Judgment B. Prasad, J. 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment dated 4-4-1985 and the decree dated 15-4-1985 passed by Sri Radhe Sharan Prasad. District Judge, Begusarai in Title Appeal No.13 of 1984, by which the learned district Judge had affirmed the judgment and decree dated 24-3-1984 passed by Sri C. L. Churihara, the First Additional Munsit, Begusarai in Title suit No.136 of 1981. The present appellants were defendants in the suit and were the appellants before the lower appellate Court. Respondent No.1 was the sole plaintiff in the suit. 2. It appears that the respondent No.1 had filed Title Suit No.136 of 1981 in the Court of Munsif, Begusrai. In the suit, the case of respondent no.1 was that, he was appointed on permanent basis as Time-Keeper in the construction section of Barauni Refinary Project in Graded with effect from 1-5-1963. This appointment was made by inviting applications and holding interview of the candidates called. Since then, respondent No.1 is working on this post continuously and without any break. In the years 1964 and 1965 the present appellants promoted 12 of the employees (now respondent Nos.2 o 13) who were working as junior clerks in the construction scheme to the cadre of the time-keepers in the permanent set-up. Though, respondent No.1 was also working as a permanent time-keeper with effect from 1-5-1963 in the construction section, his claim was totally ignored, though the post of the time-keeper is a technical post and respondent No.1 was better equipped for the same on account of his previous experience. However, the appellants did not deliberately consider the case of respondent No.1 due to malice. 3. Respondent No.1 on several occassions placed his grievances before the appellants and filed several petitioner from time to time for his absorption in the permanent set-up in the cadre of time-keepers. The case of respondent no.1 alongwith the cases of two others were referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the appellants. The case of respondent No.1 was placed before industrial Tribunal, Patna, vide Reference Case No.25 of 1973. The case of respondent no.1 alongwith the cases of two others were referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the appellants. The case of respondent No.1 was placed before industrial Tribunal, Patna, vide Reference Case No.25 of 1973. The Item of reference with respect to respondent No.1, was as follows : "item No.3 :whether Sri S. S. Mishra, a time-keeper of construction set up should be absorbed in permanent set up alongwith the pay scale of other time-keepers in permanent set-up if so from when ?" The Industrial Tribunal, Patna on 16-1-1978 gave the award as follows: "the plaintiff be absorbed in permanent set-up in time office as timekeeper and the third vacancy will go to him. " It may be mentioned here that alongwith the case of respondent No.1, the cases of Sri Panchu Rai and Sri Upendra Prasad were also referred to the industrial Tribunal, Ranchi which gave the award that they should be absorbed in the time office on the permanent side and the first two vacancies would go to them giving priority to Sri Panchu Rai over Sri Upendra Prasad in view of the formers possessing higher qualification It was in this background that Industrial Tribunal, Patna while considering the case of respondent No.1 gave the award that he should be absorbed in the permanent side in the time office as time-keeper and the third vacancy will go to him. 4. It is the case of respondent No. i that he has been in un-interrupted service without break as time-keeper since 1-5-1963 and has got an unblemished record of service. Now since he has been ordered to be absorbed as permanent time-keeper in the permanent set-up as directed by the Industrial tribunal, he is legally entitled to his seniority as the date of his joining, i. e. since 1-5-1963, since all other time-keepers who have been absorbed in the permanent set-up from the construction set-up were given seniority from the dates of their initial joining. Unfortunately, however, despite repeated requests and reminders, the appellants did not consider the claim of respondent no.1 with respect to his seniority and errounously treated respondent no. i as a fresh appointee. Unfortunately, however, despite repeated requests and reminders, the appellants did not consider the claim of respondent no.1 with respect to his seniority and errounously treated respondent no. i as a fresh appointee. This was wrong on the part of the appellants since as per the award dated 16-1-1978 the pay scale fixed for the respondent no.1 as a time-keeper was not from the starting point, but it was fixed taking into account the salary being drawn by him at that time. This illegal act of the appellants has put respondent No.1 to a great monetary loss. Respondent no.1 has also lost his seniority, as a result of which, in future also he will lose his chance of promotion. Respondent No.1 is entitled as per rules of the Corporation, for his seniority and the adjustment of his salary and other benefits of service from 1-5-1963, the date of his joining as time-keeper. The appellants are, however, inimically disposed of towards respondent No.1 and ignored his case which is against the principles of natural justice, and is also arbitrary and discriminatory. 5. On these grounds respondent No.1 had prayed for a declaration that he was entitled to his seniority with effect from 1-5-1963 and also for his pay and allowances on the basis of this seniority. Respondent No.1 further prayed from manadatory injunction to place him on seniority list on the basis of his joining as time-keeper from 1-5-1963. He also prayed for the costs of the suit, or any other relief or reliefs to which he would be deemed to be entitled. 6. The appellants contested the suit and filed a written statement. They have contended that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 was appointed as timekeeper in Barauni Refinary Project with effect from 1-5-1963 for the construction set-up on purely temporary basis. It is wrong to say that he was appointed on permanent basis as time-keeper in Gradeb with effect from this date. It is false to allege that the case of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 was ignored at the time of promotion of 12 employees, in 1964 and 1965 to the posts of time-keepers. As a matter of fact, a full-fledged time office oa permanent basis was organised and 12 posts of time-keepers were created. The minimum qualification fixed for these posts was Intermediate and applications were invited from the departmental candidates working in the construction set-up. As a matter of fact, a full-fledged time office oa permanent basis was organised and 12 posts of time-keepers were created. The minimum qualification fixed for these posts was Intermediate and applications were invited from the departmental candidates working in the construction set-up. These posts were filled up after due tests and interview. So far, as plaintiff-respondent No.1 was concerned, he was not called for test or interview, since he did not possess requisite minimum, qualification of intermediate. Any allegation of malice against the appellants is totally unfounded. Respondent no.1 was working on a lower pay scale and after the construction work in Barauni Refinary Project was over, he alongwith two others was rendered surplus. Their cases were referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. So far as the present respondent No.1 is concerned, Industrial Tribunal Pataa gave the following award on 16-2-1988. "in view of the award of Ranchi Tribunal in order to avoid conflict of decision, 1 hold that Sri S. S. Mishra should be absorbed in the permanent side in time office as time-keeper and the 3rd vacancy will go to him. " It may be mentioned here that so far as the other two employees, namely sri Panchu Rai and Sri Upendra Pd. were concerned, their cases were decided by the Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi, which gave the following award on 12-8-1977 : "both Sri Panchu Rai and Sri Upendra Pd. be absorbed in the time office on permanent side and they are entitled to the same. The first two vacancies would go to them giving prioritv to Sri Panchu rai over Sri Upendra Pd. in view of the formers possessing higher qualification than that of Sri Upendra