JUDGMENT This appeal by the State is directed against confirmation of an award in favour of the respondent by the Subordinate Judge and making it a rule of the Court. The brief facts leading to the appeal are that the respondent, a special class contractor, had undertaken construction of a high level bridge over river Daya under the appellants and disputes having arisen between the parties out of execution of the work and no arbitrator having been appointed by the appellant though requested by the respondent, the latter approached the Court under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of an arbitrator. The application, registered as C.S. No. 328 81-1 was decreed on 7th November, 1983 and a reference of the disputes as per the plaint and written statement filed by the parties was made to the Special Arbitration Tribunal consisting of Justice B.K. Ray (Retd.) by order dated 21-10-87. Before the Tribunal, the parties filed their respective statements. Voluminous documents were exhibited and witnesses were examined and the Tribunal made a detailed reasoned award on 28th of February, 1989 for a sum of Rs. 48,47,892.38 in favour of the respondent to be recovered from the appellants with interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 12-12-81 till the date of the award when the same is made rule of the Court. The award was submitted to the Court on which O.S. No. 58 of 1989-I was registered to which the appellants filed objection. On the objection filed by the appellants to the award, Misc. Case No. 117/89 was registered. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled the objections of the appellants and made the award rule of the Court which is impugned in this appeal. (2) In assailing the judgment of the Subordinate Judge and the award of the Tribunal, Mr. P.K. Mohanty, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate has reiterated before me the very same questions urged before the Subordinate Judge. The submissions may be summarised as follow : (i) There was no arbitration agreement between the parties prior to 8-7-69 as the F2 contract was signed by the Executive Engineer only on that date and though the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to arbitrate upon any dispute relating to work executed work before that date, yet it assumed jurisdiction and awarded compensation in respect of work done since 21-1-63. (ii) For the aforesaid reasons, the award suffers from error apparent on the face of the record. (iii) The claims of the respondent were barred by the limitation. (iv) In view of Cl. 11 of the F-2 contract, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to pass award in respect of extra items of work claimed by the respondent; and (v) The grant of interest by the Tribunal at the rate of 10% and the judgment of the Subordinate Judge directing interest to be payable at the rate of 19.5% from the date of the judgment till realisation are not sustainable. (3) The main plank of the submissions of the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate is that since an arrangement for arbitration of the disputes between the parties is a creature of the contract between them, there was no completed contract prior to 8-7-69 since the Executive Engineer signed the agreement on that date and that in respect of any work executed by the respondent prior to that date the arbitration clause in the agreement was incapable of being invoked. The admitted facts are that the respondent signed the agreement on 21-1-63 and that the work order in respect of the work was also issued to him on 21-1-63. The learned Tribunal, on a consideration of the various correspondences between the parties, came to the conclusion that the contract came into existence on 21-1-63 and not on 8-7-69 as claimed and hence decided the disputes between the parties to be arbitrable in accordance with the agreement. Since the Tribunal by a detailed reasoned order came to such conclusion and it cannot be said that the reasons assigned by it are perverse, the conclusion reached by it is not available to be assailed before the Court. It is well known that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal also includes within it the authority to decide the arbitrability of the disputes. There is concensus of authorities including that of the highest Court that even where the award is a reasoned one, the reasoned adopted by the Arbitrator are not assailable before the Court it having no power to scan such reasons as a court of appeal. There is concensus of authorities including that of the highest Court that even where the award is a reasoned one, the reasoned adopted by the Arbitrator are not assailable before the Court it having no power to scan such reasons as a court of appeal. If there are some reasons, the quantum of which is not justiciable for the findings reached, they are not available to be varied by the Court merely by the reason that on the available materials a different conclusion could not have been reached. The scope of interference by the Court is rigorously limited only to cases where the reasons are perverse, or suffer from error apparent on the face of the record. (4) Besides, even on a consideration of the relevant correspondences, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal is pre-eminently justified. Before however such facts are considered, it is pertinent to note that there was even no pleadings of the appellants that the contract was signed by the Executive Engineer on 8-7-69. The only pleading of the appellants regarding the singing of the contract was before the Tribunal before whom in the objections the appellant had stated that the respondent was avoiding to sign the agreement and after several registered notices and great persuasion he could be made to sign the agreement on 6-7-69. There was no statement as to when the agreement was signed by the Executive Engineer. It is agreed to by the learned counsel for both sides before me that 6-7-79 was a typographical mistake for 8-7-79. Be that as it may, what is important, is that the only pleading of the appellant was that the contract was signed by the respondent on 8-7-79. Hence, without any pleading at all that the contract was signed by the Executive Engineer on 8-7-79, the contention that the contract had come into existence on 8-7-69 is not available to be canvassed. Also apart from the fact that there is no pleading as such, the original agreement was also never produced by the appellant even though called upon by the Tribunal for which adverse inference was drawn by it to the effect that had the contract been produced, it would have gone against the appellants. 