S. RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THERE is a labour union which is recognised as bargaining agent on behalf of the workmen and functioning in the 1st respondent-Paper Mills, Bhadravathi, called the mysore Paper Mills Labourers' Association (hereinafter referred to as the 'union' ). Disputes having arisen between two factions in this union this petition is presented by one such group headed by one G. Mari swamy while the other group is headed by one B. N. Mari Gowda who are respondents 4 to 8. The union had entered into a settlement with the management of the 1st respondent on 11-6-1986 the term of which expired on 28-2-1990 but continued to be in force until a charter of demands was presented after terminating the settlement by notice dated 1-3-1990. Negotiations had been held between the office-bearers of the union and the 1st respondent in the presence of the Assistant Labour Commissioner with a view to arrive at a settlement on all the issues arising out of the charter of demands. The Staff association also had participated in the negotiations. The management was willing to offer a total of about 14% increase in the revision of basic wages, allowances and other benefits. The negotiations took place on various dates. However, a group of workmen who were members of the union and others fonned Mysore Paper Mills samyukta Horata Ranga who issued a pamphlet on 16-2-1990 claiming a comparison with and parity of wages with the workmen in Visveswaraya Iron and steel Ltd. , Bhadravathi, now a Central Government public sector undertaking. Obviously, the management of the 1st respondent was not willing to extend the wage structure suggested in the pamphlet inasmuch as what was claimed was with reference to wages paid in a steel industry and their stand was that in comparison with other paper mills and its capacity they considered the demands to be too exorbitant. On 24-3-1990 a meeting of the union was held in which respondents 4 to 8 claimed to have been elected as office-bearers having removed the other office-bearers headed by the said G. Mariswamy. On 6-4-1990 the Assistant Labour commissioner addressed a common letter to G. Mariswamy and his followers and b. N. Mari Gowda and his followers. On 24-3-1990 a meeting of the union was held in which respondents 4 to 8 claimed to have been elected as office-bearers having removed the other office-bearers headed by the said G. Mariswamy. On 6-4-1990 the Assistant Labour commissioner addressed a common letter to G. Mariswamy and his followers and b. N. Mari Gowda and his followers. Inasmuch as several other problems had arisen in connection with the labour situation the Assistant Labour Commissioner and the deputy Labour Commissioner had gone to Bhadravathi to study the situation. In that letter he states that both groups of the said union appeared before him and went on arguing that each of them were really representing the union. While the group headed by B. N. Mari Gowda claimed to have removed G. Mariswamy and his group, g. Mariswamy and his group claimed to continue to be the office-bearers. At that stage while Mariswamy and his group claimed as having been duly elected as office-bearers who had not been removed in accordance with the bye-laws or the rules of the union and also stated that the Assistant Labour Commissioner could not investigate into that question as it is an internal affair of the union and so he should recognise them as real office-bearers. While B. N. Mari Gowda and his group contended that they have become office-bearers with effect from 5 p. m. on 31-3-1990 and they had the written authorisation of more than half the total number of members of the union who had called upon the said G. Mariswamy and his group to convene a special general body meeting of the union to consider the subject-matter specified in the requisition of the members of the union and G. Mariswamy did not convene such a meeting under bye-law 21 (4) of the union. In pursuance of the said bye-law his group convened the general body meeting and passed a resolution removing the said Mariswamy and his group and electing respondents 4 to 8 as the office-bearers on 24-3-1990. The notice issued to the said g. Mariswamy was that they should revise the charter of demands by claiming wage structure in parity with VISL workmen and to reject the agreement if the management did not concede to such demands. The notice issued to the said g. Mariswamy was that they should revise the charter of demands by claiming wage structure in parity with VISL workmen and to reject the agreement if the management did not concede to such demands. Inasmuch as the office-bearers headed by G. Mariswamy and others bad not cared to heed to the demands of the majority of the members Mari Gowda and his group claimed that they had been duly elected in the meeting held on 24-3-1990 and were the office-bearers with effect from 5 p. m. on 31-3-1990. They requested the Assistant Labour Commissioner to direct the management to have negotiations with the new set of office-bearers and unless and until that was done they would not allow the Assistant Labour commissioner or Deputy Labour Commissioner to move from the place and will have to face dire consequences. Though heated exchanges took place the matter was discussed till late in the midnight, the authorities issued an endorsement to the parties dated 31-3-1990 pointing out that the matter would be decided within a week. But Mari Gowda and his group stated that they cannot