Pd. " 7. According to these awards, the vacancies to the post of time-keepers in the permanent set up were filled up by Sri Panchu Rai who was absorbed on 5-5-1978 and by Sri Upendra Pd. and Sri S. S. Mishra, who were absorbed on 28-2-1980. The appellants contended that respondent No.1 could not claim his seniority since 1-5-1963, the date of his joining his service in barauni Refinary Project, since the said appointment was purely temporary in nature and on the completion of the job, was declared surplus. and Sri S. S. Mishra, who were absorbed on 28-2-1980. The appellants contended that respondent No.1 could not claim his seniority since 1-5-1963, the date of his joining his service in barauni Refinary Project, since the said appointment was purely temporary in nature and on the completion of the job, was declared surplus. The pay of respondent No.1 on the post of the time-keeper in permanent set-up was fixed from the date of his appointment to this post as per normal rules and fixation of the seniority. Hence, respondent No 1 is not suffering any monetary loss nor is loosing his seniority. The appellants were never inimically disposed of towards respondent No.1. There has been no violation of the principles of natural justice. The seniority of all the time-keepers was reckoned with effect from the dates when they joined full fledged time office in permanent set-up. The awards given by the Industrial Tribunals; Ranchi, as well as, Patna, are final and any claiam of respondent No.1 beyond these two awards cannot be legally entertained. It was further contended that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to hesr this litigation since the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court as envisaged under the Industrial disputes Act. Respondent No.1 was also not entitled to a mauadatory injunction as prayed for and the suit was tit to be dismissed in limine. 8. Before proceeding to discuss the respective cases of the parties, I would like to mention that this litigation has got a chequered career of which notice may be taken. It appears that the suit was filed in the year 1981 by the present respondent No.1 against the Indian Oil Corporation and others and was decreed in full by the learned trial court by the judgment dated 24th march, 1984. Against this judgment the appeal was filed by the defendants before the learned District Judge which was heard and disposed of by the judgment dated 4th April, 1985. It was held by the learned lower appellate court that the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to get his seniority from the date of his initial appointment, i e. , from l-5-1963. He accordingly dismissed the appeal bled by the present appellants, who were the defendants in the suit. It was held by the learned lower appellate court that the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to get his seniority from the date of his initial appointment, i e. , from l-5-1963. He accordingly dismissed the appeal bled by the present appellants, who were the defendants in the suit. The brder sheet of this court in the present second appeal dated 17-7-1985 shows that this appeal was admitted and the following substantial questions of law were found involved in this appeal : I. Whether in view of the award dated 16-1-1978 given by the Industrial tribunal, Patna, in Reference Case No.25 of 1983, it was legal for the plaintiff to approach the civil Court for giving retrospective benefit of seniority to him? ii. Whether the Civil Court could have entertained the suit and could have granted the relief which could have been given only by special Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act? iii. Whether the question of seniority is covered under the various items, enumerated in Schedules II and III of the Industrial disputes Act? This second appeal was, however disposed of by the judgment dated 26-3-1987 by the learned Single Judge, S. Ali Ahmad, J, From this judgment it would appear that the learned judge had not proceeded to decide the substantial questions of law mentioned above as formulated by him by his order dated 17-7-1985. Sec.100 of the Code provides for filing of the second appeal. According to it save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial questions of law. (emphasis supplied ). As noticed above, the substantial questions of law were formulated by s. AH Ahmad, J. However, in his judgment dated 26-3-1987 he did not proceed to decide those substantial questions of law formulated by him. On the other hand, he held that the suit was not maintainable, in as much as, the plaintiff had failed to implead those persons 12 in number who will be effected with respect to their seniority if the claim of the plaintiff for his seniority from 1-5-1963 will be allowed. On the other hand, he held that the suit was not maintainable, in as much as, the plaintiff had failed to implead those persons 12 in number who will be effected with respect to their seniority if the claim of the plaintiff for his seniority from 1-5-1963 will be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the defendants, appellants was allowed and the judgments and the decrees passed by the learned courts below were set aside It may be noticed. Here that S. Ali Ahmad, J. did not record any finding with respect to the substantial questions of law formulated by him by his order dated 17-7-1985. 9. Against his judgment Civil appoal No.2275 of 1975 arising out of special Leave petition (Civil) No.5032 of 1987 was filed before the Hon ble supreme Court by respondent No.1. The following order was passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court on 19-10-1987 :- - "special leave granted. The Appeal is heard. We feel that the high Court has taken a highly technical view in this case in dismissing the suit on the ground that some persons who were, according to the High Court, necessary parties had not been impleaded as defendants. In the circumstances the judgment of the High Court should be set aside and the case should be remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. We order accordingly. We permit the appellant to make an application to implead the persons who are likely to be prejudiced by the order which may be passed by the High court. If such an application is made, the High Court shall grant it and direct that those persons shall be impleaded as parties before taking up the appeal disposal. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal. There shall be no order as to costs. " From the observations made above, it would appear that the Hon ble supreme Court disapproved the stand taken by this Court in calling upon respondent No.1 to implead some persons who according to it were necessary parties to this suit. According to the Hon ble Supreme Court this was taking a highly technical view in the matter in dismissing the suit on this ground without entering into the merits of the cases to the respective parties. According to the Hon ble Supreme Court this was taking a highly technical view in the matter in dismissing the suit on this ground without entering into the merits of the cases to the respective parties. This observation by the Supreme Court shows that the second appeal was not properly disposed of by the learned single Judge of this court. Accordingly, the record of this second appeal was received on remand. A petition under Order-1 Rule 10 and Sec.151 of the Code was filed by the respondent for permission to implead 12 persons named therein as respondents 2nd party to this second appeal, Accordingly, those twelve persons were added as respondents 2nd party. By the order dated 13-11-1987, notices were ordered to be issued against those who were sought to be added as respondents. The notices were found to be validly served upon them as will appear from the order of the court dated 24-3-1988. By another order dated 30-3-1988, those twelve persons were added as parties to this appeal. On 12-2-1989, however, the matter was placed before B. P. Sinha, J. The order of this date shows that the newly added respondent Nos.2 to 13 had already appeard and had filed their Vakalatnama. It was Further submitted on their behalf before the court that these newly added respondents want to adduce evidence and to place certain facts which were very much essential for the proper adjudication of the