5. Also apart from the fact that there is no pleading as such, the original agreement was also never produced by the appellant even though called upon by the Tribunal for which adverse inference was drawn by it to the effect that had the contract been produced, it would have gone against the appellants. 5. Instead, it was the respondent's case before the Tribunal that the work order was issued to him on 21-1-1963, that he signed the agreement the very day and also commenced the work. As his work was continuing, certain disputes arose between the parties and since the respondent had not been supplied with a copy of the agreement signed by him on 21-1-1963, he asked the Executive Engineer to supply him a certified copy thereof which was done only on 2-8-1969. From such certified copy, it was learnt that the contract had been signed by the Executive Engineer on 8-7-1969. Out of the correspondences exhibited before the Tribunal, Ext. A is a letter written by the Chief Engineer to the Superintending Engineer on 12th of January, 1963 in which the letter was directed to issue a registered notice to the respondent to come and sign the agreement within a week's time positively so that the work order might be issued to him and in case he failed to comply, the work might be ensured to M/s. Burma Construction Co. Three days thereafter, on 15-1-1963, vide Ext. 19, the Superintending Engineer addressed a letter to the respondent-issuing notice that in case he was willing to execute the work, he was to attend, without any further correspondence, the office of the Executive Engineer, Bhubaneswar Division within seven days of receipt of the letter, sign the agreement and receive the work order, failing which it would be presumed that he was not interested for the job. On 21-1-1963, vide Ext. D, the work order was issued to the respondent by the Executive Engineer informing him that his tender for the work had been accepted vide the letter, Ext. 19 and that he was therefore requested to start the work immediately and further such communication was to be treated as the written order to commence the work. Ext. D, the work order was issued to the respondent by the Executive Engineer informing him that his tender for the work had been accepted vide the letter, Ext. 19 and that he was therefore requested to start the work immediately and further such communication was to be treated as the written order to commence the work. Ext. 67 is a letter of 25th May, 1963 from the Executive Engineer to the respondent complaining about poor progress of work and telling him that unless proportionate progress in the work was shown, he would be liable to action as per "its penal clauses". This correspondence would show acknowledgement of the existence of the contract since action as per its penal clauses was being contemplated. Again on 3rd of December, 1964 the respondent was informed vide Ext. 64 the tender papers and the agreement for the work which had been submitted to the Chief Engineer, R. & B. had been received back in the office of the Executive Engineer and that he was directed to attend the office on 14-12-1964 for discussion on certain points. On 7-5-1966, vide Ext. 29, the fact of work order having been issued to the respondent on 21-1-1963 was acknowledged and he was issued notice to show cause as to why the contract would not be rescinded according to the penal clauses. The correspondence would show that the appellants had accepted the fact that the F2 contract had already come into existence and was in operation since unless the contract was in existence, the question of taking action under the penal clause and rescinding the same would not arise. 6. The very provision in the Orissa Public Works Department Code in para 3-5-18 of Chap. 3 is that the order to commence work is to be given within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the tender duty accepted in the Divisional office provided the contract/agreement, complete in all respects, has been duly executed. Since from the correspondence it is abundantly clear that the work order was issued to the respondent on 21-1-1963, it must be taken having regard to the provisions of the P.W.D. Code that the Government all along considered the contract to have been complete in all respects and only thereupon the work order was issued. Since from the correspondence it is abundantly clear that the work order was issued to the respondent on 21-1-1963, it must be taken having regard to the provisions of the P.W.D. Code that the Government all along considered the contract to have been complete in all respects and only thereupon the work order was issued. As a matter of fact it was the very insistence of the department that the work order would be issued to the respondent only after he had signed the agreement. Once the agreement was signed and submitted to the department and in pursuance thereof the work order was issued to the respondent who commenced the work on the basis of it, the work was supervised by the appellant's officers, and action was threatened against the respondent on the basis of penal clauses of the contract, it would be very ill-maintained to contend that the contract had not come into existence on the issue of the work order and that it was complete only when the officer competent to sign it thought it fit to do so. Such a construction of the agreement between the parties would be monstrously unreasonable. 