4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. (5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interest of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly". ( 8 ) THE revisional powers conferred on the High Court are discretionary powers and it does not say anywhere or in any sense to look with microscopic legal lense while exercising the same. In its discretion, High Court can exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Secs. 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Sessions by Sec. 307 of the Cr. P. Code. It is not restricted powers as is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents but wide powers has been given to the High Court. The conscience of the Court can never be bound by any law. Once, the judge finds and convinces himself that there is an error of judgment, committed by the learned Magistrate or learned sessions Judge which has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice no law can prevent a Judge from redressing the injustice. In such an eventuality, the discretionary powers under Sec. 401 of the Cr. P. Code must be exercised judiciously. The Court, it may be higher or a lower, is for to do justice. In such an eventuality, the discretionary powers under Sec. 401 of the Cr. P. Code must be exercised judiciously. The Court, it may be higher or a lower, is for to do justice. Justice should not only be done but it manifestly and undoubtedly should appear to have been done. It is a very basic principle of criminal jurisprudence that"let the hundred criminals go unpunished, but no innocent person should be punished". ( 9 ) THE plea of the petitioner is that he was studying in M. Com. , LL. B. and with a view to meet the educational expenses, he was serving in Lokmanya co-op. Consumer Stores Ltd. His duty was to distribute the milk to the customers on behalf of Lokmanya Co-op. Consumer Stores at 7. 00 a. m. in the morning and at 4. 45 p. m. in the evening and for that he was being paid Rs. 125. 00 p. m. as salary. On 26-3-1979, at about 4. 45 p. m. , he received a milk can from the tempo of the Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores on behalf of the Lokmanya co-op. Consumer Stores at Shahid Smarak, Mission Road, Nadiad. He opened the said can in presence of the customers, and started distributing milk from the can. At that time, Food Inspector had also came there and taken sample of milk from the petitioner-accused. It is further plea of the defence that the said Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores purchases milk from Amul Dairy and in turn it supplies milk to its members like Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers stores. On 26-3-1979, said Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores had purchased eight cans of milk from the Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores and a Bill no. 17308 (Exh. 50) was also issued to the Lokmanya Co-op. Consumer Stores. On the said bill, it is clearly written as "anand Amul Pasteurized Standard Milk". Out of eight cans, one can was received by the petitioner on behalf of the said lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores. These facts have been proved by the petitioneraccused by examining Shri Ambalal Patel, Chairman of Lokmanya Co-op. Consumer stores as his defence witness (exh. 48 ). This witness has also produced bill dated 26-3-1979 issued by the said Federation of Co-op. Consumer Stores to Lokmanya co-op. Consumers Stores i. e. Bill No. 17308 (exh. 50 ). Under these circumstances, the petitioner had submitted an application (exh. Consumer stores as his defence witness (exh. 48 ). This witness has also produced bill dated 26-3-1979 issued by the said Federation of Co-op. Consumer Stores to Lokmanya co-op. Consumers Stores i. e. Bill No. 17308 (exh. 50 ). Under these circumstances, the petitioner had submitted an application (exh. 22) to the Court for joining the Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores as co-accused. Notice was issued to the Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores. In the written statement of the said Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores (exh. 29), it has been clearly stated that the Federation purchases milk from Amul Dairy, Anand and in turn it supplies same milk to its members-Stores. It has been further admitted by the Food Inspector (exh. 9) in the cross-examination that the sample milk purchased by him was the same milk coming from Amul Dairy. He has also admitted that the tempo of Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores brings milk cans and delivers to its members. It is to be noted here that the milk delivered by the Federation of co-op. Consumers Stores is being sold by the Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores in the same state as purchased by it. In the light of these admitted facts and set of circumstances, is the petitioner entitle to for the protection under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act ? Yes. The petitioner is entitled to the protection under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act. Sec. 19 (2) of the Act reads as under : "19. Defences which may or may not be allowed in prosecution under this Act: (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) A vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves : (a) that he purchased the article of food : (i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer, a distributor or a dealer; (ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer; with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and (b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold in the same state as he purchased it. (3) xxx xxx xxx ( 10 ) IN my view, both the Courts have committed an error in not believing the plea of defence under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act of the petitioner-accused. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate insisted for a letter of warranty under Sec. 14 of the Act. Sec. 14 of the Act is reproduced herein below :"14. Manufacturers, distributors and dealers to give warranty : no manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in any article of food shall sell such article to any vendor unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor; provided that a bill, cash memo or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by a manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer distributior or dealer under this section". ( 11 ) IN the instant case, it is proved by defence that the petitioner-accused was servant of Lokmanya Co-op. Consumer Stores and was getting salary of Rs. 125. 