Judgment 1. THIS appeal arises out of the decision of the learned Additional District judge, 11th Court, Alipore dated March 10, 1978 passed in Title Appeal No. 834 of 11977 affirming the judgment and decree dated June 29, 11977 passed by the learned munsif, 1st Court, Sealdah in Title Suit No. 185 of 1974. 2. PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT filed the said suit for ejectment and mesne profits inter alia on the allegations that the appellant defendant was a tenant under her at the rate of Rs. 255/- per month according to English calendar month and that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent since June, 1972. A notice to quit was served on the defendant but the defendant failed to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises. The tenant-defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement in which the alleged default in payment of rent was denied. The defendant case was that the rate of rent was Rs. 200/- and not Rs. 2 25/-per month. 3. THE defendant-appellant paid all the instalments in terms of the order under Section 17 (2a) of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy as also the current rents excepting for two months viz. September and October, 1976 were deposited within time. Rents and instalments for those two months also were deposited on April 15, 1977. The defendant's petition for extension of time was rejected by the learned Munsif and his prayer for condonation of delay was also rejected and the defence against delivery of possession was struck out under Section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The learned Munsif has held that the defendant was not, there fore, entitled to protection under Section 17 (4) of the west Bengal premises Tenancy Act and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant for recovery of possession on the ground of default only and for mesne profits. 4. BEING aggrieved the tenant-defendant preferred the appeals against the said judgment and decree being title Appeal No. 185 of 1974. 4. BEING aggrieved the tenant-defendant preferred the appeals against the said judgment and decree being title Appeal No. 185 of 1974. The learned Additional district Judge, 11th Court, who heard and disposed of the appeal was of the opinion that the defendant did not move the Hon'ble Court in revision against the order rejecting the prayer for extension of time and condonation of delay and striking out the defence against the delivery of possession under Section 17 (3) and that it would not be lawful for the appellate court to interfere with the said orders. The appeal was dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court were affirmed. Being aggrieved the tenant-defendant has filed the second appeal. Mr. Dasgupta, learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the appellate court was palpably wrong in his view that it could not interfere with the order of the learned Munsif rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay and the order under Section 17 (3)striking out the defence against the delivery of possession and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant's petition for extension of time and/or the subsequent prayer for condonation of delay ought to have been allowed and the appellant is entitled to protection under Section 17 (4} of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, 5. UNDER Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure where a decree is appealed from any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case may be set forth as a ground of objection in the Memorandum of Appeal and interlocutory order which had independent appealed from because no appeal lay or even though, an appeal lay, appeal was not taken can be challenged in an appeal from final decree or order (Satyadhan Vs. Deorajin, AIR 1960 SC 941 . The order of the trial Court striking out the defence against the delivery of possession under Section 17 (3) after rejection of the prayer of the defendant for extension of time or condonation of delay which had bearing upon the ultimate fate of the suit, though not challenged in revision before the High Court can be challenged in the appeal against the decree for ejectment. The lower appellate court committed an error of law in thinking that he could not interfere with the order of the trial court in this respect. Mr. The lower appellate court committed an error of law in thinking that he could not interfere with the order of the trial court in this respect. Mr. Datta, learned Advocate for the respondent does not dispute this. 6. IT appears that the defendant-appellant had paid all the instalments in terms of the order under section 17 (2a) (6) as also the current rents excepting for two months namely September and October, 1976 which were disputed, on April 15, 1977. The deposit was out of time. Now before the expiry of time the defendant filed an application purported to be under Section 151 civil Procedure Code on 25. . 10. 76 for extension of time on the ground that the amount in question had been spent on account of the treatment of the mother and wife defendant who was then in an advance stage of pregnancy. Unfortunately, this petition was not disposed of in time. After several adjournments the application was heard on 18. 1. 77 and by order no. 54, the learned Munsif rejected the application mainly on the ground that two months had already elapsed. There is a criptic remark that there is no sufficient reason for extension of time. The tenant-defendant was not responsible for delay in hearing of his application which was filed before expiry of the time. The ground which was not challenged by the plaintiff was obviously a sufficient one. Mr. Datta, has contended that the court cannot enlarge the period under Section 148 of the Code which is not applicable and provisions of Section 151 or Order 47 of the Code cannot be invoked to by-pass any provisions of Section 17 for enlargement of time provided in the various Sub-sections of Se)Aion 17. In support of his contention he had referred to the decision in Mrs. Gouri bose Vs. Sukumar Bose, 75 CWN 342. It has been held in that case the time limits has been provided for in sub section (1) and (2) of Section 17 for purposes mentioned therein. In support of his contention he had referred to the decision in Mrs. Gouri bose Vs. Sukumar Bose, 75 CWN 342. It has been held in that case the time limits has been provided for in sub section (1) and (2) of Section 17 for purposes mentioned therein. Again in sub-section (2a) of Section 17 provisions have been made for payment or deposit of rent in clause (a) within the time as may be extended by court and in clause (b) by such instalments and on such dates as may be fixed by court, both on the applications of the tenant provided against such applications are filed within the time provided in sub-section (2b) of Section 17 of the act. If default of deposit or payment of any amount as may be directed by sub-section (1) and (2) within time specified therein or extended time as provided in clause (a) of sub-section (2a) or by such instalments on such dates as may be permitted under clause (b) of sub-section (2a), the court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the suit. By its terms the Section 17, under its various sub-section referred to above, defines the power and jurisdiction of the court to pass appropriate orders and in dealing with such matters the court has no power or jurisdiction to travel beyond the same. These are not the general or inherent powers of court to fix a period for doing of any act prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, but are specific powers invested in court by the Act for specific purposes. The court accordingly cannot enlarge the period even after its expiry as provided in section 148 of the Code which thus is not applicable and provisions of Section 15 or Order 47 of the Code cannot be invoked to bypass any provision of section 17 for enlargement of time provided in the said various sub-sections of Section 17. 7. THE court has power to extend time of deposit under Section 17 (2a), if the prayer for extension is made within the time specified in Section 17 (2b. Now in the instant case such an application for extension of time was made before the expiry of the time fixed, stating the grounds for such extension. 7. THE court has power to extend time of deposit under Section 17 (2a), if the prayer for extension is made within the time specified in Section 17 (2b. Now in the instant case such an application for extension of time was made before the expiry of the time fixed, stating the grounds for such extension. It was, therefore, in substance an application under Section 17 (2a) and section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code was misquoted. The substance and not the form in is to be looked into. Judicial procedure has been framed for the furtherance of justice and not to defeat it and the court cannot refuse to act in aid of justice merely on technical grounds. In the case of Trailakhyanath Maity Vs. Bimalasundari Dasi, reported in 2 ILR Cal. 385, it is held that in the administration of justice, the court will not refuse any application which on the merits,, the court can grant, simply because the applicant asked the court to exercise its admitted powers under a wrong Section. In Asit Kumar Dey Vs. Bishudhananda Chaudhury, 86 CWN 239, it has similarly been held that there was no arrear but an admission in mentioning the Section under which the relief was sought for and it cannot be conceived that a court will not take notice of but application on such technical ground. In that case an application purported to be one under the provisions of Section 17 (1)and (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was filed by the tenant-defendant without mentioning the Sections of the Act it invoked. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court had power to extend the time of deposit. Moreover, it appears that there was subsequent prayer for condonation of delay in the deposit which was actually made. It was held in the case of Mrs. Gouri bose Vs. Sukumar Bose on which Mr. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court had power to extend the time of deposit. Moreover, it appears that there was subsequent prayer for condonation of delay in the deposit which was actually made. It was held in the case of Mrs. Gouri bose Vs. Sukumar Bose on which Mr. Datta relies (supra)that under Section 39 of the act, the Indian Limitation act applies to all proceedings, under the Act including proceedings under sub-section (2) and (2a) of Section 17 as also under some other sections A tenant is entitled to represent for an enlargement of time in respect of applications to be filed in proceedings under sub-sections referred if he can satisfy the court that he was prevented by sufficient cause for not making the application in the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 8. THUS, it is p6rmissiible for a tenant to represent to court to condone for cogent reasons the delay in making the deposit before his defence against delivery of possession is struck out and the court may consider such application on merits exercising jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code. The court finally held that an application for condonation of delay in making payment, or deposit of rent pursuant to order under provisions of Section t7 (2a) would be maintainable in law. The court on such application, may condone the delay in deposit of the amount if satisfied on materials before it that there was sufficient cause on the part of the tenant in making deposit after the date fixed, on the day so done and not earlier. 9. I am satisfied from the record that there was sufficient grounds for irregular deposit and the court ought to have condoned the delay. The order under section 17 (3) striking out the defence against the deli very of possession cannot, therefore, be sustained. The defendant-appellant is entitled to protection under Section 17 (4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the impugned decree for ejectment is, therefore, liable to be set aside. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees of both the courts below are set aside and the suit stands dismissed. Parties would bear their own costs throughout. Application allowed.