case. Thereafter, B. P. Sinha, J. in his order dated 12-9-1989 has observed as follows : - "i think it will be only in the interest of justice that in the given circumstances these newly added respondents are also given opportunity to adduce their evidence on the question as to whether they are likely to be prejudiced, it the plaintiffs suit is allowed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, let the matter be sent the trial court for recording evidence, which may be adduced on behalf of the newly added respondents. No further notice need be given either to the plaintiff or defendent No.1 of the suit. Parties may appear before the trial Court on 13th November, 1989 on which date the learned trial Court shall fix a date for recording evidence in the case. If the plaintiff or defendant no.1 wants to adduce any evidence in rebuttal, they shall also be allowed to do so. Parties may appear before the trial Court on 13th November, 1989 on which date the learned trial Court shall fix a date for recording evidence in the case. If the plaintiff or defendant no.1 wants to adduce any evidence in rebuttal, they shall also be allowed to do so. Let the records of this case be sent down to the trial Court immediately. The trial Court shall try to send back the records alongwith the recorded evidence to this Court within three months from the 13th November, 1989. When the records are received here from the Court below, the case shall again be placed for final hearing This case shall, however, be not treated as part-heard. " As stated above this second appeal was received back by this Court on remand from the Hon ble Supreme Court and therefore, it was obligatory on the part of this court to follow the directions given in the order of remand passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court. I have quoted in extenso this order dated 19-10-l987. In particular, even at the cost ot repoatiiion the following direction may be quoted again : "we permit the appellant to make an application to implead the persons who are likely to be prejudiced by the order which may be passed by the High Court. It such an application is made the High Court shall grant it and direct that those persons shall be impleaded as parties bttore taking up the appeal for disposal. . . . . . . " From this it would appear that all that the Hon ble Supreme Court directed was that the present respondent No.1 was permitted to file an application before this Court to implead certain persons likely to be prejudiced by any order that may be passed by this Court. It any tuch application was filed, it was ordered to be granted before taking of the appeal tor disposal. From this order of the Hon ble Supreme Court it would appear that there was no score for sending back the record to the trial court for adducing the evidence by the newly added respondents. Obviously, there was no such direction by the Hon ble Supreme Court. From this order of the Hon ble Supreme Court it would appear that there was no score for sending back the record to the trial court for adducing the evidence by the newly added respondents. Obviously, there was no such direction by the Hon ble Supreme Court. All that was ordered was that, if present respondent No.1 would file a petition for impleading those 12 persons as respondents, they may be added as respondents to this second appeal before taking up the appeal for disposal. It will amply mean that after their being added as parties they may also be heard and the appeal may be disposed of after noting the submissions made on their behalf. When this order by the Hon ble Supreme Court was so much specific, it is not clear on what basis b. P. Sinha, J. by the order dated 12-9-1989 sent back the record to the trial Court for recording evidence. The learned trial Court as directed, has recorded the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of newly added respondents second party but it is not clear how the same for the first time can be used in his second appeal specially when it was not before the learned trial court or the learned lower appellate court and no finding in its respect was recorded by them. Moreover, though those 12 persons were added as respondents 2nd party to this appeal they were not ordered to be added as defendants to the suit. It is well settled that on remand a Court gets the jurisdiction to hear the matter only to the extent of the directions given in the remand order. As noticed, there was no direction in the remand order to the effect that the newly added respondents may oe afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence before the trial court. Thus, it appears to me that the order dated 12-9-1989 passed by B. P. Sinha, J sending back the case to the trial court for recording the evidence to be adduced on behalf of the newly added respondents does not appear to be in terms of the order dated 19-10-1987 passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court. Thus, it appears to me that the order dated 12-9-1989 passed by B. P. Sinha, J sending back the case to the trial court for recording the evidence to be adduced on behalf of the newly added respondents does not appear to be in terms of the order dated 19-10-1987 passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court. Be that as it may, it is not for me to pass any comment in this regard The fact remains that the records were sent back to the trial Court and it appears that witnesses were examined before it afresh on behalf of the newly added respondents. 10. From the judgment of the learned trial court, it appears that before the learned Additional Munsif, it was urged that the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction in the matter since it is a suit by an employee against the employer for the declaration of the seniority. It was submitted before him that any such suit would be barred under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes act. The learned trial Court alter discussions came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Civil Court had jurisdiction in the matter. The learned trial court come to the conclusion that the claim of the plaintiff was a civil right and civil Court had jurisdiction to try this suit. Hence, he decided this issue in favour of the plaintiff. This finding has been a affirmed by the learned lower appellate Court. 11. Before me also it has been seriously contended on behalf of the appellants that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to try this suit since it is barred by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Both the parties have addressed the court on this point and therefore it has become necessary for me to discuss it in more detail. In this connection, firstly a reference may be made to Sec.9 of the Code, which provides that the court shall have jurisdiction to try all suit of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In its explanation (1) it has been provided that, a suit in which the right to property or to an office is pontested is a suit of civil natural. In its explanation (1) it has been provided that, a suit in which the right to property or to an office is pontested is a suit of civil natural. It s well settled that a statute, ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must bo stictly construed as held in the case of abdul Wahid Khan V/s. Bhawani, AIR 1965 SC 1718 . In the light of section 9 of the Code, a litigant having a grievance of civil nature undoubtedly has, independantely of any statute, a right to institute a suit in some court or the other unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Statute obstructing jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be strictly construed. The nature of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is universal in the sense that but for any expressed or implied bar of the jurisdiction ; upon all civil cause or disputes, it has power of cognizance. It is also well settled that the allegations made in the plaint will decide the forum and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court will not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. In that view of the matter, I will firstly proceed to see the allegations made in the plaint in order to decide whether the Civil court had or had no jurisdiction to try the suit. 12. In this plaint it is the case of the plaintiff that