wait for a week and therefore at about 3-30 a. m. on that day the Assistant Labour Commissioner issued another endorsement that they are not in a position to go on with the matter then as they were both exhausted and left the place at about 5-30 a. m. He found that the contentions of mari Gowda and his group found support, that such a meeting had taken place on 24-3-1990 and a new set of office-bearers had been elected. At the same time he agreed as contended by the group led by Mariswamy that he had no powers to intervene in a matter relating to the internal affairs of the union in relation to the election of office-bearers of the union and relied on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High court in Sanjeeva Reddy (O) v Registrar of the Trade Unions and Others, 1969 (1) llj 11. He held that there is no provision in the Trade Unions Act empowering him to make an enquiry as to who the office-bearers are nor is any duty cast upon him to accept the return filed regarding change of office-bearers as sent to him without inquiry. He held that there is no provision in the Trade Unions Act empowering him to make an enquiry as to who the office-bearers are nor is any duty cast upon him to accept the return filed regarding change of office-bearers as sent to him without inquiry. He took the view that whether the communication sent to him with a new set of office-bearers had been elected is true or not and whether they are the true representatives of the union or not falls outside the purview of the Act and in such a matter the real dispute between the parties is an election dispute for which the proper remedy is a civil suit and therefore he stated that he is unable to entertain any pleas on the matters of election dispute and is outside his jurisdiction. When the matter stood thus, the group headed by G. Mariswamy filed a suit before the Vacation Civil judge, Shimoga, which was transferred to the Munsiff at Bhadravathi later on in o. S. No. 7/1990 for declaration that plaintiffs 2 to 4 are the elected representatives of the 1st plaintiff-union along with two others in general body meeting held on 21-8- 1989 and that to the exclusion of defendants 1 to 5 who are respondents 4 to 8 before me, sought for an injunction not to interfere with the functioning of the union and also certain other incidental reliefs. They also sought for a temporary injunction in the suit. The suit was filed on 24-5-1990. In the meanwhile, the two officers by name g. N. Srinivasa Murthy and A. N. Nasir Kukkady who had participated in the deliberations of Samyukta Horata Ranga were dismissed from service. A demand was made by the new office-bearers led by Mari Gowda and others seeking reinstatement of the said two officers and gave a notice of pen down and tool down strike from 7 a. m. of 12-4-1990. In fact, it is claimed that the workers of demineralisation plant stopped their work which was followed by the workers of coal yard who refused to feed coal to the boilers and thus the working of the factory came to a standstill. Thereafter reluctantly or willingly the other workmen appear to have joined the strike. In fact, it is claimed that the workers of demineralisation plant stopped their work which was followed by the workers of coal yard who refused to feed coal to the boilers and thus the working of the factory came to a standstill. Thereafter reluctantly or willingly the other workmen appear to have joined the strike. According to the management of the Paper Mills, the strike was illegal in view of Clause 20 of the bye-laws of the Mysore Paper Mills Labour association. The Deputy Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer also held discussions with the two groups of workmen and advised the group led by B. N. Mari gowda and others to call off the strike. Inasmuch as large number of workmen and staff were inside the plant and the management apprehending violence between the clashing groups with a view to protect the plant, machinery and equipment and to avoid an open rioting or fight between the two groups and to defuse the tension within the factory declared lockout with effect from 11 p. m. on 12-4-1990 until further orders. At that stage the Labour Commissioner held several meetings with the workmen and the Staff Association but the position did not change. Thereafter, the minister for Industries Shri Veerappa Moily appears to have taken interest in the matter to whom certain representations had been made by the employees and the local MLA. It is at that stage it appears the Minister sent minute to the Labour commissioner to consider the conversion of order of termination of two officers to one of suspension pending enquiry and to make a "referendum" to determine as to which group of Mysore Paper Mills Labourers' Association has got substantial majority. Thereafter certain correspondence ensued between the Labour Commissioner and the management although initially neither the Labour Commissioner nor the management were inclined to intervene in the intra-union rivalry between the two groups of workmen but in the larger interest of the industry they thought it fit to call for a "referendum" as suggested by the Minister. Thereafter certain correspondence ensued between the Labour Commissioner and the management although initially neither the Labour Commissioner nor the management were inclined to intervene in the intra-union rivalry between the two groups of workmen but in the larger interest of the industry they thought it fit to call for a "referendum" as suggested by the Minister. It is stated in the statement of objections filed before me and in the course of the arguments that the Labour Commissoner and others were not merely influenced by the minute sent by the Minister for industries but in fact on their own examined the matter independently and they were persuaded by three aspects of matter: (1) that in fact there existed differences between the two groups of workmen and there was a dispute as to who were officebearers pending in the Court of Munsiff in regard to that; (2) that the various pamphlets issued and other notices clearly indicate that two groups did exist in the union; and (3) that in order to bring back the factory into working it was necessary to i negotiate with the workmen and when there was a recognised union it was only through the union they could negotiate but it was not clear as to who were the office- bearers of the union in view of disputes between several groups as aforesaid and in those circumstances had no other choice but to hold a "referendum" to find out as to which of the two groups had the support of larger number of workmen. When the management in consultation with the Labour Commissioner had taken steps for holding the "referendum" as aforesaid the petitioners have approached this Court for quashing so-called settlement in relation to "referendum", the notice as per Annexure-A1 and the order as per Annexure-A2. This Court while issuing rule nisi did not withhold the "referendum" from taking place on 3rd June, 1990 but however ordered that the results need not be announced until further orders. ( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner in this background submitted : (i) that Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act does not authorise the Conciliation officer to record any settlement as per Annexures-L1 and L2 to find out the representative character of the office-bearers as to who enjoys the substantial support of the workmen and the same is illegal. Such a settlement or agreement is not enforceable in law inasmuch as the same does not confer any rights on anyone and such an action is not taken in the course of conciliation for the settlement of the dispute. (ii) that the replacement of office-bearers can take place only in accordance with the rules or bye-laws of the union and the same cannot be done contrary thereto and the method adopted by a "referendum" is not warranted in law. (iii) that when the dispute was pending in the Civil Court in regard to the question as to who were the office-bearers representing the union in question, the agreement to hold "referendum" had the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. (iv) that the procedure adopted in conducting the "referendum" is also violative of known norms of holding election and therefore the result of the "referendum" cannot bind the parties. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the Mills raised a preliminary objection that this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable inasmuch as the Mills is not an authority amenable to writ jurisdiction and relied on a decision of this Court in Nagaraja v Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. and. Another, Writ Petition No. 19995/1983 disposed of on 28th May, 1984, affirmed in Writ Appeal No. 1445/1984 by an order dated 30th July, 1984. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in this case the petition is not merely directed against the action of the Mills but also on the action of some of the officers of the Government like the Commissioner of Labour in making an order as per Annexure-A2 and in entering into terms of settlement recorded by him as per Annexures-L1 and L2 that the petitioner has approached this Court If it were to be a mere understanding between the group led by respondent-4 and others and the 1st respondent, perhaps, the contention advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent could have been countenanced. It is contended that the Labour Commissioner was influenced by the intervention of the Minister concerned and although the stand of the 1st respondent originally was not to intervene in the intra-union rivalry the subsequent action taken at the instance of the governmental agencies had in fact lent colour to their actions as that of an instrumentality of State and so it becomes necessary to examine the various matters questioned in these proceedings. ( 4 ) A perusal of Annexure-A1 would disclose that after setting out the background of the dispute between the two groups of workmen in regard to office-bearers as to who should represent them in the course of wage of negotiations, the Chairman and Managing Director of the 1st respondent refers to the advice tendered to him by the letter dated 18-5-1990 to conduct a "referendum". Of the same date an order has been issued by the Labour Commissioner directing the conduct of "referendum" and appointing one Basavaiah, Additional Labour commissioner, to be the Returning Officer to find out and determine as to which faction of union enjoys the majority support of the members thereof. Further, the proceedings recorded at Annexures-Ll and L2 also clearly disclose that there has been active participation of the officers of the Government in reaching the understanding to conduct the "referendum" to identify the office-bearers representing the union was to find out as to which of the groups enjoys the majority to identify the bargaining agency on behalf of the workmen within the recognised union and therefore it becomes obvious that this action having taken for the purpose of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act it cannot be said that what is impugned in this petition falls outside the scope or purview of Article 226 of the Constitution. If it were to be a simple case of an agreement or settlement between the 1st respondent and the group led by respondent-4 the principles laid down the decision relied on by the learned counsel for 1st respondent would have been attracted and he would have been justified in raising the preliminary objection in this case. In the circumstances, I overrule the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the 1st respondent, ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions raised by the petitioner it is necessary toset out Section 12 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as follows:"12 (2 ). In the circumstances, I overrule the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the 1st respondent, ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions raised by the petitioner it is necessary toset out Section 12 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as follows:"12 (2 ). The Conciliation Officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purposes of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. "in this case there is no dispute that on the expiry of the settlement on 28-2-1990 a fresh charter of demands had been presented on 1-3-1990 and negotiations were being held before the Assistant Labour Commissioner on various dates until the same were interrupted by reason of election of another group of office-bearers as contended by respondent-4 and others. Now the position is clear that there is a dispute at any rate after 24-3-1990 as to which group represents the union whether the one led by the petitioner or the one led by the 4th respondent and that matter itself is pending in dispute between the parties in the Civil Court. It is also clear from the report made by the Assistant Labour Commissioner as per Annexure-F as to the state of affairs in relation to holding of negotiation with the representatives of the union which is Mysore Paper Mills Labourers' Association, While the petitioner contended that his group represented the union, respondent-4 contended that petitioner's group had been replaced in the meeting held on 24-3-1990 and claimed that he was supported by the majority workmen who are members of the union. Thus, in view of the dispute as to who were office-bearers of recognised union the conciliation proceedings reached a deadlock and in those circumstances the authority had to adopt a course by which he should first identify with whom to continue the negotiations or conciliation as representing the recognised union. Thus, in view of the dispute as to who were office-bearers of recognised union the conciliation proceedings reached a deadlock and in those circumstances the authority had to adopt a course by which he should first identify with whom to continue the negotiations or conciliation as representing the recognised union. It was clear that the union was recognised but on the question as to who represented that union there was a dispute between two parties, namely, petitioner and respondent-4 and so the Labour Department with the help of management and others reached an understanding or adopted a course to identify the group having support of majority of workmen. It is submitted that: (1) the conciliation officers should have adopted the course of negotiating between the different groups of office-bearers represented by the petitioner and respondent-4 separately if not at the same table in view of tense and hard feelings exhibited by them; or (2) that they should have adopted the course of holding an enquiry under the trade Unions Act as to whether the proceedings held on 24-3-1990 in electing new office-bearers was valid or not and thereafter continued the conciliation; or (3) to negotiate or to start conciliation with both the groups at the same time. When the Labour Commissioner did not adopt any one of these courses but stayed neutral until intervention of the Industries Minister ought to be attributed with mala fides and the whole action is illegal particularly when the Labour commissioner did not consider the feasibility of any one of the courses aforesaid. ( 6 ) THE question that arises for consideration in such matters is when an officer adopts a particular course whether such a course is permissible at all or not rather than the question whether other better courses were open to him or not, which need not be considered by this Court As long as the course adopted by the officer was within the permissible limits of law and stood to reason merely because another course could have been adopted which in the opinion of the learned counsel for the petitioner is a better-course would not take away the power of that officer. In the present case, the conciliation officers adopted the course of making a "referendum" to identify as to who could be the party enjoying majority support and in my view such a course cannot be taken exception of. In the present case, the conciliation officers adopted the course of making a "referendum" to identify as to who could be the party enjoying majority support and in my view such a course cannot be taken exception of. The Conciliation Officer has got a duty to bring about a settlement of dispute and has got to do all things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. Here, the dispute is between the workmen and the management. In order to achieve that result as a step in aid if he calls for a "referendum" it was certainly open to him to have negotiated a settlement in regard to that aspect of the matter also. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, it cannot be said that such a course does not fall within Section 12 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon several decisions in relation to the scope and nature of enquiry that could be held under the Trade Unions Act when returns are submitted to the consideration of the Registrar of Trade Unions as to change in the office-bearers. But that question does not arise in this case at all because in the view of the Labour Commissioner exercise of powers under the Trade Unions Act in relation to change of office-bearers is not called for as the Civil Court is already seized of the matter and it would not be appropriate for them to decide such a matter. It cannot be said that such a stand is incorrect or not warranted in law and so it is unnecessary for me to examine the scope of the powers under the Trade Unions Act of the Registrar to hold enquiry or to examine the applicability of the principles of the decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the facts of the present case. ( 8 ) WHEN there was a tense situation between two warring groups of workmen, leading to a strike and lockout involving at least 3000 workmen, if the Minister for industries intervened in the matter and advised the examination of feasibility of defusing the situation by creating a proper atmosphere for negotiation, the action taken pursuant thereto by the Labour Commissioner cannot be stated to be mala fide or an extraneous consideration and that argument does not appeal to me. ( 9 ) IT was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that identifying a party for the purpose of negotiation or conciliation is not one of the matters which could be considered under Section 12 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for two reasons: Firstly, that the intra-union rivalry cannot constitute a dispute which could be subject-matter of conciliation and, secondly, that the conciliation could be only on a matter in relation to a question relating to employment and when such a question was not involved in intra-union rivalry it could not form subject-matter of a conciliation at all. Undoubtedly an industrial dispute is as devised under the Industrial disputes Act takes within its sweep a dispute between the management and the workmen or workmen and workmen as to the terms of employment or conditions of labour. But the question whether an intra-union rivalry is a matter connected therewith or not is a moot point. In the present case it is unnecessary to decide whether such a dispute is an industrial dispute or not inasmuch as in my view for the purpose of settlement of industrial dispute assuming for a moment intra-union rivalry is not an industrial dispute as contended for the petitioner's counsel, conciliation officer ought to have negotiated with the office-bearers of the union and to identify the office-bearers as to who represented the union had no other option but to hold a "referendum" as aforesaid; even though by merely identifying the office-bearers the whole of the dispute between the parties is not settled, it is certainly a step in aid towards that end and falls within the expression that the "conciliation officer may take all such action as he thinks fit" as provided under Section 12 (2) of the Act. Therefore, without going into the larger question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to whether an intra-union rivalry itself could be a subject-matter of an industrial dispute or not I content myself to hold that on the facts and circumstances of the present case the action to hold "referendum" as falling within the scope of section 12 (2) of the Act and therefore I must hold that the conciliation officer did have power to identify the office-bearers with whom he could negotiate and hence the contention to the contrary has got to be rejected. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Automobile Products of India Employees' Union v Association of engineering Workers, AIR 1990 SC 1159 and brought to my notice the observations made therein in relation to recognition of trade union by holding secret ballot and the efficacy of such a course and in particular the learned counsel relied upon the observations made in para 7 thereof. He emphasised that the elective element by secret ballot in the matter of recognising a bargaining agent is not to be taken as a healthy democratic process but leads to unhealthy trends resulting in injury to the trade union movement, industrial peace and stability. Such a course, it was submitted, would encourage the emergence of leaders on the eve of settlement making attractive returns to the workmen merely to assert supremacy unmindful of the interests of the industry but leading to conflict, stoppage of production or even closure of establishment with consequent loss of production and employment In order therefore to have stability in industrial relations a mechanism had been evolved whereby bargaining agent on behalf of the workers will have a durable stability with uninterrupted loyalty and an unquestionable representative character over a certain period of time and therefore resulted in the concepts such as "recognised union" and "representative union" along with it the machinery to determine it. ( 11 ) THAT case arose out of a conflict between two rival trade unions in a proceeding a rising under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971, which led to a dispute under that Act. ( 11 ) THAT case arose out of a conflict between two rival trade unions in a proceeding a rising under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971, which led to a dispute under that Act. When the matter reached the Industrial Court, it directed a secret ballot being taken to recognise union supported by majority and this course adopted by it for granting recognition to the union fell for consideration before Supreme Court and in that context the observations were made as aforesaid. In the present case, there is no question of recognising any particular union. The union has already been recognised. The question for consideration is whether the group led by the petitioner or another group led by the 4th respondent had the support of majority of members of the union had to be decided for the purpose of Section 12 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the question of continuation of the membership of the workmen in the union to ensure their association as a bargaining agent should be of a steady and durable character and their allegiance and loyalty to it could not be mere matters of fleeting nature but a result of proper evaluation by workmen has no application to this case. Within the union all decisions are taken by democratic process of voting and if that process is adopted to find which of the two groups has the support of majority I cannot find anything wrong. ( 12 ) IN the present case when it is clear that the Civil Court is seized of the dispute between the parties as to who are the real office-bearers and the parties not having obtained any interim order from that Court and when the 1st respondent bad declared a lockout and the workers had gone on strike what other course could have been adopted in the said set of circumstances baffles me. Therefore, in my view, the principles laid down or the observations made in that decision cannot have any application to the facts of the case. This discussion leads to the conclusion that there is no substance in the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the same has got to be rejected. Therefore, in my view, the principles laid down or the observations made in that decision cannot have any application to the facts of the case. This discussion leads to the conclusion that there is no substance in the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the same has got to be rejected. ( 13 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v State of West Bengal and others, 1988 (2) LLJ 335 which is to the following effect: That when two rival groups claim that they are the real office-bearers the same cannot be decided except by securing evidence and such a course cannot be adopted by this Court as the ultimate forum in such a matter is the Civil Court though the Registrar of Trade Unions may also hold an enquiry of an administrative nature which is ofcourse limited in scope. When a quick remedy is required in a matter of that nature when there are other problems which will delay the solution, a deadlock is created for running the union activities and the working atmosphere is disturbed leading both the management and the workmen to uncertainties and industrial peace in jeopardy with the court directing the Registrar of Trade Unions to hold an election afresh. It is contended on this basis that such a course should have been adopted by the management and the conciliation officers in this case also. It was also submitted that when the union itself had its bye-laws and that procedure had not been followed in removing the office-bearers the method adopted by the respondents in making a "referendum" cannot be supported in law. It is clear that the question for consideration before the civil Court itself is whether the replacement of the office-bearers is in accordance with the rules and bye-laws of the union or not. The contention on behalf of the petitioner that their replacement in the meeting held on 24-3-1990 is itself not valid and not in accordance with the bye-laws or rules of the union remains a contention and not an established fact. Whether all the necessary procedures were followed or not in finding out the real office-bearers cannot be decided except by adducing evidence and other documents, if any, and considering related and other relevant materials. Whether all the necessary procedures were followed or not in finding out the real office-bearers cannot be decided except by adducing evidence and other documents, if any, and considering related and other relevant materials. Now that a suit is pending in the Civil Court it would not have been proper for any of the authorities to decide that question. Hence, the second contention cannot be examined by this Court and it does not advance the case of the petitioner. In the absence of consensus between the groups led by the petitioner and the 4th respondent regarding holding a fresh election as directed in the Calcutta case referred to above also may have led to problems depending upon for what period they hold the office and the interpretation of bye-laws thereof in that regard. Unless there had been an agreement between the parties on that aspect of the matter, it would be very difficult for the management or conciliation officers to