JUDGMENT 1. By the Court.- The writ petition is directed against the order dated 3rd June, 1949 passed by the Secretary, Environment Department, Lucknow, by means of which the petitioner was to remain in the service of the U. P. Pollution Control Board on contract till 3rd June, 1989 in pursuance of the judgment of this Court dated 17-5-1989 in Writ Petition No. 2070 of 1988, Surendra Singh v. State of U. P. The petitioner prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties to regularise his services with all benefits and privileges. It was further prayed that the order dated 3-6-1989 contained in Annexure No. 1 be quashed. 2. The petitioner, who was earlier in the employment of the U. P. Development System Corporation, Lucknow as Member-Manager, Consultancy (Project, Planning and Project Management) applied for the post of Member- Secretary, U. P. Pollution Control Board on which he was duly selected and thereafter the State Government vide order dated 4-12-1984 appointed him for a period of six months temporally with the stipulation that the said services shall come to an end on regularisation, or selection of any person to the post or even prior to that, on giving one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof. The appointment was made, in exercise of powers under Section 5 of Sub-section (2) (F) of the Air (Prevention Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. Before expiry of the said period of six months, the term of the petitioner was extended in exercise of the powers vested in the Government in continuance of his previous appointment for a period of one year on contract. It was further provided that on his giving consent to appointment on contract, the Government would settle the terms and conditions of contract. The petitioner, it appears, never gave his consent in writing nor was he asked to do so. After his initial appointment for six months, the petitioner moved an application about four months thereafter and again after some five months he again moved an application for regularisation followed by yet another application after the expiry of one year of his continuous appointment. After his initial appointment for six months, the petitioner moved an application about four months thereafter and again after some five months he again moved an application for regularisation followed by yet another application after the expiry of one year of his continuous appointment. After expiry of this one year period, which came to an end on 2nd June, 1986 the petitioner continued to work and some three months thereafter vide order dated 2th August, 1986, purporting it to be in continuation of previous appointment, the said appointment on contract was extended for three years with retrespsctive effect, viz. with effect from 4th June, 1986. It was provided that during this period he would be governed by Government Servant Rules and all the Government Orders and after his consent for the said appointment, the terms of contract would be settled. It appears that on the petitioner's application for regularisation dated 29-3-1985 a note was put before the Secretary, Environment Department. Even before it, it appears, in January 1985 before expiry of initial appointment of six months, the file was in movement and the matter was also referred to the Chief Minister and it was decided to appoint him on contract for one year. After the expiry of period of one year, the file was again in movement and in the month of August, 1986 and the Chief Minister vide order dated 27-8-1986 directed for extension of his appointment on contract for three years with the provision that after getting consent of this contractual appointment, terms of the contract will be decided by the State Government. Till then there was a Single State Board under the provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the order dated 29-8-1986 referred to above, was also sent to the Chairman of the U. P. Development System Corporation, Lucknow and also to the Managing Director, U. P. Development System Corporation, Lucknow. When the petitioner joined the U. P. Pollution Control Board, he was allowed and granted six months leave without pay to join a fresh appointment. Again the petitioner was granted six month's leave without pay by his previous employee with the condition that in no case this six months period of leav6 will be extended on expiry of the same and the petitioner will automatically cease to be an employee of the Corporation. Again the petitioner was granted six month's leave without pay by his previous employee with the condition that in no case this six months period of leav6 will be extended on expiry of the same and the petitioner will automatically cease to be an employee of the Corporation. When his services were again extended for a period of one year in the U. P. Pollution Control Board, as stated above, the petitioner applied for extension of his leave without pay for a period of one year which was granted with the clear stipulation that in no case this one year leave will be extended and no expiry of the same, the petitioner will automatically cease to be an employee of the Corporation. It was thereafter that the previous employer vide letter .dated 5/8 July, 1986 informed the petitioner that he was no more an employee of the Corporation with effect from forenoon of 12th June, 1986. The petitioner again sent a letter for extension of leave without pay till he was in service with the U. P. Pollution Control Board, but the said application was rejected on the ground that he was no more an employee of the Corporation, and, as such, there was no question of granting leave to him. In his application for regularisation, the petitioner stated that he is in continuous service of the U. P. Pollution Control Board and he has no lien in his parent department. On the petitioner's application dated 29-3-1985 for considering his claim for regularisation before the Secretary, Science and Environment Department, U. P. Lucknow, a note was, made appreciating his services and contributions. Thereafter the Deputy Secretary made a detailed note appreciating his service and various successes attained during his tenure and the petitioner's act in bringing to the notice of the State Government various financial and administrative irregularities committed by Sri P. C. Tyagi, President, Pollution Control Board and his efforts for removing the ""same was appreciated He too recommended that his services may be regularised and that the concurrence of the Chief Minister may be obtained. The Special Secretary of the department also in his note appreciated the services of the petitioner and stated that it was not desirable to have a person from outside on deputation on the post of Member-Secretary but the Reviewing Officer, viz. The Special Secretary of the department also in his note appreciated the services of the petitioner and stated that it was not desirable to have a person from outside on deputation on the post of Member-Secretary but the Reviewing Officer, viz. Secretary, Ministry of Environment has" disagreed with the entry given by the Reporting Officer and has rated him as a 'first class Officer'. The Chief Minister's concurrence for six months was obtained on 31-3-1983. On 18-8-1986, the Joint Secretary of the Department, after submitting his report, looked into the matter and recommended that the petitioner's term may be extended on contract. It is, thereafter in view of his capability and services, his term was extended for a period of three years on contract as ordered by the Chief Minister. It appears that on the basis of complaints of some M.Ps. one of whom later on denied it, the Secretary of the Department on 13-4-1987 submitted a note before the Chief Minister, who directed that work from the petitioner may not be taken as his association with the department may create difficulties and with immediate effect he may be appointed in the Environment Department. It appears that his proposal was concurred by the Chief Minister and thereafter he was sent to the Environment Department and a few days thereafter his services were terminated, though on the ground of certain lapses resulting in death of thousands of fishes in river Gomti because of pollution against which he filed a writ petition, referred to earlier, which was allowed. The termination order was quashed and it was provided that the petitioner will be deemed to be continuing in service till he continues to hold the post in accordance with law. 3. Initially the appointment of the petitioner was for a period of six months with an indication of its being regularised and was extended for a period of one year with some variation in its language and after expiry of said period, the appointment was not extended with the result that extension for a period of one year came to an end. The petitioner was sent to Holland for training and thereafter he came back to India and resumed his duties and during this period he was paid his salary regularly. The petitioner was sent to Holland for training and thereafter he came back to India and resumed his duties and during this period he was paid his salary regularly. The fixed term appointment having come to an end after extension of period of one year, the petitioner's appointment became an appointment for an definite period. 4. Some two and a half months thereafter without disposing of the petitioner's application for regularisation for which hopes were given to him even in the initial appointment letter, the State Government vide its letter dated 3rd June, 1986 appointed him for a period of three years on one stretch treating it to be an appointment with retrospective effect, i.e. from the date when his previous appointment come to an end and thereby including the period when the petitioner's appointment was not for any particular term. The unilateral appointment for a further period of three years, though not in continuation of previous one yet including the period during which the petitioner's services were continuing without break and without any period fixed for the same. The continuity in the appointment of petitioner after expiry of period of one year not being irregular, there was no question of its regularisation. If the same period is ignored and appointment for three years in not to be taken with retrospective effect, the period of three years then would come to end in August, 1989 and the services of the petitioner could not have been terminated or put to an end to on 3rd June, 1989 on the ground that three years' period> has come to an end on that date. But no specific plea in this behalf has been taken in the instant writ petition and no relief has been claimed, and, as such, the petitioner is not entitled to claim relief on this score. No formal contract was entered into between the parties and twice it was, though unilaterally, extended without even taking his consent. The terms of the contract were never settled and services rules were not framed and the employee was made to understand that for all practical purposes, he was a Government Servant and was entitled to all privileges and facilities of Government Servants. The terms of the contract were never settled and services rules were not framed and the employee was made to understand that for all practical purposes, he was a Government Servant and was entitled to all privileges and facilities of Government Servants. The State Government even treated him to be a Government servant by transferring him from the U. P. Pollution Control Board to the Environment Department where he worked as a Government Servant, whereafter his services were terminated, which action has been held by a Division Bench of this Court to be by way of punishment and the termination order was quashed and the petitioner's transfer by the State Government was also held to be illegal, by transferring the petitioner in the office of the State Government and not taking him on deputation, the State Government itself put an end to the unilateral appointment of the petitioner for a period of three years and not only treated, but accepted the petitioner as a Government Servant. The transfer was held to be invalid by the Court in the previous writ petition, but the State Government can not claim benefit of its own wrong having been held as a such that the earlier unilateral appointment for three years in continuity thereafter was revived and would automatically come to an end after expiry of three years from retrospective effect, that is, the date in the appointment letter. 5. The petitioner was not restored back of office after his termination was held to be illegal and in-operative by this Court. The State Government allowed its nominee to continue to hold the said office which he is now holding, paying him salary for the post of Member Secretary. Two persons cannot hold one and the same office and get its salary. Merely because salary was paid to the petitioner too for the said office, would not mean that the State Government submitted to be verdict of the Court. The so-called compliance was, more or less, a sham compliance of the Courts order. This indicate that when an authority or officer makes up a mind to do a particular wrong, he sticks to it. 6. It is true that generally and ordinarily an appointment for a fixed term comes to an end when the term expires. IT is also true that contractual obligation as such can not be enforced by means of a writ petition. 6. It is true that generally and ordinarily an appointment for a fixed term comes to an end when the term expires. IT is also true that contractual obligation as such can not be enforced by means of a writ petition. Service with employer is a matter of contract and though service normally starts with a contract, but after entering into service it is the Statutory Rules, if any, which govern the service conditions and not the contract which is the starting point of service. If it is only a matter of contract, a mandamus normally can not be issued for enforcement of contract. In Satish Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1953 SC 250 , the petitioner who was appointed again for a fixed term after expiry of previous term was asked to indicate whether he was willing to continue in service on those terms mentioned in the letter. The offer was accepted and the petitioner continued to remain in service. In these circumstances it was held that there was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract which he did and having accepted the offer he still had open to him all the rights and remedies available to other person similarly situated to enforce any right under his contract which had been denied to him, assuming there was any, and to pursue in the ordinary Courts of land, such remedies for a breach. The remedy of writ, was therefore, misconceived. The instant case is distinguishable inasmuch as neither any consent was given or taken and there was no pleading that any assurance to continue in service or regularisation was given in any manner. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ex-Pilot Officer Artn Govil, C. A No- 4649 of 1989 (arising out of S. L P. (C) No 1088 of 1989 decided on 21-11-1980 (Now Reported in AIR 1990 SC 458 ) the order passed by High Court in Writ Petition was maintained but its modification made by way of review, in view of interim order passed by the Court in W. P. to the effect that post be kept vacant and made available by way of success, was quashed. In the said case extension in service for a fixed term which was terminated before expiry, was quashed and the order passed by this Court in writ petition to that effect, "IT is open for the opposite parties to consider the claim of the petitioner for continuation of service or the fresh appointment and no observation in this regard are being made by this Court," was maintained. But in the instant case, though the last extention was for three years in continuation, but after a break and the unilaterla extension of time or appointment with regard to a statutory post is said to be artificial appointment for a term without disposing of the prayer for regularisation for which assurance is said to have been given not only orally but was also contained in the appointment letter: the State Government will be estopped from terminating the petitioner's services on such grounds under these circumstances, which in fact was by way of punishment or for maintaining the earlier order, which too was in the shape of punishment and the principles of promissory estoppel apply in this case and further the so-called termination was in fact against public policy. 7. The State Government, in the circumstances stated above, it has been contended, adopted the policy of "hire and fire" taking advantage of its superior position and the weak position of the employee. The State Government without framing rules and taking any consent and without specifying the terms except making conditions applicable to Government Servants applicable, took advantage of its superior position, without deciding the question of regularisation, and after the petitioner under belief had to clip off his wings disabling him from going back in the service of his previous employer, terminated his services arbitrarily. Such a contract, if any, in the above circumstances would be against public policy and would be void under the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act as was observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Central Water Transport Corporation Ltd., v. Berjo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156 . 8. Even if it could be said that the petitioner's appointment was contractual appointment and it was to come to an end after a period of three years, the principles of promissory estoppel were applicable and the services of the petitioner could not have been terminated in the way the same has been done. 8. Even if it could be said that the petitioner's appointment was contractual appointment and it was to come to an end after a period of three years, the principles of promissory estoppel were applicable and the services of the petitioner could not have been terminated in the way the same has been done. In this connection reference may be made to the first appointment letter and the averments made by the petitioner that he was assured by the Secretary that his services were regularised, which averment has not been denied by the Secretary, Environment Department and instead the Joint Secretary of the Environment Department, who has nothing to do with it, has come forward and denied the same. The extension of the term of the petitioner for one year and thereafter for a period of three years and keeping his application for regularisation pending, obviously the petitioner was led to believe that he will be absorbed in the Board and his services will be regularised. The services of the petitioner were appreciated and he had to part away with his previous job and he was made to change his position on the representation made by the State Government. The representation was double assured by the Secretary of the Environment Department, referred to above. Even the assertion of the petitioner that the Secretary of the Environment Department had assured him that his services have been regularised and there was no occasion for him to disbelieve the assurance, stands unchallenged and un-controverted. It is thereafter the petitioner wrote letter to his previous employer for extension of leave which was not accepted. In Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 the Court observed :- ".........Even though the case did not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Evidence Act it was still open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution." 9. Similar observations were made by the Honourable Supreme Court in the cases: Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of U. P., AIR 1979 SC 621 and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Similar observations were made by the Honourable Supreme Court in the cases: Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of U. P., AIR 1979 SC 621 and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal, Counsel AIR 1971 SC 1021 . In Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotel Pvt. Ltd, AIR 1983 SC 848 , the Court after holding that the Corporation was an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India again stressed upon the applicability of the same principle and observed :- "........It if would be so, as held by this Court in R. D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India ( 1979 3 SCR 1014 ) AIR 1979 SC 1628 at pp. 1641-42, the rule inhibiting arbitrary action by the Government would equally apply where such corporation dealing with the public whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise and it cannot act arbitrarily and its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance........................... .........Now if appellant entered into a solemn contract in discharge and performance of its statutory duty and the respondent acted upon it, the statutory corporation can not be allowed to act arbitrarily so as to cause harm and injury, flowing from its unreasonable conduct, to the respondent. In such a situation, the Court is not powerless from holding the appellant to its promise and it can be enforced by a writ of mandamus directing it to perform its statutory duty. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would certainly lie to direct performance of a statutory duty......" 10. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 86 it was observed that alteration in position by acting on assurance or representation is enough and consequent detriment and damage or prejudice need not be proved. The principles of promissory estoppel squarely apply in the instant case and it was no longer open to the State Government to take shelter behind the unilateral extension or appointment for a period of three years and its end due to efflux of time. The principles of promissory estoppel squarely apply in the instant case and it was no longer open to the State Government to take shelter behind the unilateral extension or appointment for a period of three years and its end due to efflux of time. The deprivation of the petitioner's service in this manner despite bar to it, in view of assurance for regularisation and keeping the matter pending and applicability of principles of promissory estoppel will be also hit by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 of the Constitution reads as under "21. Protection of life and personal liberty :-No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." 11. Obviously, Article 21 of the Constitution does not confer, a right, but it protects not only personal liberty but also life of a person of which he can be deprived by procedure established by law. If the deprivation is against the procedure established by law, it will be an arbitrary deprivation. The question to be considered is whether "right to livelihood" will also include and come within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution. Right to life means something more than survival or animal existence; it would include the right to live with human dignity. In Re i Sant Ram, AIR 1960 SC 932 , the word "life" came up for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court and it was held that it will not include the 'right to livelihood.' It was a case of touts and the Registrar of the Court issued notice to show cause whey their names be not included in the list of touts. A writ petition was filed and a preliminary objection was made that they were being deprived of their right to livelihood. It was held that Article 21 of the Constitution does not include livelihood. 12. Practically similar view was taken in subsequent decision but ultimately the Constitution Bench in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 , the case of Sant Ram (supra) was distinguished and it was held :- "The right to life includes the right to livelihood. The sweep of the right of life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. The sweep of the right of life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaning fulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life." Deprivation from the means of livelihood which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the petitioner has been deprived of his means of livelihood by the opposite parties after he had to part away with the services of the previous employer with whom he had earlier lien on the assurances given by the opposite parties, who did not frame any rules or spelt out the terms of contract, and that too without disposing of his application for regularisation fiist. Unilateral extension of further period of three years, though not in continuation of the previous one and making the petitioner to believe that he was to be regularised and thereafter terminating his services for maintaining earlier termination order, the basis of which could be univestigated act or commission or charges. Unilateral extension of further period of three years, though not in continuation of the previous one and making the petitioner to believe that he was to be regularised and thereafter terminating his services for maintaining earlier termination order, the basis of which could be univestigated act or commission or charges. If it is not to be deemed to be term appointment, it would be violative of Article 21 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 13. On behalf of the opposite parties, the main plea as well as contention was that the petitioner not having taken certain pleas in the previous writ petition and the question which could have been raised in the previous writ petition not having been raised, or if raised the same not having been decided, it is no longer open to the petitioner to take the pleas which have been taken by him in this writ petition as the same is barred under the principles of constructive res judicata. There is no challenge to the legal position that the principles of res judicata also extend to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in High Courts. The principles of constructive res judicata will bar a second petition on the same cause of action or when relief asked for but not granted in previous application. If ground, which ought to have been taken in previous petition, but not taken, the principles of constructive res judicata as envisaged under Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, will apply. In the case of Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri, AIR 1986 SC 391 , it was observed that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to actual matter determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legtimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The Principle under lying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. The Principle under lying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue, it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. Therefore, the judgment of the High Court in the earlier writ petition would operate as res judicata even where one of the grounds taken in the subsequent writ petition before the High Court was absent in the earlier writ petition. 14. In Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust (1978) 3 SCC 119 it was observed :- "......the technical rule of res judicata, although a whole-woroe rule based upon public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceedings merely on an uncertain assumption that the issue must have been decided. It is not safe to extend the principle of res judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guess work. Thus, what has been decided will operate as res judicata and if certain other pleas which could not be taken or if taken, but the same were not decided, the same will not operate as res judicata. Merely because the petitioner has not taken the pleas of regularisation in the previous writ petition, the petitioner will not be debarred from taking the said plea is view of the principles of res judicata. The plea so raised by the learned counsel for the opposite parties fails. Merely because the petitioner has not taken the pleas of regularisation in the previous writ petition, the petitioner will not be debarred from taking the said plea is view of the principles of res judicata. The plea so raised by the learned counsel for the opposite parties fails. In the instant case, as has been seen, after the previous termination order the petitioner was appraised that this services have come to an end, after expiry of the period of three years and, thus, his services were put to an end to and this is subject matter of challenge in this writ petition that the previous writ petition having become final and the petitioner was to continue to remain in service till he was entitled to hold the post in accordance with law and according to the petitioner he was entitled to hold the statutory post rather premanently as he was to be regularised and the regularisation matter was put off though the same could have been decided earlier. In the previous petition, the earlier termination order was challenged and although other grounds were raised, but the writ petition was allowed with a finding that the services were terminated by way of punishment and the same could not have been terminated in this manner without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The other pleas raised by the petitioner in his writ petition that the Government impliedly waived the contractual part of the contract and treated him as permanent Member-Secretary of the U. P. Pollution Control Board and the Government has no power to terminate him, and the petitioner's services could not have been terminated by one months notice and he cannot be thrown out on the street after having lost his lien with the previous employer were not decided. In this writ petition, the petitioner has taken specific plea of promissory estopped which was taken in around about manner in the earlier writ petition and has challenged his subsequent termination on the ground of being arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that he stood regularly absorbed. 15. In this writ petition, the petitioner has taken specific plea of promissory estopped which was taken in around about manner in the earlier writ petition and has challenged his subsequent termination on the ground of being arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that he stood regularly absorbed. 15. Undoubtedly in the previous writ petition, it was open for the petitioner to contend that the period of three years came to and end on a particular day, which was not done and, thus, argument was advanced that it was not open for the petitioner in this writ petition to raise that point, but all the other points which were raised and not decided by the Court and which have now been raised in the fresh petition, which were necessitated because of fresh order, it cannot be said to be barred by principles or res judicata. Though it cannot be ignored that the previous order, against which Special Leave Petition was dismissed as withdrawn, is binding on the parties in which the petitioner was ordered to be deemed in service and to hold the post in accordance with law, the plea of res judicata falls on the ground in respect of pleas referred to above. 16. Accordingly, in view of what has been stated above, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 3-6-1989 contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition informing the petitioner that his services will come to an end on 3-6-1989, which could not have been put to an end to in this manner, is hereby quashed. A mandamus is issued to the opposite parties directing them to consider the petitioner's case that he stood permanently absorbed or stood regularised in the service. This is to be done within a reasonable period say, within two months. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.