D. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) PARAKSHITA Pradhan, brother of the deceased Laxmidhar Pradhan filed this application u/s. 439 (2), Cr. P. C. to cancel the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Puri admitting the opposite party No. 1 Bairagi Pradhan to bail. ( 2 ) THE opposite party No. 1 along with others has been charge-sheeted u/ss. 302, 323, 149, 148 and 147, IPC for having committed the murder of Laxmidhar Pradhan on 6-10-1989. In the application under S. 439 (2) it is stated, inter alia, that the opp. party No. 1 though named in the FIR as one of the assailants was not included in the chargesheet submitted by the investigating Officer. Subsequently, on the intervention of the superior police officers further chargesheet including his name as an accused was submitted. It is the case of the petitioner that due to the influence exercised by the opposite party No. I on the local police, particularly the Investigating Officer and the Addl. Superintendent of Police his name was excluded from the charge-sheet even though he was the principal accused and at his instigation the other accused persons assaulted Laxmidhar. The petitioner has further alleged that as per the report dated 4-4-90 the opp. party No. 1 threatened him on 5-4-90 that if he deposes in the case against him he will be eliminated like his brother. On these allegations the petitioner contended that the learned Sessions Judge erred in admitting the opposite party No. 1 to all and the order passed by him should be cancelled. ( 3 ) FROM the facts stated above, it is clear that the petitioner seeks cancellation of bail mainly on the grounds that the case is not at all a fit one for grant of bail to opposite party No. 1 from the order dated 19-4-90 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, it appears that he was inclined to exercise his discretion in favour of opposite party No. 1 considering the facts that initially the Investigating Officer had accepted his (opposite party No. 1) plea of alibi and had not included him as an accused in the charge-sheet. Later at the behest of the D. I. G. (Crimes) the supplementary charge-sheet showing the name of opposite party No. 1 was submitted. Later at the behest of the D. I. G. (Crimes) the supplementary charge-sheet showing the name of opposite party No. 1 was submitted. ( 4 ) THE power of this Court to cancel bail granted by the Sessions Judge u/s. 439 (2) in the absence of any supervening circumstance is not in controversy. The question is whether in the present case the said power is to be exercised. The Apex Court in the case of State through Delhi Administration v. Sanjao Gandhi reported in AIR 1978 SC 961 : ( 1978 Cri LJ 952) construing the provisions of Ss. 439 (2) and 437 (2), Cr. P. C. observed :"rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing, cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier to reject a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only if by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "in the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State ( Delhi Administration), reported at page 179 of the same Volume the Court observed :"the question of cancellation of bail u/s. 439 (2) is certainly different from admission to bail u/ S. 439 (1), u/s. 439 (2) the High Court or the Court of Session may direct any person who had been released on bail to be arrested and committed to custody. Under Section 498 (2) of the old Code, a person who had been admitted to bail by the High Court could be committed to custody only by the High Court. Similarly, if a person was admitted to bail by a Court of Session, it was only the Court of Session that could commit him to custody. This restriction upon the power of the entertainment of an application for committing a person, already admitted to bail, to custody, is lifted in the New Code u/s. 439 (2 ). Similarly, if a person was admitted to bail by a Court of Session, it was only the Court of Session that could commit him to custody. This restriction upon the power of the entertainment of an application for committing a person, already admitted to bail, to custody, is lifted in the New Code u/s. 439 (2 ). Under S. 439 (2) of the New Code a High Court may commit a person released on bail under Chapter XXIII by any court including the court of Session to custody, if it thinks appropriate to do so. "in the case of Bhagirathsinh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1984 SC 372 : (1984 Cri LJ 160) the Court observed that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation bail. The principles laid down in the abovementioned case have been followed by this Court in several cases. To notice one such case, State of Orissa v. Mr. Abdul Karim, reported in (1984) 57 CLT 28 1 : (1984 Cri LJ 905) wherein a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows :"the opposite party has been released on bail more than six months ago. As a long period of pre-trial detention in the course of investigation or on its completion during trial is a factor taken into consideration while considering an application for bail, it may not be wrong and improper, in our view, to take into consideration among other matters, the long period intervening between the date of release of an accused person and consideration of an application for cancellation of his bail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "this Court declined to cancel the bail granted to the accused in that case. ( 5 ) COMING to the facts of the present case, the notable circumstances which come to notice are that the prosecution has not applied for cancellation of bail; the application has been filed by a private person, which prima facie shows that the prosecution has not experienced does not apprehend any difficulty in trial of the case on account of the opposite party No. 1 being at large. The opp. party No. 1 was released on bail in the month of April, 1990 and about five months have elapsed in the meantime. The opp. party No. 1 was released on bail in the month of April, 1990 and about five months have elapsed in the meantime. No acceptable material has been produced indicating misutilisation or abuse of the liberty granted to him. It cannot be said that the fact/circumstance noticed in the order of the learned Sessions Judges granting bail was wholly irrelevant/extraneous to the matter or that the order was a perverse one. ( 6 ) IN these circumstances, I am not convinced that for proper trial of the case or for ends of justice the bail granted to the opposite party No. 1 in the present case should be cancelled in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under S. 439 (2), Cr. P. C. The application is accordingly rejected. Application ismissed.