00 per months. It is true that the petitioner could not show any letter of warranty to the Food Inspector and had also failed to disclose identity as servant of Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores on the spot, but that does not deprive his right of defence under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act. As stated above, the petitioner-accused had produced Bill No. 17308 (exh. 50) wherein it is clearly mentioned as "anand Amul Pasteurized standard Milk". As per the proviso to Sec. 14 of the Act, even bill, cashmemo or invoice would be deemed to be a warranty. Where a bill, cash-memo or invoice is given at the time of sale, a separate warranty is unnecessary and the bill, cash-memo or invoice would be deemed to be a warranty even though it does not contain the details as to be nature or quality of the article sold. So, even if there is no written warranty in the prescribed form, the production of credit bill is sufficient compliance of the law which gives protection from prosecution to the vendor who purchased the articles from distributor, dealer or manufacturer under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act. So, even if there is no written warranty in the prescribed form, the production of credit bill is sufficient compliance of the law which gives protection from prosecution to the vendor who purchased the articles from distributor, dealer or manufacturer under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act. When the vendor raises a defence under Sec. 19 (2) of the Act, it implies that the manufacturer, distributior or dealer from whom he had purchased the article had sold him adulterated or misbranded article of food and had given a false warranty and exposes the manufacturer, dealer or distributor to prosecution for offences under Secs. 16 (1) and 19 (1-C) of the Act. Supreme Court has also observed in the case of Amarchand v. State of Punjab, 1984 (1) FAC 1967 that when there was no written warranty in the prescribed form, the cash memo issued by the manufacturer or dealer to the vendor was held to be a legal and valid warranty. ( 12 ) REVERTING back to the facts of the present case, though the petitioner could not show a letter of warranty, the defence witness Ambalal Patel (exh. 48) has categorically stated in his deposition that the petitioner-accused was a servant of his Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores and that he was distributing milk to the customers on behalf of the Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers stores. It has been deposed by him that on 26-3-1979, Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores had purchased milk from the Federation of Co-op. Consumers stores and a Bill No. 17308 (exh. 50) was also produced, wherein it was written "anand Amul Pasteurized Standard Milk". I do not see any reason for disbelieving the evidence of this defence witness. Thus it has been proved by the defence witness-Ambalal Patel (exh. 48) that the Federation of Coop. Consumers Stores was a dealer and it had a licence. It need not require further proof of any written warranty. Thus the learned Chief Judicial magistrate committed an error in not believing the evidence of defence and committed an error in rejecting the application exh. 22 of the petitioneraccused for joining Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores as co-accused. Further Food Inspector himself has deposed that Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers stores received Amul Milk and distributed it. On the day of incident, it has been deposed by him, a milk can was delivered by the Federation Co-op. Consumers Stores to the Lokmanya Co-op. 22 of the petitioneraccused for joining Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores as co-accused. Further Food Inspector himself has deposed that Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers stores received Amul Milk and distributed it. On the day of incident, it has been deposed by him, a milk can was delivered by the Federation Co-op. Consumers Stores to the Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores and milk can was opened by the petitioner-accused in the presence of customers and started distributing milk. It is not the case of the Food Inspector that the petitioneraccused has added water in the milk. There was no scope for the petitioner to add anything in the milk in presence of the customers. It is the case of the prosecution that the sample milk found having less fat than the prescribed standard under Rule 20 of the Act. The minimum fat required under the law is 4. 5% while as per the report of Public Analyst, the sample milk contained 3. 7% fat. There are more than one reason for having less fat in milk and the Court need not go to investigate it. But the fact remains that there was a deficit of 0. 80% fat in the milk. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, the learned Magistrate ought to have exercised the powers under sec. 20a of the Act and ought to have called dealer, manufacturer or distributor to implead it. Sec. 20a of the Act is as under :"20a. Power of Court to implead manufacturer etc : where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the Court may notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in Sec. 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Sec. 20". ( 13 ) UNDER Sec. 20a of the Act, the Court has been conferred with powers to proceed against a manufacturer, distributor or dealer, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. ( 13 ) UNDER Sec. 20a of the Act, the Court has been conferred with powers to proceed against a manufacturer, distributor or dealer, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in Sec. 20 of the Act, if during the trial Court is satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence. In the instant case, in my view, the learned magistrate has failed to exercise his powers under this section despite the application exh. 22 submitted by the petitioner-accused. There is sufficient evidence on record which has proved beyond doubt that the petitioner-accused was servant of the Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores and Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores purchased milk from the Federation of Co-op. Consumers stores. In these peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the question is, whether the petitioner, as a servant, liable for prosecution ? The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has relied on the case of Surajprasad v. State of U. P. , AIR 1961 SC 631 and submitted that even a servant is also liable for the offences committed under Sec. 7 (1) (3) (5) read with Sec. 16 (A) (i) (ii) of the Act. