Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J.: Except one writ appeal, W.A.No.842 of 1984, the other cases are petitions. The appellant in the writ appeal was the petitioner in W.P.No.6674 of 1984 petitioners in all the writ petitions including W.P.No.6674 of 1984 out of which W.ANo.842 1984 arises, are tenants within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Control) Act 18 of 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The tenants are proceedings under the Act, instituted against them by their landlords. They have come Court impeaching the prosecution of the proceedings before the Controllers under the who are seized of them, and who in the instant cases, are the respective Judges of the of Small Causes, Madras. 2. The decision in W.P.No.6674 of 1984 has gone against the tenant/the petitioner In W.P.No.6674 of 1984 two contentions were raised before the learned Single Judge, heard and disposed of the same and they are as follows: (1) Sec.2(3) of the Act empowers the Government to appoint “ any person ” as a Controller under the Act and the conferment of such sweeping powers on the Government, prescription of qualifications for the person to be appointed as Controller amounts to Nainar Sundaram, J.: Except one writ appeal, W.A.No.842 of 1984, the other cases are petitions. The appellant in the writ appeal was the petitioner in W.P.No.6674 of 1984. petitioners in all the writ petitions including W.P.No.6674 of 1984 out of which W.ANo.842 1984 arises, are tenants within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Control) Act 18 of 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The tenants are proceedings under the Act, instituted against them by their landlords. They have come Court impeaching the prosecution of the proceedings before the Controllers under the who are seized of them, and who in the instant cases, are the respective Judges of the of Small Causes, Madras. 2. The decision in W.P.No.6674 of 1984 has gone against the tenant/the petitioner In W.P.No.6674 of 1984 two contentions were raised before the learned Single Judge, heard and disposed of the same and they are as follows: (1) Sec.2(3) of the Act empowers the Government to appoint “any person” as a Controller under the Act and the conferment of such sweeping powers on the Government, prescription of qualifications for the person to be appointed as Controller amounts to of the said expressions. The common Dictionary meaning of the word "person" is "a being". The Judge of a Court of Small Causes, is certainly a human being and person coming within the expressions "any person" found in Section 2 (3) of the Act. krishna Ayyar, J., in Coonoor Mosque v. Abdul Hamid Sahib, (1960)1 M.L.J. 135 , as follows: "Under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, Government can appoint person to perform the functions of a controller under the Act. The person so appointed be a Tahsildar, he may be a District Munsif or he may be a Revenue Divisional Officer fact he may be anybody." It must be noted that there is no express embargo in Section 2 (3) of the Act with regard appointing a Judge or Judges of the Court of Small Causes to exercise the powers Controller under the Act. When such being the position, we have not been persuaded out such an embargo by implications by reference to any other provision of the cannot also find fault with choice of the Judges. Depending on the workload Controllers, and other factors relating to administration of Justice, the choice has made. Hence, we are not in a position to sustain the first point urged by the learned for the tenants. 3. The second point put forth by the learned counsel for the tenants is as follows: "The Notifications under which the Judges of Court of Small Causes are appointed Controllers under the Act are invalid as they do not have any authority under the Act other law for enabling the State Government to extend the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Court of Small Causes or of any of the Judges thereof thereby bringing about trarity between the Act and the Central Act 15 of 1882 and transgress the various provisions of the Constitution of India." With regard to the learned counsel appearing for the we must state that this point omits to take note of the fact that there is no extension enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Judge or Judges of the Court of Small Causes and the Judge or Judges of Court of Small Causes as persons are being only conferred vested with the powers of the Controller. With regard to their powers as Judges of the of Small Causes, they shall always stand settled governed and circumscribed provisions of the Central Act 15 of 1882 and the rules, if any framed thereunder. By designation, the Judges of the Court of Small Causes are conferred the powers Controller and nothing more. We could not conceive of this conferment of the powers Controller on them as extension or enlargement of their powers as Judges of the Small Causes. Hence, the second point is eschewed. 4. The third point urged by the learned counsel for the tenants is as follows: “Inasmuch as the State Legislature of the Tamil Nadu has merely defined the “Controller” without prescribing any qualification or any other guidelines whatsoever enable the State Government to appoint a Controller, the said provision, namely, Sec.2(3) the Act is invalid for the reason that it confers unbridled and arbitrary powers on the Government to appoint ‘any person’ as a Controller”. The provision does not by its contemplate the Controller to be appointed to possess any particular qualification. In such contingency if the Government pursuant to that power appoints any person to exercise powers of the Controller, such exercise of power need not necessarily be frowned upon the ground that there is lack of guidelines for such exercise. It could not be a case of lack guidelines for the very exercise of powers. It is a case of a plain conferment of a straight simple power of appointment. The substance of the grievance, seems to be lack prescription of qualifications for the person to be appointed as Controller and the guidelines therefor. The legislation having conferred such a straight and simple power on Government, we cannot insist for a rider to the provision so as to say that there has be delineation or prescription of particular qualification or qualification for the person appointed to exercise the powers of a Controller. Further-more, the Government is expected to exercise the power of appointment properly keeping in mind the functions of Controller and nature of his duties, and the proceedings to be prosecuted before him are inbuilt guidelines in this behalf in the Act itself. It would be a different matter if individual appointment is tainted with arbitrariness or other vitiating factors. As a result, reject the third point raised by the learned counsel for the tenants.” 5. It would be a different matter if individual appointment is tainted with arbitrariness or other vitiating factors. As a result, reject the third point raised by the learned counsel for the tenants.” 5. The fourth point raised by the learned counsel for the tenants runs as follows: “The power to constitute a Court or to extend or to add to the powers, authority or jurisdiction of an existing Court or the Judges thereof being an essential legislative function, in the instant case, assuming that by the words any person ’ the State Legislature intended to mean the Presiding Officer of the Court already constituted, it has abdicated such essential legislative function in favour of the State Government, and hence Sec.2(3) of Act is invalid.” The above point though makes an interesting reading, does not appeal at all. Our reasons are as follows: The Act delineates the powers to be exercised by Controller. The Act, by Sec.2(3) had delegated the power of appointment of the Controller the Government. It is well settled proposition that delegated legislation if we can use the popular sense, has become a necessity of the present day. It is an inevitable indispensable feature with regard to making of laws. The legislaturecan frame the statute and with regard to working of the details of the statute, it is always competent the legislature to delegate the powers to the appropriate authority, set out in the We are not impressed that with regard to the Act, the delegation of the power appointment of Controller, it has got to be frowned upon by any acceptable ground. from making a statement with regard to the point raised, learned counsel for the tenants not enlightened us by any expatiative argument as to why the power of delegation has to be eschewed as suffering from any infirmity. As a result, we are not able to appreciate and sustain the fourth point urged by the learned Counsel for the tenants. No other urged before us. 6. The writ appeal as well as the writ petitions lack ‘merits and they deserve dismissal accordingly we dismiss them with costs. Appeal and petitions dismissed.