ORDER B. C. VARMA, AG. C.J. - At the instance of the Commissioner, Sales Tax, M.P., the Tribunal (the Board of Revenue), in exercise of power under section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, has referred the following question for this Court's opinion : "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, 'timber' specified as raw material in the dealer's registration certificate would include standing trees also ?" The assessee, M/s. Durga Shellac Factory, Bilaspur is a dealer registered under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958. He is also a forest contractor. He purchased standing trees from forest coupes and paid full sales tax on these transactions. When the assessee's turnover for the Diwali year 1972-73 was being assessed for purposes of sales tax, he claimed that the tax-paid by him on purchase of standing trees from the forest department should be set off against the sales tax assessed. Its contention was that the entry in its registration certificate mentions "timber" and that would cover standing trees also. The entry in the registration certificate was modified after May 7, 1973 to include standing trees also. The assessing authority as also the appellate authority rejected the assessee's aforesaid claim for set off prior to May 7, 1973 holding that the entry in the registration certificate did not include the standing trees. In further appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee's contention prevailed and the Tribunal held that the contract was for sale of standing trees agreed to be severed. Such was the agreement between the forest department and the assessee. The Tribunal also held that the entry "timber" in the registration certificate would include standing trees. The set off claimed by the assessee was thus allowed. It is in these circumstances that the above mentioned question has been referred to this Court for opinion. The Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 defines "goods" to mean all kinds of movable property other than ....... and includes all materials, articles and commodities whether or not to be used in the construction, fitting out, improvement or repair of movable or immovable property and also includes all growing crops, grass, trees, plants and things attached to, or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. and includes all materials, articles and commodities whether or not to be used in the construction, fitting out, improvement or repair of movable or immovable property and also includes all growing crops, grass, trees, plants and things attached to, or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. Interpreting clause (13) of section 2 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, in somewhat similar terms, the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Kishanlal Mohta [1971] 27 STC 116; AIR 1971 SC 908 , held that the standing timber may ordinarily not be regarded as "goods" but by inclusive definition given in section 2(7), Sale of Goods Act, things which are attached to the land may be the subject-matter of contract of sale provided that under the terms of the contract of sale they are severed before the sale or under the contract of sale. Since the "goods" as defined in Bombay Sales Tax Act, included all standing timber which are agreed to be severed before the sale or under the contract of sale, the Supreme Court held "timber" to be goods within the meaning of section 2(7) of Sale of Goods Act, and since the expression "sale of goods" in entry 54, List II of Seventh Schedule has the same meaning as that expression has in the Sale of Goods Act, sale of timber agreed to be severed under the terms of the contract may be regarded as goods and was held to be sale of goods. The statement of case submitted to this Court by the Tribunal indicates that the contract, in the instant case, was for sale of standing trees agreed to be severed under that contract of sale, and, therefore, what was sold to the assessee was "goods". The question is whether this sale of standing trees was sale of timber. In absence of any definition of "timber", the courts had to resort to the dictionary meanings taking into account the popular sense in which the term has been accepted whenever a question arose whether or not given articles were timber. In the case of Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal & Co. In absence of any definition of "timber", the courts had to resort to the dictionary meanings taking into account the popular sense in which the term has been accepted whenever a question arose whether or not given articles were timber. In the case of Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1988] 68 STC 324 (SC); AIR 1988 SC 563 , the question was whether "eucalyptus-wood" sold by the forest department after separating the "bailies" and "poles" constitute and answer the description of "timber" under entry 32-A of Part II of Second Schedule to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. It was observed that in a taxing statute words which are not technical expressions or words of art, but are words of every day use, must be understood and given a meaning, not in their technical or scientific sense, but in a sense as understood in common parlance, i.e., "that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it". Such words must be understood in their "popular sense". Their Lordships referred to an earlier decision in Shantabai v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 532 , wherein while distinguishing "standing timber" and "tree" the dictionary meaning, i.e., "wood suitable for building houses, bridges, ships, etc., whether on the tree or cut and seasoned" was accepted and it was held that "standing timber" must be a tree in a state fit for these purposes and, further a tree that is meant to be converted into timber so shortly that it can already be looked upon as timber for all practical purposes even though it is still standing. Reference may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court, in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. [1985] 60 STC 213; AIR 1985 SC 1293 , wherein dealing with the provisions of Orissa Sales Tax Act, one of conclusions as summarized in paragraph 127 of the report, is that "under the timber contracts the property in the trees which were the subject-matter of the contracts passed only in the trees which were felled, that is, in timber, after all the conditions of the contract had been complied with and after such timber was examined and checked and removed from the contract area". The question before the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Ramaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1973] 32 STC 309, was whether planks, rafters, cut sizes, etc., were timber. While holding that such planks, rafters, cut sizes, etc., were timber it was observed that the word "timber" may in the context mean the timber tree; when it is felled, the wood, when it is cut into logs for convenience of transport, the ballis cut to sizes or even the planks, rafters, cut sizes, etc., for the use of construction of buildings or such other like purposes. Chief Justice Ekbote, who delivered the judgment of the court, expressed an opinion that "one of the most significant aids of construction in determining the meaning of a tax provision is the administrative interpretation given to it by the agency that is responsible for its administration and enforcement, and in interpreting a word used in a statute, the courts may have regard to the interpretation placed by those who are presumed to be acquainted with the economic significance of the tax in question". The court referred to certain opinions expressed by the department and the Board of Revenue as to the significance of the term "timber" and with the assistance of those opinions, reached the conclusion as aforesaid. This Court also, in Mohanlal Vishram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. [1969] 24 STC 101, opined that by felling standing timber trees, cutting them and converting some of them into ballis, the character of the goods is not altered and the goods still continue to be "timber". From the aforesaid discussion, it can well be inferred that a tree that is meant to be converted into timber shortly can well be looked upon as timber for all practical purposes even though it is still standing. This will be particularly so in case of timber contract where the property passes when they are felled, that is, in timber. In the instant case also, as appears from statement of case drawn by the Tribunal, the contract was for sale of timber which was agreed to be severed. For all practical purposes, therefore, the sale was of felled trees, that is, "timber". The subsequent sale by the assessee after cutting those timber in the shape of ballis, rafters, etc., would not alter the character of goods so sold by him. For all practical purposes, therefore, the sale was of felled trees, that is, "timber". The subsequent sale by the assessee after cutting those timber in the shape of ballis, rafters, etc., would not alter the character of goods so sold by him. This subsequent sale by him must also, therefore, be taken as sale of "timber" which they had purchased. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that what the assessee purchased from the forest department was timber. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. We hold that the entry "timber" specified as raw material in the dealer's registration certificate includes standing "trees" also. Reference answered accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs of the reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.