JUDGMENT - H. SURESH, J.:---The appellant-plaintiff filed a suit in the Bombay City Civil Court, being Suit No. 7879 of 1989 as against the respondent defendant for a decree or an order, in effect, to remove him from a certain cabin, which is in the occupation of the defendant. 2. The plaintiff's case is that he is a tenant in respect of a second floor of a building bearing No. 35, Hamam Street, Fort, Bombay, since about the year 1953. The plaintiff has built number of cabins in the said premises. Each of the cabin is provided with a door. The original keys of the doors of all the cabins have also been in the custody of the plaintiff all the time since 1953. Different cabins have been given to different persons from time to time. So, the plaintiff's case is that he is in possession and control of the entire premises, while the defendant is allowed the use and occupation of one of the cabins. After filing of the suit the plaintiff took out a notice of motion for certain reliefs when the defendant raised an objection under section 9-A, C.P. Code and submitted that as the plaint stands, the Bombay City Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit as the suit would fall within the scope of section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as recently amended. The learned Judge decided this question and upheld the contention of the defendant and by his order dated 10th July, 1990 returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation in a proper Court. It is against this order dated 10th July, 1990, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. 3. It is an accepted proposition that the jurisdiction of a Court will have to be decided on the basis of the averments in the plaint. Mr. Walawalkar, appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that If one goes through the plaint, it becomes clear that it is the case of the plaintiff that he is in joint possession of the premises with the defendant and that in such a suit it is not necessary that the plaintiff should seek any decree for possession of the property. Mr. Mr. Walawalkar, appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that If one goes through the plaint, it becomes clear that it is the case of the plaintiff that he is in joint possession of the premises with the defendant and that in such a suit it is not necessary that the plaintiff should seek any decree for possession of the property. Mr. Walawalkar submitted that under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Act, 1882, the Court of Small Causes at Bombay only will have jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit or proceedings between licensees or landlords and tenants for recovery of possession of immovable property situated in Bombay. Therefore, Mr. Walawalkar a proposition is that if on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto, it could be said that the plaintiff and the defendant are in join possession of the property, then, it cannot be said that the suit relates to recovery of possession of any immovable property and that, therefore, the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay will have jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit. 4. As against this, Miss Parekh submitted that the suit herein is the suit between a licensor and licensee, and if it relates to recovery of possession, whether joint of otherwise, it is the Court of Small Causes, which will have jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. She further submitted that in such a suit, it is not necessary that the licensee should have any protection under section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, She submitted that if a licensee is in possession of any defined area and the licence having been terminated, such suits cannot be filed in any Court except under section 41 of the presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 5. It is also well settled that the Court must look at the substance of the plant, not withstanding any ingenuity in drafting the plaint as such. Therefore, we have to see what is the substance of this plaint, he plaintiff says that he is a tenant in respect of a second floor premises in this particular building. He says that the premises consists of a big hall and there is a main door with the lock put up by the plaintiff. The plaintiff says he is in exclusive possession of the locks and the keys of the said main door. He says that the premises consists of a big hall and there is a main door with the lock put up by the plaintiff. The plaintiff says he is in exclusive possession of the locks and the keys of the said main door. He says that his guests, licensees and visitors to the said premises are allowed entry therein only when the said main door is opened by him. 6. The plaintiff further says that he has provided many small and big cabins in the said premises by means of wooden partitions. He is permitting his licensees or paying guests to make use of the said cabins. Each of the cabins is provided with a door. The original keys of the doors of all the cabins have also been in the custody of the plaintiff all the time since 1953. He also says that he has appointed lady clerks and receptionists for directing visitors to the said cabins. He is also providing electricity in each of the cabins. Water and toilet facilities are also provided in the said premises for the convenience of the occupants of the said cabins. He has also employed the services of a sweeper who cleans the common verandas and passages in the said premises . The cabins in the said premises are separately numbered. The present cabin bears number 8/C. The suit is in respect of this cabin. 