S.K. Homchaudhuri, J.:- This writ petition is directed against the award dated 1st September 1984 made by the learned Labour Court Dibrugarh in Reference Case No. 23 of 1980. 2. The petitioners along with two other workmen were charge-sheeted by the Management, the Respondent No. 2, on the allegation of commuting various gross misconduct. Out of 5, charges against two of them were dropped on their tendering unqualified apologies to the Management. The petitioners, the other charge-sheeted workmen did not tender apologies and the Management not being satisfied with their replies to charges, decided to hold a domestic enquiry in respect of the charges made against them. The Enquiry Officer, after conclusion of the domestic enquiry, gave his finding holding that the charges against the petitioners were established. The Mana­gement agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer dismissed the petitioners. On the question of dismissal of the petitioners, an industrial dispute was raised and ultimately the Government of Assam, Labour Department, by Notification No. GLR 145/80/23 dated 30.7. 80 referred the dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour court, Assam, Dibrugarh on the following issues : (i) Whether the management of Dheodam T. E. are justified in dismissing Sarbashree (1) Baisingh Poija, (2) Buta Dhuba and (3) Jonash Birsha from their services. (ii) if not, whether they arc entitled for their reinstatement with back wages or any other relief in lieu thereof. 3. The reference was registered as Reference Case No. 23 of 198(1 in the Court of the learned Labour Court, Dibrugarh. After receipt of notices', the Management as well as the workmen filed written statements. The learned Labour Court initially heard the preliminary question as to whether the domestic enquiry was proper and valid. The Management proved the domestic enquiry proceedings before the learned Labour Court. The learned Labour Court held that the domestic enquiry was not proper and valid. Thereupon the dispute was heard on merit by the learned Labour Court after giving opp­ortunities to the Management and the workmen to adduce evidence. The learned Labour Court on appreciation of evidences adduced before it, held that from the evidences it was clear that the three workmen named in the reference were guilty of offence as per the charge sheet to some extent. The learned Labour Court on appreciation of evidences adduced before it, held that from the evidences it was clear that the three workmen named in the reference were guilty of offence as per the charge sheet to some extent. The learned Labour Court, however, to of into consideration the fact that two other workmen accused of the same charges were pardoned by the Management on their offering apologies and held that same treatment ought to have been given to the petiti­oners since they deserved also similar treatment from the Management. Learned Labour Court held that since two of the five workmen accu­sed in the same offence, were pardoned, dismissal of the other three workmen, showed discrimination and the malafide motive of the Management. The learned Labour Court and observed that when the Court asked the advocate of the management as to whe­ther the management was ready to reinstate the petitioners on offer­ing apologies on the footing of the other two woken, the learned advocate avoided direct answer saying that he had no instruction. On that ground, learned Labour Court held that the dismissal of the three workmen were discriminatory, an act of victimization and amounted to unfair labour practice. In the exercise of power under section of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act'), learned Labour Court set aside the order of dismissal and modified the punishment to reinstatement of the petitioners to ser­vice without back wages and back service benefit on their tendering unqualified apologies to the Management. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that after the award was made, all the peti­tioners have been reinstated in service by the Management on their tendering unqualified apologies. 4. Dr. M. K. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the learned Labour Court having held that the order of dismissal passed against the petitioners was discriminatory, an act of victimization and amounted to unfair labour practice and having ordered reinstatement of the petitioners, the petitioners are entitled to full back wages. As such, the learned Labour Court committed manifest errors of law apparent on the face of the record in ord­ering reinstatement of the petitioners without back wages and back service benefits. Learned counsel has, however, submitted that the petitioners having been reinstated, the award may not be set aside, which would unsettle the settled position. As such, the learned Labour Court committed manifest errors of law apparent on the face of the record in ord­ering reinstatement of the petitioners without back wages and back service benefits. Learned counsel has, however, submitted that the petitioners having been reinstated, the award may not be set aside, which would unsettle the settled position. In support of the con­tention for full back wages, Dr. Sarma has placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. the Employees ( AIR 1979 SC 75 ), wherein the apex Court held that ordinarily a workman whose service has been illegally termi­nated either by dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, would be entitled to full back wages. Learned counsel has also placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Vidya Dhar Pande vs. V.G.S. Samiti and others reported in 1988 (VI) SCC. 734 and the case of S.M. Saiyid vs. Baroda Municipal Corporation ( AIR 1984 SC 1829 ). In the case of Vidya Dhar Pande (supra) the apex Court held that the order of dismissal of the employee was illegal and inv­alid and directed the employer to reinstate the employee with 50% back wages as it appeared that the employee was not in employment during the period of dismissal. In the case of S. M. Saiyad (supra), the apex Court held that the dismissal order passed against the employee having been found to be invalid and direction for reinstatement leaving been given, the workman would be entitled to full back wages. 