ORDER 1. Heard Shri T.V.S.N. Chari for the appellant. Respondent appeared in person. Delay condoned. Special leave granted. 2. The State of Andhra Pradesh prefers this appeal from the order dated March 21, 1989 of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal made in R.P. No. 2396 of 1988 on its file, quashing certain disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent. The charges against the respondent were that he while working as Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Land Reforms Tribunal II, Amalapuram, passed orders on December 30, 1978 in two cases in which he determined the extent of the holdings by treating the minor sons of the declarants as majors as on the notified date in order that the declarants be benefitted and that respondent did so for corrupt considerations by overlooking certain glaring discrepancies and tell-tale suspicious features in the so-called birth certificate and other documents presented by the declarants. 3. The Tribunal rested the conclusion it reached as to the infirmities which, according to it, vitiated the proceedings principally on two grounds. The first was that though the disciplinary proceedings were initiated at a time when respondent was still in service, however, their continuation after the attainment by him of the age of superannuation was subject to and attracted the condition envisaged in Rule 9(2)(b) and (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980 and that such continuation of the disciplinary proceedings which did not satisfy the requirements of those sub-rules would be invalid. 4. The second ground was that the proceedings were so long drawn out that the inference becomes inescapable that the disciplinary authority was not diligent in pursuing the matter and that in the circumstances of the case, it would be wholly unreasonable to have permitted the charges arising out of certain acts and omissions alleged against respondent in the year 1978 to pursue after the lapse of over a decade. 5. On the first contention, Shri Chari submitted that the construction placed on Rule 9 by the Tribunal is palpably erroneous and is not one that the language of the statutory provision could bear. Shri Chari submitted that the decision of the Delhi High Court relied upon by the Tribunal, to the extent it supported the conclusion of the Tribunal on the point, cannot be held to have stated the law correctly. 6. Shri Chari submitted that the decision of the Delhi High Court relied upon by the Tribunal, to the extent it supported the conclusion of the Tribunal on the point, cannot be held to have stated the law correctly. 6. To appreciate Shri Charis contention, it is necessary to notice the language of the rule. 7. Sub-rule (2)(a) of Rule 9 says : "9. (2)(a) The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1) is instituted while the government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the government servant had continued in service." Proviso : (Omitted as unnecessary) Clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-rule (2)(b) of Rule 9, provide : "The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment: (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the government; (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution." The construction placed by the Tribunal on these provisions is that even if the proceedings at the time they were initiated during the period of service of the government servant were otherwise proper, however, if they are sought to be continued after retirement, such continuation shall be subject to the requirement that the event to which the proceedings relate should have been within four years immediately preceding the date of retirement. Shri Chari says that this construction has the effect of importing into the scheme of the sub-rule (2)(a) a limitation not expressly provided therein but one that is exclusive and peculiar to and envisaged by sub-rule (2)(b) and sub-rule (3) of Rule 9. Rule 9(3) says: "9. Shri Chari says that this construction has the effect of importing into the scheme of the sub-rule (2)(a) a limitation not expressly provided therein but one that is exclusive and peculiar to and envisaged by sub-rule (2)(b) and sub-rule (3) of Rule 9. Rule 9(3) says: "9. (3) No judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or in respect of an event which took place, more than four years before such institution." Shri Chari contends that sub-rule (2)(a) on the one hand and sub-rules (2)(b) and (3) on the other envisage two different class of cases and to import the limitations of the latter with the former is to ignore the fiction in sub-rule (2)(a) that for purposes of that sub-rule the government servant must be deemed to continue in service. Sub-rule (3), it is urged, is again in a different area. Shri Chari submits that cases where disciplinary proceedings have already commenced before retirements are to be kept distinguished from those in which fresh action is to be initiated for the first time after retirement. 8. The Tribunal noticed the proposition thus : "The question that arises for consideration is whether in respect of an event which took place beyond four years from the date of retirement of the official, disciplinary action commenced prior to his retirement could be continued under Rule 9 of the pension rules." 9. The Tribunal held that inasmuch as the event on which the charge was based was beyond four years prior to the retirement, the proceedings could not be continued. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal referred to and relied upon the observations of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in O.P. Gupta v. Union of India {(1981) 3 SLR 778 (Del HC)} where certain analogous provisions came in for consideration. Learned Judge had held: (SLR op. 788-89, para 17) "In other words is the deeming provision in Rule 9 so unbridled. Can the provision be used to keep the enquiry alive for any number of years or indefinitely ? Can it be deemed that even after 20 years the enquiry is still not concluded, as in the present case? Learned Judge had held: (SLR op. 788-89, para 17) "In other words is the deeming provision in Rule 9 so unbridled. Can the provision be used to keep the enquiry alive for any number of years or indefinitely ? Can it be deemed that even after 20 years the enquiry is still not concluded, as in the present case? Considering public interest and difficulties in government administration, I am of the opinion that power to continue or to start a disciplinary proceeding after retirement may be necessary in certain cases. By itself the power is not arbitrary. It has a rational basis. But the power must be exercised within a reasonable period and consistent with justice and public interest. In Mohanbhai Dungarbhai Parmar v. Y.B. Zala {(1980) 1 SLR 324 (Guj HC)} Gujarat High Court held that starting of a departmental enquiry 1 1/2 years after the incident, was violative of natural justice. The court held that it was too much to expect that delinquent would be able to remember and narrate the old incident. We have here the lapse of more than 20 years. If Rule 9 is to be saved from the attack of arbitrariness it must be read in a reasonable and just manner. A guideline is available in Rule 9(2)(b). A fresh enquiry cannot be started in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution. This statutory limitation embodies sound principle of equity and justice. It also recognises the principle of finality and repose, I do not find any difference in principle from the point of view of public interest, in continuation of pending proceeding and starting a fresh proceeding. I, therefore, hold that in case of an event more than four years old on the date of retirement, a departmental proceeding cannot be continued after retirement under Rule 9(2) of the Pension Rules, 1972." 10. Shri Chari contends that the language of the rule is not susceptible of this construction; that the construction virtually places an indirect limitation on the duration of an enquiry and that, however desirable such a limitation might otherwise be, it cannot be supplied by interpretation. The Tribunal is of the view that the limitation is inherent in the scheme of the Rules itself and what is necessary is a harmonious construction of the several provisions of Rule 9. 11. The Tribunal is of the view that the limitation is inherent in the scheme of the Rules itself and what is necessary is a harmonious construction of the several provisions of Rule 9. 11. In the view we take of the second point, it appears to us unnecessary to decide this question, though the contentions of Shri Chari merit consideration. The point might, perhaps, have to be considered in an appropriate case. One of the reasons that persuade us to abstain from a pronouncement of the point, one way or the other, is that the respondent who appeared and argued the matter in person himself, quite frankly, submitted that he would not support the interpretation placed by the Tribunal on the relevant provisions of Rule 9 and that, further, he had not himself advanced any argument before the Tribunal supporting the view taken by the Tribunal on the point. In view of this stand by the respondent himself, it is inappropriate to examine and pronounce on the question independently as any pronouncement on the point in favour of the appellant would have the effect of overruling the decision of the Delhi High Court in the said O.P. Gupta case {(1981) 3 SLR 778 (Del HC) without the possible arguments in support of the view found acceptable to the High Court being presented. All that we need to do in the circumstances of the case is to set aside the finding of the Tribunal on the point leaving, however, the legal question open. We do so, accordingly. 12. So far as the second point is concerned, the Tribunal has, on the material before it, persuaded itself to the view that it would be unreasonable to permit the continuation of the enquiry after the lapse of a decade after the alleged misconduct. We do so, accordingly. 12. So far as the second point is concerned, the Tribunal has, on the material before it, persuaded itself to the view that it would be unreasonable to permit the continuation of the enquiry after the lapse of a decade after the alleged misconduct. The Tribunal noticed that while the charge against the respondent that while functioning as a statutory authority to deal with the cases under the land ceiling laws had accepted a birth certificate in order to come to the conclusion that the person referred to therein had attained the age of majority and entitled to the benefit of an additional ceiling area and that the respondent had, instead of rejecting the claim, deliberately, overlooked the tell-tale interpolations in the documents that, respondent, even while the appeal against his determination was pending before the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, had himself proposed to correct the order on the ground that he had since come to suspect that the declarant had practised fraud on him and that the mistake should not be left uncorrected. The Tribunal also noticed the inaction on the part of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the enquiry with reasonable diligence. 13. The question is whether this view of the Tribunal should be interfered with under Article 136. On a consideration of the matter, we are of the view that it is not an appropriate case where we should interfere with the view taken by the Tribunal. 14. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal that no further proceedings in the enquiry be taken against the respondent is left undisturbed. 15. The appeal is disposed of, accordingly. No costs. For Citation : 1992 (2) Supp SCC 486. Vikas Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd.