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Allahabad High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 36 (ALL)

Durga Sahu v. Rama Kant Singh

1990-01-09

G.D.DUBE, N.N.MITHAL

body1990
JUDGMENT : G. D. Dube, J. 1. By order dated 11-5-1989, durga sahu appellant was appointed receiver of the cinema known as "durga chitra mandir" which is the subject matter of the dispute between the parties in original suit no. 19 of 1988 : rama kant singh v. Ram sewak sahu and others pending in the court of civil judge, azamgarh. By the impugned order, the learned civil judge, azamgarh has removed the appellant from the post of receiver and appointed sri krishna murari singh, advocate as receiver. This has given rise to this appeal. 2. The facts of this case are very brief. The plaintiff-respondent filed application no. C/394 before the lower court making allegation that the cinema is not being properly managed. It was contended that on 20th march, 1989 and 26th march, 1989, the receiver had withdrawn rs. 4,05,000/- from the bank account without the order of the court. The appellant has not maintained proper accounts. The expenditures have not been made by cheques according to the orders of the civil judge dated 5th july, 1988. The receiver had been keeping large amount of money of the cinema in his possession and had been utilizing it for his own benefits. It was further urged that in the night between 18/19-11-1988, durga sahu was arrested at the bhagwati railway crossing of west bengal with stolen railway property. He had surrendered before the sub divisional magistrate, durgapur in a criminal case and was released on bail the same day. On these grounds, it was contended that durga sahu was not a proper person to remain as a receiver. The plaintiff also complained that the receiver had left the cinema business without informing the court and leaving it in the hands of unauthorised persons. This act was done particularly in contravention of the order dated 6-12-88 of the lower court. From the facts stated in the impugned order, it transpires that this application no. C/394 was moved on 5-5-1989. Objections were invited from the defendant appellant and 9-5-1989 was fixed for hearing. On that date, the appellant moved application no. C/399 for adjournment. 10-5-1989 was fixed for hearing. The lower court has mentioned that, on the date of hearing, the court hours were from 6.30 a.m. To 12.00 noon. On 10-5-89, the parties of both sides had appeared. Objections were invited from the defendant appellant and 9-5-1989 was fixed for hearing. On that date, the appellant moved application no. C/399 for adjournment. 10-5-1989 was fixed for hearing. The lower court has mentioned that, on the date of hearing, the court hours were from 6.30 a.m. To 12.00 noon. On 10-5-89, the parties of both sides had appeared. The counsel for the appellant had stated orally that the plaintiff may argue his case and he will argue on 11-5-1989. On 11-5-1989, the plaintiff-respondent was present throughout, but none was present from the side of the defendant-appellant. At 10.00 a.m., an application was moved by the defendant-appellant making some allegations against the presiding officer and praying that as he will move a transfer application some time be granted to him for obtaining the stay order. The learned civil judge has observed that as the application was moved malafidely with wrong allegations, he had rejected it and had directed the parties to furnish the list of two names each for appointment of a receiver. The plaintiff had furnished the list at 11.45 a.m. The defendant-appellant had not supplied any name. Thereafter, the learned trial court had passed the impugned order. 3. From the facts stated above it is obvious that the impugned order is ex parte. The defendant has not filed any objection so far. 4. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that application no. C/394 was a very lengthy document. Some facts relating to incident in west bengal were alleged. The appellant was also required to make some detailed objections regarding the accounts. He had to explain his conduct as a receiver. Hence, there was no justification to adjourn the hearing on 9-5-1989 to 10-5-1989. It was urged that he had tried to move an application dated 10-5-1989, copy thereof is annexure "2" to the affidavit accompanying application for staying the proceedings dated may 10, 1989 but was unsuccessful. It was further urged that when allegation had been made against the presiding officer that the appellant had no faith in the presiding officer, then some reasonable time ought to have been allowed to the appellant to obtain stay order. The learned counsel for the appellant expressed surprise over the whole proceedings of lower court. It was contended that by 11.45 a.m. The list of receiver had not been supplied. The learned counsel for the appellant expressed surprise over the whole proceedings of lower court. It was contended that by 11.45 a.m. The list of receiver had not been supplied. Hence, after 1145 a.m, the presiding officer must have applied his mind to the matter. The court hours were only up to 12.00 noon. It was, therefore, urged that it was not at all possible for the presiding officer to dictate the detailed impugned order running in four foolscap pages containing various details of the facts relating to the procedure adopted in this case and the facts alleged against the defendant-appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant also urged that in this matter the defendant was required to collect materials from west bengal for the purposes of showing that the charges made against him were not of such nature as to make him unfit to act as a receiver. He was also required to collect materials from the bank, shift them in a proper manner and show that he managed the cinema in a most proper manner. Both the parties had annexed some papers showing the accounts of the cinema. Learned counsel for the appellant had urged that from the accounts submitted in this court as well as in the lower court, it is clear that the defendant-appellant had been maintaining accounts properly. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent urged that the actual intention of the defendant-appellant was to delay the disposal of the application c/394 that is why he was seeking adjournment. It was urged that copy of the application dated 5-5-1989 had been received by the appellant and, therefore, he had ample time upto 10-5-89 to prepare his objections. The learned counsel for the respondents also urged that as the appellant was arrested in connection with theft of railway property and also had surrendered in a criminal matter pending before the sub divisional magistrate, durgapur, he was not entitled to remain as a receiver. It was pointed out that, on several occasions, the receiver had left the management of the disputed property in the hands of unauthorised persons. The receiver had not obtained any permission of the trial court to leave the station. It was contended that the receiver had not shown the income from cycle stand, cinema slides and canteen. It was pointed out that, on several occasions, the receiver had left the management of the disputed property in the hands of unauthorised persons. The receiver had not obtained any permission of the trial court to leave the station. It was contended that the receiver had not shown the income from cycle stand, cinema slides and canteen. It was also urged that the court had authorised the receiver to spend only rupees two lakhs towards loan whereas the receiver had spend rs. 4,00,000/-. It was pointed out that when the receiver took charge, there was Rs. 1,47,000/.- in the bank. This amount had not been shown in the accounts. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the criminal charges against the appellant were at a very initial stage. The appellant had not tried on those charges. Unless he was held guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction, the appellant could not have been branded as a criminal and thus rendered unfit to act as a receiver of the property. It was urged that he had not been given an opportunity to show that the charges allegedly made against him were not of such a character as to amount to moral turpitude. It was urged that even if the appellant bad been convicted in the two cases, the conviction would not have rendered him unfit to act as receiver. No law of the land including the code of civil procedure make a receiver convicted in such a minor offences unfit to act as a receiver of the property. It was pointed out that several items have been shown in the accounts submitted in the trial court. The amount of rs. 1,47,000/- was shown in a latter statement dated 14 to 20-11-1988. The canteen had not function from june, 1988 onwards. The income of cycle-stand was not regular. No cinema slides were exhibited in the cinema. In these circumstances, there was no question of showing the income from these items in the account books of the cinema and the accounts submitted in the lower court. 6. From the facts narrated above, it is obvious that the lower court had acted in hot haste. The application dated 5-5-1989 contained 18 paragraphs running into five foolscap pages. In view of such a detailed allegation against the appellant, some reasonable time ought to have been granted to the appellant. 6. From the facts narrated above, it is obvious that the lower court had acted in hot haste. The application dated 5-5-1989 contained 18 paragraphs running into five foolscap pages. In view of such a detailed allegation against the appellant, some reasonable time ought to have been granted to the appellant. From the impugned order itself, it transpires that by 9th may, 1989, the appellant has not received the copy of application c/394. The copy of this application along with its annexures were handed over to him on that day. In these circumstances some little time ought to have been allowed to the appellant to prepare his objection. In our view the time of twenty four hours was not at all sufficient. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has referred to annexure "2" mentioned above and stated that in the application prepared by him, he was seeking only a week's time for filing objection. This prayer had been made even on 9th may, 1989. The defendant himself was not at all interested in delaying the matter for he had nothing to fear as he had been maintaining his accounts properly and bona fidely and managing the property in question in a most proper and prudent manner. We are also not satisfied by the procedure adopted by the lower court. There was no justification of calling two names of receiver from the two parties by 10.30 a.m. On 10-5-1989. The calling of these two names would have arisen only when the lower court had come to the conlusion that there was a sufficient ground to remove the receiver appointed by the orders of the high court and thereby had ordered the removal. The very calling of the names by 10.30 a.m. Itself speaks that the learned judge had made up his mind to remove the appellant from the post of receiver. All the applications therafter were only formal procedure. It looks strange that the names have been supplied to the court by 11.45 a.m. There is no evidence on record that the court had continued its hearing beyond 12.00 noon. Hence, the passing of the detailed impugned order within less than fifteen minutes is shrouded in mystery. Moreover, it is apparent that in the application c/400, the defendant-appellant had made some allegation alleging partisan attitude to the presiding officer. Hence, the passing of the detailed impugned order within less than fifteen minutes is shrouded in mystery. Moreover, it is apparent that in the application c/400, the defendant-appellant had made some allegation alleging partisan attitude to the presiding officer. Then in such a situation, the learned presiding officer ought to have stayed further bearing of the case and afforded an opportunity to the appellant to obtain stay order from the court of district judge. We would like to make it clear that we are not laying down any ratio in this respect. Such a procedure will depend on the circumstances of the case. In this case, the circumstances were quite peculiar and the presiding officer ought to have acted as indicated above by us. 7. It is a settled principle of law that justice should not only be done but should appear to have been done. A cardinal principle of natural justice has enunciated in raipur development authority v. M/s. Chokhamal contractor, etc., judgment today 1989 (2) sc 285 that a judge or umpire must be disinterested or unbiased (nemo judex in causa sua). The presiding officer had not tried to show that he was doing justice even to the defendant. 8. Since we feel that the case must be remanded back to the lower court for hearing of c/394 again, we do not find it necessary to express our opinion on the rival contention regarding the conduct of the receiver in the management of the disputed property. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the lower court are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the lower court for disposal of application c/394 again after affording an opportunity to the defendant to file his objection the file of the lower court along with this order be sent back expeditiously to the lower court. The file shall be placed before the district judge who shall transfer it to some other court for disposal. After receiving the file, the trial court shall afford ten days' time to the defendant-appellant to file his objection on the aforesaid application. Thereafter, this application shall be heard and decided according to law quite expeditiously. In the above circumstances, both the parties shall bear their own costs.