7. Under an agreement of leave and licence dated 11-3-1964, the plaintiff had granted licence to one Jayantkumar Kothari to use and occupy the said cabin for using as an office of his business. The said licence initially was granted for a period of 11 months. But he had continued till his death on 4-9-1985. The said agreement permitted the said Jayantkumar Kothari to have access to the said only during office hours from 5.50 a.m. to 6.30 p.m. on weekdays i.e. from Mondays to Fridays and from 9.30 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. on Saturdays. Therefore, the plaintiff submits that under the said contract the said Jayantkumar was permitted to enter into the said cabin only if the main door of the suit premises was open and he was required to leave the said cabin before the said main door was closed by the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff submits that under the said contract the said Jayantkumar was permitted to enter into the said cabin only if the main door of the suit premises was open and he was required to leave the said cabin before the said main door was closed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff says that he had given a duplicate key of the said cabin to the said Jayantkumar just for the sake of convenience. The said Jayantkumar was carrying on business in the name and style of Jayantkumar Co., as importers and Stockists of Air Compressors, Spray Gums, Transition Rollers and Conveyor Chains and he was using the said Cabin as his office. At the time of his death, the said Jayantkumar was paying compensation at the rate of Rs. 325/- per month. 8. After the death of the said Jayantkumar, his son, the present defendant, approached the plaintiff and requested him to allow him to make use of the said cabin. That request was granted and that is how the defendant continued to use the said cabin for office as before. 9. The plaintiff says that in or about July 1983, the defendant requested the plaintiff to permit him to renovate the partitions of the said cabin and also to permit him to start a new concern in the name and style of M/s. Blue Chips, Computers. He also requested the plaintiff to enter into a fresh leave and licence agreement and to permit him to make use of the cabin as a regular class room for giving tiutions on computers and electronic machines. The plaintiff declined to grant any such permission to the defendant. The plaintiff thereupon called upon the defendant to stop use of the said cabin and the defendant did not stop. Thereafter there was correspondence and finally the defendant was called upon to leave the said cabin. 10. The plaintiff says that on account of the changes effected by the defendant in the electricity connections, the plaintiff is required to bear an additional burden of about over Rs. 800/- per month towards electricity charges. He also submitted that the defendant installed 8 to 9 computers, other appliances, more tube lights and fans in the said cabin. 10. The plaintiff says that on account of the changes effected by the defendant in the electricity connections, the plaintiff is required to bear an additional burden of about over Rs. 800/- per month towards electricity charges. He also submitted that the defendant installed 8 to 9 computers, other appliances, more tube lights and fans in the said cabin. The plaintiff further says that the defendant has been inviting number of persons to the said cabin of taking tiutions is operating computers and such persons visit the said cabin from very early morning till late in the evening in different batches. The plaintiff, therefore, submits that though the defendant is using ant occupying the said cabin, the said entire premises including the said cabin are in exclusive possession and control of the plaintiff. The defendant has no control over the said cabin inasmuch as the original key thereof is also in the possession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, states that the position of the defendant is no more than a lodger or paying guest or a licensee in occupation of the said cabin. The plaintiff then submits that the occupation of the defendant is not protected by any enactment and the defendant has no right to continue to use and occupy the said cabin. Since the defendant refused to vacate the said cabin, the plaintiff was required to file the present suit. The plaintiff has also claimed decree for compensation, etc. The remaining averments are not very relevant excepting that the plaintiff says that the suit does not relate to recovery of possession of any premises from the defendant and he submits that the defendant is not in possession of any portion of the said premises or even of the said cabin. Prayer (a) is for a mandatory order of injunction directing the defendant to remove himself from the said cabin No. 8/C. Prayer (b) is for an injunction restraining the defendant form entering into the said cabin. Prayer (c) is for arrears of compensation. Prayer (d) is for mesne profits for wrongful use and occupation of the said cabin. 11. Therefore, on the basis of the above averments made in the plaint, can it be said that this suit falls within the scope of section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, 1882. 12. Mr. Prayer (c) is for arrears of compensation. Prayer (d) is for mesne profits for wrongful use and occupation of the said cabin. 11. Therefore, on the basis of the above averments made in the plaint, can it be said that this suit falls within the scope of section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, 1882. 12. Mr. Walawalkar submitted that under the agreement, the main door keys are with the plaintiff, the hours of occupation are fixed and that the plaintiff has a key of the said cabin and that the plaintiff is incharge of the main door, Mr. Walwalkar therefore, submitted that, therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant is in possession of any portion of the premises exclusively. Therefore, his submission is that if the defendant is in joint possession with the plaintiff, then in such circumstances it cannot be said that the suit is for recovery of possession. This is a suit only for an injunction restraining the defendant from coming upon the suit premises and also for an injunction directing the defendant to remove himself from the suit premises. 13. Advocates have cited number of judgments in this connection, namely : (i) (Eknath Vithal Ogal v. Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain)1, 1988(2) Bom.C.R. 9 . (ii) (Vashdev Prakash v. Mrs. Vimal Premchand Hinduja)2, 1988(2) Bom.C.R. 288 . (iii) (Devi Prasad Surju Mishra v. Arjun Manohar Misra)3, 1983(1) All India Rent Control Journal 509. (iv) (Vishwanath Sawant v. Gandabhai Kikabhai)4, 1990 Mah.R.C.J. 273 : 1990(2) Bom.C.R. 406 . (v) (M. M. Amonkar v. Dr. S.A. Johari)5, U.J. (S.C.) 1984 Page 455 : 1984(2) Bom.C.R. 441 . It is not necessary for me to deal with these cases, as in all these cases referred to above, it is the licensee who went to a Civil Court or to the Court of Small Causes, as the case may be, filed a suit on an allegation that his possession of the suit premises is being interfered with or that he is being deprived of possession of the suit premises and sought suitable reliefs and in all such cases, the Court naturally held that the dispute is between a licensor and a licensee and that it relates to recovery of immoveable property and, therefore, such suit would fall within the scope of section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act. What is relevant is the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of (Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli v. Haribhai Patel)6, reported in A.I.R. 1980 Bombay 123. That, of course, was a suit relating to recovery of possession of a flat given on leave and licence agreement. It was argued that the relief claimed was not a decree for possession but was a declaration that the defendant was a trespasser upon or in respect of the said flat and that the to remain or continue to remain in use or occupation thereof and for a mandatory injunction against the defendant forthwith to remove himself from the said flat. The Court held that the declaration sought for did not change the real nature of the suit, and the prayer for mandatory injunction was in substance no other than a prayer for possession of the flat. Thus what was really preyed for was a decree for possession. 14. In the present case, the suit, in substance, relates to a defined cabin or an enclosed space, which has been numbered as Cabin No. 8/C, which is given to the defendants. It is in that cabin, the defendant's father, the said Jayantkumar carried on his business from 1964 till 1985. It was his office. It is true, under the agreement, one key was with the said Jayantkumar and perhaps the other key was with the plaintiff. But there is nothing to indicate that the said Cabin No. 8/C was at any time in the joint possession or occupation of the plaintiff and the said Jayantkumar. The same position continues even thereafter. The present defendant is in occupation of the said cabin and he carries on his business, therein. The plaintiff says that the defendant has made alternations or renovations with regard to the partition of the said cabin, though he did not change the original lock of the cabin. Mr. Walawalkar says that the plaintiff has still a key with him. But I thought that was the key factor in this case. The fact that there is a cabin with a lock and key at once determines the area which is in the exclusive use and occupation of the defendant. There is nothing to hold that the plaintiff is in joint possession or occupation of the cabin as such. But I thought that was the key factor in this case. The fact that there is a cabin with a lock and key at once determines the area which is in the exclusive use and occupation of the defendant. There is nothing to hold that the plaintiff is in joint possession or occupation of the cabin as such. Therefore, in law, if the plaintiff seeks to evict the defendant from the suit premises by an order of injunction, in effect and in substance, he is seeking to recover possession of the suit cabin, which is in exclusive use and occupation of the defendant himself. In my view, such a suit must necessarily fall within the scope of section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. 15. Mr. Walawalkar submitted that the main door of the entire hall is under the control of the plaintiff. He also submitted that the hours of use an occupation have been prescribed under the said agreement. He also submitted that the plaintiff has provided for various facilities such as supply of water, engaging a sweeper, etc. In my view, all these things would not make any difference. The subject matter is not the hall. The subject matter is the cabin and the claim for possession thereof Even otherwise, we can visualise, for example a landlord having control over the entire compound with a gate fixed thereon, with tenements situated within the compound, and it cannot be said that persons who are occupying such tenements are in joint possession with the landlord. It is only where a landlord and a tenant or a licensor and a licensee are in joint possession of the premises without any area of demarcation between the two, then, in such circumstances, it could be legitimately said that they are in joint possession enabling a plaintiff to file a suit for injunction and not for any relief of recovery of possession. 16. In the present case, it is evident that the plaintiff himself has sought for a mandatory order of injunction, which, in substance, is a decree for possession of the said Cabin No. 8/C. It is only after the possession of the said cabin is handed over to the plaintiff, the plaintiff can get an order of injunction restraining the defendant from entering upon the suit premises. In other words, in substance, this is a suit for recovery of possession of an immovable property, which is in the exclusive occupation and possession of the defendant under a leave and licence agreement. If that is so, as the plaint stands, the Bombay City Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit. 17. Mr. Walawalkar has relied on the case of (Mrs. M. R. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb)7, reported in A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 610. In my view, this case will have no bearing on the case which is before me. I am not concerned with the question as to whether the defendant could be said to be a tenant or a licensee. I proceed on the assumption what is stated in the plaint is correct. It is on that basis, the question of jurisdiction is being decided. 18. I, therefore, dismiss this appeal. The Registrar of the Bombay City Civil Court will now fix a date for handing over the plaint to the plaintiff for the presentation in a proper Court. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -----