N. D. V. BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 23-8-1976 passed by the additional civil judge, dharwar in r. a. No. 91/1972. The facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal, briefly stated, are as under: ( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS filed o. s. No. 230/1969 on the file of munsiff, dharwar praying for a decree against the defendant for declaration that the sale deed dated 29-6-1967 by their father in favour of the defendant in respect of the suit house and the decree obtained by the defendant in o. s. No. 49/1969 against their father are illegal and void and not binding on them and for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from executing the said decree in o. s. No. 49/1969. ( 3 ) THE case of the plaintiffs as made out in the plaint can be briefly summarised as follows: the suit property comprising the house and a backyard bearing t. p. c. No. 832 of hebballi village in dharwar taluk is the coparcenary property consisting of plaintiffs and their father and that the plaintiffs have got distinct interest therein. The suit property has been in their possession and that of their mother and grand-mother. The father of the plaintiffs basappa desai was an extravagant man and he was addicted to all vices and so in order to meet out his expenses it appeared that he raised some petty loans by leasing the joint family lands. The joint family lands at that point of time were in the possession of savantrawa, the minor guardian of plaintiffs as she had left interest in the suit properties. Savantrawa filed a suit for injunction against the father of the plaintiffs and defendant and others restraining them from interfering with her enjoyment of the lands. Thereafter, the defendant failing in his attempts to satisfy his debt out of the lands it appears that he made the father of the plaintiffs to execute the sale deed (and a lease deed) dated 29-6-1967 in respect of the suit property. The transaction was fraudulent. The suit house was worth Rs. 3,000/- but the same was sold only for Rs. 2,000/ -. Even the amount mentioned in the sale deed was not received in full by the father of plaintiffs. The whereabouts of the father of the plaintiffs were not known to the plaintiffs. The transaction was fraudulent. The suit house was worth Rs. 3,000/- but the same was sold only for Rs. 2,000/ -. Even the amount mentioned in the sale deed was not received in full by the father of plaintiffs. The whereabouts of the father of the plaintiffs were not known to the plaintiffs. The sale was without consideration and was not binding upon the plaintiffs. Sometime before the suit was filed, defendant filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against the father of the plaintiffs on the strength of the sale deed referred to earlier in o. s. No. 49/1969 on the file of the munsiff, dharwar. He obtained an ex-parte decree on 15-11-1969. The said decree was not binding upon the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were not parties to the said suit. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs have filed the suit in question praying for the reliefs referred to earlier. ( 4 ) DEFENDANT resisted the suit of the plaintiff by his written statement. He denied the allegation that the suit property was the joint family property of the plaintiffs and their father. He asserted that the suit property was the self-acquired property of basappa. Basappa had purchased the same out of his own funds. After defendant purchased the suit property, basappa was actually residing in the suit property as a tenant and plaintiffs were also residing along with basappa as tenants without any independent right. The suit filed by savantrawa referred to in the plaint against the plaintiffs' father and others had nothing to do with the instant defendant. The allegation that she obtained a fraudulent sale deed is denied by him. It is the contention of the defendant that as basappa was hard pressed and for legal necessity he took out the suit property for sale and this defendant purchased the suit property for Rs. 2,000/ -. He denied the allegation made in the plaint that the whereabouts of basappa were not known. Defendant has asserted that the decree obtained by him against basappa is binding on the plaintiffs and that the same is neither void nor null. On these grounds, in pith and substance, the defendant prayed for the dismissal of the suit. ( 5 ) THE trial court examined 3 witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs. Exts. P. 1 to p. 8 were marked for plaintiffs. On these grounds, in pith and substance, the defendant prayed for the dismissal of the suit. ( 5 ) THE trial court examined 3 witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs. Exts. P. 1 to p. 8 were marked for plaintiffs. D. w. 1 and d. w. 2 were examined for the defendant. Exts. D. 1 and d. 2 were marked on behalf of the defendant. ( 6 ) THE trial court on a consideration of the evidence on record and for the reasons recorded in its judgment dated 25-8-1972 dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. ( 7 ) BEING aggrieved by the same, plaintiffsp referred r. a. No. 91/72, before the additional civil judge, dharwar. The additional civil judge by his judgment dated 23-3-1976 was pleased to allow the appeal and decree the suit of the plaintiffs as prayed for. Hence, the instant appeal by the defendant. ( 8 ) I have heard the arguments of Smt. Kumud rao, the learned Advocate for the appellants and Sri m. Mahabaleswara gouda, the learned Advocate for the respondents. ( 9 ) IT is seen that at the time when the appealwas admitted in the year 1977 substantial questions of law are not shown to have been raised. Under these circumstances, this court is required to decide the appeal on its merit bearing in mind the restrictions reflected in Section 100 C. P. C. and incidentally substantial question calls for consideration is as to whether the approach of the first appellate court in reversing the judgment of the trial court is in accordance with law. ( 10 ) IT is seen that both the courts below have held that legal necessity pleaded by the defendant is not established by acceptable evidence. It is purely a question of fact. Evenotherwise it is noticed that the finding of the courts below with reference to this aspect is based on the totality of the evidence brought into being on record. ( 11 ) THE trial court, it is seen, has dismissed the suit on the ground that the fact that basappa had antecedent debt was established on plaintiffs' own showing, and that it was not established that it was tainted with illegality or immorality. ( 11 ) THE trial court, it is seen, has dismissed the suit on the ground that the fact that basappa had antecedent debt was established on plaintiffs' own showing, and that it was not established that it was tainted with illegality or immorality. The first appellate court, however, took the view that the plea of antecedent debt was not taken by the defendant in his written statement and vague allegation in the plaint with reference to basappa having been in the habit of raising petty loan cannot be taken as a proof of existence of antecedent debt. In this view of the matter, it was held by the first appellate court that the sale executed by basappa in favour of the defendant was not binding on plaintiffs since the property in question was the joint family property of basappa and his children as established from the evidence on record. ( 12 ) IT will have to be seen as to whether the decree passed by the first appellate court is sustainable in law. ( 13 ) SMT. Kumud rao, the learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the fact that basappa had an existing debt prior to the execution of the sale deed in favour of the defendant is established on plaintiffs' own showing. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the appellant drew the attention of this court to the allegations in the plaint at para-4 therein. The attention of this court is also invited to the evidence of P. W. 1 wherein P. W. 1 is seen to have asserted that basappa had leased the lands to pay his debt. Marshalling her submissions on these lines, the learned Advocate for the appellant contended that the fact that there was no specific plea in that behalf in the written statement of the defendant cannot be made much of in view of the fact admitted. Continuing her submission, the learned Advocate argued that in that context it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that the debt in question was tainted by illegality or immorality and that plaintiffs, according to the learned advocate, have miserably failed to prove the same. Continuing her submission, the learned Advocate argued that in that context it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that the debt in question was tainted by illegality or immorality and that plaintiffs, according to the learned advocate, have miserably failed to prove the same. In this connection, reliance is placed on the decision in luhar Amrit Lal Nagji v Doshi Jayantilal Jethalal and others, reported in AIR 1960 SC at page 964 as also on the decision in Venkatesh Dhonddev Deshpande v Kusum Daltalraya Kulkami and others reported in AIR 1979 SC at page 1791. The learned Advocate has also relied in this behalf on the treatise on hindu law and usage by mayne's as also by mulla. In fine, the learned Advocate for the appellant contended that the judgment of the first appellate court is liable to be set at naught. The learned Advocate for the respondents on the other hand, contended that the perspective with which the matter in controversy was approached by the first appellate court is the correct one and the same cannot be found fault within that, the learned civil judge has proceeded to reach the conclusion which he did on the basis of oral and documentary evidence and after applying the law correctly to the evidence on record. ( 14 ) I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions made on either side. The legal proposition canvassed by the learned Advocate for the appellant is unexceptionable. The principles governing the doctrine of pious obligation are well-settled. As pointed out by the hon'blc Supreme Court in the decision in Luhar Amrit Lal Nagji v Doshi Jayantilal Jethalal and others, AIR 1960 SC 964 the doctrine of pious obligation under which sons are held liable to discharge their father's debts is based solely on religious considerations. This doctrine inevitably postulates that the father's debts must be vyavaharik. If the debts are not vyavaharik or are avyavaharik the doctrine of pious obligation cannot be invoked at all. The liability arises from an obligation of religion and duty which is placed upon the sons under the mithakshara law to discharge the father's debts where the debts are not tainted with immorality. This liability of the sons to pay the father's debts exists, whether the father be alive or dead. The liability arises from an obligation of religion and duty which is placed upon the sons under the mithakshara law to discharge the father's debts where the debts are not tainted with immorality. This liability of the sons to pay the father's debts exists, whether the father be alive or dead. (vide Venkatesh Dhonddev Deshpande v Kusum Dattatraya Kulkarni and others, AIR 1979 SC 1791 .) The Supreme Court while laying down the law as above, has referred to paras-240, 290 and 251 in mulla's hindu law, 14th edition with approval. ( 15 ) IT will have to be seen as to whether the evidence on record in the instant case, is such as would bind interests of the plaintiffs in the property sold by basappa to defendant on the basis of pious obligation. Before the said doctrine is invoked, it will have to be established that there was an existing debt next before the sale took place. The expression 'antecedent debt' will have to be understood in a correct perspective. 