JUDGMENT : D.P. Mohapatra, J. - The core question that fairs for determination this case is whether a suit fifed u/s 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short the Act') altering illegal dispossession of the plaintiffs from the disputed property is maintainable against a person who has valid title to it, 2. This revision petrtion is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28-10-1987/7-T.1-1987 of the Subordinate Judge, Rourkefa in T. S. No. 41 of 1982 decreeing the suit. The factual backdrop of the case leading to the present proceeding may be shortly stated thus : The opposite parties 1 and 2, Abhijit Biswas and Samarjit Biswas filed the suit under Sec 6 of the Act against the petitioners Nanda Kumar Prasad and Bijy Kumar Prasad and opposite party No. 3 Ranjit Biswas brother of opposite parties land 2 seeking recovery of possession of the suit land by evicting the petitioners from it. The suit land is described in Schedule-A to the plaint as Rayatri land bearing Major Settlement Plot No. 760 measuring an area of A3. 035 decimals (Thirty-five decimals in Khata No. 428 (Kha) of Rourkela Town,. Tahasil Pinposh, District Sundargarh The case of the plaintiffs was that they negotiated with Maguni Chandra Dwivedy owner of the suit: Sand for purchase of AO. 02 decimals of land out of Sabik plot No. 461 for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/-; the owner agreed to sell the land, received the consideration amount, executed a document on 15-4-1988 handed over possession to the plaintiffs and defendant No and promised :to execute a formal sale deed later. While possessing the said two decimal, of land the plaintiffs round another piece of vacant Sand of the same owner laying to the adjacent north of the land in their possession. On their request the owner agreed to-sell - that land also -to them and allowed them to possess it. Thereafter, the, plaintiffs raised a -boundary wall enclosing the entire area and possessed it by constructing a Kutcha house to store coal, firewood etc. for their hotel. They paid rent for the land and it was recorded in their names in the settlement parcha. Thereafter, the, plaintiffs raised a -boundary wall enclosing the entire area and possessed it by constructing a Kutcha house to store coal, firewood etc. for their hotel. They paid rent for the land and it was recorded in their names in the settlement parcha. While they were in possession of the land, on 17-7-1982 the defendants 1 and 2 forcibly dispossessed them, broke open the main gate in the western side and destroyed the boundary wall on the eastern side of the land and removed the structure standing on it. On 23-7-1982 they forcibly constructed a pucca boundary wall on the eastern side of the suit land. Thereafter, the defendants made preparations for construction of a building without any permission from the Notified Area Council or the Rourkela Regional Improvement Trust and without any right to or interest over the suit land. In these circumstances the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking the reliefs noticed dearlier. 3. The defendants I and 2 who contested the suit filed written statement denying the claims of the plaintiffs. According to the defendants Maguni Chandra Dwibedi sold the suit land to Laxmidevi Somani by.a registered sale deed dated 4-11-1968 and put her in possession of the land; the Slid Laxmidevi Somani possessed the land by constructing a boundary wall and hut, she sold the suit land with its structure to M/s. Emeralled Industrial Corporation, Calcutta under a registered sale deed on 26-7-1972 and put the purchaser in possession. Though M/s. Emeralled Industrial Corporation had applied to the Rourkela Regional Improvement Trust for sanction of a building plan and also to the Executive Officer, N. A C. (C. T.), Rourkela, but the latter sold the land with structure to Smt. Manorama Devi and Santosh Kumar Gupta by a registered sale deed executed on 8-6-1982 and delivered possession of the properties to them. Since then the defendants are in possession of the suit land in their own right, title and interest. They have effected repairs to the existing structures thereon. The defendants 1 and 2 denied the claim of the plaintiffs that they have purchased any portion of the suit land or had entered into any agreement for purchase of 2 decimals and 1 1/2 decimals of land. They have effected repairs to the existing structures thereon. The defendants 1 and 2 denied the claim of the plaintiffs that they have purchased any portion of the suit land or had entered into any agreement for purchase of 2 decimals and 1 1/2 decimals of land. They also denied the allegation that they forcibly broke open the main gate by demolishing a portion of the boundary wall or they demolished any portion of the structure standing on the suit land. It is the contention of the defendants that they have right, title, interest and possession over the suit land, the plaintiffs' suit is not maintainable and it is liable to be dismissed. 4. On the pleadings of the parties discussed above, the trial Court framed four issues of which issue No. 1 was : "Is the suit maintainable in the present form;" and issue No. 3 was : "Were the plaintiffs in possession of the suit land till 17-7-1282 and dispossessed of the same from that day by the defendants 1" 5. Both the parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment dated 3-3 1986 decreed the suit. The defendants 1 and 2 filed Civil Revision No. 277 of 1906 challenging the said decision which was disposed of by this Court on 11th February, 1987. This Court considering the contentions raised by the parties held that the suit was maintainable u/s 6 of the Act but since the trial Judge had not considered the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants, this Court set aside the decision and remanded the case to the trial Court for redisposal on the existing materials in accordance with law bearing in mind the observations made in the judgment. 