S. R. BHARGAVA, J. This revision is directed against order dated 6. 6. 1989, passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, allowing the revision of opposite party No. 11 and quashing the orders of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Sees. 145 and 146 Cr. P. C. 2. Facts are that police submitted report dated 17. 1. 1989 to S. D. H. , Deoband, District Saharanpur stating that revisionist Vijai Singh and Opposite Party No. 2 Dharmvir Singh own a joint Haveli (building) in village Sadauli. There is dahlees (main entry) and stair-case for passage. Dharmvir has got construction made above the dahlees. Both these parties claim the dahlees and stair-case. There is dispute between these parties about the construction made above the dahlees. Both the parties want to take possession over the land of the construction resulting into apprehension of breach of peace and there is eminent danger of breach of peace. Proceedings under Sees. 107/116 Cr. P. C. have been launched against the parties. Police prayed launching of proceedings under Sec. 145 Cr. P. C. 3. Upon this report S. D. H. concerned passed order dated 16. 2. 1989 "issue notice under Sees. 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. " This order was followed on the same day by separate formal orders under Sees. 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. In formal order under Sec. 145 (1) the parties concerned were required to appear before the Magistrate on 23. 3. 1989, and to file their written statements and produce evidence. In formal order under Sec. 146 (1) not only attachment of the disputed property was directed but the police was also directed to keep the property under attachment until order or decree of competent court deciding rights or possession of the parties is obtained. 4. Opposite party No. 2 filed a revision against order issuing notices under Sees. 145/146 Cr. P. C. before the Sessions Judge which came up for disposal by Addl. Sessions Judge. The learned Addl. Sessionsc Judge held that order under Sec. 146 could be passed only after an order under Sec. 145 (1) but the learned Magistrate passed a composite order which was only a direction to the office and was without application of mind. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge further held that proceedings could not launched in respect of joint property or land held by co-tenants or co- sharers. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge further held that proceedings could not launched in respect of joint property or land held by co-tenants or co- sharers. The learned Magistrate observed that every co-sharer is deemed to be in possession of every inch of joint land and where the parties are in joint possession proceedings under Sec. 146 cannot be directed. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge was of view that the order appeared to him to have been passed in arbitrary manner. It this further appears from the judgment of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge that it was urged before him that the order passed by the -Magistrate was inter locutory order and the revision was barred by Sec. 397 (2 ). The learned Addl. Sessions Judge did not feel the necessity to enter into the controversy whether the order passed by the Magistrate is an interlocutory order or final order because great miscarriage of justice has taken place and the learned Magistrate has passed the order in question arbitrarily without following the procedure laid down in Sees. 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. Order being patently improper, the revisional court has jurisdiction to interfere. 5. Being aggrieved by the order of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Vijai Singh has come to this Court in revision. 6. First point urged in this revision is that the order of the Addl. Sessions Judge is without jurisdiction because the order under Sees. 145 (I) 146 (3) is an interlocutory order and revision against an interlocutory order is barfed by Sec. 397 (2 ). On behalf of revisionist in this Court reliance was placed on the Division Bench case of this Court Indra Deo Pandey v. Smt. Bhagwati Devi, 1981 ALJ 687. In this ruling reference was made to the case olharnath Chanda v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 in which Honble Fazal Ali, J. said: - "it seems to us that the term interlocutory order in Sec. 397 (2) of the 1978 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because, that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Sec. 397 of the 1978 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in and or the pending proceed ings, may no doubt, amount to interlocutory orders against which no jevision would lie under Sec. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of recent and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect to the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview ofthe revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. " In the case of Indra Deo Pandey (ibid) case of Sohan Lal Puran v. State of U. P, 1977 Cr. LJ 1322, decided by Division Bench of this Court was referred and it was held that case no doubt decided that order under Sec. 146 is a final order inasmuch as the proceedings under Sec. 145 of the Code stand concluded after such an order is passed and as such the order of attachment would fall outside the ambit of interlocutory order yet in the case of Mathuralal v. Bhanwar Lal, AIR 1980 SC 242 , it was laid down that where an order of attachment on ground of emergency is passed by the Magistrate he is bound to decide the question of possession under Sec. 145 (4) and deliver possession to the party found in possession, and so after the decision of the Supreme Court, in Mathuralals case, an order of attachment under Sec. 146 (1) on ground of emergency is an interlocutory order, and the earlier view thai an order attaching property is a final order disappears. 7. Single Judge rulings were cited on both sides. But in view of the Division Bench rulings and the Supreme Court decisions, this Court should not rely upon Single Judge rulings. 