'antecedent debt' means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached. A borrowing money on the occasion of the grant of mortgage is not an antecedent debt. It is also necessary to bear in mind that to constitute 'antecedent debt', it is not necessary that the prior and subsequent creditor should be different person. All that is necessary is that the two transactions must be dis-associated, in time as well as in fact. This aspect is properly elucidated in the treatise on the principles of hindu law by mulla at page 406 (15th edition ). The Advocate for the defendant-appellant as pointed out earlier has relied on the 'admission' of the plaintiffs in the plaint as also on the admission of P. W. 1 in the course of his evidence. At this juncture, therefore, it is indeed necessary to see as to what is that admission relied on -by the defendant, in support of his submission that the admission relates to the existence of debt at the time of the sale deed executed in favour of defendant by basappa. Reliance is placed on the allegations made in the plaint at para-4 of the plaint. Reliance is placed on the allegations made in the plaint at para-4 of the plaint. The allegations in para-4 of the plaint relevant in this context read as under:"the father of the plaintiff basappa desai was an extravagant man and addicted to all vices. So in order to meet out his expenses it seems he raised some petty loan by leasing the joint family lands which were in the possession of the minor guardian savantrawa in this case as she had life interest in the said properties but said minor guardian savantrawa filed a suit for permanent injunction against the father of plaintiff and this defendant and others also restraining them from interfering with her enjoyment of her lands. Thereafter, the defendant failing in his attempt to satisfy his debt out of lands, it seems the defendant made father of the plaintiff to execute the sale deed and lease deed dated 29-6-1967 in respect of suit house fraudulently. . . . "then again, reliance is placed on the evidence of P. W. 1 - lakkanagouda at page 2-3 of his deposition. He has stated as under:"basappa was extravagant. Basappa had leased out his properties in order to satisfy his debts. Then savantrawa filed a suit in l. c. No. 150/66 on the file of this court against the present defendant and her adoptive son and his genitive father. " ( 16 ) IT will have to be seen as to whether the allegations culled out from para-4 of the plaint are of any avail to the defendant in support of the submission made on his behalf and referred to earlier. It is necessary to note that the first part of the allegations culled out from para-4 of the plaint refers to the fact that basappa was addicted to vices and in order to mete out the expenses he seems to have raised some petty loan by leasing the joint family lands which were in the possession of minor guardian savantrawa. (emphasis supplied ). It is, therefore, clear that the said allegation was made in the context of lease of lands. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the said lease was next before 1966 as can be seen from the copy of the plaint at ex. P. 8 in the suit filed by savantrawa. (emphasis supplied ). It is, therefore, clear that the said allegation was made in the context of lease of lands. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the said lease was next before 1966 as can be seen from the copy of the plaint at ex. P. 8 in the suit filed by savantrawa. Further assuming that the same would amount to the admission of existence of debt of basappa the same must have been wiped out by the lease of lands. At any rate, it is not permissible to assume that the debt continued to exist even after the lease of lands. Further the alleged admission is in the pleading of the plaintiffs. That is not the case made out by the defendant. In such a situation the admission relied on by the defendant in this behalf cannot be dissected. The allegation is that basappa used to raise petty loan in order to meet out his expenses to foster his vices. If that be so, the allegations will have to be taken as a whole and not in piecemeal. In this connection, it is indeed instructive to refer to the observation in the decision in Motabhoy Mulla Essabhoy v Mulji Haridas reported in AIR 1915 PC at page 2. It is pointed out therein that it is permissible for a tribunal to accept part and reject the rest of any witness's testimony. But an admission in pleading cannot be so dissected and if it is made subject to a condition, it must either be accepted subject to the condition or not accepted at all. If the allegations are taken together as a whole it means that the loan of basappa was tainted with immorality, having regard to the fact that it was also alleged that he was raising petty loans to meet the expenses for his vices. It is obvious that the same will not be of any avail to the defendant. If that be so, it will have to be next seen as to whether the second part of the allegation culled out from para-4 of the plaint hereinabove is of any assistance to advance the case of the defendant. It is obvious that the same will not be of any avail to the defendant. If that be so, it will have to be next seen as to whether the second part of the allegation culled out from para-4 of the plaint hereinabove is of any assistance to advance the case of the defendant. The second part of the allegation is that the