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge has also referred the observations of the supreme Court in his judgment. It has been observed in that case by the Supreme court as under :"every person, be he an employer or an agent is prohibited from selling adulterated food and infringement of the prohibition is by Sec. 16, penalised. By Sec. 19 (1) in a prosecution for an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated article of food, it is no defence merely to allege that the vendor was ignorant of the nature of the substance of quality of the food sold by him. Prohibition of sale of adulterated food is evidently imposed in the larger interest of maintenance of public health. If the owner of a shop in which adulterated food is sold is without proof of mens rea liable to be punished for sale of adulterated food, there is no reason why an agent or a servant of the owner is not liable to be punished for contravention of the same provision unless he is shown to have guilty knowledge". If the owner of a shop in which adulterated food is sold is without proof of mens rea liable to be punished for sale of adulterated food, there is no reason why an agent or a servant of the owner is not liable to be punished for contravention of the same provision unless he is shown to have guilty knowledge". ( 14 ) THERE cannot be any dispute regarding the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above case. In my view, the ratio of the above decision cannot be applicable to the facts of the present case since the facts of both the cases are quite different. In that case, it was a store and accused was selling mustard oil from open oil tin as a servant of the Store and that oil was found adulterated. Under the circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that the accused was having guilty knowledge. While in the instant case, Federation of Co-op. Consumers Stores purchased milk from Amul Dairy and in turn supplied milk to its members. As stated above, on the day of incident, petitioner-accused received a milk can at about 4. 45 p. m. which was delivered by the Federation of Co-op. Consumers stores and immediately, in presence of the customers, petitioner-accused opened the milk called and started distributing the milk. Therefore, in my view, it cannot be said that the petitioner was having guilty knowledge or mens rea while he was distributing/selling milk to the customers. As i have held that the petitioner-accused is servant of the Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores and said stores being Co-operative body, the petitioner cannot be held liable for the alleged offence, in absence of mens rea. ( 15 ) IN the recent judgment in the case of R. Venkatakrishnan v. Food inspector (Hqs.) Food and Drugs Administration, Pondicherry, AIR 1989 Mad. 35 , it has been observed by the Madras High Court as under :"the scheme of the Act is to reach the person responsible for the sale of adulterated articles in the legal sense of the term. Those who by their mistake, negligent act or conduct prevent the inspection agency to reach the source of the evil may be caught in the net. In actual practice, the Food Inspector will hold first the person found actually involved in sale. Those who by their mistake, negligent act or conduct prevent the inspection agency to reach the source of the evil may be caught in the net. In actual practice, the Food Inspector will hold first the person found actually involved in sale. But he should immediately endeavour through him and through independent investigation to spot the seller in the eye of law and prosecute the latter one. Earnest effort and sound common sense suffice for the purpose. If the respective role is not clear to him, it may be open to him to prosecute both, leaving the matter to the Court to decide. In such a case, his investigation should clearly establish the acts of each one, and the Court should afford opportunity to those who claim to have been selling on behalf of others to establish their case. There is a tendency among the inspection agency to rest content with striking at the ostensible vendor who execute mechanically the orders of the real vendor and to avoid penetrating up to the source of adulteration. Such an attitude would not be conducive to the fulfilment of the object of the Act". ( 16 ) THE ratio laid down by the Madras High Court in the above decision is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The petitioner is a poor yound boy and was serving with Lokmanya Co-op. Consumers Stores in order to meet both the ends together and was earning Rs. 125. 00 per month as a salary which is even less than the minimum wages. Misery of such a human being can be imagined from the helplessness of a Doubled Graduate (M. Com. , ll. B.) who has been exploited to the extent that human existence disappeared from the Society, destroying the human values. Tragedy of the petitioner is that the real culprit, inspite of persistant request of the petitioner, has been allowed to go untouched. Therefore, in my view, it is only miscarriage of justice, but it is an adulterated justice. ( 17 ) THE result of the above discussion reveals that the finding of the fact recorded by the learned Magistrate is not based on the proper appreciation of the evidence on record and is proved to be wrong from the record itself and judgment of the subordinate Court is palpably wrong. ( 17 ) THE result of the above discussion reveals that the finding of the fact recorded by the learned Magistrate is not based on the proper appreciation of the evidence on record and is proved to be wrong from the record itself and judgment of the subordinate Court is palpably wrong. The finding of the subordinate Courts is based on misreading of the evidence and has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. In the interest of justice, this Court, in exercise of its revisional powers, would be justified in interfering with the said findings of facts recorded by the subordinate Courts. On this ground alone, this revision application is bound to succeed. ( 18 ) IT has been next submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that no valid sanction was obtained as provided under Sec. 20 of the Act which is a mandatory provision and, therefore, the petitioner is liable to be acquitted on this ground also. She has drawn my attention to the sanction letter at exh. 17. Bare perusal of the sanction letter reveals that it is simple sanction given by the authority to prosecute the petitioner for the alleged offences under the act. It is in the printed form and only certain details regarding the name of the accused, sections under which the accused person is to be prosecuted, date, business etc. is filled in. By this letter, the Food Inspector has been given power to launch complaint-prosecution against the petitioner. The wording of sanction letter reveals that it is a simple sanction permitting the Food Inspector to launch prosecution against the petitioner-accused for the offences alleged to have been committed under the Act. Competent Authority has not given any reasons justifying the sanction in the public interest. While exercising the powers under sec. 20 of the Act, sanctioning authority must give reasons for giving sanction to prosecute the accused and if it fails to record such reasons, to its satisfaction it is not a valid sanction. In support of her arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Gahininath Bhimrao Patekar v. State of Maharashtra, 1988 Cri. LJ 48. It has been held in that case by the Court that sanction under Sec. 20 of the Act for prosecution must record reasons for launching prosecution in public interest. LJ 48. It has been held in that case by the Court that sanction under Sec. 20 of the Act for prosecution must record reasons for launching prosecution in public interest. It has been observed in para-7 of the judgment by the Bombay High Court, as under :"7. The Supreme Court in State of Bombay (now Gujarat) v. Parshottam kanaiyalal, AIR 1961 SC 1 : (1961 (1) Cri. LJ 170) has held : "to read by implication that before granting a written consent, the authority competent to initiate a prosecution should apply its mind to the facts of the case and satisfy itself that a prima facie case exists for the alleged offender being put up before a Court appears reasonable. . . . . . "in a recent ruling in A. K. Roy v. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 SC 2160 : (1986 cri. LJ 2037), the Supreme Court while dealing with Sec. 20 (1) of the Act held :". . . . . . . HE can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and record his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the public interest". Therefore, according to the latest law laid down by the Supreme Court what is required of a sanctioning authority is not only to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case to be satisfied that prima facie case existed but also to record reasons as to why launching of prosecution against an offender is necessary in the public interest. . . . . . . . " ( 19 ) IN the instant case also, neither the reasons are recorded for granting the sanction nor it is pointed out that the launching of the prosecution was in the public interest. This being the position in law, the inevitable conclusion is that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind and has not recorded reasons while granting sanction to prosecute the accused and therefore, the sanction cannot be said to be in accordance with law. In my view, therefore, the prosecution launched against the petitioner on invalid sanction is, therefore bad in law. In my view, therefore, the prosecution launched against the petitioner on invalid sanction is, therefore bad in law. On this ground also, this criminal revision application is bound to succeed as prosecution launched against the petitioner accused fails and the conviction recorded against the petitioner-accused and the sentence imposed on him will have to be set aside. ( 20 ) IT was lastly submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the learned Magistrate, while recording the statement of the applicant under Sec. 113 of the Cr. P. Code, did not put question about the extent of adulteration in the article and this has prejudiced the defence of the petitioner. In support of her argument, she has relied on the case of Amarnath v. State of Haryana, 1987 (1) FAC 150, wherein it has been observed as under :"the petitioner, who is accused of having stored for sale adulterated cows milk, at the trial was not put question under Sec. 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, in the right perspective inasmuch as the extent of adulteration was not put to him. This case is thus fully covered by my decision in Mangal Das v. State of Haryana, reported as 1986 (2) FAC (6 ). Here, it was only put to the accused that the sample sent to the Director disclosed that the sample was adulterated and thus the accused was prejudiced when the extent of adulteration was not put to him. Thus in accord with that view this petition is allowed and the accused petitioner is acquitted of the charge. Fine, if paid, be refunded". In view of this clear legal position, this criminal revision application is bound to succeed. . ( 21 ) IN view of the above discussion, this Criminal Revision Application is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 1980 on 9-9-1981 confirming the order of conviction passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Nadiad in Cri. Case No. 769 of 1979 passed on 9-10-1980 and modifying the order of sentence by allowing the appeal partly and awarding sentence as stated above for the offences punishable under Secs. 7 (1) (3) (5) read with Secs. 16 (A) (i) (ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner-accused is on bail. His bail-bonds stand cancelled. 7 (1) (3) (5) read with Secs. 16 (A) (i) (ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner-accused is on bail. His bail-bonds stand cancelled. Fine, if paid, is ordered to be refunded back to the petitioner-accused. Rule made absolute. .