7. Law is far well settled that a valid contract with the Government may be brought into existence even in the absence of the drawing up of a formal contract if it can be inferred from the correspondence between the parties that a contract in fact had come into existence, Authority for the proposition is AIR 1963 SC 1685 (Union of India v. Rallia Ram) which has been uniformly followed in all subsequent cases. It was held in the decision that while S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which corresponds to Art. 299 of the Constitution of India, makes mandatory provision that a contract made on behalf of the Government is to be executed on behalf of the Governor General or the Governor only by the authorised person, yet where the authorised person himself signs under his official designation the acceptance note in respect of a tender without the description that the contract was executed on behalf of the Governor General, the correspondences between the parties ultimately resulting in the acceptance note amounted to a contract made in terms of S. 175(3). In a subsequent decision AIR 1970 SC 729 (B. C. Mohindra v. The Municipal Board, Saharanpur), AIR 1963 SC 1685 (supra) was relied upon to held that even though no formal contract had been executed in accordance with S. 97 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (2 of 1916), yet the existence of such contract could be inferred regarding auction sale of a Theka where the auction had been held before Municipal Board and a resolution was passed on the very day of the auction confirming the same and the list of bidders bore signatures of the highest bidder, the Chairman and of the Executive Officer of the Municipal Board. There are also two direct authorities of this Court bearing on the question, AIR 1969 Orissa 274 (State of Orissa v. Govind Choudhury and Sons) and AIR 1989 Orissa 147 (State of Orissa v. B.K. Parida & Bros.) where, from the correspondence between the parties, the existence of valid contracts complying with the terms of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution of India were inferred and the arbitration clauses are enforced. 8. Once conclusion is reached that disputes between the parties were arbitrable and the reference was valid the argument that the award suffers from error apparent on the face of the record does not survive. At any rate, assumption of jurisdiction by the arbitrator on an non-existence arbitration clause is not an error apparent on the face of the record but is an act without jurisdiction. 9. The next submission of the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate is that the claims are barred by limitation. Though he also raised a submission of the application for reference made under S.20 of the Act being time-barred under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, yet such submission was fairly not pressed by him in view of the decision of this Court in M.A. No. 333 of 1986 (F.C.I. v. N. Mohapatra) decided on 14-10-1989 and that even though the contract was rescinded on 25-4-1975, yet penalty was imposed on the respondent on 9-11-1979 forfeiting all his security deposits with Government and also further directing recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,18,164.00 from him towards the differential cost of getting the balance work left unfinished done through another agency and also levying a compensation of Rs. 95,661/- for non-completion of the work in time as per Cl. (2) of the F2 contract. 6,18,164.00 from him towards the differential cost of getting the balance work left unfinished done through another agency and also levying a compensation of Rs. 95,661/- for non-completion of the work in time as per Cl. (2) of the F2 contract. The application for reference having been filed on 21-12-1981, i.e. within a period of three years from the date of imposition of the penalty, it was within time. There is also no force in the contention that any claim of the respondent was barred by time since once it is found that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction to decide the disputes, he had the jurisdiction also in respect of such claims and no exception thereto can be taken. 10. The other submission made by the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate regarding non-arbitrability of the claims for extra items of work is based upon Cl. 11 of the agreement which for the sake of convenience may be extracted :- "The Engineer-in-charge shall have power to make any alteration in or additions to the original specifications, drawings, designs, and instructions that may appear to him to be necessary or advisable during the progress of the work, and the contractor shall be bound to carry out the work in accordance with any instructions which may be given to him in writing signed by the Engineer-in-charge, and such alteration shall not invalidate the contract; and any additional work which the contractor may be directed to do in the manner above specified as part of the work shall be carried out by the contractor on the same conditions in all respects on which he agreed to do the main work, and at the same rates as are specified in the tender for the main work. The time for the completion of the work shall be extended in the proportion that the additional work bears to the original contract work and the certificate of the Engineer-in-charge shall be conclusive as to such proportion. The time for the completion of the work shall be extended in the proportion that the additional work bears to the original contract work and the certificate of the Engineer-in-charge shall be conclusive as to such proportion. And if the additional work includes any class of work, for which no rate is specified in this contract, then such class of work shall be carried out at the rates entered in the sanctioned schedule of