6. In pursuance of this order, the learned Subordinate Judge reconsidered the matter and passed the impugned judgment decreeing the suit. 1 he judgment reveals that the learned Subordinate Judge on detailed discussion of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties .ame to the following conclusions : (i) That the suit filed u/s 6 of the Act is maintainable. (ii) That the description of the suit land is neither vague nor indefinite and the decree, if passed, would not be incapable of execution. (iii) That the plaintiffs have satisfactorily established their possession over the suit land since 1968. (ii) That the description of the suit land is neither vague nor indefinite and the decree, if passed, would not be incapable of execution. (iii) That the plaintiffs have satisfactorily established their possession over the suit land since 1968. (iv) That the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to establish that they are in lawful possession of the suit land on 17-7-1982. 7. The main thrust of the argument of Sri B. Ray learned counsel appearing for the petitioners was regarding maintainability of the suit u/s 6 of the Act against the petitioners who according to his contention have valid title to the suit land. Sri B Pal learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties on the other hand submitted that there is no substance in the challenge to the maintainability of the suit and further that the question of maintainability is no longer available to be raised by the petitioners since it has been set at rest by this Court in Civil Revision No. 377 of 1986. 8. On perusal of the judgment in Civil Revision No. 377 of 1986 it appears that in the said proceeding the question of maintainability of the suit was raised in a different form. The question which was considered by this Court was whether the suit was based on title or on possession. This Court on consideration, held that the plaintiff case was based on possession and therefore, the suit was maintainable u/s 6 of the Act. In the present case the point of maintainability is. as formulated earlier. Further the question was argued before me at great length. Therefore, instead of going by mere tachnicalities, I deem it proper to deal with the question of maintainability. The pari materia provision of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1887 is Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The object of the section is to protect possession. The Patna High Court in the case of Subodh Gopal Bose Vs. Province of Bihar and Others, inter- preting Section 9 of the old Act held that possession is a good title against all but the true owner, and entitles the possessor to maintain an action in ejectment agrtinst any person other than true owner who dispossesses him. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Yar Muhammad and Another Vs. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Yar Muhammad and Another Vs. Lakshmi Das and Others, considering the scope and object of Section 9 observed thus : "Possession is prima facie evidence of title and the person who is in possession is dispossessed and has a right to claim back possession from the person who dispossesses him. In an ordinary suit of that kind if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing his title as well as possession he is bound to succeed. Even if he is unable to prove his title he can succeed on the basis of prior possession alone; But the suit can easily be 'defeated if the defendant succeeds in proving a good title in himself or another. In that case the presumption in favour of the plaintiff is displaced. In such a suit, therefore, the title of both the parties can be brought in issue and can be considered by the Court. A suit u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act is however an entirely different kind of action. That section gives a special privilege to persons in possession who take action promptly. In case they are dispossessed it entitles them to succeed simply by proving(1)that they were in possession, (2) that they have been -dispossessed by the defendant, (3) that the dispossession is not in accordance with law and (4) that the dispossession took place within six months of the suit. No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the defendant can be raised or gone into in that case. The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed without proving any title on which he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to establish the best of all titles. The restoration of possession in such a suit is however always subject to a regular title suit and the person who has the real title or even the better title cannot therefore be prejudiced in any way by a decree in such a suit. It will always be open to him to establish his title in a regular suit and to recover back possession. It will always be open to him to establish his title in a regular suit and to recover back possession. The obvious objects for the attainment of which the section was enacted appear to be these: (1) Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it.It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause. (2) In the interest of public order self-help is not permitted so far as possession, over immovable property is concerned. The section is, therefore, intended to