Judgment G. N. Ray, J. 1. This is an application for clarification of and/or consequential order or direction on the judgment dated 8.3.85 passed in appeal from original order no. 406 of 1982 arising out of Matter no. 2082 of 1981. The appellants Sri Pratul Chandra Chowdhury and his son, Sri Partha Chowdhury have made this application. The parties to the appeal are brothers and their sons. It appears that Sri Pramode Roy Choudhury and his three sons. namely, Praful Roy Chowdhary, Prafulla Roy Chowdhury and purnendu Roy Chowdhury and two grandsons Partha Roy Chowdhury and Prasanta Roy Chowdhury became the co-owners of several immovable properties including premises no. 104A and B, Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Road, known as Southern Market by virtue of several girls made by Sri Promode Roy Chowdhury during his life time in favour of the members of his family from time to time. As disputes and defenses with regard to the management and distribution of the income and joint properties arose, the parties entered into an agreement for referring all the disputes and differences to the sole arbitration and final determinati0n of Mr. B.M Das, since deceased, who was a former Advocate General of the State of West Bengal. The respondent no. 2, Sri Purnendu Roy Chowdhury stated before the Arbitrator that the north-eastern portion of roof of the ground floor of Southern Market covering an area about 5500 sq.ft. had been given on lease by the four co-owners in favour of the S.A.S. Enterprises, a partnership firm of the wives of Prafulla and Purnendu. It appears that on the direction of the Arbitrator, M/s. Talbott & Company assessed the value of the Southern Market at Rs. 7,30,600/- on the basis of existing rents receivable from different tenants, including the rent from S.A.S Enterprises and at Rs. 6,08,000/- on the basis of existing rents receivable from different tenants excluding the rents payable by the S.A.S. Enterprises but including the rent payable by the Bank to S,A.S. Enterprises. It was also stated before the Arbitrator that an additional structure had been constructed by S.A.S. Enterprises on the alleged leasehold land of the Southern Market by taking loan from the United Rink of India and such loan was adjusted against the rent payable by the said Bank to S.A.S. Enterprises. It was also stated before the Arbitrator that an additional structure had been constructed by S.A.S. Enterprises on the alleged leasehold land of the Southern Market by taking loan from the United Rink of India and such loan was adjusted against the rent payable by the said Bank to S.A.S. Enterprises. It also appears that the respondent no.2 stated before the Arbitrator that on January 26, 1931, a sum of Rs. 1.40,000/- approximately was still outstanding in favour of the United Bank of India on account of loan for the construction of the said building leased to the Bank. The learned Arbitrator published an award on October 5, 1981 and the said Southern Market was allotted in favour of the appellants, Sri Praful Roy Chowdhury and his son, Partha Roy Chowdhury. The learned Arbitrator held in paragraph 12A of the award to the following effect :- "That the contention of the third and fourth parties that the respective " wives have acquired a lease in perpetuity in respect of the north-eastern portion of the roof of the ground floor in the Housing Estate of the Southern Market at no. 184 A and n, Shy~m1a Prasad Mukherjee Road under the name of a partnership firm as S A S Enterprises from the first, third and fourth parties by way of a registered indenture dated November 3. 1975 is wholly mala fide and illegal. -By the alleged document, S A.S. Enterprises has acquired no tenancy right in the portion of the Southern Market and the alleged tenancy ~hall n01 be in any way binding on the allottees of the said market." 2. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 and Promode Roy Chowdhury, since deceased, filed a petition under Ss. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the said Award. On such application, Matter no. 82 of 1989 in the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of this Court arose. Such award was also set aside by the learned trial Judge by order dated November 30, 1982 and an appeal was preferred by the appellants against the judgment whereupon the instant appeal from Original Order no. 406 of 1982 arose. Such appeal was disposed of by a Division Bench presided over by Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.M. Dutt (as his lordship then was). 406 of 1982 arose. Such appeal was disposed of by a Division Bench presided over by Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.M. Dutt (as his lordship then was). Various objections were raised against the maintainability of the said award and one of the objections was that the SAS Enterprises was not the parties to the arbitration proceedings and had not also appeared before the Arbitrator, Accordingly, the learned Arbitrator misdirected himself in considering the respective rights of the parties to the arbitration agreement, vis-a- vis, SAS Enterprises stated to be a partnership firm. h was very strongly contended that the Arbitrator could not give an award to the effect that the SAS Enterprises had not acquired any 'tenancy right in the portion of the Southern Market and the alleged tenancy would not be in any way binding on the allottees of the said market, Referring to the findings made by the learned Arbitrator in paragraph 12A of the award, the Court of appeal in the judgment dated March 8, 1984 by which the appeal was finally disposed of, inter alia came to the finding that the said award was valid and binding on the parties 10 the agreement. It was, however, observed that "there can be no doubt that no finding of the learned Arbitration will be binding on SAS Enterprise." 3. The respondents, thereafter, made an application for Special, Leave to Appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which was numbered as Special Leave Petition (Civil Appeal no 2958 of 1985). It appears that the Special Leave Petition was ultimately disposed of by consent of parties in view of the fact that the appellants, namely, the allottees of the Southern Market agreed to pay an additional sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- to the respondent no. 1, Sri Prafulla Roy Chowdhury for his exclusive benefits within three months from the date of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Such consent was noted in the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 18.785 disposing of the Special Leave Petition. On August 19, 1985, the decree was passed in terms (}f the award since modified by the Court of Appeal by its judgment dated 8385 and incorporating the said provision of payment of Rs. 140000/- as noted in the judgment on the said Special Leave Petition. On August 19, 1985, the decree was passed in terms (}f the award since modified by the Court of Appeal by its judgment dated 8385 and incorporating the said provision of payment of Rs. 140000/- as noted in the judgment on the said Special Leave Petition. It appears that the appellants made an application for execution of the decree dated 19885 and for appointment of a Receiver for taking delivery of possession of the said north-eastern portion of ground floor of Southern Market from the said SAS Enterprises and to realise the occupation charges and to pay the same to the decree-holders in Award Case no. 70 of 1982. The respondents nos. 1 and 2 filed an affidavit-in opposition and another affidavit-in• opposition was filed by the wives of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 claiming to be the partners of the SAS Enterprises, inter alia, contending that the execution award was not enforceable against the said firm since it, was not party to the arbitration proceedings. It appears that by an order dated April 28, 1987. Receiver had been appointed in the said execution proceedings with certain directions. Thereafter, various order, were passed in the said execution proceedings. The appellant, made an application before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for clarification of its order dated 187.85 disposing of Civil Appeal no. 2868 of 1985 and for further direction in the matter. Such application was numbered as Civil Misc. Petition no. 8894 of-'988. Such application was disposed of by the Hon'ble High Court on April 20, 1988 by holding that there was no need for clarification of the order dated 18.785 and the pending execution petition should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. The execution proceedings are still pending. The appellants are apprehensive that in disposing of the said appeal, the observation of the Court of Appeal to the effect there could be no doubt that no finding Arbitrator will be binding on SAS Enteprises" is likely to create a serious prejudice to the appellants in the execution proceedings and such observation is likely to be interpreted as a finding made by the Court of Appeal in favour of SAS Enterprise. In the aforesaid circumstances, the instant application has been made by the appellants for clarification of purport and true effect of the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 8.3.85 in the light of the finding of the Arbitrator in paragraph 12A of the award as confirmed by the Appeal Court in its judgment and also in the context of the statements made by the respondent no. 2 in the arbitration proceedings as referred to in the judgment. . 4. Mr. Bankim Dutt, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that it was very strongly contended by the respondents before the Court of Appeal that paragraph 12A of the award was invalid in view of the fact that a portion of the Southern Market was given in lease to SAS Enterprise and the said SAS Enterprise was not party to the arbitration agreement. Such contention was however not accepted by the Court of appeal on the finding that the award relating to the said Southern Market in favour of the appellants was binding between the parties to the agreement and despite the alleged lease creased in favour of the SAS Enterprise in respect of the Southern Market by some of the parties in the arbitration agreement, the Arbitrator was competent to give a binding award in respect of the said Southern Market. Mr Dutt has submitted that as SAS Enterprise was not a party to the arbitration agreement it was contended that the Arbitrator was unjustified in attempting to decide the title If the SAS Enterprise by holding that such tenancy was not binding on the allottees. The Court of appeal had proceeded on the footing that the question of title infer se between the SAS Enterprise and the allotrees of 1 he Southern Market could not have been decided by the Arbitrator but 1 he Arbitrator was suite competent to allot the properties in favour of the appellants and such allotment was quite binding on all the parties to the arbitration agreement. Mr. Mr. Dutt has submitted that although the Court of appeal has clearly indicated that the Arbitrator should not have decided the question of inter se title between the SAS Enterprise and the parties to the arbitration agreement because of SAS Enterprise was not