MOHAN, C. J. ( 1 ) ALL these writ appeals may be dispo the sed of by this common order, since they raise one and the same point. ( 2 ) THE appellants are the membersof Yelechagahalli mandal panchayat. They were elected as members on 20th of Jan the uary, 1987 under the provisions of the karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya panchayats Act, 1983. The appellant namely Y. M. Basappa was further elected as Pradhana of the Mandal Panchayat. The appellants received a notice dated 7th july, 1989 from the Chief Secretary, hassan District Zilla Parishad, Hassan, calling upon them to show cause why they should not be disqualified under sec the tion 3 (1) (A) read with Section 4 (1) (a) of the Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987, stating that e complaint had been preferred by presid the ent, Hassan District Janata Party, Hassan (M. G. Dodde Gowda, respondent No. 2 herein) to the effect that the appellants had voluntarily left the party (Janata paity) on which ticket they were elected and joined the Congress-1 party. On receipt of the said show cause notice, the appellants made their appearance through their advocate and filed their objections to the show cause notice. In their objections they contended that they had not commi the tted any act opposed to the relevant provisions of the Act and therefore the complaint was mis-conceived and was liable to be dismissed. It was further contended that Janata Party is no more in existence in view of the fact that the said party had merged with Lok Dal and as a result of which Janata Dal has been formed. ( 3 ) WITHOUT conducting any enquiryor taking evidence, the matter was pro the ceeded with by the first respondent (Chief secretary, Zilla Parishad ). He came to the conclusion that in so far as the appel the ants had not specifically denied their leaving Janata Party, it must be presumed that they have voluntarily left and there the fore they are liable for disqualification. To this effect, he passed an order on 4th of August. 1989. This was questioned in the writ petitions. He came to the conclusion that in so far as the appel the ants had not specifically denied their leaving Janata Party, it must be presumed that they have voluntarily left and there the fore they are liable for disqualification. To this effect, he passed an order on 4th of August. 1989. This was questioned in the writ petitions. ( 4 ) OUR learned brother Chandrakantharajurs, J. was of the view that the complaint of the writ petitioners before him that no evidence was recorded and there is no proof that the petitioners before him had resigned from Janata Party and joined Congress-1 party cannot be accepted, because the order of the Chief secretary was a lengthy one. If the petitioners had not examined themselves, they alone were to be blamed. Further he held in so far as there is no specific denial of the parties. Order 8 Rule 5 of the code of Civil Procedure would apply. Thus, he dismissed the writ petitions. It is under these circumstances, the writ appeals have come to be preferred - Writ appeals 1588 to 1591 of 1989 against writ Petitions 14256 to 14259 of 1989 and Writ Appeal 1476 of 1989 against writ Petition 14255 of 1989. ( 5 ) THE contention of Mr. A. K. Subbaiah, the learned counsel for the appellants is this: in the matter of disqualification of any member as contemplated under Ss. 3 and 4, serious consequences follow. The pro the ceedings are quasi criminal in nature. First and foremost, therefore, it is essential on the part of the Chief Secretary, to decide a charge under Section 4, to have insisted upon atleast the minimum proof that was required of those who alleged that the appellants had left Janata party. A news item appearing in press cannot tantamount to proof. The Chief Secretary having held so cannot merely rest his conclusion on the non denial in the objection statement to the show cause notice filed by the appellants. Once the allegation is made that the appellants were subjected to dis the qualification, the onus of proving the dis the qualification is of. the persons to alleging. In this case nothing whatever was done excepting to cause a complaint through the President of Hassan District Zilla parishad and producing a news item appe the aring in the local newspapers. This cannot tantamount to proof at all. the persons to alleging. In this case nothing whatever was done excepting to cause a complaint through the President of Hassan District Zilla parishad and producing a news item appe the aring in the local newspapers. This cannot tantamount to proof at all. If really the proceedings are quasi criminal in nature, the appellants are even entitled to keep quiet. One cannot draw presumpthetions by the non-denial and then find that they have been subject to disqualification. Then again, what the law insists is a voluntarily giving up. This again clearly shows that it is a matter essentially of proof by evidence and not dispensing with that evidence and proceeding upon the singular ground of non-denial and accept theing it as proof of the allegation. From this point of view the order is bad in law, leave