5. Mr. J.P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the Management (Respondent No. 2 has submitted that in the instant case the lear­ned Labour Court in appreciation of evidence on record found that the guilt of the petitioners were established to some extent. The finding of the learned Labour Court that the action of the Management in orde­ring dismissal of the petitioners was discriminatory and an act of victimization and amounted to unfair labour practice, is arbitrary, uncalled for and misconceived. Admittedly, two other workmen-who were charge, sheeted along with the petitioners, after receipt of the charge sheet, tendered unqualified apologies and were pardoned by the Management whereas the petitioners did not tender any apology and under the circumstances, no question of pardoning them could arise. Admittedly, two other workmen-who were charge, sheeted along with the petitioners, after receipt of the charge sheet, tendered unqualified apologies and were pardoned by the Management whereas the petitioners did not tender any apology and under the circumstances, no question of pardoning them could arise. The work­men were charged with gross misconduct and in order to enforce discipline, the Management had to continue the disciplinary proceedings against them. The two workmen who after receipt of the charge sheet tendered unqualified apologies to the Management stood on quite a different footing than the petitioners who did not at all tender apologies after receipt of the charge sheet. As such, the quest­ion of discrimination did not arise at all in continuing the procee­dings against the three petitioners, whose case stood on an altogether different footing. Learned counsel has submitted that the of victimization or unfair labour practice are serious charges against the Management which has to be pleaded giving all particulars upon which the charge is based to enable the Management to fully meet them and the charge of victimisation and unfair labour practice has to be proved by the workmen by adducing cogent evidence. In the instant case, there was no proper pleading. Vague allegations without giving any particulars at all upon which the allegations were based have been made. No evidence was adduced by the workmen in support of the allegation of victimisation. In support of the contention, learned counsel has placed reliance in the decision of the apex Court in the case of Bharat Iron Works vs. B. B. Patel and others, ( AIR 1976 SC 98 ). Learned counsel for the Management has further submitted that the learned Labour Court in the exercise of power under section of the Act, keeping the proved delinquency of the pet­itioners in view, having modified the punishment of dismissal from service to reinstatement without back wages and back benefits on offering unqualified apologies, there is very little scope for interference by this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of the contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd and Anr., reported in (1984) 3 SCC 5 . In support of the contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in Jitendra Singh Rathor v. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd and Anr., reported in (1984) 3 SCC 5 . In para 3 of the said decision, the apex Court held : "Wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal under this provision and in a given case on, the facts established the Tribunal car vacate the order of dismissal or discharge and give suitable directions. It is a well settled principle of law that when an order of termination of service is found to be and reinstatement is directed, the wronged workmen is ordinarily entitled to full back wages unless for any particular reason the whole or a part of it is asked to be withheld. The Tribunal while directing reinstatement and keeping the delinquency in view could withhold payment of a part or the whole of the back wages." 6. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners as well as on behalf of the respondents. We have perused the impugned award and other materials on record. We find sufficient force in the submissions made on behalf of Respondent No. 2 (the Management). From the impugned award, we find that the finding of the learned Labour Court that the Management was guilty of comm­itting discrimination, victimisation and unfair labour practice is based on the fact that when the learned Labour Court asked the counsel for the Management as to whether the petitioners would be reinst­ated in service on offering unqualified apologies as the other two workmen who were accused of the same charge but were pardoned on tendering apologies after receipt of the charge sheet, the advocate of the Management avoided the answer stating that he had no instruction. Avoidance to concede, may even refusal to concede, on behalf of management to the suggestion of the learned Labour Court to reinstate the three dismissed workmen on their tendering apologies at that very late stage, because at the outset of the proceedings, two other workmen accused of same charges were pardoned by the manage­ment on their tendering unqualified apologies after receipt of the charge sheet, cannot be held to be an act of discrimination and victimisation or unfair labour practice on the part of the management. We find that vague allegations of victimisation has been made against the management by the petitioners but no particulars of the act of victimisation has been pleaded, nor any evidence was adduced in support of the vague allegation. As such, we are constrained to hold that the finding of the learned Labour Court that the dismissal of the petitioners by the management was discriminatory and an act of victimisation and amounted to unfair labour practice on the reason and ground stated in the impugned award, is unwarranted, arbitrary and misconceived and, as such, otiose and is of no consequence. 7. The dispute was heard on merit by the learned Labour Court and on appreciation of evidence on record, learned Labour Court has found that the charges against all the petitioners were established by evidence on record to some extent. It is not a case that charges against the petitioners were not at all established before the learned Labour Court and the order of termination of service of the petitioners was found to be invalid by the learned Labour Court. Had the charges against the petitioners were not at all proved by the management before the learned Labour Court which would have rendered the order of dismissal invalid, the petitioners would have been entitled to get reinstatement with full back wages. 8. Order of modification of the punishment passed by the Labour Court in the exercise of power under section of the Act is not open to challenge in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, unless the order is arbitrary or unreasonable. In the instant case, keeping in view that charges of misconduct against the petitioners were established to some extent, by the evidences adduced before it by the management, the termed Laboar Court in the exercise of power under Section 1IA of the Act, has modified the punishment of dismissal passed against the petitioners to reinstatement in service without any back wages or back service benefits on their tendering unqualified apolo­gies to the Management. The decisions of the apex Court in the cases of Hindustan Tin Works (supra), Vidya Dhar Pande (supra) and S.M. Saiyed (supra), in. our opinion do not apply to the facts of the instant case. The decisions of the apex Court in the cases of Hindustan Tin Works (supra), Vidya Dhar Pande (supra) and S.M. Saiyed (supra), in. our opinion do not apply to the facts of the instant case. We are inclined to hold that operative part of the impugned award is not unreasonable and do not suffer from any infirmity which calls for interference by this Court in the exer­cise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not and any merit in the petition and the petition is liable to be dismissed. However, for the ends of justice, we direct that the period from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement service shall be counted for maintaining continuity of service of the petitioners only for the purpose of granting retirement benefits to them. 10. In the result, the petition is dismissed with the aforesaid direction. No cost.