a party to the arbitration agreement, through inadvertence and on an apparent mistake, the said passing observation was made by the Court of Appeal by which the infer se title between the SAS Enterprise and the allottee, of the Southern Market was sought to be considered. Such apparent mistake obviously made through inadvertence requires to be corrected so that the SAS Enterprise does not get an endorsement by the court of appeal on the binding nature of the alleged agreement of tenancy on the allot tees of the Southern Market. namely the appellants. He has submitted that such observation is being strongly relied on by the objectors to the execution proceeding including the SAS Enterprise. The appellants are apprehensive that such observation though never intended by the Appeal Court to be any finding against the appellants so far as the alleged right of the SAS Enterprise is concerned, is likely to be interpreted in favour of the SAS Enterprise and the other objectors to the execution proceeding, as an adjudication of the Court of Appeal on the question of binding nature of the. said alleged tenancy in fayour of the SAS Enterprise Mr. Dutt has submitted that if inadvertently the Court makes a mistake, thereby prejudicially effecting a party, the court has ample power to rectify such error either by deleting the said observation or by making a suitable clarification of the said observation. Mr. Dutt has submitted that every court ha, inherent power to undo injustice meted out to a party through the error or mistake of the Court in support of this contention Mr. Dutt has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radha Kishore Chamaria reported in AIR 1953 SC 23 . The Supreme Court has held in the said decision that the court has inherent power to correct the mistake of the court. Mr. Dutt has also referred another decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Janaki Ram Aiyar v. P.M. Nilkanta Aiyor reported in AIR 1962 SC 633 . The Supreme Court has held in the said decision that the court has inherent power to correct the mistake of the court. Mr. Dutt has also referred another decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Janaki Ram Aiyar v. P.M. Nilkanta Aiyor reported in AIR 1962 SC 633 . In the said case, instead of the expression 'net profits' 'mesne profits' was mentioned in the order of the Court due to inadvertence. The Supreme Court held that such error can be corrected under s. 151 C. P. Code even if the appeal had been admitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Mr. Dutt has submitted that if the said observation in favour of the SAS Enterprises is expunged or deleted or explained by way of clarification, the appellants will not suffer any prejudice and expunction or deletion of the said observation inadvertently made will not create any prejudice against the respondents and/or the said SAS Enterprises. Mr. Dutt has aha submitted that the respondents accepted the position that the appellants would get Southern Market free from in cumbrance namely without being affected by the alleged lease-hold interest of the wives of the respondents no. 1 and 2 being the partners of SAS Enterprise. It was precisely for the said reason a slim of Rs. 140000/- alleged to be due to United Bank of India from SAS Enterprise was claimed by the respondents and on agreement of the parties the Special Leave petition was not pressed and was allowed to be disposed of by comment by upholding the judgment of the court of appeal after noting that the said sum of Rs. 140000/- would be paid by appellants to respondent no. 1 for his personal benefit in addition to other payments indicated in the judgment of the court of appeal. He has submitted that the said comment order clearly indicates that the alleged lease in favour of SAS Enterprise was, in reality a benami transaction of respondents otherwise there could not have been any question of receiving the said slim of Rs. 140000/- by respondent no.1 when it was alleged that the said Slim was the liabillity of SAS Enterprise to the United Bank of India. 140000/- by respondent no.1 when it was alleged that the said Slim was the liabillity of SAS Enterprise to the United Bank of India. It is not only illegal but against all principles of equity that even after the said consent order, the respondents and SAS Enterprise are contending that the award relating to Southern Market is not binding on SAS Enterprise and/or the said leasehold interest of SAS Enterprise was binding on the appellants. 5. Mr. Mallick, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has, however, contended that against the said judgment of the Court of appeal, the Special Leave petition was made before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and such Special Leave Petition was disposed of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by modifying the decree to the effect that a Slim of Rs. 1,40,000/- was to be paid by the appellant to respondent no. 1 for his perrsonal benefits. Mr. Mallick has submitted that the parties consented in having the judgment modified to that extent and on such consent, the Special Leave Petition was disposed of. In the aforesaid circumstances, the ultimate decree to be executed is the decree passed by the Supreme Court by modifying the decree of this Court and the judgment of this Court has merged into the order of the Supreme Court even if such order has been passed on comment. Accordingly no application for any correction or clarification of the judgment of the court of appeal can be made. It is only the Supreme Court, which may entertain such application. In