he was appointed on permanent basis as time-keeper or 1-5-1963 in the construction section in grade-d after observing the necessary formalities on a particular scale of salary. Since then he is in an interrupted service without any break as time-keeper with unblemished record of service. He has also been absorbed as a permanent time-keeper in the permanent set up as directed by the Industrial tribunal and is legally entitled to his seniority since the date of his joining, i. e.1-5-1963. Accordingly, the reliefs sought by the plaintiff in the suit were that it may be held that he is entitled to his seniority with effect from 1-5-1963 and also for his pay and allowances on the basis of this seniority. The plaintiff had further prayed that the defendants be directed through manadatory injunction to place the plaintiff on the seniority list on the basis of his joining as time-keeper from 1-5-1963. The plaintiff had further prayed that the defendants be directed through manadatory injunction to place the plaintiff on the seniority list on the basis of his joining as time-keeper from 1-5-1963. From the relevant claims made by the plaintiff, it appears that he has prayed for his seniority with effect from 1-5-1963 with all consequtial benefits and has also prayed for the issuing of manadatory injunction directing the defendants to place the plaintiff on the seniority list on the basis of his joining as time-keeper from 1-5-1963. 13. The next question that will arise in this connection would be whether the Industrial Tribunal could have granted these reliefs to the plaintiff. In this connection, a reference may be made to the Industrial disputes Act. Its Sec.2 (k) runs as follows : "industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employer, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with employment or non employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. " According to Sec.7 of this Act, the appropriate Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts lor the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second Schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. Sec.7-A of the Act relates to constitution of the Industrial Tribunals for adjudicating any industrial dispute mentioned in the second and third schedule. Obviously, the question of seniority has not been included either in the second or the thud Schedule, Also not included in these schedules is the question of issuance of manadatory injunction either by the labour court or by the Industrial Tribunal. As noticed above, in this suit the plaintiff has only Claimed his seniority with effect 1-3-1963, but has also prayed for the issuance of a manadatory injunction directing the defendants-appellants to place him on the seniority list on the basis of his joining as time-keeper from 1-5-1963. It is clear that these two reliefs could not have been granted to the plaintiff by the Industrial tribunal. The question that will now arise for consideration would be, whether under these circumstances the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred. 14. It is clear that these two reliefs could not have been granted to the plaintiff by the Industrial tribunal. The question that will now arise for consideration would be, whether under these circumstances the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred. 14. That matter had come upon for determination before the Hon ble supreme Court in the case of premier Automobiles V/s. K. S. Wadke, AIR 1975 sc 2238 . The Hon ble Supreme Court in the judgment has laid down what would be the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to the Industrial Disputes. The principles have been enumerated as follows : 1. If the dispute is not an Industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the Civil Court.2. If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the act,the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative leaving it to the election of the suit or concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.3. If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suit or is to get an adjudication under the Act.4. If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Sec.33 C or the raising of an industrial dispute as the case may be. 15. If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter V-A then the remedy for its enforcement is either Sec.33 C or the raising of an industrial dispute as the case may be. 15. This is a leading judgment of this subject and it still holds the field it clearly spelts out the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil court in relation to an Industrial Dispute, It provides that if the dispute is no and industrial Dispute nor does it relate to enforcement to any other right under the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy lies only in the Civil Court It further provides that even if the dispute is an Industrial Dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the industrial Disputes Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative It further provides that ,f the Industrial Dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or pn obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, then the" only remedy available to the suitor is to get adjudication under this Act. If however, the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under this Act in Chapter. V-A, then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33 (C) or the raising Industrial dispute, as the case may be. 16. As noticed above in the preceding paras the claim of the plaintiff is for his seniority with effect from 1 -3-1963 and also for manadatory injunction directing the respondents to place him on the seniority list with effect form this date when he has claimed to have joined as time-keeper on placement basis. Under these circumstances, it is obivious that these two reliefs could not have been granted to the plaintiff under the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act as they have not been covered either under second Schedule or third Schedule of the Act. Therefore it is obvious that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try this suit and the finding to this effect by the learned trial court as also by the learned lower appellate Court cannot be assailed. 17. As mentioned above, there were two awards given by the Industrial tribunal. One was with respect to respondent No.1 and it was given by the industrial Tribunal Patna on 16-1-1978. 17. As mentioned above, there were two awards given by the Industrial tribunal. One was with respect to respondent No.1 and it was given by the industrial Tribunal Patna on 16-1-1978. The other was with respect to sri Panchu Rai and Sri Upendra Prasad. This award was given the Industrial tribunal, Ranchi on 12-8-1977. In the award given by the Industrial tribunal, Patna in Reference Case No.25 of 1973 relating to respondent No.1 it was observed that he be absorbed in the permanent set up in the time office as time-keeper and the third vacancy will go to him. It is not clear on what basis it has been observed as such because obviously respondent No.1 was not a party before the Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi which was considering the cases of only Panchu Rai and Upendra Prasad. In this view of the matter, also this award dated 16-1-1978 given by the Industrial Tribunal, patna with respect to respondent No.1 has been rightly assailed. 18. The appellants have contended that respondent No.1 was appointed on 1-5-1963 as time-keeper in Barauni Refinary Project on temporary basis. Subsequently, a full-flaged time office on permanent basis was organised and 12 posts of time-keepers were created. The minimum qualification fixed for these posts was Intermediate, and the applications were invited from the departmental candidates working in the Construction set up. Respondent no, 1 was not called for test interview since he did not possess requisite minimum qualification of Intermediate. In the course of argument, the learned counsel for the appellants has supported this statement made in the written statement. He has also submitted that in a circumstance like this there could be no question of any malice against respondent No.1. 19. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 has challenged these contentions. In this regard, his submissions were two-fold, firstly, he has submitted that respondent No.1 even at the relevant time was holding the qualification of Acharaya which was held to be equivalent to the Intermediate of Arts vide resolution dated 29th Match, 1963 issued by the Education department vide notification No. Vl/ii-7-018/63 E-374. It has been submitted that this a notification issued by the Government of Bihar and its judicial notice should be taken. No doubt, the law prescribes, a particular mode of proving a notification issued by the Government. That mode does not appear to have been adopted tn this regard. 20. It has been submitted that this a notification issued by the Government of Bihar and its judicial notice should be taken. No doubt, the law prescribes, a particular mode of proving a notification issued by the Government. That mode does not appear to have been adopted tn this regard. 20. The alternative plea of respondent No.1 in this regard is that exhibit-6 is a circular issued by the Barauni Retinary Project on 24-4-1964. This circular will show that it was decided to fill up a few posts of time-keeper in the permanent set up of the accounts department from the willing senior clerks/junior clerks and time-keepers in the organisation on the basis of their qualification, seniority and efficiency. It does not speak a word that the minimum qualification fixed for this appoint was Intermediate. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 has contended before me that respondent No.1 fully qualified to be considered for this appointment of time-keeper in the permanent set up as per this circular dated 24-4-1964 even if it be presumed for a moment that he did not possess the qualification of Intermediate. However, he has pointed out that now respondent No.1 is a graduate. Be that as it may, Exhibit-6 clearly shows that no minimum qualification was prescribed for the appointment of the time keepers in the permanent set up who were to be appointed solely on the basis of their qualification, seniority and efficiency. All heads of the departments were requested to send the applications of the employees working under them Respondent No.1 has contended that inspite of Ext.6, his application was not forwarded for being considered for appointment to the post of time-keeper in the permanent set up for the reasons best known to the administration. As in Ext.6 no minimum qualification has been prescribed. I see no reason why the case of respondent No.1 was not considered. 21. In this connection, my attention has been drawn to another circular (Ext 6/a) which is dated 29-8-1964. It also speaks of filling up a few posts of time keepers in the permanent set up of the accounts department from senior clerks/junior clerks/ time keepers in the organisation on the basis of their qualification, seniority and efficiency. Its last sentence runs as follows : only those candidates will be considered to who have passed Intermediate examination in Arts/science/commerce. It also speaks of filling up a few posts of time keepers in the permanent set up of the accounts department from senior clerks/junior clerks/ time keepers in the organisation on the basis of their qualification, seniority and efficiency. Its last sentence runs as follows : only those candidates will be considered to who have passed Intermediate examination in Arts/science/commerce. obviously this is a new addition in Ext.6/a which is totally absent in ext 6. Ext 6 is prior in point of time. If the administration of Barauni refinary Project intended to amend the earlier circular (Ext.6) by the new circuler (Ext.6/a) it is not clear what prevented the Project from spelting it out in the subsequent circular Ext.6/a ). Even it be presumed that it was with in the competence of the administration to amend Ext.6 so as to state sat the candidates having passed Intermediate examination in Arts/science/commerce were only to be considered, it would have been proper that this fact have been spelt out in Ext.6-A Since this was not done, obviously ext.6 will have its force and this Exhibit does not prescribe the mum qualification. Under these circumstances, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that since respondent no.1 did not have requisite qualification of Intermediate, he was not called for interview in as much as, Ext.6 which is prior in point of time and which was not subsequently annulled, or withdrawn or modified, did not prescribe any such minimum qualification The learned Counsel appearing on behalf the appellants has not been able to cleanfy this position. From this it could safely be concluded as per Ext, 6 that respondent No.1 possessed the repuisite qualification and in this circumstance it is not clear why his case was not considered for being absorbed in the permanent set upas time keeper. This clearly lands support to the contention of respondent No.1 that this was done out of malice In paragraph-5 of the written statement it has clearly been stated that the plaintiff (respondent No.1)was not called for test or interview for these 12 posts since he was not eligible as he did not possess the minimum qualification of Intermediate. Ext 6 gives a he to this statement made in paragraph-5 of the written statement and supports the allegation of malice against the appellants. 22. Ext 6 gives a he to this statement made in paragraph-5 of the written statement and supports the allegation of malice against the appellants. 22. In oaraeraph 5 of the plaint it has been stated that the plaintiff has been in un-interrupted service without any break as time-keeper since 1-5-1963 and has got unblemished record of service This paragraph has not clearly been replied in the written statement and an omnibus statement has been made in its paragraph-6 that the entire allegations of the plaintiff made in para-Nos.3 to 7 are incorrect and false and are denied these defendants. This type of viguo denial can hardly be of any consequence. However, at the time of argument Sri Gupta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant conceded that the services of respondent No.1 was never terminated in the sense that there was no cessation of the relationship of master and servant. It was his only submissions that respondent No.1 was rendered surplus. From this it would appear that there is no denying the fact that over since his appointment with effect from 1-5-1963 either on a permanent basis, as claimed by respondent No.1, or on a temporary basis as alleged by the appellants, Respondent No.1 is continuing on the post of time keeper without any break and un-interruptedly. 23. From the plaint, it would appear that the plaintiff (respondent no.1) on several occasions placed his grievances before the defendants appellants and filed several petitions from time to time with respect to his claim of seniority and permanent absorbtion as time keeper in the permanent set up. It. however, appears that it was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, patna vide Reference Case No.25 of 1973. The reference was in the following language : "whether Sri S. S. Mishra, a time-keeper of construction set up should be absorbed in permanent set up along with pay scale of other time keepers in permanent set-up ; if so from when ?" According to the written statement, the Industrial Tribunal, Patna gave the following awards: "in view of the award of Ranchi Tribunal in order in order to void conflict of decision I hold that Sri S. S. Mishra should also be absorbed in the permanent side in the time office as time-keeper and the third vacancy will go to him. " 24. " 24. From para graph-6 of the written statement, it would appear that respondent No.1 was absorbed in the permanent set up on 28-2-1980. From this it would appear that in any view of the matter with effect from 28-2-1980 respondent No.1 was absorbed in permanent set up of time keepers. 25. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 has contended that under this circumstances, he is entitled to his seniority with effect from the initial date of his appointment which is 1-5-1963 even if it be presumed for a moment that it was a temporary appoinment. He has submitted that it was not a temporary appointment but a permanent appointment, and in proof thereof he has pointed out that no temporary appointment could have been allowed to continue from 1-5-1963 till today. Alternatively, he has submitted that if any such temporary appointment is allowed to continue indifinetely for such a long period for all practical purposes it may be treated to be a permanent appointment. He has taken pains to point out that even if the continuance of respondent No.1 to his post after 16-1-1978 (the date of the award in Ref. Case No.25 of 1973) is considered to be on the basis of this award, there is no denying the fact that till 15-1-1978 he had continued to act as a time keeper. He has, however, hastened to add that it is his case that till date he is acting as a time keeper with effect from the initial date of his appointment i. e. , 1-5-1963. in this connection, he has pointed out that the Tribunal had no business to say that any third vacancy will go respondent No.1, in as much as at the time when the cases of Panchu Rai and Upendra Prasad were being considered, respondent No.1 was not noticed and the award was given behind the back. Whatever may be the position, the facts remains that admittedly respondent No.1 is acting as time-keeper continuously without any interruption or broak with effect from 1-5-1963. Whatever may be the position, the facts remains that admittedly respondent No.1 is acting as time-keeper continuously without any interruption or broak with effect from 1-5-1963. Even if the contention of the appellants that he was appointed on a temporary basis on this date in the Construction set up be accepted for a moment to be correct, it has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for respondent No.1 that under these circumstance it is well-settled that he acquires legal right not only to continue on the post, but also to claim seniority with effect from 1-5-1963. In support of his contention, he has relied on a number of decisions. 26. In this connection, he has placed reliance on the latest case of Direct recruitment Class II Engineering Officers Association V/s. State of Maharashtra 1990 2 SC Cases 715. This was a case relating to claims of inter-se authority between the Direct Recruits and the promotees. It was hold that where appointment was made in accordance with the rules seniority was to be counted from the date of such appointment, and not from the date of confirmation. The Hon ble Supreme Court in this case has gone to the extent of holding that even where initial appointment was not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules, but the appointee continues on the post un-interruptedly till regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating services will be counted. It is only in the case of stop gan or ad hoc appointment not made according to rules that the officiation on such posts cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority. It was further held that once an incumabent was appointed to a post according to rules his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his coaspiration the seniority cannot be determined on the sole test of confirmation, for confirmation his one of the inglorious uncertaatities of goverment service depending neither on efficiency of the incumbent nor on the availability of the substantive vacancies. The principle for deciding inter se. Seniority has to confirm to the principle of equality spilt out in Articles 14 and 16 of confirmation. The principle for deciding inter se. Seniority has to confirm to the principle of equality spilt out in Articles 14 and 16 of confirmation. It may be pointed out here that respondent No.1 had mentioned in paragraph-1 of the plaint that he was appointed as time keeper in the construction section in Group-D after proper interview and after observing necessary formalities by the Defendant Corporation on 1-5-1963. Paragraph 5 of the written statement deals with this paragraph of the plaint. In paragraph-5 of the written statement, it has been admitted that the plaintiff was appointed as time keeper in Barauni Refinary Project with effect from 1-5-1963. It has not been denied that this appointment was not made after observing due interview and other tormalities tne defendant corporation. The only denial is that, on this date he was appointed on purely temporary basis. From this it would appear that the assertion of respondent No.1 that he was appointed on 1-5-1963 after observing necessary formalities has not been denied by the appellants. 27. From the judgment of the above mentioned decision by the Supreme court, it wuld appear mat a number of other decisions on this point were reviewed and the law has been laid down in very clear terms in this regard. The case of S. B. Patbardhan V/s. State of Maharashtra, Alr 1977 SC 2051 ). The case ol Baleshwar Das V/s. State of U. P. ( AIR 1981 SC 41 ) and the case of narendra Chadda V/s. The Union of India ( AIR 1986 SC 638 ) were taken in to consideration by the Hon ble Supreme Court in this decision and the ratio of these cases was approved. In the case of Narendra Chadda (supra) it was held that where Steers were promoted without following procedure prescribed in the rules and worked continuously for a long periods without being reverted, then it was held that they were entitled to counting the period of their continuous officiation for seniority and that any other view would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that if ad hoc appointees are allowed to continue, as such for long years without being reverted or charged, they would be deemed to have been regularised. It was further held that if ad hoc appointees are allowed to continue, as such for long years without being reverted or charged, they would be deemed to have been regularised. In this connection, a reference may also be made to the full Bench decision of this court in the case of Bisundeo Mahton V/s. State of bihar, (1982 LIC 1446) (FB ). It was the case in which the determination of seniority of the officers in the State and subordinate services were more than one officer were appointed to the services at the same time was involved, it was held that the appointment on temporary posts can alone be substantive and 1934 rules under which the appointments were made, applied both at the stage of temporary as also the substantive appointment. However, since facts of this Full Bench case are entirely different, it is not much help to the appellants. 28. From these authoritative pronouncements by the Supreme Court which have been noticed above it becomes clear that even if it be presumed for a moment that initial appointment of respondent No.1 was temporary in nature, he will be entitled to his seniority with effect from the date of his initial appointment, i. e.1-5-1963, notwithstanding the award dated 16-1-1978 given by the Industrial Tribunal Patna and notwithstanding anything to the contrary which might have been decided by the appellants. 29. On behalf of the appellants, it has further been submitted that this suit was not maintainable because it has tried to enforce the term of the contract of service which is barred by Sec.14 (b) of the Specific Relief act. Sec.14 of this Act provides for those contracts which cannot be specifically enforced. The following contract cannot be specifically enforced namely : "14 (b):a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details or which is not dependent on the personal qualifications or volition of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the Court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms. " It has further been submitted on behalf of the appellants that since under section 36 (A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy has been made available to respondent No.1, no suit is maintainable. " It has further been submitted on behalf of the appellants that since under section 36 (A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy has been made available to respondent No.1, no suit is maintainable. Sec.36-A (2) runs as follows : "36-A (2):the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which such question is referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of beine heard, decide such question and its decision shall be final and binding on all such parties. " 30. With respect to the questions raised under the Specific Relief Act, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 has submitted that this plea cannot be raised for the first time in the second appeal. He has taken pains to point out that no