JUDGMENT M.M. Lal, J. - In this writ petition under Art_ 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner, who has described itself to be a Society looking after the interest and welfare of the community carrying on trade within the limits of Municipal Board. Afzalgarh (hereinafter referred to as Municipal Board) is seeking to prevent the Municipal Board from realising octroi in accordance with the rates published in the U.P. Gazette dated 24-4-1989. 2. Vide the aforesaid Gazette the Municipal Board has enhanced the rate of octroi duty on a number of articles. On some of the articles octroi duty has been imposed for the first time. The petitioner has challenged the enhancement as also the imposition of the octroi duty on various goods. 3. The first and foremost point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the objections filed by the inhabitants of the aforesaid Municipal Board against the proposals framed for imposing and enhancing the rates of octroi duty under Section 132 of the Municipalities Act, were not considered and decided by the competent authority. Section 132 provides that any inhabitant of the Municipality may submit to the Board an objection in writing to all or any of the proposals framed under Section 131 of the said Act. and the Board shall then take any Objection Sc) submitted into consideration and pass orders thereon by special resolution. 4. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in this case it shall he proper to note that in U.P. the Municipal Boards stood superseded as a result of promulgation of V.P. Ordinance entitled as "U.P. Mahapalika, Notified Area and Town Area (Alpalik Vyawastha) Adhvadesh. 1977" and all the powers, functions and duties as also that of its President and various authorities were vested in the District Magistrate. The Ordinance was subsequently replaced by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1977, published in the Gazette dated 1-10-77. Section 2 of the said Act provides that until the reconstitution of the Municipal Board etc. the provisions of the said Act shall have effect in relation to the each of the municipalities subject to the provisions contained therein. Clause It of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the said Act. being relevant, is re-produced below for ready reference : "All powers. the provisions of the said Act shall have effect in relation to the each of the municipalities subject to the provisions contained therein. Clause It of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the said Act. being relevant, is re-produced below for ready reference : "All powers. functions and duties of the Municipal Board, its President and Committee shall he vested in and he exercised, performed and discharged by the District Magistrate. and the District Magistrate. including the person or authority to whom the District Magistrate delegates his powers under sub- section (2) of Section 4 shall be deemed to be the Municipal Board, its President or the Committee concerned, as the occasion may require." 5. Thus according to said Section 2(1)(b) all powers, functions and duties of the Municipal Board, its President and Committees stood vested in the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate was further empowered to delegate his powers to any person or authority and if the said powers was so delegated, then person or authority to whom the said powers were delegated was to he deemed to be Municipal Board, its President or the committee concerned as the occasion required. 6. The respondents in this case have taken a positive case (see para 3 of the supplementary affidavit dated 16-1-90 of Sri Tilak Raj Sharma. Head Clerk) that the Administrator District Magistrate had delegated his powers from time to time to Sub-Divisional Officers. who were Officers in charge of Nagar Mahapalika. Along with the said affidavit a copy of the order dated 29-4-86 (Annexure S.A-1) was filed to show that the District Magistrate had delegated to the Officers-in-Charge of the Municipal Boards all the powers of the Municipal Board and its President etc. In the counter-affidavit as well the respondents have further stated that specifically in order to dispose of the objections filed against the proposed imposition and enhancement of octroi duty the Administrator specially empowered Sub- Divisional Officer, Nagina to consider the said objections. To substantiate the said plea that respondents have filed a copy of the order to Annexure Nt. which shows that the Officer-in-Charge Sub-Division Officer, (vagina was empowered by the Administrator to consider the said objections. We arc thus satisfied that Sub-Divisional Officer. Nagina, Officer-in-Charge had been delegated the necessary powers by the District Magistrate, Administrator to consider the aforesaid objections. by way of delegating the power of the Board to him. 7. which shows that the Officer-in-Charge Sub-Division Officer, (vagina was empowered by the Administrator to consider the said objections. We arc thus satisfied that Sub-Divisional Officer. Nagina, Officer-in-Charge had been delegated the necessary powers by the District Magistrate, Administrator to consider the aforesaid objections. by way of delegating the power of the Board to him. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that in the aforesaid order i Annexure 8) reference to Section 14301 of the Municipalities Act had been made and that, therefore, it could not he said that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nagina/Officer-in-i Charge had been empowered to consider and' decide the objections under Section 132 of the said Act. It is true that in the orders (Annexure 8) reference to Section 143t31' instead of Section 132. had been made but in our opinion if instead of Section 132, Section 143 had been wrongly and inadvertently mentioned in the aforesaid order (Annexure 8) the same will not go so far as to nullify the powers of the Board which had been delegated to Sub-Divisional Officer, Nagina/Officer-in-Charge to consider and decide the objections which had been filed by the inhabitants of the Municipal Board against the proposed imposition and enhancement of the octroi duty. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged before us that the aforesaid objections filed against the imposition and enhancement of the octroi were not in fact considered and decided by the Municipal Board. We find no merit in the said submission. The respondents along with their counter-affidavit have filed Annexure Nos. 8 to 12 show that the dates fixed for hearing and disposal of the said objections were communicated to the persons concerned from time to time. The respondents have also filed Annexure No. 13 to show that the said objections were considered and disposal of by the Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Board. Therefore, we are satisfied that the objections against the imposition and enhancement of the octroi duty were duly considered and decided by the Officer In charge of the Municipal Board, who was duly empowered to do so. 9. Therefore, we are satisfied that the objections against the imposition and enhancement of the octroi duty were duly considered and decided by the Officer In charge of the Municipal Board, who was duly empowered to do so. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to us Rule 131 of the U.P. Municipality Account Code which provides that octroi shall not be levied on the following articles : (1) Salt; (2) Opium; (3) Mineral Oil; (4) Excisable liquor manufactured in India and drugs liable to excise duty; (5) Matches so long as they are subject to excise duty. He has also referred to us Rule 132 of the Municipal Account Code which provides that some other articles like Gur and Shira shall be exempt from payment of octroi duty. Relying upon the said Rules 131 and 132 learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that when the Government had laid down that octroi shall not be levied on the aforesaid articles Municipal Board could not possibly levy octroi duty on the said articles. In our opinion the said argument is misconceived. 10. Section 157(3) of the Municipality Act is the only provision under which the State Govt. is competent to grant exemption from the payment of a tax, sub-section (3) of said Section 157 runs as follows : "The State Government may, by order, exempt from the payment of a tax, or any portion of a tax, imposed under this Act any person or class of persons or any property or description of property." As is clear from the language of said Section 157(3) the State Government is empowered to grant exemption from the payment of tax only when the said tax has been imposed and not otherwise. In this case the petitioner has taken a stand that salt, opium mineral oil, excisable liquor, matches have been subjected to octroi duty by Municipal Board for the first time. In our opinion when the Municipal Board has levied octroi duty on the aforesaid articles for the first time in the year 1989, the State Government could not have possibly exempted the said articles from the payment of the octroi duty a long time and so for as the Municipal Board. Afzalgarh was concerned. In our opinion when the Municipal Board has levied octroi duty on the aforesaid articles for the first time in the year 1989, the State Government could not have possibly exempted the said articles from the payment of the octroi duty a long time and so for as the Municipal Board. Afzalgarh was concerned. The said controversy came up for consideration before this Court in 1981 UPLBEC 426 (DB), M/s. Emkay Glass Works v. State of U.P., in which a similar view was pressed. In our opinion the aforesaid point raised by the petitioner also stands concluded by a Full Bench decision of this Court rendered in the case of M/s. Central Distillery & Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1979 U PTC 1206, wherein it was held that : "Section 153(3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act conferring power of exemption on the State Government comes into play after a tax has been imposed. It does not entitle the State Government to exempt from payment of a tax where the tax has not been imposed at all. The order dated 1-3-1961 granting exemption will not be applicable to the Municipal Board of Meerut in relation to excisable liquor because no octroi was imposed on it by this municipality at any time before 1-3-1961. That order cannot be construed to mean exemption from payment of hypothetical tax which may be imposed in future. The order of the State Government sanctioning the imposition of octroi by notification of January 4, 1975 being latter, will supersede the exemption order of March 1, 1971 in relation to the Municipality of Meerut and in respect of liquor manufactured in India. Rule 131 in 1925 did not relate to the power of imposition but on the execution-of that power, by levying or quantifying the tax exemption levied on excisable liquor manufactured in India. Since the Municipal Board of Meerut imposed the octroi by notification of January 1975, Rule 131 hence was ineffective in relation to the Municipal Board, Meerut. Hence the imposition as well as the levy of octroi on Indian made foreign liquor as well as country liquor was valid." 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted before us that in this case the publication of the draft rules and notices were not made in the prescribed manner and that the Municipal Board also failed to comply with certain other procedures. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted before us that in this case the publication of the draft rules and notices were not made in the prescribed manner and that the Municipal Board also failed to comply with certain other procedures. The respondents on the contrary have asserted that the notices and the draft rules etc. were fully published in accordance with law and that all other procedures were fully complied with. We have no reason to doubt the said assertion made by the respondents. Besides, we are of the opinion that when in this case notification under Section 134 of the Municipalities Act has been published it becomes a conclusive proof that all necessary steps against the imposition of tax have been taken and then even if there were any procedural defects, the same stood cured by Section 135(3) of the said Act.This view was also expressed in AIR 1978 SC 306 , Tharoo Mal v. P.C. Pandey, 1978 All LJ 25 and 1983 UPLBEC 124 , Anand Sugar Mills, Khalilabad v. Notified Area Committee, Khalilabad. 12. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that although on some of the articles the rate of octroi imposed by the Municipal Board was less yet octroi at higher rate had been charged. To substantiate the said plea the petitioner has filed receipts (Annexures Nos. 7 to 9). In our view if against the prescribed rate the octroi clerk by mistake, negligence or otherwise has charged higher rate on any article then proper course for the aggrieved person was to claim refund of the same from the Municipal Board and not to rush to this Court in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondents in their counter-affidavit have offered to refund any amount which may have been charged in excess by the Octroi Mohair by mistake or otherwise. 13. In the result we find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.