this connection. Mr. Mallick has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Gojer Brothers v. Sri Ratan Lal Singh reported in AIR 1974 SC 1380 . It has been held in the said decision that where the decree of the trial Court is carried in appeal and the appeal Court makes a decision after a contested hearing, the decree to be executed is the decree of the appeal Court and not of the trial Court and the decree of the trial Court merges in the decree of the appeal Court Mr. Mallick has submitted that if the decree of the appeal Court stands modified in terms of the order of Supreme Court it is immaterial whether such modification has been made by consent of parties. Mallick has submitted that if the decree of the appeal Court stands modified in terms of the order of Supreme Court it is immaterial whether such modification has been made by consent of parties. The doctrine of merger will apply in view of such modification of the decree of the court of appea1. Mr. Mallick has also contended that before the Hon'ble Supreme' Court, the appellants had also made an application for clarification of the order and judgment made in respect of the said award. The appellants were quite conscious that any clarification can only be made before the Hon'ble Supreme - Court and precisely for the said reasons, such application for clarification was made but the Hon'ble Supreme refused to make any clarification and disposed of the said application with the only direction that the execution proceedings should be expedited. After the said order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the instant application for clarification and/or rectification is wholly misconceived and not maintainable. Mr. Mallick has next contended that in the application for. clarification made before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was contended by the appellants that such clarification was necessary because in terms of the judgment of the court of appeal, the appellants were entitled to collect rents and occupation charges from all -"the occupants of Southern Market and the respondents nos. 4, 5 and 6 should be restrained from collecting rents or occupation charges in respect of Southern Market. But such attempt to get an order was not allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence. the case for clarification in any other ground must be held to be barred by the principles of constructive res judicata. Mr. Mallick has next contended that after the judgment was passed, the decree has been drawn up and completed in all respects. The Court of appeal has, therefore, become functus afficio and as such, the Court cannot entertain any application for clarification and/or rectification of the alleged error or mistake. In this connection, Mr. Mallick has referred to a Bench decision in this Court made in the case of M/s. N, N. Verma v. Gordhandas Jerambhai reported in AIR 1965 SC 544. It has been held in the decision that once the order is drawn up, completed and filed, no application for variation can be entertained. Mr. In this connection, Mr. Mallick has referred to a Bench decision in this Court made in the case of M/s. N, N. Verma v. Gordhandas Jerambhai reported in AIR 1965 SC 544. It has been held in the decision that once the order is drawn up, completed and filed, no application for variation can be entertained. Mr. Mallick has also referred to a decision of the Privy Council made in the case of Priyarantna Unnase v. Wahareka Senutama, reported in 54 CWN 568. It has been held in the said decision that the general rule relating to amendment of an order of the court is that once an order is passed and the order is otherwise perfected: the Court, which passess the order becomes functus officio and it cannot set aside or alter the order however wrong it may appear to be and it can be done only under the relevant provision of the Code for rectification of obvious error. Mr. Mallick has further contended that in any event, no application under s. 151 for clarification and/or rectification of mistake or error can be entertained in view of the Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the of the Kerala State Electricity Board I', T. P. Kunhalinmma reported in AIR 1977 SC 288, Mr. Mallick has contended that Article 137 has a very wide application and it controls all applications to be made before a Civil Court including the application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal having been passed more than 3 years before the instant application it is barred by limitation. Therefore, the application should be dismissed in limine. Mr. Mallick has also contended that even on merits, there is no case for rectification of any mistake or error. He has contended that the respondents challenged the validity of the award in so far it related to the said Southern Market in view of the fact that interest of strangers not being party to the arbitration agreement was involved. It was essentially necessary for the Court of appeal to decide as to whether or not any award should be lawfully made in respect of the said Southern Market when SAS Enterprise had tenancy right in a portion of the said market. It was essentially necessary for the Court of appeal to decide as to whether or not any award should be lawfully made in respect of the said Southern Market when SAS Enterprise had tenancy right in a portion of the said market. It was in this context, the Appeal Court had decided that the award was not binding on .the strangers to the arbitration agreement namely the SAS Enterprise but the award was binding on the parties to the arbitration agreement. The said observation that the award was not binding on the SAS Enterprises was, therefore, not any stray observation inadvertently made as sought to be contended but such finding was made by the Court of Appeal as a part of the judgment in order to sustain the arbitration award relating to the Southern Market. Mr. Mallick has submitted that even if a portion of the decision was not necessary for the disposal of the lis between the parties and such decision may be held as obiter dictum, such obiter dictum cannot be held to be any error or mistake which can be rectified. He has, therefore. submitted that there is no substance in this application and the same should be dismissed. 6. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, it appears to us that the award was challenged by some of the parties to the arbitration agreement in the ordinary original jurisdiction of this court on various grounds and the learned trial Judge set aside the award. Such decision of the learned trial Judge was challenged by the appellants in appeal from original order no. 406 of 1982. The Court of Appeal with certain modification affirmed the award made by the learned Arbitrator. The respondents thereafter moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the decision of the Appeal Court in SLP no. 2858 of 1985. The premise, known as Southern Market has been allotted to the appellants. The respondents had been contending both before this Court and also before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that since a portion of the open space in Southern Market had been given in lease by some of the co-sharers in favour of the wives of respondent nos. 2858 of 1985. The premise, known as Southern Market has been allotted to the appellants. The respondents had been contending both before this Court and also before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that since a portion of the open space in Southern Market had been given in lease by some of the co-sharers in favour of the wives of respondent nos. 1 and 2 who had formed a partnership known as SAS Enterprise and the said partnership had been in possession of the same by letting out a building built on the open space to United Bank of India, the learned Arbitrator could not deal with Southern Market because the said SAS Enterprise was not a party to the arbitration agreement. Such contention was not accepted by the Appeal Court. The Appeal Court was of the view that the A ward in so far as it provides for allotment of the said Southern Market in favour of some of the parties to the arbitration agreement was quite valid and binding on all the parties to the agreement. It was also contended that the SAS Enterprise had got the building constructed on the said leasehold land after obtaining loan from the United Bank of India on condition that such Joan would be adjusted against the rent payable by the said United Bank of India and at the time of arbitration proceeding, one of the respondents had stated that a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- was outstanding in favour of the United Bank of India. It was contended that the learned Arbitrator while making allotment of the said Southern Market in favour of the appellants did not make any provision for the said sum of Rs. 1,40,000/-. Before the Supreme Court it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the Court of Appeal had also not provided for payment of the said sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- to the respondents. The proceeding before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, came to an end on consent of parties and the appellants had agreed that besides the sum payable by the appellants in terms of Appeal Court's judgment, a sum of Rs. 1,40,000/- should also be paid to the respondent no. 1 for this personal benefit. On such consent of the parties, the Special Leave Petition was disposed of. 1,40,000/- should also be paid to the respondent no. 1 for this personal benefit. On such consent of the parties, the Special Leave Petition was disposed of. It does not appear to us that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had any occasion to dispose of the Special Leave Petition on an independent consideration of the respective contentions of the parties. It is on the basis of the coment of parties the Special Leave Petition was disposed of by noting that the appellants would pay the said sum of R~, 1,40,000/- to the respondent no. I besides other payments as indicated in the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It appears that the judgment of Court of Appeal now stands affirmed upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court subject to the aforesaid modification on consent of parties. There is no manner of doubt that the decree as stands modified by the order of Supreme Court made on consent of parties is the ultimate decree to be executed. It also appears that such modified decree has been put to execution. If a decision of a Court is challenged in appeal or revision before the Supreme Court and a decision is ultimately made by the Superior Court, the decision of the Superior Court becomes the binding judgment superseding other judgments made by the Subordinate Courts and in such circumstances the judgment of the subordinate Courts merges with the judgment of the superior Court. It is immaterial if the, judgment of the superior court is based on contest or consent of parties. The question which comes up for decision in this application is whether or not the observation made in the judgment of the Appeal Court to the effect that award relating to southern market will not he binding on SAS Enterprise should be clarified or expunged or modified in exercise of inherent power of the Court of Appeal as recognised in s.