discourage and prevent proceedings which might lead to serious breaches of the peace. It does not allow a person who has acted high-handedly by wrongfully dispossessing a person in possession from deriving any advantage of his own unjustified act. (3) It prevents all attempts to shift the burden of proof by illegal dispossession. (4) Section 9, therefore, provides, for a summary and quick remedy for a person who is in possession but is illegally ousted therefrom without his consent. As this remedy is a summary one and is intended to restore the status quo ante, all questions of title whether of the plaintiff or the defendant are out of place in it, and cannot on that account be allowed either to be raised or to be considered. This seems to be a peculiar feature of this kind of suits and distinguishes it from suits of other kinds." The Supreme Court considering the scope of Sections 8 and 9 or the Specific Relief Act (1377) and Sections 5 and 6 of the Act (1993) in the case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander and Others, observed thus : "... Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act does not limit the kinds of suit but only lays down that procedure laid down by the Cods of Civil Procedure must be followed. This is very different from saying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after the expiry of 6 months. u/s 9 of the CPC itself all suits of civil nature are triable excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred. This is very different from saying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after the expiry of 6 months. u/s 9 of the CPC itself all suits of civil nature are triable excepting suits of which their cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred. No prohibition expressly barring a suit based on possession alone has been brought to our notice, hence the attempt to show an implied prohibition by reason of Section 8, (Section 7 of the Travancore Act) of the Specific Relief Act. There is however, good authority for the contrary proposition. In Mustapha Sahib v. Santha Pillai (1900) IIR 23 Mad. 179. xx xx xx ......The uniform view of the Courts is that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is utilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of 6 months has passed questions of title can be raised by the defendant and if he does so the plaintiff must: establish a better title or fail. In other words, the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit u/s 9 .of the Specific belief Act but that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and tide need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. '"he present amended Arts. 64 and .65 bring out this difference. Art 64 enables a suit within 12 years from dispossession, for possession of immovable property based on possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed. Art. 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. The amendment is not remedial but declaratory of the law. In our judgment the suit was competent." A similar view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Somnath Burman Vs. Dr. S.P. Raju and Another, wherein the Court observed: "Section9 is no way inconsistent with the position that as against a wrong doer, prior possession of the plaintiff in an action of ejectment, is sufficient title, even if the suit be brought more than six months after the act of dispossession complained of and that the wrong, doer cannot successfully resist ' the suit by showing that the title and right to possession are in a third 1 person. Therefore, a person having possessory title can get a declaration that he was the owner of the land1 in suit and on injunction restraining, the defendant from interfering with his possession." To the similar effect was the decision of this Court in the case of Wathuram Sarma and Ors. v. Mewa Devi and another, reported in 37(1971) CLT 122, Note No. 151 wherein this Court observed that a person- in possession of land without title has an interest in the property which is heritable and good against all the would excepting the true owner. Such an; interest is also transferable. 9. Tested on the touchstone of the principles laid down in the- aforementioned decisions, the judgment of the teamed Subordinate judge in my view, is unassailable. In the facts and circumstances of the case- revealed in the pleadings of the parties, he rightly laid stress on the factum- of possession of the land on 17-7-1982 when according, to the plaintiffs- they were dispossessed from the land by the defendants 1 and 2. As- noticed earlier, the learned trial judge has thoroughly discussed the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the parties. He has given cogent and valid reasons for believing the case pleaded by the plaintiffs and for not believing the ease of the defendants. There is hardly any scope to interfere with the finding given by the learned Subordinate judge. The learned Subordinate judge was also right in holding that the suit u/s 6 of the Act is maintainable. Admittedly the suit has been Held within the period of six months from the date of dispossession. Therefore, the question, of title was of no relevance and 4he plaintiffs could succeed merely by. establishing their prior possession over the land which as noted earlier they did. 1 here is, therefore, no merit in the contention raised by Sri Ray that since the defendants have a valid title to the suit land, the suit under See. 6 of the Act does not lie. 10. In the result, the civil revision being, devoid of merit is dismissed. Both the parties are to bear their respective costs of this proceeding. Final Result : Dismissed