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Madras High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 374 (MAD)

N. Meenakshisundaram v. South India Corporation (P) Ltd. , Cochin-5 represented by Power Agent PL. Ramaswamy Chettiar and another

1990-06-11

JANARTHANAM

body1990
Judgment :- The South India Corporation Private Ltd., (for short ‘Corporation’) is a registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Anna Salai, 2 and carrying on business of Engineering Contractors at Cochin, Madras and other The Corporation and the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (for short ‘Board’) represented Chairman entered into an agreement on 27.10.1967 for supply and erection of Power Structural Steel between columns 0 to 10 (both inclusive) excluding Coal Bunker Ennore Thermal Scheme, Ennore, Madras-57, according to Specification No.C.990 clause for arbitration in case of any dispute arising between the parties. After completion the work, the Corporation had been claiming from the Board payments for execution work. Disputes between them arose, in the sense of the Board denying certain of the made by the Corporation, which resulted in the Corporation filing Civil Suit No.144 for filing the arbitration agreement into Court; for appointment of an Arbitrator referring the disputes to arbitration. 2. This Court by order dated 21.7.1983 appointed Thiru N.Meenakshisundaram, District and Sessions Judge and formerly Additional Registrar of this Court, as Arbitrator arbitration proceedings went upto 203.1987. The Arbitrator passed an award in a Rs.5,70,747.10 on various claims and he would however decline to grant interest as for on the ground that he is not empowered to do so. Thereafter, the Arbitrator award, which was ordered to be received on 29.4.1987 in O.P.No.206 of 1987. 3. The Court, after receipt, of the award, ordered issue of notice to the parties under (2) of the Arbitration Act. The Corporation, aggrieved by that portion of the award to grant interest, had come forward with O.P.No.562 of 1987 to set aside the same its right to file a separate application for passing a decree in terms of the award allowing claim of the Corporation to the extent of Rs.5,70,747.10. Despite reservation of such the Corporation did not appear to have filed such an application and learned appearing for the Corporation would also submit that he has no objection for a decree passed in terms of the award in so far as it relates to the claim of the Corporation various heads to the extent of Rs.5,70,747.10, obviously because of the fact that legally permissible for such an application to be filed beyond thirty days from the service of notice intimating the receipt of the award by the Court. In such State of the area of controversy between the parties revolves on the question of declining to interest by the Arbitrator from the date of the claim. 4. Learned counsel appearing for both sides do not at all dispute the legal position that award of the Arbitrator consists of different parts and all such parts are distinct and separate having any sort of a connection with the other, in the sense of each part is severable other, it is legally permissible for the Court to pass a decree in terms of the award in of a part, which is severable and is also valid and remit that part of the award, severable and not valid to the Arbitrator for consideration and in such circumstances, is no need for the Court to set aside the Award in its entirety and remit the same consideration to the Arbitrator. In this view of the matter, there is practically no difficulty all to pass a decree in terms of the award of the Arbitrator allowing the claim Corporation to the extent of Rs.5,70,747.10, which is admittedly distinct, separate severable from the other portion of the award relating to interest. Worthy it is to note that the power of the Arbitrator to award interest from the date of the passing of the till its realisation does not at all vest with him and this position is made clear sanguine and salutary provisions of Sec.29 of the Arbitration Act, which prescribes where and in so far as an award is for the payment of money, the Court may in the order interest, from the date of the decree at such rate as the Court deems reasonable, be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree face of such a provision, the question that is posed for consideration is as to the interest to be ordered on the amount awarded by the Arbitrator. 5. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the lending rates of nationalized is at 18 per cent per annum, which if awarded, cannot be stated to be unreasonable, circumstances of the case and therefore it is that the award of interest at the said rate the date of this order till payment of the amount awarded by the Arbitrator would meet the ends of justice. 6. 6. As respects the question regarding the power of the Arbitrator to award interest date of the claim to the date of passing of the award, learned counsel, for the Board seriously contend that the Arbitrator had not committed any error apparent on the record amounting to a legal misconduct in not awarding any interest for the said on the face of no other provision excepting Sec.29 of the Arbitration Act, which gives to the court to award interest only from the date of passing of the decree in terms award till date of realisation. In amplification of this argument, he would further that there is no clause at all in the agreement with regard to the payment of interest was only a general reference to the Arbitrator for resolving the disputes between them. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the Corporation would with all force and vehemence contend that the award of interest is implied in the agreement, in the absence of a prohibiting payment of interest and in the case on hand, there is no such prohibition provision and in this view of the matter, there is a legitimate duty cast upon the Arbitrator consider the claim of interest, according to the law of the land and such a non-consideration is an error apparent on the face of the record, tantamounting to legal misconduct on of the Arbitrator, which enables the award to be set aside for such misconduct. In support such a submission, he would place reliance on certain passages of Russel on the Arbitration, XX Edition appearing in pages 64 and 421 and they respectively read as "Implied terms: Certain terms are implied in any arbitration agreement, unless the intention is expressed in it. In addition, an arbitrator has certain powers to deal with which in part override any express terms of an arbitration agreement. In addition to these statutory terms, the Court will normally imply a term that the arbitrator is to decide the case in accordance with the ordinary law." "Failure to award interest: It is ‘misconduct’ for an arbitrator to fail to award interest when would be appropriate and no reason has been given why he should not; but in any event failure to award interest would result in a remission so that the arbitrator could make appropriate award." 8. He would also draw the attention of this Court to Halsbury’s Laws of England, IV Edition, Volume 2, on Arbitration, wherein it is stated at page 273 - Para 534: "Express and implied clauses: In general, the parties to an arbitration agreement include in it such clauses as they think fit. By statute, however, certain terms are implied an arbitration agreement unless a contrary intention is expressed or implied therein. Moreover, it is normally an implied term of an arbitration agreement that the arbitrator decide the dispute in accordance with the ordinary law. This includes the basic rules procedure, although parties can expressly or impliedly consent to depart from those The normal principles on which terms are implied in an agreement have to be considered the context that the agreement relates to an arbitration. “ Page 303 - Para 580: ”Interest: An arbitrator or umpire has power to award interest on the amount of any damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of arose and the date of the award. “ 9. He then relied on the decision in Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Division Surendranath, A.I.R. 1980 Ori. 119, wherein, while considering the power of the Arbitrator award interest, it was held as follows: “Unless there is specific clause in the agreement prohibiting award of interest the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to grant interest on the principal amount awarded by him on the different items of claim referred to him for arbitration. The natural conception of the word the ordinary or normal profit which the person entitled to the principal money might made if he had the use of the said money, or his expected loss under usual or circumstances due to the non-payment of the same at the proper time. Apart from express provisions for payment of interest in different statutes or in the contracts between the parties, interest can be directed to be paid in an arbitration proceeding on ex-gratia by way of compensation for the deprivation of the use of the principal amount. If interest be awarded by the Arbitrator on that basis in order to compensate the loss suffered man entitled to the principal amount due to deprivation of the use of the, said amount, is no reason why the Arbitrator cannot on the same principle grant future interest from due date till its realisation. If interest be awarded by the Arbitrator on that basis in order to compensate the loss suffered man entitled to the principal amount due to deprivation of the use of the, said amount, is no reason why the Arbitrator cannot on the same principle grant future interest from due date till its realisation. True it is that provision of Sec.34, C.P.C., is not applicable proceedings before the Arbitrator but there is nothing wrong for the Arbitrator to call the principles of that section for awarding interest, especially when one of the referred to him for adjudication relates to payment of interest. “ 10. He then relied on the decision in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand td., A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030: (1967)1 S.C.J. 472: (1967)1 S.C.R. 105 , herein Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 4 at page 1032 observed as follows: ” The last objection to the award is that the arbitrator had no power to award interest the pendency of the suit. In support of this objection, counsel for the appellant relied the following observations of Bose, J., in Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India, M.L.J. (S.C.) 23:1955 S.C.J. 445: (1955)2 S.C.R. 48: A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 468. “It was suggested that at least interest from the date of ‘s78t’ could be awarded analogy of Sec.34 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. But, Sec.34 does not apply because arbitrator is not a ‘Court’ within the meaning of the Code nor does the Code apply arbitrators, and, but for Sec.34, even a Court would not have the power to give interest the suit. This was, therefore, also rightly struck out from the award.” These observations divorced from their context, lend colour to the argument that arbitrator has no power to award pendente life interest. But, in later cases, this Court pointed out that the observations in Thawardas’s case, (1955)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 23: 1955 445: (1955)2 S.C.R. 48: A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 468, were not intended to lay down such a and unqualified proposition, see Nachiappa Chettiar v. Subramaniam Chettiar, (1960)1 (S.C.) 101: (1960)1 An.W.R (S.C.) 101: 1960 S.C.J. 416, Satindar Singh v. Umrao A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 908: (1961)3 S.C.R. 676 . The relevant facts regarding the claim for in Thawardas’s case, (1955)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 23: 1955 S.C.J. 445: (1955)2 S.C.R 48: 1955 S.C. 468, will be found at pp.64 to 66 of the Report (S.C.R.): (at pp.477 to A.I.R.) and in paras 2,17 and 24 of the Judgment of the Patna High Court reported in of India v. Premchand Satram Das, A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 201 at pp.204-205. The arbitrator awarded interest on unliquidated damages for a period before the reference to arbitration and also for a period subsequent to the reference. The High Court set aside the regarding interest on the ground that the claim for interest was not referred to arbitration and the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain claim. In this Court, counsel for the claimant contended that the arbitrator had power under the Interest Act of 1839 to award the interest and, in any event, he had to award interest during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings under Sec.34 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. ‘Bose, J., rejected this contention. It will be noticed judgment of this Court in Thawardas’s case, (1955)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 23.1955 S.C.J. (1955)2 S.C.R 48: A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 468, is silent on the question whether the arbitrator award interest during the pendency of arbitration proceedings, if the claim regarding is referred to arbitration. In the present case, all the disputes in the suit were referred arbitrator for his decision. One of the disputes in the suit was whether the respondent entitled to pendente lite interest. The arbitrator could decide the dispute and he could pendente lite interest just as a Court could do so under Sec.34 of the Code Procedure. Though, in terms, Sec.34 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not arbitrations, it was an implied term of the reference in the suit that the arbitrator decide the dispute according to. law and would give such relief with regard to pendente interest as the Court could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the arbitrator fettered either by the arbitration agreement or by the Arbitration Act, 1940. The contention that in an arbitration in a suit the arbitrator had no power to award pendente lite must be rejected.” 11. law and would give such relief with regard to pendente interest as the Court could give if it decided the dispute. This power of the arbitrator fettered either by the arbitration agreement or by the Arbitration Act, 1940. The contention that in an arbitration in a suit the arbitrator had no power to award pendente lite must be rejected.” 11. A reference had also been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union v. Bungo Steel Furniture (P) Ltd, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1032, wherein Their Lordships again the occasion to consider the question of grant of interest from the date, of award till of decree and observed in paragraph 6 at page 1036 reiterating the view taken decision in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1030, as follows: ” The legal position is the same in India. In Bhowanidas Ramgobind v. Haraukhdas ishendas, A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 524, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting Rankin and Mookerjee, JJ., held that the arbitrators had authority to make a decree interest after the date of the award and expressly approved the decision of the English - (1851)11 C.B. 588, Sherry v. Owke, (1835)3 Dowl. 349: 1 H.& W. 119 and Beahan Wolfe, (1832)1 Al and Na. 233. The same view has been expressed this Court in judgment in Firm Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd, Indore, A.I.R. S.C. 1030: (1967)1 S.C.J. 472: (1967)1 S.C.R 105 . We are accordingly of the, opinion the arbitrator had authority to grant interest from the date of the award to the date decree of Mallick, J. and Mr.Bindra is unable to make good his argument on this aspect case. 12. This view has been followed by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decisions Berry and Company (P) Ltd v. Union of India, A.I.R 1971 S.C. 696 and The Upper Valley Electricity Supply Company Ltd v. The UP. Electricity Board, A.I.R 1973 S.C. 13. From the aforesaid decisions, it is rather abundantly clear that what was committed the Arbitrator is not an error occasioned as a result of misappreciation of the records, but it is definitely an error of law on non-consideration and application of proposition regarding payment of interest according to the law of the land. Electricity Board, A.I.R 1973 S.C. 13. From the aforesaid decisions, it is rather abundantly clear that what was committed the Arbitrator is not an error occasioned as a result of misappreciation of the records, but it is definitely an error of law on non-consideration and application of proposition regarding payment of interest according to the law of the land. On the such an error having been committed by the Arbitrator, amounting to legal misconduct part, learned counsel for the Board was unable to support the award regarding the of the claim of interest and hence this portion of the award has to be set aside. 14. The resultant position is that the award of the Arbitrator in favour of the Corporation recognising its claim for Rs.5,70,747.10 has to be confirmed with interest at 18 per annum from the date of this order till payment and the award of the Arbitrator relating rejection of the claim of the Corporation regarding payment of interest deserves aside and the matter has to be remitted to the Arbitrator for fresh consideration, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order. 15. In this view of the matter, no orders are necessary in O.P.No.206 of 1987 award has already been received and notice was ordered to the parties as prayed for even on 29.4.1987. 16. In the result, there will be a decree for Rs.5,70,747.10, in terms of that portion Award, with interest at 18 per cent per annum from the date of this order till payment the Award of the Arbitrator rejecting the claim of the Corporation regarding payment interest is set aside and matter is remitted to the Arbitrator for fresh consideration claim with a direction that the Arbitrator should submit his decision to this Court within months from the date of receipt of this order. O.P.No.562 of 1987 is allowed accordingly the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Original Petition No.562 of 1987 allowed.