rates of the locality during the period when the work is being carried on and if such last mentioned class of work is not entered in the schedule of rates of the district then the contractor shall within seven days of the date of his receipt of the order to carry out the work inform the Engineer-in-charge of rate which it is his intention to charge for such class of work and if the Engineer-in-charge does not agree to this rate he shall by notice in writing be at liberty to cancel his order to carry out such class of work and arrange to carry it out in such manner as he may consider advisable, provided always that if the contractor shall commence work order of any expenditure in regard thereof before the rates shall have been determined as lastly hereinbefore mentioned, then and in such case he shall only be entitled to be paid in respect of the work carried out or expenditure incurred by him prior to the date of the determination of the rate as aforesaid according to such rate or rates as shall be fixed by the Engineer-in-charge. In the event of a dispute, the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the circle will be final." It is hence the submission on behalf of the appellant that a specific procedure having been devised under Cl. 11 for determination of the disputes relating to additional work or extra work in respect of which the Superintending Engineer is constituted an arbitrator specifically, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide such disputes. 11. A reading of Cl. 11 for determination of the disputes relating to additional work or extra work in respect of which the Superintending Engineer is constituted an arbitrator specifically, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide such disputes. 11. A reading of Cl. 11 shows that it has two parts, the first is an obligation on the part of the contractor to carry out all additional works which he is directed to do by the Engineer-in-charge who has the power to make any alterations in or additions to the original specifications, drawings, designs and instructions provided the instructions in regard to that is given in writing by the Engineer-in-charge. The other part of the clause relates to the rates of payment for such additional works which itself breaks into three parts :- (1) The contractor is to carry out the work on the same conditions and at the same rates as are specified in the tender for the main work. (2) If the additional work includes any class of work, for which no rate is specified in the contract, such class of work is to be carried out at the rates entered in the sanctioned schedule of rates of the locality effective during the period when the work is being carried on; and (3) If such class of work is not entered in the schedule of rates of the locality the contractor has the duty that within seven days of the date of the receipt of the order to carry out the work he should communicate the Engineer-in-charge his desired rates for execution of the work who, if the rates are not agreeable, would be at liberty to cancel the order for execution of the extra works by notice in writing and arrange to get it executed in such manner as he may consider feasible. This part has an overriding proviso that if the contractor commences work in respect of additional works before the rates are determined, he shall be entitled to be paid, in respect of the works carried out or the expenditure incurred prior to determination of the rates, according to such rates as shall be fixed by the Engineer-in-charge. In the event of any dispute, the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle would be final. In the event of any dispute, the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle would be final. The analysis as above shows that the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle as final is contemplated only in relation to the last contingency of part three of the second part of Clause 11, namely, if the additional work is not covered under part one or two of the second part and the rate quoted by the contractor is not acceptable to the Engineer-in-charge, but nevertheless the work is commenced by the contractor on receipt of the directions, he is to be paid for such work is executed only at the rates fixed by the Engineer-in-charge and that any dispute regarding the same is to be resolved by the Superintending Engineer whose decision on the question is final. Hence, what falls to be decided finally by the Superintending Engineer is only the rates for such works and not any other disputes relating thereto and that even after the rates have been determined in such cases, the final amount due to the claimant on account thereof has also to be determined by the arbitrator. Clause 23 of the agreement relates to arbitration and is in the following words : "23. Except here otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, designs, drawings, and instructions hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the work, or as to any other question, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions, orders, or these conditions, or otherwise concerning the work or the execution, or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work or after the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of a Superintending Engineer of the State Public Works Department unconnected with the work at any stage nominated by the concerned Chief. If there be no such Superintending Engineer it should be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chief Engineer, concerned. It will be no objection of any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Government servant. The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to these contracts". If there be no such Superintending Engineer it should be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chief Engineer, concerned. It will be no objection of any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Government