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for ends of justice. It has been strongly contended that since the Special Leave Petition was disposed of by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by modifying the decree to the extent indicated above and such decree has been drawn up and perfected and has been put to execution and an application for clarification and further direction made by the appellants before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not allowed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, any prayer for clarification or modification of the alleged error or mistake of the Court of Appeal in making the 'aid observation, can no longer be entertained by the Court of Appeal. It was in this context the principle of merger and principle underlying constructive resjudiciable been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. It, however, appears to us that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not, considered the judgment of the Appeal Court on merits because there was no occasion for the Hon'ble Supreme Court to consider the judgment of the Appeal Court on merits and to give its decision on the same. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of on consent of parties by which subject to the additional payment of Rs. 1,40000/- by the appellants to the respondent no. I as agreed upon by the parties, the judgment of the Appeal Court stand affirmed. In such circumstances the court of Appeal. in our view, will not be precluded from considering the question of clarification. and or rectification of any error or inadvertent observation in its judgment fur ends of justice in exercise of inherent power of the court recognised in s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In our view, it is not correct to contend that simply because the decree has been drawn up and perfected and has been put to execution, a Court loses its inherent power for rectification of any error or mistake of the Court although rectification of such error or mistake is comonant to justice to the parties. It cannot be contended that when a decree, drawn up and perfected, has been put to execution the power to rectify clerical or arithmetical mistake under s. 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure will no longer be available because the Court having such power has become functus officio after the decree has been drawn up and perfected. It cannot be contended that when a decree, drawn up and perfected, has been put to execution the power to rectify clerical or arithmetical mistake under s. 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure will no longer be available because the Court having such power has become functus officio after the decree has been drawn up and perfected. Similarly every Court has inherent power to rectify any error or mistake of the Court by deleting, expunging or clarifying the error or mistake, if any, for ends of justice to the parties. Justice is the paramount consideration in the functioning of the court of law and precisely for the said reason it has always been recog1ised that the court of law, for ends of justice, can correct its own mistake and error by passing suitable order. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure by itself has not given any inherent power to the court of Jaw. It only recognises the power inherent in it. Large number of decisions have been given by the High Courts and the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of India in exercise of inherent power of the Court. There is no manner of doubt that if any error or mistake has been committed by the Court in disposing a is between the parties, the Court has not only the power to correct such error or mistake committed by it but it has also a duty to do so as to ensure that for the fault or the mistake of the Court, a party does not suffer unmerited prejudice and/or hardship. It should, however be borne in mind that a mistake or error of a Court may not be corrected on the ground of expediency if by the delay and/or laches of the aggrieved party action consequential to the judgment has been taken by others thereby fully satisfying the rights of the parties to the judgment and/or their succeessor-in-interest. Similarly, if on the basis of a judgment a right has been created in favour of third party, and such third party has proceeded on such right created in its favour, the court should desist from exercising inherent power to unsettle the settled position. Similarly, if on the basis of a judgment a right has been created in favour of third party, and such third party has proceeded on such right created in its favour, the court should desist from exercising inherent power to unsettle the settled position. Inherent power, in' our view, should not be exercised in the anxiety to undo injustice occasioned due: to mistake or error of the court, if due to delay and/or changed circumstances, such exercise of inherent power will also cause injustice or prejudice to the other party or persons. In the instant case, despite the fact that the decree has been drawn lip and put to execution. there has not been any alteration of the position of the parties including the SAS Enterprise so that exercise of inherent power will amount to unsettling the, settled position caused by implementing the judgment and decree. It also appears to us that the application for clarification and/or further order made