7. Single Judge rulings were cited on both sides. But in view of the Division Bench rulings and the Supreme Court decisions, this Court should not rely upon Single Judge rulings. An interlocutory order is basically an order other than final decision, this could have been the basis for Honble Fazal Al, J. to observe in Amar Nath Chawlas case that even orders which adjudicate a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be inter locutory order. If an order decides or terminates a proceeding it has to be treated as final order and not as interlocutory order. Sec. 146 (1) envisages three contingencies for attachment, that are - (1) emergency, (2) decisions of Magistrate that none of the parties was in possession as is referred in Sec. 145 (3) decision of the Magistrate that he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession. Sec. 146 (1) further empowers the Magistrate to attach the subject-matter of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to possession thereof. Mathuralals case was confined to attachment on ground of emergency. When the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was in possession or that he is unable to decide the question of possession and then proceeds to attach property, the proceedings under Sec. 146 stand decided and attachment ordered by Magistrate is to continue until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession tjjereof. In these two contingencies after his decision the Magistrate has only to wait decision of competent court and deliver possession according to decision of the competent court. There can be no dispute that in these two contingen cies, the order passed under Sec. 146 (1) would be a final order and not an interlocutory order. 8. It is true that where the Magistrate passes an order simpliciter for attachment under Sec. 146 (1) in view of the decision of Division Bench in Indra Deo Pandeys case the order would be interlocutory. But the difficulty arises where the order of attachment on ground of emergency under Sec. 146 (1) is not simpliciter. In the instant case the initial order of the Magistrate was for issuing of notice under Secs. 145 (1) 146 (1 ). But the difficulty arises where the order of attachment on ground of emergency under Sec. 146 (1) is not simpliciter. In the instant case the initial order of the Magistrate was for issuing of notice under Secs. 145 (1) 146 (1 ). But this initial order was followed by exhaustive and formal orders under Secs. 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. In the formal exhaustive order under Sec. 146 (1) attachment was directed on ground of emergency but it also contained a direction to the police to keep the property under attachment until adjudication of the rights or possession of the parties by competent court. By issuing this direction the Magistrate abjured his jurisdiction to decide question of possession under Section 145 (4) as laid down in Mathuralals case. After issuing this direction the Magistrate despite his direction to the parties in order 145 (1) to appear before him on the date fixed by him decided to await the decision or adjudication of the competent court. He left nothing to be done by himself. It is thus evident that by issuing this direction relating to attachment the Magistrate decided and terminated the proceed ings under Sec. 145. I hold that in the peculiar circumstances of the case and on the reading of the peculiar order of the Magistrate passed under Section 146 (1) on ground of emergency, is not interlocutory order and revision is not barred by Section 397 (2) Cr. P. C. 9. Next point which arises is whether the Magistrate could have passed order of attachment as he did. It is evident that initially he passed a composite order under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) and did not record reasons for passing that cryptic order. But that cryptic order was followed by separate orders of the same day under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1 ). In elaborate order under Section 145 (1) he mentioned about police report and his satisfaction about apprehension of breach of peace. In elaborate order under Section 146 (1) he mentioned that he was satisfied with the police report that breach of peace can take place at any time. It is no doubt true that an order under Section l46 (1) can be pased only after an order under Section 145 (1 ). But the Code does not prescribe forms for orders under the said two sub-sections. It is no doubt true that an order under Section l46 (1) can be pased only after an order under Section 145 (1 ). But the Code does not prescribe forms for orders under the said two sub-sections. There is sufficient law that orders under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) can be passed on after the other, simultaneously and there can be even a composite order under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. In this connection reliance can be placed on the cases of Braja Mohan Nath v. Smt. K. C. Tripathi, 1985 Cr. L. J. 1112 and Pradeep Tyagi v. The State, 1985 Cr. LJ NOC 42. Both the formal orders under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) not only contain the basis of satisfaction regarding apprehension of breach of peace and emergency arising from dispute relating to property but also contain description of the property. There can be no presumption that the formal orders drawn under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) were prepared by office and the Magistrate did not apply his mind to these orders. Revisional Court cannot interfere which the satisfaction of the Magistrate regarding apprehension of breach of peace or imminent danger of breach of peace arising from dispute relating to property. Merely from the fact that the Magistrate passed initial cryptic order for issuing notices under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. no interference can be drawn that the formal orders under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1) Cr. P. C. were drawn by the office of the Magistrate without application of his mind. Findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the order of attachment is bad because it was not passed after the order under Section 145 (1) and that the order was passed without application of mind, are not correct. It has been seen above that there could be even a simultaneously or a composite order under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1 ). 10. Then the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that proceedings under Sec. 145 could not be launched about the disputed property which is part of joint property, has to be scrutinised. 11. It has been seen above that there could be even a simultaneously or a composite order under Sections 145 (1) and 146 (1 ). 10. Then the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that proceedings under Sec. 145 could not be launched about the disputed property which is part of joint property, has to be scrutinised. 11. In the case of Abdul Aziz v. State of U. P. and others, 1985 ALJ 393 a single Judge of this court held that jointness of tenure-holders would be immaterial if the cotenure-holders are having a dispute regarding possession over that property to the exclusion of another giving rise to an apprehension of breach of peace and is not beyond the purview of Section 145. Thus when the dispute regarding" exclusive possession over the disputed property is there, an attempt to take forcible possession on the part of other side is alleged, as to give rise to an apprehension of breach of peace, then Section 145. Cr. P. C. is attracted. In case of Scahidanand v. State of U. P. and others, 1987 Cr. LJ 1366, a Single Judge of this court took similar view and further held that the language of Section 145 Cr. P. C. is quite plain and clear that where ever there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace concerning land or water, the executive Magistrate can pass a preliminary order followed by a final order or save other order provided under Section 145 Cr. P. C. Plain and clear language of the section cannot be enlarged so as to engrave a proviso to the effect that in case of land in dispute is held by co-sharers or the parties are in joint possession the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. cannot be initialed. 