such plea was raised in the written statement and no evidence was adduced in support of any such plea. This plea was not even taken in the course of the argument either before the trial Court or before the lower appellate Court. Hence, for the first time, the appellants cannot be allowed to raise this plea in this second appeal. It has further been contended that even in this appeal at the time of the formulation of the substantial questions of law, no such substantial questions of law was formulated by this Court. Accordingly, it was the submission of the learned counsel for respondent No. i that for the first time the plea with respect to the specific Relief Act, cannot be raised at this stage. In this connection, he has drawn my attention to the case of the Assistant Manager, CBI V/s. V. N. Sinha, ( 1985 BBCJ 194 ) in support of his contention. In this case, it was held that the points which were not raised either before the trial court or before the lower appellate Court cannot be allowed to be agitated in the second appeal. So far Sec.36)-A (2) is concerned, a decision by any Labour Court or Tribunal can be said to be final only when any such decision was within their competence. As held above, the question of seniority or issuance of mandatory injunction being not within their competence any decision by them in this regard cannot be said to be final or binding. 31. As held above, the question of seniority or issuance of mandatory injunction being not within their competence any decision by them in this regard cannot be said to be final or binding. 31. The learned Counsel for respondent No.1 in this connection has drawn my attention to the provisions of Articles 12 and 311 of the Constitution of india He has submitted that even Sri Gupta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has conceded that Indian Oil Corporation, is a Government of India undertaking. Drawing my attention to article 12 of the Constitution of India, he has submitted that Indian Oil corporation will be deemed to be "the State" within the -meaning of Part-III of the Constitution since it is admittedly under the control of the Government of India. Under this circumstance, it was his submission that the provisions of part-Ill of the Constitution. Including Articles 14 and 16 will be applicable to the case of respondent No.1. In as much as, the Indian Oil Corporation is a "state" within the meaning of Article-12 of the Constitution. He has pointed out that though respondent No.1 cannot seek the benefit of Article-311 of the Constitution, which relates only to members of the Civil services of the Union or State or a person holding a Civil post under them, he can very well seek the aid of Article-12 of the Constitution of India. 32. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellants has heavily relied on the case of Executive Committee of U. P. State Ware Housing Corporation Ltd. V/s. Chandra Kiran Tiyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 . No doubt, the ratio of this case was that the violation of Regulation 16 (3) of the Agricultural Produce (Development and Ware Housing) Corporation Act, 1956 was a breach of terms and conditions of relationship of master and servant and the master was liable for damages lor wrongful dismissal. In the said case, the Hon ble supreme Court did not find any violation of statutory obligation. 33. However, this decision appears to have been over-ruled by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhdeo Singh V/s. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1975, SC 1331. It was hold in if that the authorities such as Oil and Natural gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation and Industrial Finance corporation were "authorities" within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of India. It was hold in if that the authorities such as Oil and Natural gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation and Industrial Finance corporation were "authorities" within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of India. It was further held that rules and regulations framed by these statutory corporation had the force of law and their employees had a statutory status and were entitled to declaration of bxing in the employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of the statutory provisions. Accordingly, the above mentioned decisions of the Hon ble Supreme court to the tiyagis case was to th;s extent over-ruled. Also over-ruled was a similar decision by the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Air Lines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Singh, AIR.1971 SC 1828. In view of the fact of that this decision in Tiyagis case, has since been over ruled by the Hon ble Supreme court in the case of Sukhdeo Singh (supra) it was not fair on the part of the learned Counsel for the appellants to rely on an over-ruled decision. Be that as it may, it is now well established that Articles 12, 14, 16 and 226 of the constitution of India will come to the aid of respondent No.1 who is admittedly an employee of India Oil Corporation Company, a Government of India undertaking. 34. In this connection, it may be mentioned that as early as in the year 1973, in the case of Sirsa Municipality V/s. C. K. F. Tellis, ( AIR 1973 SC 855 )the facts, were that an employee was dismissed by Sirsa Municipality (which was governed by Bombay District Municipality Act), without giving him an opportunity of being heard. In this case also, the above noted two decisions in Tiyagis case and Indian Air Lines Corporation case alongwith several other decisions were taken into consideration. Its para-29 above the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in this case. It runs as follows : "29. There decisions indicate that statutory provisions may limit the power of dismissal. Where such limitation is disregarded, a dismissal may be held invalid. In this respect employment under statutory bodies differs from ordinary private employment. Its para-29 above the conclusion arrived at by the Supreme Court in this case. It runs as follows : "29. There decisions indicate that statutory provisions may limit the power of dismissal. Where such limitation is disregarded, a dismissal may be held invalid. In this respect employment under statutory bodies differs from ordinary private employment. Where a public body is empowered to terminate employment on specific grounds, or, where a public body does not enforce the procedure laid down by the Legislature e. g. in properly delegates power of dismissal to anybody, the courts have declared that such dismissal from public employment to be invalid. " In this connection, a reliance has been placed by the appellants in the case of vaishya Degree College V/s. Lakshmi Narayan, ( AIR 1976 SC 888 ,. This is a case of a Degree College, which was registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act, and was affiliated to the Agra University, The question that arose for determination before the Hon ble Supreme Court was, whether it wat a statutory body. It was held that before a institution can be a statutory body, it must be created by or under the statute and owe its existence to a statute. A distinction was sought to be made between an which was not created by or under the Statute, but was only governed by certain statutory provision for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution, it was further held that there were a number of institutions which though not created by or under any statute, had adopted certain statutory provisions but it was held that by itself it was not sufficient to cloth the institution with the statutory character, 35 In reply the learned counsel for respondent No.1 has submitted that in the present case admittedly the Indian Oil Corporation is an organisation created by the Statute, and therefore, this decision will not be applicable to the present case. He has pointed out that this is not one of those class in which the institution (Indian Oil Corporation) was not created by or under a Statute, but was simply governed by the statutory provisions. Hence, it was his submission that this decision is of no help to the appellants. He has pointed out that this is not one of those class in which the institution (Indian Oil Corporation) was not created by or under a Statute, but was simply governed by the statutory provisions. Hence, it was his submission that this decision is of no help to the appellants. Hence, I do not find any force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants specially in view of the decision in the case of Premier Automobiles (supra ). 