by the appellants before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not allowed because there was no question of any clarification or further order to be made by the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after noting the fact that the execution proceeding was pending observed that such proceeding should be expedited. The decision of the Supreme Court in not passing any order of clarificatian or further order can be will understood. The Supreme Court has not given any decision or consideration of the merits of the case. The parties had consented, that in addition to the payment indicated in the judgment of the court of appeal, the appellants would pay to the respondent no. 1 Rs. 1,40,000/- (which according to the respondents was outstanding to United Bank of India account of loan advanced for the building) and on such consent, the special leave petition was disposed of. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court on its own did not decide the case, there was no question of clarifying its decision and there was aha no question of any further order to be made on an order made on consent. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court on its own did not decide the case, there was no question of clarifying its decision and there was aha no question of any further order to be made on an order made on consent. Hence, disposal of such application by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Our vie, cannot operate as a bar' to this court to consider the case of clarification and/or rectification of any error or mistake of the court and the disposal of the said application by the Hon'ble Supreme Court also will not prevent this court from considering the player of the appellants on the principle of constructive resjudicata as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents. We are also not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that this application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is barred in view of Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Mallick has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court made in AIR 1977 SC 282 where the Supreme Court has held that any application to be made in a civil court will be governed by the Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Mallick has contended that this application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore must be held to be an application governed by Article 137. Admittedly such application has been made long after three years after the date of judgment. Hence the application must be dismissed illumine. But exercise of inherent power by the court is not dependent on any provision of the Code or on any application to be made. Inherent power, as the term indicates, is inherent in a court of law and s. 151 does not confer any inherent power. It only recognises such power. In the Bench decision of this Court in Annada Prasad Mitra v. Sushil Mondal, reported in AIR 1942 Calcutta 396, Mr. Justice Bijon Kumar Mukherjea (as His Lordship then was) has very succinctly indicated the import of inherent power and real nature of such inherent power. It has been held that the Code of Civil Procedure no where provides for such' application. They are proceedings by which inherent power of the court is invoked. The application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not really any application under any provision of the Code. It has been held that the Code of Civil Procedure no where provides for such' application. They are proceedings by which inherent power of the court is invoked. The application under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not really any application under any provision of the Code. But it is essentially statement of certain facts for drawing the attention of the court for invoking its inherent power. It may be noted here that even suo mote the Court can initiate its inherent power. The true import of inherent power has also been indicated b)' the Supreme Court in Monoharlal v, Seth Hiralal reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 . In this connection reference may be made to a bench decision of the Madras High Court in Gopal Krishna v. State of Madras reported in AIR 1971 Madras 463. The decision in Almada Prasad Mitra's case has been followed by Orissa High Court reported in AIR 1956 Orissa 165 (Shram Sundar v. Nilkanth) and Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1962 Andhra Pradesh 64 (Poornahand v. Kamal Chand). In our view, this application in its real essence is not an application made under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it contains statements for drawing the attention of the court for exercising its inherent power which power the court can also exercise suo motu. Hence, unless on account of delay or laches there has been change in, the rights inter se the parties to the judgement or some right has been created in favour of a third party and on the ground of expediency, unsettling of the existing position on account of exercise of inherent power is not warranted, the Court can exercise its inherent power to rectify any mistake committed by Court in its paramount consideration and anxiety for ends of justice and such exercise of inherent power is not limited by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The decision made in AIR 1977 S. C. therefore is clearly distinguishable in the facts of this case. 7. Coming to the merits of the case for interference under inherent power of the court, Mr. The decision made in AIR 1977 S. C. therefore is clearly distinguishable in the facts of this case. 7. Coming to the merits of the case for interference under inherent power of the court, Mr. Mallick has contended that the appeal court in order to sustain the award so far as it related to Southern Market had held that the award was not binding on SAS Enterprise as SAS Enterprise was not party to the arbitration agreement and in view of such finding, the award was held maintainnable inter se the parties to the arbitration agreement. Such finding that the award was not binding on SAS Enterprise was, therefore, not just a stray observation but was made by the court of appeal for deciding the lis, Such finding is also not I officer but it was necessary to make such finding in order to salvage the award relating to Southern Market. Mr. Mallick has contended that even if the said finding is obiter dictum, there is no occasion to clarify or rectify an obiter dictum in exercise of the inherent power of the Court. It appears to us that an award could be lawfully made in respect of the Southern Market when market was the property of the parties to the arbitration agreement and such property was included within the terms of reference. The Court of appeal has clearly indicated in its judgment that such award relating to Southern Market had a binding effect on the parties to the agreement. The SAS Enterprise not being party to the arbitration agreement there was no occasion for arbitration to decide the right, if any, of SAS Enterprise in respect of Southern Market. The Award of the learned Arbitrator to the extent it purported to hold that SAS Enterprise did not acquire any tenancy right and the allottees were not bound by the alleged tenancy of SAS Enterprise was not approved by the Appeal Court on the ground that SAS Enterprise not being party to the arbitration agreement, the Arbitrator should not have decided the question of tide, if any of SAS Enterprise, 8. In the context of justification of the Award in so far in purported to decide the question of title of SAS Enterprise in a portion of Southern Market, on that ground the SAS Enterprise not being a party to the arbitration agreement such decision on the right title and interest of SAS Enterprise was foreign to the scope of reference, the Court of appeal was only required to decide the validity of the award and its binding nature on the parties to the agreement. and the question of title, if any, of a stranger and not being party to the arbitration agreement was not required to be gone into and no observation as to whether or not SAS Enterprise would he bound by the award was required to be made. It is apparent from the judgment of the court of appeal that although the Full Bench decision of the court in Niranjan Mukherjee's case (AIR 1926 Cal. 714) was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants for contending that the alleged tenancy not having been given by ~he appellants who were some of the co-sharers, the appellants would get the property on allotment of the same without being affected by the alleged lease in favour of SAS Enterprise created by a few co-sharers, the Court of appeal refrained from making any decision on the right of the appellants in Southern Market vis a vis the alleged tenancy right of SAS Enterprise simply on the ground that SAS Enterprise not being a party to the agreement, any determination of inter se title of SAS Enterprise and the appellant and/or respondents ,vas not warranted. In such circumstance, the said observation made by the appeal court was not intended for making a decision that the alleged leasehold interest of SAS Enterprise will not be affected by the award. As a matter of fact, such finding has not been made by the Appeal Court. The respondents and SAS Enterprise have been contesting the execution proceeding by contending that in view of the alleged tenancy right of SAS Enterprise the decree relating to allotment of Southern Market in favour of the appellants was not executable. As a matter of fact, such finding has not been made by the Appeal Court. The respondents and SAS Enterprise have been contesting the execution proceeding by contending that in view of the alleged tenancy right of SAS Enterprise the decree relating to allotment of Southern Market in favour of the appellants was not executable. It is not necessary for the disposal of this application to consider as to the maintainability of the execution proceeding and/or the effect of the decree on the respondents and/or SAS Enterprise, But as it appears to us that on the premises on which the award of the Arbitrator making a declaration that the alleged lease in favour of SAS Enterprise was not binding on the appellants was not approved by the Appeal Court, there was no necessity to hold as to whether or not the lease in favour of SAS Enterprise will be binding on the appellants or vice versa. It is, therefore, clarified that the expression in the judgment of the Appeal Court dated March 8, 1985 to the effect "there can be no doubt that no finding of the learned Arbitrator will be binding on SAS Enterprise is not any decision on the right title and interest, if any, inter se SAS Enterprise and the appellants in respect of the Southern Market or any portion thereof Such question could not be gone into in the absence of SAS Enterprise being a party to, the arbitration agreement and the said question, therefore, was kept open by the court of appeal. This proceeding for exercising inherent power is accordingly disposed of There will be no order as to costs. All parties to act on signed copy of the operative part of this judgment. Altamas Kabir, J : I agree. Application disposed of.