12. Learned lower revisional court was, however, guided by the case of Khem Chand v. Balwant, AIR 1967 All 44 , Kanhaiya v. Har Mohan and another, 1974 ALJ 56 and of Chaudhury Ashahar Husain v. State and another, 1978 ACJ 71. The last case is from an unapproved journal which could not be available to this court despite long waiting. In the former two cases the Magistrate perused evidence before him and recorded finding that parties were in joint possession. In that context it was held that the Magistrate became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to proceed further. The last case is from an unapproved journal which could not be available to this court despite long waiting. In the former two cases the Magistrate perused evidence before him and recorded finding that parties were in joint possession. In that context it was held that the Magistrate became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to proceed further. But it is evident that in both the cases there was finding of the Magistrate under Section 145 (4) that parties were in joint possession. 13. The word "then without reference to the merites or the claims of any of the parties the right to possess the subject of dispute" occurring in Section 145 (2) are very important and pregnant. They excludes drawing inference from right to possession or from title. There is well settled law that under Section 145 (4), the Magistrate has to decide about the physical possession and not to rely upon constructive possession. In this connec tion just for sake of an illustration case of Narandas Tola Ram and others v. Bhag Singh Kripal Singh Khalsa and another, 1968 Cr. LJ 1136 can be cited. In case of co- sharers or co-tenure-holders a co-sharer or co-tenure-holder can be in exclusive physical possession of the entire joint property or part of it by mutual arrangement of by ouster. So long there is evidence of ouster or mutual arrangement regarding physical possession of a co-sharer, constructive possession of all the co-sharers cannot be inferred under Section 145 (4 ). All this means that after initiating proceedings under Section 145 (1) regarding whole or part of joint property, the Magistrate is bound to record finding regarding possession under Section 145 (4 ). If after perusal of the statement of the parties, evidence of the parties and after hearing the parties the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the parties are in joint possession, he cannot exercise jurisdiction under Section 145 (6) which applies only when the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section (f) be treated as being, in such possession. In that event he becomes functus officio and snould drop the proceedings. For maintaining peace he may proceed under Section 107 Cr. In that event he becomes functus officio and snould drop the proceedings. For maintaining peace he may proceed under Section 107 Cr. P. C. A careful scrutiny of law on the subject makes it clear that mere fact that the property is joint, cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to -initiate proceedings under Sec. 145, nor a revisional court without any evidence being recorded and without a finding of the Magistrate can be allowed to infer that in case of joint property the co-sharer are in joint possession of every inch of the property. A agree with the view of Single Judge expressed in the cases of 1985 and 1987. Finding of the lower revisional court that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Sec. 145 (1) in respect of joint property is illegal. 14. There is yet another aspect of this case. Dispute between the parties, according to the police report, relates to Dahlees" and stair-case. They are essentially means of passage and are used for way. Both the Sections 145 and 147 Cr. P. C. relate to disputes regarding private property and apprehension of breach of peace. Where the dispute is regarding possession over property, Section 145 applies but where the dispute concerns right or rights of use of property, Section 147 is attracted. From the police report in the instant case it is not clear whether the dispute between the parties is about possession over Dahlees and stair-case or the dispute concerns right of passage through the Dahlees and stair-case. Magistrate however, treated the dispute as relating to possession over Dahlees and stair-case, hence he initiated proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. and called upon the parties to put in their statements. If after the parties file their statements and it appears from their statements that the dispute concerns right of use of Dahlees and stair-case, the Magistrate would be well advised to drop proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. and initiate proceedings under Sec. 146 Cr. P. C. 15. From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. It cannot be overlooked that satisfaction of breach of peace is of the Magistrate and with that revisional court cannot interfere. P. C. and initiate proceedings under Sec. 146 Cr. P. C. 15. From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. It cannot be overlooked that satisfaction of breach of peace is of the Magistrate and with that revisional court cannot interfere. It is further evident that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass preliminary order under Section 146 (1) on the ground of emergency. But he had no jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment till the rights of the parties are decided by competent court. By such an order the Magistrate abdicated his jurisdiction to decide possession of any of the parties under Section 145 (4 ). Hence the order of the lower revisional court quashing the entire proceedings is bound to be set aside. But the order of the Magistrate directing that attachment shall continue till decision of the rights of the parties by competent court has to be set aside and the Magistrate has to be directed to proceed further in accordance with the provisions of Section 145 and in the light of the observations made above. 16. In the result this revision is allowed. Judgment and order of the lower revisional court are set aside. Order of the Magistrate for continuing the attachment till the decision of rights of the parties by competent court is set aside. He is directed to proceed further with the case in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment. 17. Considering the nature of the case, no order for cost need be passed. Revision allowed. .