adopt that course either. Thus, the Calcutta case also cannot be of much assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioner. Further, it may be noticed that the group led by the petitioner also had participated in the course of negotiations held for the purpose of making a "referendum" resulting in terms of understanding for "referendum". They had participated in the deliberations on 21st, 22nd and 23rd of May, 1990 but did not agree for a "referendum" on the ground that they were the duly elected representatives of the work and they are entitled to hold office till the end of February 1991. In that background though the two rival groups contended that they were the real representatives, in the interest of industrial peace, harmony and cordial atmosphere in the factory premises after protracted and prolonged discussions on the advice of the Commissioner of Labour and Additional Labour Commissioner certain terms of understanding were arrived atbetween the management representatives and the group led by the 4th respondent Though the group led by the petitioner had not participated in the terms of settlement it would certainly safeguard their interest if they participated in the "referendum" but it is said that their group did not take part in the "referendum". When a democratic process is adopted as aforesaid to identify which group had the majority and that too purely as an interlocutory measure I do not think this Court should take any exception to the same. ( 14 ) NOW I will examine the next contention that the respondents could not have entered into an agreement to hold "referendum" or made arrangements in regard thereto so as to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The dispute in the Civil Court was in relation to whether as to who were the real office-bearers; whether the group led by the petitioner or the group led by the 4th respondent and the validity of the meeting held on 24-3-1990. The subject-matter of "referendum" was to identify the bargaining agent for the time being in view of the dispute between the two groups, subject to further orders from Court or in the event the term of office-bearers expired by holding a fresh election as is clear from the terms of the settlement in regard thereto. Therefore, it cannot be said that adopting the course of holding a "referendum" has ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. If the Civil Court ultimately decided in favour of either the group led by the petitioner or the group led by the 4th respondent that decision would displace any result that may come out of the "referendum". Further, if an election is held by agreement of parties or otherwise that would also override the "referendum". Hence, I do not think the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is justified, ( 15 ) NOW what remains to be considered is the last contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the procedure adopted in taking the "referendum" is violative of the norms for holding elections. As stated earlier the "referendum" is held only to identify the parties representing the union for the purpose of entering into a settlement which is also interlocutory in character subject to the result of the Civil Court or until the term of office-bearers expires and not beyond. As stated earlier the "referendum" is held only to identify the parties representing the union for the purpose of entering into a settlement which is also interlocutory in character subject to the result of the Civil Court or until the term of office-bearers expires and not beyond. If the ultimate settlement that may be entered into between the parties as to the conditions of employment and that settlement needs to be challenged one of the incidental questions to be determined is whether such a settlement was entered into with a party who had a proper representative character or not and therefore in this case it is unnecessary to decide such a question at this stage as such a question can be decided only if the parties are ultimately affected or prejudiced by the settlement that could be entered into between the parties regarding conditions of employment. Therefore, I decline to investigate this aspect of the matter at this stage. ( 16 ) NOW to sum up the position, the impugned action to hold a "referendum" to identify the representatives of the union for the purpose of entering into a conciliation or settlement during the interregnum between the decision by the Civil Court and/or the term of office of elected persons being totally interlocutory in character as a step-in-aid to effect a settlement on question of conditions of employment referred to in charter of demands and what could affect the workmen would be only ultimate settlement that may be entered as a result of conciliation and this arrangement being only temporary, I do not think it would be necessary for this Court to interfere and upset the course of events in the background of a lockout declared by the 1st respondent and strike observed by the workmen, a tense situation between the two rival groups in the union of the workmen leading to a complete deadlock, disturbing the industrial peace and atmosphere. ( 17 ) IN the result, the petition stands dismissed and rule discharged. The interim order granted earlier shall stand vacated and it is open to the respondents to proceed from the stage at which the same was interrupted by an order of this Court and take such further action as may be open to them under law. --- *** --- .