servant. The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to these contracts". The provision shows that the ambit of arbitration and the authority of the arbitrator is very wide and sweeping and that only those disputes the decision for which are otherwise provided for expressly in the contract, can be said to be excepted from arbitration. Hence, reading Clauses 23 and 11 together, the conclusion is irresistible that except determination of rate or rates in respect of the cases covered by the last part of part three of the second part of Clause 11, all other disputes as provided for under Clause 23 are within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide. For such reason the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate that all claims for extra items of work should be held to be outside the purview of arbitration of the Tribunal is not sound and at best, if at all, it could only be contended that only the determination of rates of such items of work as covered under part three were outside the scope of arbitration. However, to contend as such, a specified pleading was necessary as to which items of extra claim made by the claimant-respondent came under part three of the second part of Clause 11 of the contract and that there had been a determination of the rate in respect of such work in the manner provided for by the Superintending Engineer, which was final. 12. The provisions of Clauses 1 and 23 came to be considered by this Court in (1979) 48 Cut. L.T. 505 : (AIR 1980 Orissa 157) (State of Orissa v. G.C. Kanungo) wherein S. Acharya, J. held, referring to Clause 11 that it would be against all canons of law to hold the contractor to remain contended and to calmly accept whatsoever decision is given by the Superintending Engineer in purported exercise of his authority under Clause 11 merely because of the last sentence thereof, even though his decision is in complete disregard of the rates and the principles and modes of assessment in that clause. Negativing the plea raised by the Government, the learned Judge reached the same conclusion as has been reached by me regarding the interpretation of Clause 11. In a later case, i.e., (1980) 50 Cut. L.T. 602 (State of Orissa v. Sisir Kumar Das) it was also held that since the additional works were supplemental to the main work, disputes regarding the same would be covered under the arbitration clause and the arbitrator would have jurisdiction to entertain the same and arbitrate. 13. The Tribunal specifically dealt with the objections raised by the appellant in respect of the additional work and observed as follows : "..... Regarding the contention that the claimant is not entitled to any payment for extra work done by him or for any work done by him according to changed design and specification it is argued that the claimant not having taken recourse to the provision contained in Clause 11 of the agreement he is not entitled to any payment on this account. The case of the claimant from the very beginning is that he represented to the concerned authorities regarding his claim for extra work or for work according to changed design or specification, and that in spite of such representation the department never decided the matter while assuring the claimant that due notice of the claim for extra work and for work according to changed design shall be taken at the time of final payment and that while the claimant relying on such representation of the department went on executing the work, the contract was suddenly rescinded, and so in these circumstances he could not take recourse to Clause 11 of the agreement. Regarding claim of the contractor due to change in design in respect of certain items of work there is practically no denial by the respondents. Regarding extra work claimed to have been done by the claimant the position is no better. On the other hand the evidence both oral and documentary led by claiming in this regard is almost one sided." Considering such additional claims, the Tribunal allowed the claim in respect of item Nos. 4, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 33 and 34 and 37 rejected the claims in respect of item No. 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 35, 36 and 37. In view of such facts, it cannot be said that the Tribunal in any way exceeded his authority. 14. 4, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 33 and 34 and 37 rejected the claims in respect of item No. 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 35, 36 and 37. In view of such facts, it cannot be said that the Tribunal in any way exceeded his authority. 14. The last submission made by the learned Additional Government Advocate relates to grant of interest by the Tribunal at the rate of 10% per annum and by the Subordinate Judge at the rate of 19.5% per annum. The challenge is made on the ground that no reasons have been assigned by the Tribunal to award interest at such rate. The submission is not correct as the very award shows, the Tribunal considered the question and found from Ext. 62 that the rate of interest of banks on fixed deposits varied from 9 to 11 percent from 1974 to 1985 and considering such fact he allowed interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 21-12-1981 till the date of the award when the same is made a rule of the Court. The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge however shows him to have merely allowed interest at the rate of 19.3% as claimed by the respondent. No reason has been assigned as to why such high rate of interest was allowed. In the circumstances of the case, I think it is more reasonable to limit the interest to 12% per annum from the date of the judgment till realisation in the payment is made within two months from today, failing which the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 16% per annum till realisation. 15. In the result, subject to aforesaid modification the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. *-*-*-*-*