JUDGMENT A.N. Varma 1. This civil revision is directed against the order passed by the learned II Addl. Civil Judge Kanpur making an award given upon a reference made at the instance of the parties a rule of the Court under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. After the award was filed in the Court the opposite party made an application dated 31-1-1984 under section 14/17 of the Arbitration Act for the award being made a rule of the Court. Several objections were filed by the applicant against the aforesaid application but it is not necessary to elaborate all of them in view of the fact that the ? learned counsel has confined his submissions to only two objections in this Court. The objection urged by the learned counsel is two folds : First, that the award was not filed strictly in the manner prescribed under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act; second, that the Arbitrator had made the award after the period fixed for the same had expired. 2. I shall take up the first objection first. The contention of the learned counsel was that Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act contemplates that the award should be filed either by the Arbitrator himself or by a party authorised by him in that behalf. In the present case neither of these two procedures was followed. I am unable to agree. The existence of the award as well as the covering letter dated 14-3-1984 written by the Arbitrator stating that the award was being sent to the Court through a messenger is not disputed. This gives sufficient jurisdiction to the Court to consider an application under Section 17 for the award a rule of the court. It must be remembered that Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act does not state that the Arbitrator should file the award himself. The provision merely requires as the Arbitrator either at the request of any party to Arbitration agreement or if so directed by the Court or even suo motu to cause the award to be filed in the Court. Further, Section 14 (2) is not exhaustive as to the mode of filing of the awards. No exception could, therefore, be taken to the Arbitrator having sent the award through a messenger. 3. Further, Section 14 (2) is not exhaustive as to the mode of filing of the awards. No exception could, therefore, be taken to the Arbitrator having sent the award through a messenger. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant, however, submits that the case of the opposite party was that the Arbitrator had authorised Sri K. C. Sinha, an Assistant Engineer in the PWD to file the award in the court. But, it was urged, K. C. Sinha has denied this allegation in the affidavit filed in the Court below. In my opinion, the question whether the Arbitrator had authorised Sri K. C. Sinha to file the award or not or whether the arbitrator had caused the award to be filed in the Court on his own is a question of fact which cannot be allowed to be raised in a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is sufficient that the court below has accepted the position that the award was filed on 14-3-1984 along with a covering letter of the Arbitrator. For the purpose of the proceedings under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act this was enough compliance. See the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1976 Cal 291 Federal Republic of Germany v. S. Dey and Associates. 4. The decision of the learned Civil Judge is fully supported by two decisions both of which have been noticed by the learned Civil Judge. These are Federal Republic of Germany v. S. Dey and Associates, 1976 Cal 291 and The District Co-operativa Development Federation Ltd. v. Ram Samujh Tiwari, 1973 Allahabad 476. The latter of these decisions is a Full Bench decision bearing on the effect of any irregularity as to the manner of filing of an award under Section 14 (2) on the jurisdiction of the Court to make award a rule of the Court under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act. The learned Judges have accepted that the act of filing an award under Section 14 (2) is a ministerial act not affecting the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 17 to pass a decree in terms thereof. In 1976 Cal 291, in paragraph 50 (Supra) the learned Judge observed thus : "It is settled law that filing of an award by the Arbitrator in Court is a ministerial act and not a judicial or a quasi judicial act. In 1976 Cal 291, in paragraph 50 (Supra) the learned Judge observed thus : "It is settled law that filing of an award by the Arbitrator in Court is a ministerial act and not a judicial or a quasi judicial act. In the case of Anandilal v. Keshavdeo reported in AIR 1949 Cal 549, an award dated the 24th December, 1939 had been made and signed by two named arbitrators. Subsequently arbitrator filed the award on the 13th January 1949. It was contended that the Rules of this Court required both the Arbitrators to perform the act and action by one of such arbitrators was not sufficient compliance with the Rules and the award therefore was not properly filed. This Court held that the relevant Rules did not require that the Arbitrator would file the award but all that was required that the Arbitrator must cause the award to be filed. In causing an award to be filed the arbitrator does not perform a judicial act but a ministerial act. In 1963 Allahabad page 602 Hazi Rahmetulla v. Chaudhari Vidya Bhusan the award had come before the Court having been filed by the plaintiff with a prayer that it may be made a rule of the Court. The award had neither been filed by the Arbitrator