ORDER This is an application by the defendant for taking off the file the plaint filed in the instant suit and also for permanent stay of all further proceedings in the suit including stay of all interim orders. 2. It is the submission of petitioner that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the subject matter of the suit is in respect of the land which is entirely situate outside the jurisdiction of this Court, and as such, the present suit is the suit for land and no part of the land, being the subject matter of the suit, is situate within the jurisdiction of this Court. 4. On or about 19th September, 1988 the plaintiffs instituted the suit against the defendant praying for following reliefs: a) A decree adjudging the Agreement dated the 18th September 1976 void or voidable; b) A decree directing the defendant to deliver up the said Agreement so that the same may be cancelled; c) If necessary, the said Agreement be rescinded by a decree of this Hon'ble Court. d) Injunction restraining the defendant and its servants, agents and assigns from making any claim in terms of the said Agreement of the 18th September, 1976. e) Decree for Rs. 1,24,800/- f) Further mesne profits; g) Interests; h) Receiver; i) Costs; j) Further or other reliefs. 5. It is alleged in the plaint that prior to 15th December, 1972 one, Gupta Builders Pvt. Ltd had constructed a building known as "Regent Chambers" in Plot No. 208 in Block No III of Backbay Reclamation, Noriman Point, Bombay. 6. By an agreement in writing dated 15th December, 1972 made by and between one Smt. Gulab Devi Ajmera and the said Gupta Builders Pvt. Ltd. the said Gulab Devi Ajmera, inter alia, agreed to purchase and/or acquire portion of the said building measuring 1014 sq.ft. approximately being office no. 4 on the 5th Floor of the said building and also car parking space in the said plot. 7. By another agreement in writing dated 18th September, 1976 made between said Smt. Gulab Devi Ajmera and the defendant the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, the said Smt. Gulab Devi Ajmera granted to the defendant leave or licence in respect of the said portion of the building and the car parking space on the terms and conditions contained the said agreement. 8. 8. Sometime in May, 1983, the said Smt. Gulab Devi Ajmera died intestate leaving the plaintiffs as her heirs and heiress and legal representatives. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that they are now solely entitled to the right, title and interest in respect of the said portion of the said building along with the said car packing space. 9. The plaintiffs claim in this suit that the said agreement dated 18tb September, 1976 was and is void ab-initio and was liable to be delivered up for cancellation. 10. It is the case of the petitioner that the said building being the immoveable property is situated at Bombay outside the jurisdiction of this Court. It is also an admitted position, according to the petitioner that The said agreement dated 18th September, 1976 was executed at Bombay outside the aforesaid jurisdiction and all the consideration money was paid in Bombay, the possession of the flat was delivered in Bombay, the licence fees were paid in Bombay and option to purchase, as stipulated in the said agreement was exercised in Bombay. 11. It is further claimed by the petitioner that the instant suit and the reliefs prayed for relate to rights, liabilities, obligation or duties arising out or in connection with the said agreement dated 18th September, 1976 which relates to the determination of title to the car parking space and the portion of the said building in Bombay and also possession thereof. It is further claimed by the petitioner that the reilefs claimed by the plaintiffs if granted, would directly affect the title to or possession of the land or involve an adjudication of title to the land or determination of any right or interest therein. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the instant suit is primarily or substantially in respect of the determination of the rights, interest or title to the said portion of the premises being the subject matter of the said agreement dated 18th September, 1976 and accordingly this is a suit relating to or arising out of the immoveable property situated wholly outside the jurisdiction of this Court. 12. 12. On the question of balance of convenience, it is the contention of the petitioner that in any event the natural forum for the trial of the instant suit is in Bombay and it would be an abuse of process and extremely inconvenient for the petitioner to defend the suit in this Court. According to the petitioner, the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the suit, being tried by the appropriate court in Bombay and as would appear from the facts of the case nothing at all relating to the said agreement dated 18th September, 1976 took place in Calcutta. It is the contention of the petitioner that the agreement was entered into at Bombay, the consideration was paid in Bombay, the possession of the Flat was delivered in Bombay, licence fees was paid in Bombay and the option exercisable under the said agreement was exercised in Bombay. 13. It is also the allegation of the petitioner that the parties had earlier litigation in respect of the subject matter forming part of the instant suit in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. Therefore, the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the petitioner and this suit ought to be tried at Bombay as all the issues, or the cause of action, according to the petitioner arose at Bombay outside the jurisdiction of the Court. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also taken a point that the suit is also barred by s. 28 of the Bombay Rent Control Act. 15. It is being submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this agreement is relating to licence in respect of the occupation of the flat and said licence coupled with the grant and if it is such, then the licensee will have interest in land, According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the grant is option to purchase. The learned Counsel has referred to paragraph 9 of the plaint wherein it is averred that the defendant however, wrongfully purported to exercise of option is ineffective and not binding on the said Gulab Devi Ajmera and also the plaintiffs being the successors in-interest. 16. The learned Counsel has also referred to paragraph 16 of the plaint where it is alleged that the defendant has been and is in wrongful and unuthorised occupation, possession and me of t he said premises. 17. 16. The learned Counsel has also referred to paragraph 16 of the plaint where it is alleged that the defendant has been and is in wrongful and unuthorised occupation, possession and me of t he said premises. 17. Referring to the prayers of the plaint, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the plaintiff has also claimed relief for injunction restraining the defendant from making any claim in terms of the said agreement dated 18th September. 1976. It is a submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the defendant claims right, title and interest in the said premises being plot at Regent Chamber, Plot No. 208, Block III Back bay Reclamation, Nariman Point, Bombay the subject matter of the said agreement and in order to give relief to the plaintiff as claimed in the plaint, the Court has to make an enquiry as to the entitlement of the defendant to the right, title and interest of the said premises and also the defendant's right to exercise the option to purchase the right, title interest in the said flat. It is also the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that it is true that the plaintiffs in the suit ask for delivering up the said agreement so that the same may be cancelled and for adjudging the said agreement as void. But according to learned Counsel for the petitioner this relief involves an enquiry as to the parties right, title and interest in the said flat. 18. The learned Counsel has also relied on a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1976 Calcutta 57 (Bengal Glass & Silicate Works vs. Latif Mohan Bijlaui) which is a decision rendered by me. 19. The learned Counsel has also relied on a bench decision of this Court, an unreported decision of this court in appeal arising out of the Suit no. 354 of 1984 (D. L. Millar & Co. v. Smt. Anita Chowdhury & Ors.). 20. The learned counsel on behalf of the plaintiff has submitted that in the instant suit no relief has been claimed regarding the possession, use and occupation of the said flat. The learned Counsel submits that the cause of action in the plaint comprises only those averments of fact which must be proved in order to obtain the relief claimed. 20. The learned counsel on behalf of the plaintiff has submitted that in the instant suit no relief has been claimed regarding the possession, use and occupation of the said flat. The learned Counsel submits that the cause of action in the plaint comprises only those averments of fact which must be proved in order to obtain the relief claimed. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that in the instant case the reliefs as claimed can be granted without considering the legality or otherwise of the defendant's present's possession. It is his submission that the only question to be tried in the suit will be whether the agreement was and is binding on the plaintiffs. Although, the Government has not yet granted a lease, the builders have not yet transferred the land and building to the society and the defendant purported to exercise its option after several years unexplained delay. It is also the submission of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that if the suit is decreed, by execution of that decree, the possession cannot be obtained. The plaintiff will have to file a separate suit for eviction. 21. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has also submitted that the decisions sought to be relied on by the petitioner have to be considered on the facts of each case. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that there is no dispute as to the test to be applied as laid down in several decisions of this Court and also other Courts, but the Court has mainly to consider the facts of each case and will draw the conclusion whether this is a suit for land within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent considering the facts involved. 22. The learned Counsel referring to the facts of the case has submitted that the agreement in the present case is for a grant of licence coupled with an agreement for sale or option to purchase. The learned Counsel has submitted that the last paragraph of s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that an agreement for sale does not create any interest in or charge on the property. The learned Counsel has submitted that the last paragraph of s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that an agreement for sale does not create any interest in or charge on the property. The learned Counsel has, however, conceded that a lease is certainly an interest in land and a licence coupled with a lease is therefore, a part of such interest and in such a case it may be stated that it is a suit for land. He draws a distinction referring to the fact involved in the instant case that the licence is coupled with or preliminary to an agreement for sale. According to the