defendant failing in his attempt to satisfy his debt out of the loans, it seemed that the defendant made the father of the plaintiffs to execute the sale deed and lease deed dated 29-6-1967 in respect of the suit house fraudulently, (emphasis supplied ). From the above allegation it is indeed difficult to read an admission to the effect that basappa sold the land to satisfy his debt. On the other hand, the allegation is that defendant was not able to satisfy hid debt out of lands and that therefore, he fraudulently made plaintiffs' father (basappa) to execute a sale deed and lease deed dated 29-6-1967. At any rate the allegations are ambiguous and are shrouded with obscurity. The Supreme Court in the decision in Bharat Singh and others v mst. Bhagirathi reported in AIR 1966 SC at page 405 (410) has pointed out that admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. As pointed out in the decision in Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v Bhawani Shankar Bhargava and another reported in AIR 1957 Allahabad at page 1 (11) an admission in order to be competent and to have the value and effect should be clear, certain and definite, and not ambiguous, vague and confused. Every admission should be given plain, literal and fair meaning and its scope should neither be enlarged nor restricted on the basis of suspicion or surmises vide Soraisem Kamini Singh v Chongtham Iboyaima Singh reported in AIR 1954 manipur at page 11 (13 ). Under these circumstances, it would follow that the allegation contained in the latter half of plaint para-4 also is not of any assistance to the defendant. ( 17 ) IN so far as the alleged admission attributed to P. W. 1, lakkanagouda is concernedit will suffice if it is stated that the same relates to the lease of lands. Under these circumstances, it would follow that the allegation contained in the latter half of plaint para-4 also is not of any assistance to the defendant. ( 17 ) IN so far as the alleged admission attributed to P. W. 1, lakkanagouda is concernedit will suffice if it is stated that the same relates to the lease of lands. Whatever is stated in this behalf with reference to the allegations in the earlier part of para-4 of ihc plaint referred to above- will mutatis mutandis apply here also. Further it is significant to note that P. W. 1 has resolutely denied at page-11 of his deposition that basappa was indebted to others and that he sold the suit property to the defendant for Rs. 2,000/- for his family legal necessities. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the admission attributed to P. W. 1 also is of no avail to the defendant. ( 18 ) FURTHER, as rightly pointed out by the 1st appellate court, defendant has not averred in his pleading that basappa had an existing debt next before the sale deed as per ex. p. 5. The learned additional civil judge has in the course of his judgment also referred to the decision in Tolaram and another v Beenjraj and others reported in AIR 1957 Rajasthan at page 256 - para-13 therein which reads as under:"in cases where there is a mere reference about the antecedent debts but no particulars are given to show what those debts were and also in cases where the mortgage is really executed for paying off the antecedent debts but there is no mention of antecedent debts in the mortgage deed, the onus would lie on the mortgagee to prove that the father had some antecedent debts to be paid at the time of the mortgage and he would further be required to relate the mortgage money to those debts. Unless the mortgagee is thus able to prove that there were antecedent debts in existence and that the mortgage money was borrowed to pay off those particular debts, the sons, cannot possibly prove the immorality or illegality of the antecedent debts. " ( 19 ) IN my opinion, the observation culledout here in above reflects the correct legal position. Unless the mortgagee is thus able to prove that there were antecedent debts in existence and that the mortgage money was borrowed to pay off those particular debts, the sons, cannot possibly prove the immorality or illegality of the antecedent debts. " ( 19 ) IN my opinion, the observation culledout here in above reflects the correct legal position. ( 20 ) THUS, it is seen that the defendant has not pleaded that basappa had any existing debt at the time of sale reflected in ex. P. 5. It is also seen that the allegations reflected in para-4 of the plaint allegedly amounting to admission arc of no assistance to the defendant. It is further seen that the recitals in ex. P. 5 do not bear out the said fact. It is also seen that both the courts have held that the legal necessity pleaded by the defendant-appellant is not established from the evidence on record, and i do not find any justifiable ground to take a view different from the one taken by the two courts below on this aspect. Under these circumstances, it is clear that there is no merit in this appeal. ( 21 ) BEFORE i conclude it is necessary to observe here that though the sale is not binding onthe interests of the plaintiffs in the property and that therefore, they cannot be dispossessed in execution of the decree passed in o. s. No. 49/89 against their father, the same will be good to the extent of the interest of basappa in the joint family property. The remedy if at all available to the defendant is the remedy available to the purchaser of a joint family property from a member of an undivided hindu joint family. It is for dcfcndant-1 to work out his remedy in a properly constituted suit subject of course to the law of limitations if he is so advised. ( 22 ) SUBJECT to the observations madeherein above, the appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, i make no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed. --- *** ---