36. Sri Gupta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has placed reliance on Sec.18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. He has pointed out that a settlement arrived at by the agreement between the employer and the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Relying of Sec.18 (2), he has contended that an arbitration award also which has become enforcible, shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to the arbitration. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the case of Barauni Refinary P. S. Parishad V/s. I. O. C. , 1990 BBCJ 93 . This his a decision by the Hon ble Supreme Court. The facts of the said case, however, appears to be entirely different. That was a case of settlement between Employer and the Employee in the course of conciliation proceedings. It was under these circumstance thut it was held that any such settlement by recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment including those belonging to the minority union which had objected to the same. In the present case, there is no question of any settlement or any conciliation proceeding. There is also no question of any dispute between a majority union or a minority union. It is simply a case of an employee claiming his seniority with effect from a particular date and seeding an order of mandatory injunction directing the appellants to giving him seniority with effect from the date of initial appointment as time-keeper. Hence this decision is of no held to the learned Counsel. However, as has been pointed out above, the question of seniority is not a labour dispute. Hence this decision is of no held to the learned Counsel. However, as has been pointed out above, the question of seniority is not a labour dispute. It is important to notice here that both the parties have placed reliance on the case of N and C Bank Employees Union V/s. I Kannan, 1978 LB IC 648. This is a single Bench decision of Madrass High Court. No about in it was held that the disputes not covered by any of the items under Schedules-II and III, will not even that it is not an Industrial dispute since the learned judge held that any such dispute can be covered by residuary items. However, in the same decision it has been held that even if the dispute is an industrial dispute, but is one arising out of a right or liability under the general Common Law and not under the Act, the jurisdictioa of the Civil court was not ousted. It was further held taat the dispute as to seniority arises under the Common law and the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide the same. This decision, therefore, helps the case of respondent No.1 as noticed above, the matter appears to have been well settled in the case of premier Automobiles (supra) in whose paragraph-23 the entire law has been authorised. 37. I have briefly summarised the various contentions of the parties and the case law involved. On behalf of the appellants it was firstly urged that the suit was not maintainable because it had tried to enforce the terms of contract of service which could not be specifically enforced. In my earlior discussions, I have already negatived this plea, Similar plea with respect to section 36-A of the Industrial Disputes Act has been raised. This plea also does not have any force, in as much as, it will apply only to those cases which will be covered by Schedules II and Schedule III of this Act. 38. Sri R. D. Chaterjee, the learned Counsel for the appellants has posed a question namely under what law the civil Court can grant the reliefs claimed by respondent No.1. In this connection, he had referred to Section 14 (b) of the Specific Relief Act and has relied on the case of the Executive committee of U. P. State Ware Housing Corporation Ltd. (Supra ). In this connection, he had referred to Section 14 (b) of the Specific Relief Act and has relied on the case of the Executive committee of U. P. State Ware Housing Corporation Ltd. (Supra ). This case has already been discussed and it has been noticed that it was over ruled by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhdeo Singh, AIR.1975 SC 1331. Jn this connection a reference may also be made to the case of ajoy Hasia V/s. Khalid Mujib ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ). This was the case of regional Engineering College Srinagar, a college sponsored by Government of India. Its management was carried on by a society registered under Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898. Having regard to the memorandum of association and the rules of the Society, it was held that the society was a instrumentality of the agency of the State and the Central government and was "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution. 39. I have carefully gone through the judgments of the trail court, as well as the lower appellate court. I have also taken into account the substantial questions as formulated by this court in the second appeal. I find that both the courts in low have came to correct conclusion with respect to the claim of the Respondent No.1 in the suit. The judgments of both the courts below are well-discussed and correct and they do not call for any interference by this Court. So far as the substantial questions of law, that were formulated by this Court are concerned from the discussions made above it would become clear that plaintiff-respondent No.1 could very well approach the Civil Court tor giving retrospective benefit of seniorty to him notwithstanding the award dated 16-1-1978 given by the Industrial Tribunal, patna Accordingly, the first substantial questions of law as formulated by this Court is answered in affirmative and in favour of responent No.1. 40. So far as the second substantial question of law as framed by this court is concerned it is clear from the discussions made above, that the reliefs sought in the suit could not have been granted by the Special Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. 40. So far as the second substantial question of law as framed by this court is concerned it is clear from the discussions made above, that the reliefs sought in the suit could not have been granted by the Special Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. It has already been pointed nut above that the plaintiff had claimed lor manadatory injunction and also for a declaration that he was emitted to his seniority with effect from 1-5-1963. Neither the question of seniority nor the question ot granting the manadatory injunction could be granted by the Labour Court, or the Tribunal constituted under Sec.7 (A) of the Industrial Disputes Act Under this circumstance as will appear from the discussions made above, that the Civil court was well within its rights in entertaining the suit brought by respondent no 1 This substantial question of law is, therefore, answered in favour of respondent No.1 and against the appellants. 41. The third substantial question of law is whether the question of seniority is covered under various items enumerated in Schedules II and III to the Industrial Disputes Act. As noticed above, the question of seniority is not covered under these two schedules, and therefore, this substantial questions of law has also be answered against the appellants and in favour of respondent No.1. 42. From the detailed discussions made above, it becomes perfectly clear to me that there is no merit in this second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed on contest with cost throughout to respondent No.1 and ex-parte without costs to the rest. The judgments and the decreed passed by the trial court as also by the lower appellate Court are hereby confirmed. 43. Since this litigation has continued for a long period from 1981, and is between a low-paid employee and the employer, namely, Indian Oil Corporation ltd. , I think that in the interest of justice,the appellans should be directed to immediately comply with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the lower appellate court. They are directed accordingly. Hearing fee will be of Rs.250/-. Decided accordingly.