not by any of the parties to the arbitration agreement nor was any application made under Section 14 (2) of the Act. The question arose was whether it was open to the Court to act on the award under Section 17 and pass a decree on its basis. The question was answered in the affirmative. The Court ruled that a decree could be passed in terms of the award under Section 17 when the award had come before it and that it was not necessary that the award should have come before it in the manner provided under Section 14. This decision was approved by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of District Cooperative Development Federation Ltd. (Supra). The Full Bench held that there was nothing in Section 14 of the Act which precluded the Court from taking into consideration the award for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction conferred on it by Section 17 of the Act. 5. These decisions furnish a complete answer to the contention of the learned Standing Counsel on the first point mentioned above. The Full Bench held that there was nothing in Section 14 of the Act which precluded the Court from taking into consideration the award for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction conferred on it by Section 17 of the Act. 5. These decisions furnish a complete answer to the contention of the learned Standing Counsel on the first point mentioned above. In my opinion, the award having come before' the Court it could lawfully exercise its jurisdiction under Section 17 and pass a decree in terms thereof. Any supposed irregularity in the manner of filing the award could not in my view be made the basis for refusing to exercise the jurisdiction which was vested in the court below under Section 17. 6. That brings me to the second submission urged in support of the revision. The learned standing Counsel contended that the parties to the reference could agree to the extension of time within which the arbitrator was obliged to make the award only if they do so within four months after entering on the reference and not after the expiry of the period of four months fixed under clause 3 of the first schedule to the Arbitration Act. There is no merit in this contention either. Clause 3 of the first schedule as amended by U. P. Act 57 of 1956 reads as follows : "The arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within such extended time as the parties to the reference agree to, or in the absence of such agreement, as the court may allow". It is difficult to read in the provisions quoted above, clear and explicit as they are, any restriction on the right of the parties to agree to the extension by time after four months from the arbitrator's entering on the reference. The provision has been enacted primarily for the benefit of the parties to the arbitration agreement and to ensure that the arbitrator does not unduly delay the proceedings. That being so, I see no reason why the proceedings before the arbitrator should be held to lapse automatically on the expiry of four months after the arbitrators enter on the reference. The provision has been enacted primarily for the benefit of the parties to the arbitration agreement and to ensure that the arbitrator does not unduly delay the proceedings. That being so, I see no reason why the proceedings before the arbitrator should be held to lapse automatically on the expiry of four months after the arbitrators enter on the reference. The provision should not be construed in a narrow and restricted way so as to take away the right even of the parties themselves to agree to the extension of time. 7. Learned Standing Counsel tried to support his second contention with reference to Section 28 of the Arbitration Act which reads as follows : "Power to Court only to enlarge time for making award-(1) The Court may, if it thinks fit, whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not, enlarge from time to time, the time for making the award. (2) Any provision in an arbitration agreement whereby the arbitrators or umpire may, except with the consent of all the parties to the agreement, enlarge the time for making the award, shall be void and of no effect". 8. It is difficult to appreciate how these provisions can curtail the width and amplitude of clause 3 (as amended in U. P.) of the first schedule to the Arbitration Act which has been enacted under Section 3 of the Act. Section 28 merely deals with the power of the Court to enlarge time for making award and it states that any provision in the arbitration agreement which authorises the arbitrators to extend time for making the award shall be void and of no effect "except with the consent of all the parties to the agreement". Here again it will be noticed that the cases where the parties to the agreement them selve agree to enlargement of time have been excepted from the purview of sub-section (2) of Section 28. Some arguments were also advanced by the parties as to the date on which the arbitrator can be said to have entered on the reference. It is, however, unnecessary to enter into that question in view of the opinion expressed by me that the parties could agree to extension of time even after the period of four months referred to in clause 3 of the first schedule has expired. It is, however, unnecessary to enter into that question in view of the opinion expressed by me that the parties could agree to extension of time even after the period of four months referred to in clause 3 of the first schedule has expired. 9. In the result the revision fails and is dismissed with costs on the parties. Revision dismissed.