alone it being opposed to the principles of natural justice. ( 6 ) MR. Datar, learned counselappearing for the second respondent complainant, would urge where a notice was given by the second respondent specifically stating that the appellants have left Janata Party and joined Congress-party and equally another notice was given by the Chief Secretary, Hassan district Zilla Parishad, there was a duty to speak on the part of the appellants. They should have categorically denied that they still continue to be members of Janata party. If they had not denied, when there is an onus to speak, it would amount to consent. Therefore, the Chief Secretary of Zilla Parishad was well in order in holding that in the absence of denial, the allegations stood proved. May be the proceedings are quasi criminal, but that does not mean, even when the appellants are confronted with the positive statement, they can get away with it without a specific denial. As a matter of fact when similar allegations were made against six other persons, they came forward with specific denial, which course the appel lants also ought to have adopted. Accordingly he would submit that no exception could be taken to the order of the Chief secretary and in turn the judgment of the jearned single Judge. ( 7 ) IN order to appreciate these respectivearguments of the appellants and the respondents, it is necessary on our part to refer to the important provisions of the Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987. ( 7 ) IN order to appreciate these respectivearguments of the appellants and the respondents, it is necessary on our part to refer to the important provisions of the Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987. This Act was passed with the avowed object of taking immediate action on defection by the Councillors of Municipal Corporations, and Municipal Councils and Members of zilla Parishads and Mandal Panchayats from the political parties by which they were set up as candidates and matters connected therewith. Though this Act received the assent of the Governor on 2nd May, 1987, the operation of the Act was corelated to the coming into force of the Ordinance (Karnataka Ordinance No. 18 of 1986 ). Therefore, for all practical purposes, it was effective from 29th of december, 1986 Sections talks of disqualification on the ground of defection. We are now concerned with sub-section (1) clause (a ). That reads as follows :"3. (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4, a Councillor or a member belonging to any political party, shall be disqualified for being such councillor or member, a) if he has voluntarily given up this membership of such political party ;" section 4 relates to the procedure to be adopted for deciding the question of diaqualification on the ground of defection. That says as follows :4. Decision on the question as to disqualification on the ground of defection. Where acomplaint of defection is received from a member or councillor or a political party by the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned Local Authority, he shall, within twenty-four hours from the receipt of such complaint, refer the same for decision to, (1) in the case of Zilla Parishad, to the Chief Secretary to Government; (2) in case of Municipal Cor poration, to Divisional Commissioner; (3) in case of a City or Town municipal Council, to Deputy Com missioner; (4) in case of a Mandal Panchayat, to Chief Secretary to Zilla parishad; who shall decide question within seven days after receipt by him of reference and his decision shall be dfinal. " (Rest of section omitted as not necessary.) ( 8 ) IT is not denied before us that appellants were elected on Janata Partytickets and symbol allotted to Janata party. " (Rest of section omitted as not necessary.) ( 8 ) IT is not denied before us that appellants were elected on Janata Partytickets and symbol allotted to Janata party. However, what was done was a complaint was preferred on 6th of July, 1989 by second respondent (Sri M. G. Dodde Gowda), President of District janata Party, Hassan, stating that appellants had voluntarily left Janata party from which they were elected and joined Congress-l party. On this com plaint, a notice was issued by Chief secretary, Hassan District Zilla Parishad on 7-7-1989 calling upon these appellants why they should not be disqualified under section 3 (1) (a) of Karnataka Local authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as Act ). appellants filed detailed objections in which they referred to fact that Janata Party was not in existence in eye of law. It is a matter of wide publi city that a number of national parties merged long time back and formed a separate party called Janata Dal. This was done by Janata Party also and on coming into existence of Janata Dal, janata Party has ceased to exist legally. district units of all political parties stood merged consequent on the merger of their respective national parties into Janata Dal. Thus, there is no separate district Janata Party as a separate political party for, national party of Janata party has lost its identity when Janata dal came to be formed. Having regard to this principal stand, no specific denial was made in those replies to show cause notice. It was at this, matter came up for consideration before Chief secretary. He was of view that no doubt press report on which complaint was based cannot be taken as a basis, however he held "the respondents, including Pradhana against whom complaint has been lodged, have not denied for having left party neither in their statement of objections nor during course of argument. Under circumstances, it is clear that five persons have not denied allegation that they volun tarily left their Party. Having said so, Chief Secretary refers again to press report and then says that though allegation was against eleven members, six persons have chosen to file affidavit that they did not leave party, while such a course has not been adopted by these appellants. Accordingly, he declared appellants as disqualified under Section 4 (2) of Act. Having said so, Chief Secretary refers again to press report and then says that though allegation was against eleven members, six persons have chosen to file affidavit that they did not leave party, while such a course has not been adopted by these appellants. Accordingly, he declared appellants as disqualified under Section 4 (2) of Act. ( 9 ) FIRST and foremost, we are clearlyof view that disqualification if proved will entail serious consequences. In that person against whom disquajification is proved cannot be any longer corporator ('corporator' used in generic sense. ii) It may affect his political career seriously. iii) proof of such a disqualifica tion is considered to be quasi criminal in nature. Where, therefore, law requires proof of such an allegation, it is imperative, having regard to Section 101 of Evidence act, that person who alleges disqualification must prove same. To put it in other words, minimum requirement of proof must be insisted upon. To this extent, we are of view that Sri a. K. Subbaiah is right in his submission. But in this case what Chief Secretary did was, he merely rested his conclusion or non denial. We are unable to accept that line of reasoning. Where law insists a matter to be proved by positive evidence, even without minimum evi dence, from fact of non-denial a pre sumption cannot arise. This is reason why we said proceedings partake nature of quasi criminal in character. If that is so, looked at from this point of view, we find no evidence whatever was let in by second respondent, who merely based his complaint on a press report. It is practice of this Court and which is adopted in all judicial proceed ings that press reports cannot form evi dence nor again can they be substitute for evidence. Chief Secretary having held that press report should not be acted upon, to buttress his conclusion that appellants are disqualified, would refer to fact that allegations were made against all eleven members, six have chosen to deny allegation and these five have not chosen to do so. That is not proper way of looking at matter. He ought to have insisted on proof from second respondent. There fore, procedure adopted is wholly wrong. ( 10 ) THEN again, what is to be provedunder Section 3 (1) (a) of Act is voluntarily leaving party. That is not proper way of looking at matter. He ought to have insisted on proof from second respondent. There fore, procedure adopted is wholly wrong. ( 10 ) THEN again, what is to be provedunder Section 3 (1) (a) of Act is voluntarily leaving party. Whether leaving party was voluntary or not is a matter again to be established by evidence and that is proof required. It r. 29 is not merely leaving. Concerning that there is no proof at all. Therefore, evidence is woefully lacking. Unfortuna tely, learned single Judge has not addressed himself to these aspects. He had also applied Order 8 Rule 5 of Code of Civil procedure and has taken view that there being no specific denial, it would tantamount to admission. We are unable to subscribe to this view. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, we set aside order of Chief Secretary as confirmedby learned single Judge and allow writ appeals. We direct that Chief secretary shall take evidence on allegations made by second respon dent and parties shall be afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence on allegations and counter allegations made before him and thereafter matter shall be decided on merits uninfluenced by observations contained in this judgment or in judgment of learned single Judge. We make it clear, now that we have set aside order of Chief Secretary, there will be no legal impediment for appellants to continue to occupy their respective positions as members of mandal panchayat or pradhana, as case may be, till decision is rendered by Chief Secretary as directed above. Chief Secretary - respondent No. 1 is hereby directed to dispose of matter in manner indicated above on or before 30th of September, 1990. first date of hearing shall be 13th of August, 1990. parties have agreed to waive notice for first day of hearing, which state ment is recorded. No costs. Appeals allowed. --- *** --- .