Judgment :- In execution of a charge decree, decree-holder purchased the property in court sale on 28-3-1979. It was confirmed on 29-5-1979. Sale certificate was granted on 21-5-1988. Decree-holder-auction purchaser filed E.A. No. 597 of 1988 for delivery under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 22-9-1988. Judgment debt contended that application for delivery was barred by limitation. The executing court accepted this contention and dismissed the application as barred. This order is now challenged. 2. Application for delivery of possession by purchaser of immovable property of a sale in execution of decree is governed by Article 134 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation is one year and the time from which period begins to run is "when the sale becomes absolute". In this case sale became absolute on 29-5-1979. Application for delivery was filed nearly nine years after the sale became absolute. It was in this view that the executing court held that application was barred by time. 3. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that auction purchaser cannot file application for delivery merely because sale has become absolute; he has to wait till sale certificate is granted and in cases like the present one where sale certificate is granted after eight years, it would be inequitable to hold that application for delivery would be barred even before the issue of sale certificate. According to him even though third column of Article 134 mentions starting point of limitation as "when the sale becomes absolute", it must actually be read as "when the sale certificate is granted". The application for delivery has been filed within one year from the date" on which sale certificate was granted and hence, it is contended, application was within time. 4. My attention is invited to decisions of three High Courts. The earliest is the decision in Sm.Armian Bibi v. Chandra mani (AIR 1932 Calcutta 75), At the relevant time, period of limitation prescribed under the 1908 Act was three years from the date on which sale becomes absolute as indicated in Article 180. In that case application for delivery was made within three years from the date on which sale certificate was granted but beyond three years from the date on which sale became absolute. A Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Mukerji and Mitter, JJ. In that case application for delivery was made within three years from the date on which sale certificate was granted but beyond three years from the date on which sale became absolute. A Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Mukerji and Mitter, JJ. observed: "It is not possible to get over the position that time-would run from the date of confirmation of the sale the date on which the sale becomes absolute is recognised as a distinct and separate date from the date on which the sale certificate is actually issued, because Order 21, Rule 94, says that though the grant of certificates will follow the confirmation and consequently must be subsequent to the sale becoming absolute, the sale certificate shall bear the date the day on which the sale became absolute." Considering the arguments based on hardship to the parties the court observed: "We do not see why the auction-purchaser should not make the application for delivery of possession, so long as nothing in the shape of a definite bar stands in his way" Referring to arguments based on Rules 95 and 96 of Order 21 regarding mandate of existence of certificate, the court observed: "That is so; but the only effect of that is that no order can be made until the certificate has issued, and not that an application under either rule should on that account be delayed". 5. A Bench of the Nagpur High Court consisting of Hidayatullah and Sen, JJ. in Babulal Nathoolal v. Mt. Annapurnabai (AIR 1953 Nagpur 215) had to consider a specific question whether application for delivery could be filed with out sale certificate. Referring to Article 180 of the Limitation Act, 1908 the bench observed: "This article makes no reference to the certificate. It merely speaks of a purchaser'. The question is whether the purchaser who has not yet obtained a certificate from the Court is incompetent to apply or if he does apply the Court is bound to dismiss his petition unless he can produce a certificate within the period of limitation". The court pointed out that rights of the purchaser at a court sale do not commence when the certificate is granted and under S.65 of the Code the property is deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. The court pointed out that rights of the purchaser at a court sale do not commence when the certificate is granted and under S.65 of the Code the property is deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. Certificate is not a title deed. It is merely evidence of title. The Bench further observed: "Article 180, Limitation Act, provides its own conditions. It is not made subservient to the provisions of Order 21 Rules 94 and 95. If there was no provision of law imposing a stamp duty the court would be bound to grant a certificate forthwith. Since there may be delay in issuing the certificate the certificate is made to bear the date on which the sale becomes absolute". The court held that the application complied with all the requirements of Art.180 and could not be dismissed on the ground of limitation. With reference to Rule 95 of Order 21, the Bench pointed out that "There is nothing in that rule to make it incumbent for the purchaser to file the certificate along with his application. On the confirmation of the sale it is compulsory to issue the certificate. The failure to issue the certificate - whether the delay arises due to the action of the Court or to the inaction of the purchaser - has no bearing on the limitation for the application under Article 180. The purchaser cannot seek to extend the limitation on the ground that the certificate has not been issued. It is patent, therefore, that the issue of a certificate is not the sine qua non'of the application. The application being properly within limitation the evidence of title could be supplied later and this is what has happened". 6. In the decision in Kasinatha Pandaram v, Viswanatha Pandaram (79 Law Weekly 193) court sale was held on 21-12-1937, sale was confirmed on 22-7-1958 with regard to 15/16 share, sale certificate was issued on 23-7-1959 and application for delivery was made on 7-12-1961, within three years of the date of issue of certificate but beyond three years of the date of confirmation of sale. The Madras High Court referred to the observations of a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Abdul Ghani v. Lalchand (AIR 1940 Lahore 230) to the effect that title to the property after the sale is made absolute vests in the auction purchaser from the date of the sale and that the right to possession accrues only from the date of the sale certificate is not good in law. The court also referred to the observations of the Allahabad High Court in Ranjit Singh v. Baldeo Sing (ILR 30 All. 390) to the effect that although the grant of a certificate is a necessary preliminary to an application under S.318 (present Order 21 Rule 91) such application will be barred under S.178 (now Article 134) of the second Schedule to the Limitation Act, if not made within three years of the date on which certificate is granted, which we take to mean the date it bears, that is, the date of the confirmation of sale. The court also referred to the observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Chandramani Saha v.Anarjan (AIR 1934 P.C.134) to the effect that in construing the meaning of the words "when the sale becomes absolute" in Article 180, regard must be had not only to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 92(1) but also to the other material provisions of the Code. The court ultimately held that "it is practically settled law that, when a person wants to take delivery of the property purchased in a court auction, the limitation starts from the date of the confirmation of the sale and not from the date of the issue of the sale certificate by the court." 7. When sale of immovable property is ordered under Order 21 Rule 88 and it takes place, Rule 85 requires that full amount of purchase money payable together with the amount required for the general stamp paper for the certificate under R.94 shall be paid by the purchaser into court before the court closes on the fifteenth day from the date of the sale of the property, subject of course to the provisions of set off which may be available under R.72. Rules 89 to 91 provide for application being filed to set aside sale. Rule 92 explains, inter alia, when a sale becomes absolute. Rules 89 to 91 provide for application being filed to set aside sale. Rule 92 explains, inter alia, when a sale becomes absolute. Where no application is made under Rules 89 to 91 or where such application is made and disallowed, the court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. This rule is subject to the proviso that the court shall not confirm the sale until the final disposal of any claim to or any objection to the attachment of the property. Rule 94 states that where a sale of immovable property has become absolute, the court shall grant a certificate specifying the property sold and the name of the person who at the time of sale is declared to be the purchaser. Such certificate shall bear date the day on which the sale became absolute. Section 65 states that where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. Thus it is clear that court auction sale becomes absolute only on confirmation and once the sale has become absolute, title shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time of the sale. While it is the duty of the purchaser to provide necessary stamp required for the certificate it is the duty of the court to grant certificate. Sale certificate is not a title deed, it is only a document evidencing title. 8. While Rule 95 relates to order being passed for delivery of possession in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor, rule 96 deals with case where property sold is in the occupancy of a tenant. Relevant portion of rule 95 reads thus: "Where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under rule 94, the court' shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by putting such purchaser" Rule 96 also is on the same lines. Rule 95 does not lay down when an application is to be made for delivery. It only lays down when the court has to order delivery. Rule 95 does not lay down when an application is to be made for delivery. It only lays down when the court has to order delivery. The words "where the immovable property sold" in rule 95 apply to situation where sale which has taken place has been made absolute. As long as sale is not made absolute, auction purchaser obviously has no right to apply for delivery. The Court can order delivery when three conditions are satisfied; namely, the sale is made absolute, certificate has been granted under Rule 94 and there is an application of the purchaser. Reference to "application of the purchaser" would only mean, that the court cannot suo mote order delivery. There is nothing in the rule to indicate that grant of certificate under rule 94 is also a pre-condition for filing application for delivery, though grant of certificate is a pre-condition for the court ordering delivery. 9. Article 134 of the Limitation Act 1963 prescribes period of limitation for an application for delivery of possess ion by the purchaser of immovable property at court auction sale. The period of limitation prescribed is one year and time begins to run when the sale becomes absolute. If the intention of the legislature was that the time should begin to run only from the date of grant of certificate, the third column could very well have stated "when the sale certificate is granted". Sale certificate can be granted only after sale is made absolute. Though sale certificate is granted some time after the date, on which sale is made absolute, it shall bear the date on which sale became absolute. Title shall be deemed to have vested from the dale of sale and not from the date when sale is made absolute, nor from the date of grant of sale. Legislature had the choice of prescribing the date of commencement of period of limitation as either the date on which sale becomes absolute or the date on which sale certificate is granted and chose the former and not the latter. The Court cannot add to or subtract from the prescription made by the legislature. Legislature had the choice of prescribing the date of commencement of period of limitation as either the date on which sale becomes absolute or the date on which sale certificate is granted and chose the former and not the latter. The Court cannot add to or subtract from the prescription made by the legislature. The court auction purchaser when the sale has become absolute, has to file an application for delivery within one year from the date on which sale became absolute and without waiting for the grant of sale certificate, though before ordering delivery court has to wait for grant of sale certificate. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the High Courts of Calcutta, Nagpur and Madras. 10. I agree with the view taken by the lower court that the application for delivery in the instant case having been filed beyond the period of one year from the date on which sale has become absolute is barred by limitation. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed, but the circumstances without costs.