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1990 DIGILAW 382 (BOM)

Bhagirathi Vishandatt Makholia v. Kemp & Co. Ltd. and another

1990-09-19

S.M.DAUD

body1990
JUDGMENT - S.M. DAUD, J.:---This petition takes exception to an order of dismissal from service made against an employee of the 1st respondent and confirmed as valid by the 2nd respondent. 2. The 1st respondent hereinafter also referred to as the employer, is a company dealing in retailing of drugs and pharmaceuticals. The petitioner joined the 1st respondents employment on 16th July, 1970. In course of time she was promoted as a Personel Assistant and posted at the employer's head office at Prabhadevi, Worli, in or about December 1971. P.T. Talwar came to head the Personal Department in July 1976. P.L. Yevalekar was appointed as a Trainee in the Employer's concern. Talwar found some defects in the working of the petitioner and in due course she came to be charge sheeted., Briefly, the charges against here were that being in control of the records of the personnel, she had been manipulating the record with regard to herself. As a result of this manipulation, the record showed her to have different types of leave aggregating to 6 days to her credit in the year 1976. This had resulted in payment of salary to her also for those days on which she was absent without entitlement or authorisation. Next, it was contended that she had been late on a number of occasions between August 1976 to January 1977. This being unpunctuality constituted a misconduct on her part. The charge-sheet having been served upon the petitioner she gave a reply and an enquiry was commenced. One Mr. S.T. Ganpule was appointed an Enquiry Officer (E.O.). The said Enquiry Officer conducted an enquiry and found the petitioner guilty of the lapses attributed to her. Pursuant thereto the employer dismissed her from service. This was on 13th May, 1977 and the petitioner sought redress from the Labour Court presided over by the 2nd respondent. The said respondent affirmed the finding of guilt recorded against the petitioner as also the propriety of the punishment imposed upon her. The order of the 2nd respondent to the above effect is at Exh. I. That order has occasioned the present petition. 3. It is the petitioner's contention that the charge-sheet upon her was frivolous and that the manner in which the enquiry was carried out left much to be desired. The order of the 2nd respondent to the above effect is at Exh. I. That order has occasioned the present petition. 3. It is the petitioner's contention that the charge-sheet upon her was frivolous and that the manner in which the enquiry was carried out left much to be desired. In any case, the enquiry was vitiated by the part played by P.T. Talwar who was interested in displacing the petitioner so as to accommodate trainee Yevalekar. The 2nd respondent was in error in sustaining the procedure for the conduct of the enquiry and the punishment imposed upon her. The 1st respondent denies that the enquiry was vitiated by bad faith on the part of P.T. Talwar. Petitioner was rightly found guilty of manipulating office records so as to benefit herself. This was proof of dishonest and the continued unpunctuality established against her warranted the punishment of dismissal imposed upon her. The order passed by the 2nd respondent was unassailable and the petition deserved to be dismissed. 4. The factual position is that though the petitioner had taken six days unauthorised leave, she had to her credit leave of different type aggregating to 3½ days. Thus if there was any manipulating of the office record, it was to the extent of the same showing that she had taken leave in excess of more than 2½ days. Petitioner explains this a result of an error resulting from inadvertence. Admittedly she was in-charge of the records of several employees and therefore, her making a mistake and a slight one at that, in respect of the total number of days of leave to her credit is not necessarily ascribable to dishonesty. At the most this would be carelessness and entirely excusable having regard to the work load that the petitioner was burdened with. In Exh. E-1 which was a reply given by the petitioner to the charge-sheet served upon her, the petitioner maintained that existing practice prevailing in the establishment permitted her to set off excess leave taken in any one year against the leave admissible in the year following. She has quoted the instances of 3 to 4 employees who were given the benefit of this practice. Mr. Naphade for the employer maintains that there was an element of dishonesty in the record petitioner maintained about her leave account. I do not agree. She has quoted the instances of 3 to 4 employees who were given the benefit of this practice. Mr. Naphade for the employer maintains that there was an element of dishonesty in the record petitioner maintained about her leave account. I do not agree. This dishonesty was so slight that it must be ascribed to inadvertence. 5. The second charge levelled against the petitioner was that she had been unpunctual in coming to office on a number of occasions from the months of August 1976 and right upto January 1977. The delay never exceeded 15 minutes. In Bombay where people are dependent on public transport which rarely works with the regularity expected, such delays are to be ignored. A normal establishment does that and there is no reason why the first respondent should have adopted different yard-strick. 6. The very dis-proportionateness of the punishment imposed upon the petitioner suffices to set aside the punishment of dismissal visited upon her. This brings me to the relief to which the petitioner is entitled to. In its return the employer has pleaded that the Bombay office wherein the petitioner was employed has been shifted to Jalgaon. This being the position the petitioner is agreeable to forego the right reinstatement, provided adequate compensation is paid to her. Mr. Naphade has referred me to (Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. The Tribunal, West Bengal)1 reported in A.I.R. 1978 Supreme Court 331, in support of the submission that where a case has been pending since long the proper order to make is for a proportion of and not the entire backwages. Here the petitioner has been seeking justice right since the year 1977. True, it is not the respondent 1's fault that the case took so much time in the Labour Court as also here. But 50% of the backwages as was allowed in the case relied upon by Mr. Naphade would not be adequate compensation to the petitioner. Regard being had to the circumstances I allow the petitioner 75% of backwages together with interest at rate 9% per annum from the date of dismissal until the amount is actually paid. In regard to reinstatement, the petitioner is entitled to the same, but is willing to forego the said right provided she is adequately compensated. Mr. Regard being had to the circumstances I allow the petitioner 75% of backwages together with interest at rate 9% per annum from the date of dismissal until the amount is actually paid. In regard to reinstatement, the petitioner is entitled to the same, but is willing to forego the said right provided she is adequately compensated. Mr. Cama suggests that she should be given two years wages at the rate at which it admissible to her as of this date. This offer is quite fair and I accept the same. Hence the order :--- O R D E R The order of dismissal passed against the petitioner and confirmed by the 2nd respondent is hereby quashed. Petitioner shall be given 75% of the backwages upto date together with 9% p.a. from the date of dismissal until the amount is actually paid. This shall be treated as the notional date on which she stands reinstated in service. For the purpose of computing her wages for the next two years, the wage payable to her today shall be taken into consideration. The two years wage representing the compensation payable in lieu of the actual reinstatement shall be paid to her. The arrears of compensation paid shall be treated as spread over for the purpose of income-tax. Respondent 1 shall assist the petitioner in getting an order of spread over from the income-tax authorities Payment as above has to be made to the petitioner within 2 months from today. Rule in these terms made partially absolute with parties being left to bear their own costs. Rule made partly absolute. -----