RAMAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) W. P. No. 3525/1988 order on i. a. nos. Ii and iii two applications ias. Ii and iii have been filed. La. No. Ii is for recalling the order dated 2-4-1990 and la. No. Iii is for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased jayamma, l. r. No. 2 of the deceased petitioner kenchegowda. ( 2 ) I first consider the application la. No. iii. In this la. Under order 22, Rule 3 r/w Section 151 CPC, it is brought to the notice of the court that jayamma one of the three legal representatives of the deceased kenchegowda, who was brought on record by an order dated 11-1-1989 is said to have expired on 22-5-1989. Therefore, a prayer is made to bring her legal representatives on record. One rajeswari, aged about 22 years, the daughter of jayamma is to be brought on record in her place. Rajeswari has sworn to an affidavit saying that she is the daughter of Smt. Jayamma. As there is no objection, in respect of these facts la. No. Iii is allowed. Smt. Rajcswari-daughter of the deceased jayamma is permitted to be brought on record in place of jayamma. ( 3 ) AS regards i. a. No. Ii, learned counsel submits that he could not be present when the order dated 2-4-1990 was made; that he wants to urge some contentions favourable to the petitioners and that therefore the order dated 2-4-1990 may be recalled and he may be heard. I heard him accordingly. ( 4 ) THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that while considering the ruling of the division bench in chikkanarasiah v tirupataiah, ILR 1989 Karnataka 1520, the view taken by the division bench in adiveppa shivappa mattur v tahsildar, ILR 1990 Karnataka 879, must be considered for the purpose of taking correct view on the facts of this case. In the decided case of adiveppa, the division bench of this court has held as follows:"when an application for regrant is filed, there is a statutory obligation on the authority exercising the power under the act to consider and decide the same. In the decided case of adiveppa, the division bench of this court has held as follows:"when an application for regrant is filed, there is a statutory obligation on the authority exercising the power under the act to consider and decide the same. In a case where on granting the application filed for regrant, the authority becomes disabled or disentitled, to exercise the power under Section 7 of the Act, it is the duty of the authority exercising the power under the act to decide the regrant proceeding first, if the authority exercising the power under the act is permitted to proceed with the summary eviction under Section 7 of the act without deciding the application filed for regrant, the valuable right accrued to the vendee to perfect his title in the event the regrant takes place will be defeated. At any rate, the state should not be allowed to take such a recourse because the object of the act is not only to abolish the village offices but also to regrant the land appertaining to the village office to the holders of the village office in addition to other objects. Therefore, to permit the authority to keep back the regrant proceedings and proceed with the eviction proceedings would result in permitting the authority to defeat the very object of the act and further to defeat or render infructuous the application filed for regrant of the land because once the eviction takes place under Section 7 of the Act, the question of regranting the land under Section 5 or 6 of the act does not arise because in such an event sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the act comes into operation. " ( 5 ) IN hanumaiah v state of karnataka, ILR 1987 Karnataka 550, the division bench of this court, having considered the preliminary issue relating to doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel as found in lakshmanagowda's case (1981 (1) kar. L. j. page 1) has distinguished the view taken by the division bench in lakshmanagowda's case and held that it was no longer a good law. In that view and having regard to the object of amended Section 7 of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (the act for short) it has laid down the law that a person squatting on the land illegally is liable to be evicted summarily. In that view and having regard to the object of amended Section 7 of the Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (the act for short) it has laid down the law that a person squatting on the land illegally is liable to be evicted summarily. The question of considering the application of the alienee in his favour under Section 5 or 6 would not arise. This view had been reiterated in chikkanarasiah's case. In chikkanarasaiah's case having regard to the amended Provisions of Section 7 of the act the bench has clearly laid down in paragraph 12 as follows:"section 5 (3) stood amended with effect from 7-8-1978, thereby imposing a complete bar against alienation for a period of 15 years from the date of the amended act. Hence, while considering the principles stated in para 65 of lakshmanagowda's case, it has to be examined whether, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel can be extended, so as to override the bar imposed by the amended Section 5 (3 ). When a person purports to transfer a property without title, the transferee gets title only when the alienor acquires a valid title; in such a case, the moment the alienor gets a good title, the estate would pass on to the transferee by the application of the doctrine of feeding the estoppel. But here, that is not possible because at the very instant of the grant, the bar against alienation imposed by the statute operates. " ( 6 ) THEIR lordships have observed that the application of principle of feeding the estoppel and that of Section 43 of the Transfer Of Property Act would be inconsistent with the Provisions of Section 7 of the act; a new mode of conferring title to the land on an unauthorised holder not provided by the act will be contrary to the scheme of the act. In that view of the matter, the earlier view found in lakshmanagowda's case came to be distinguished in chikkanarasiah's case, in view of the object found in the amended Section 7 of the act. ( 7 ) UNFORTUNATELY, in the adiveppa's case this ruling has been neither noticed nor has it been distinguished. Therefore, I am fortified by the judgment which is just and proper and there is no ground to recall the order. Accordingly, i. a. No. II is rejected. --- *** --- .