learned Counsel, such agreement is not an interest in land so the licence coupled with it cannot have a higher status in law. It has also been contended that if the said agreement has created no interest in the flat, consideration thereof, cannot involve any question as to title or possession or use or occupation or management of the said flat. 23. The question whether a suit is a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent' is to be determined on the basis of the reliefs claimed in the suit as also averments in support of such reliefs. It has been held in several decisions of this Court as also other Courts that the determining factor in a suit for land is what is the primary object of the suit. In order to find out what is the primary object of the suit, one has to see what are the reliefs claimed and by granting such relief whether any enquiry is involved as to the right, title and interest in land. I have set out above the reliefs in the present suit and I have also indicated the averment in support of such reliefs. The plaintiffs are asking for a decree adjudging the agreement dated 18th September, 1976 void or voidable; decree directing the defendant to deliver up the said agreement so that the same may be cancelled and, if necessary, the said agreement be rescinded by a decree of this Court, and also an order of injunction restraining the defendant from making any claim in favour of the said agreement. 24. By the said agreement dated 18th September. 24. By the said agreement dated 18th September. 1976 made between Smt. Gulab Debi Ajmera and the defendant Industrial Finance Corporation of India, the said Gulab Devi Ajmera granted to the defendant leave or licence in respect of a portion of the building and car parking space. Admittedly, such building is situate outside the jurisdiction of this Court. It has been contended by the petitioner that the present suit and the reliefs prayed therein relate to the rights, liabilities, obligation or duty arising out or in connection with the said agreement dated 18th September, 1976. It is the contention of the petitioner that in order to consider the effect of such agreement, one has to consider whether a party to the agreement is required to have any determination as to the title to the portion of the said building or the car parking space therein. 25. Considering the averments in the plaint as also the reliefs asked for, I find that in the present suit no determination would be necessary as to who has any right, title and interest to the property concerned. The subject matter of the suit is the said agreement and the plaintiff claims that said agreement is to be cancelled on the grounds stated in the plaint. The plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant failed to exercise the option to purchase within the period stipulated in the agreement. The said option has purportedly been exercised nearly after four years after the expiry of the stipulated period. The plaintiffs, therefore, contend that the said purported exercise of option was and is ineffective and not binding on the said Smt. Gulab Devi Ajmera or the plaintiffs by reason of unreasonable, undue or unconscionable delay. In such circumstances, the plaintiff, claim that the said agreement be adjudged void or voidable. If voidable, the plaintiffs avoid the same by filing the instant suit. 26. At the final hearing of the suit, if the agreement is cancelled that again will not give rise to any determination as to the right, title and interest into the property in the present suit. If, however, that agreement is sustained, then again the Court is not required to go into the question as to the right, title and interest in the building or the car parking space therein. 27. If, however, that agreement is sustained, then again the Court is not required to go into the question as to the right, title and interest in the building or the car parking space therein. 27. On the averments contained in the plaint, the Court will have to consider what is the effect or nature of such agreement and what are respective duties and obligations of the parties to such agreement, and further, whether such agreement is to be cancelled or adjudged void on the grounds alleged in the plaint. 28. Considering at this stage, the averments of the plaint and the reliefs asked for I cannot persuade myself to hold that the suit involves any determination as to the right, title and interest of any of the parties to the agreement in the premises concerned. On the basis of materials as on record I cannot hold that this is a suit for land. It may be that on further evidence the court may be called upon to consider the question as to the right, title and interest to the land but at this interlocutory stage, without anything more it cannot be said that on the basis of the averments contained in the plaint and the reliefs asked for, the present suit is a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of Letters Patent. 29. It has been contended that the balance of convenience is overwhelmingly in favour of the suit being tried in Bombay. I think this question is not relevant in an application where the petitioner has asked for an order that the plaint be taken off the file inasmuch as the suit relating to land situate outside the jurisdiction is not entertainable by this Court. The Court at this stage is called upon to consider whether the instant suit is a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Moreover, there is no prima facie case made out in support of the petitioner's contention that the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner. 30. For the reasons aforesaid, this application fails and is hereby dismissed Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.